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


















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# HISTORY

OF THE LATER

## ROMAN COMMONWEALTH,

FROM THE END OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE  
DEATH OF JULIUS CÆSAR;

AND OF

## THE REIGN OF AUGUSTUS:

WITH A

## LIFE OF TRAJAN.

BY

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THOMAS ARNOLD, D.D.

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## PREFACE.

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THIS Volume contains a republication of the portion of Roman History contributed by Dr. Arnold to the "Encyclopedia Metropolitana," between the years 1823 and 1827.

It is scarcely necessary to remark, that if his life had been prolonged, his great growth in knowledge and ability would have given a new character and a much higher value to this portion of the History of Rome. It is, however, believed that these Articles form a valuable part of our literature, and are not unworthy of accompanying those Volumes, which were the fruit of matured years. They will carry on the reader through a long and important era, from the close of the Second Punic War to the final establishment of the Empire under Augustus, and will furnish him with a consecutive narrative of the events of this period.

The text is such as the Author left it, with the exception that a few trifling inaccuracies of detail have been corrected. What seemed to be errors of a more general character have been untouched. Some, and amongst them, those respecting the Agrarian laws, will be found corrected in Dr. Arnold's History of the Earlier Periods ;

whilst the alteration of the text would have been an act of unwarrantable liberty, and would have destroyed much of the psychological interest which must belong to a comparison of the earlier with the later productions of any eminent writer.

The references to the original authorities have been all examined and verified.

Dr. Arnold broke off, after the *Life of Augustus*, his contributions to the continuous series of *Roman History* in the *Encyclopædia*. He subsequently composed the *Life of Trajan* for that Work. It is reprinted in this Volume.

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RUGBY, *July 31, 1845.*



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# HISTORY

## OF THE

### LATER ROMAN COMMONWEALTH.

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#### CHAPTER I.

SKETCH OF THE EXTERNAL ADVANCEMENT OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE FROM THE END OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE INVASION OF THE CIMBRI.—FROM A.U.C. 553, B.C. 201, TO A.U.C. 652, B.C. 102.

THERE are certain portions of the history of mankind, in which military operations assume a character of such predominant importance, that the historian is bound to assign to them the principal place in his narrative. At other times there may be long and bloody wars, by which great changes have been produced in the state of the world, which yet deserve no more than the most cursory notice; whilst our main attention is bestowed on the progress of society, the rise of literature, or the origin and struggles of domestic factions. The period to be comprised in this sketch belongs to this latter class: it was full of wars; it was marked by decisive victories and extensive conquests; yet its military history is totally uninteresting, from the great inequality of force between the Romans and their several enemies; and from the scarcity of those signal displays of valour and ability, which have, on other occasions, thrown lustre on the resistance of the humblest power. Besides, except the "Fragments" of Polybius, we have no political nor military history of these times, the authority of which can be relied on with any satisfaction, for the detail of events. No more then will be here attempted, than briefly to trace the succession of the Roman conquests, and to notice the causes which rendered them so unbroken and so universal.

No sooner was the second Punic war ended than the senate of Rome determined to crush the power of Philip, king of Macedon. He had joined Hannibal in the most critical period of the late war, when the destruction of Rome seemed inevitable; he was the most considerable potentate in the countries neighbouring to Italy on the east; and the fame of his armies, derived from the conquests of Alexander, was not yet extinguished. These were considerations sufficient to point him out as the next object of hostility to the Roman arms; and although peace had been concluded with him two or three years before, yet the grounds of a new quarrel were soon discovered. He<sup>2</sup> was accused of having attacked the Athenians and some others of the allies of Rome; and of having sent some Macedonian soldiers to the assistance of Hannibal in Africa. A Roman army was instantly sent over into Greece, and a Roman fleet co-operated with the naval force of Attalus, king of Pergamus, and the Rhodians; these powers, together with the Ætolians, being constantly enemies to Macedon, and the present war being undertaken by the Romans chiefly, as was pretended, on their account. The barbarous<sup>3</sup> tribes on the north and west of Macedonia were also led, by the temptation of plunder, to join the confederacy; and their irruptions served to distract the councils and the forces of Philip. Yet, under all these disadvantages, he maintained the contest with great vigour for three years; till being defeated in a general action at Cynocephale in Thessaly, and his whole country, exhausted as it already was by the war, being now exposed to invasion, he was reduced to accept peace on such terms as the Romans thought proper to dictate. These, as usual, tended to cripple the power of the vanquished party, and at the same time to increase the reputation of the Romans, by appearing more favourable to their allies than to themselves. Philip was<sup>4</sup> obliged to give up every Greek city that he possessed beyond the limits of Macedonia, both in Europe and in Asia; a stipulation which deprived him of Thessaly, Achæa, Phthiotis, Perrhæbia, and Magnesia, and particularly of the three important towns of Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias, which he used to call the fetters of Greece. All these states were declared free and independent; except that the Romans (pretending that Antiochus, king of Syria, threatened the safety of Greece) retained, for the present, the strong places of Chalcis and Demetrias<sup>5</sup> in their own hands. Philip was forced also to satisfy the several demands of Attalus, of the Rhodians, and of the other allies of

[<sup>1</sup> According to Niebuhr, Vol. IV. 232, this date should be 552, and that for the battle of Cynocephale 556, Livy having made an error of one year.—Ed.]

<sup>2</sup> Livy, XXX. 42; XXXI. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, XXXI. 28. 38. 41, &c.

<sup>4</sup> Polybius, XVIII. 27, et seq. 17, and XVII. 2.

[<sup>5</sup> Polybius, XVIII. 28.—Ed.]



Rome, except of the *Ætolians*, whom it was now the policy of the Romans to humble; as the depression of Philip had left them the principal power in Greece. In addition to these sacrifices, he was to surrender almost the whole of his navy, and to pay to Rome a thousand talents.

Immediately<sup>6</sup> after the conclusion of this treaty followed the memorable scene at the Isthmian games, where it was announced to all the multitude assembled on that occasion, that the Romans bestowed entire freedom upon all those states of Greece which had been subject to the kings of Macedon. The Greeks, unable to read the future, and having as yet had no experience of the ambition of Rome, received this act with the warmest gratitude; and seemed to acknowledge the Romans in the character which they assumed, of protectors and deliverers of Greece.

The kingdom of Macedon being now humbled, there was no one in a condition to dispute the power of the Romans in Greece, except Antiochus, king of Syria. This prince had lately<sup>7</sup> enlarged his dominions by reducing those cities on the coast of Asia Minor, which, in the course of the many wars between the successors of Alexander, had been gained by the kings of Egypt. He now professed his intention of crossing into Europe, and re-uniting to his empire those cities and parts of Thrace which had been conquered from Lysimachus by one of his predecessors; and which had since been wrested from the crown of Syria by the kings of Egypt and Macedon. But the Romans having now brought their war with Philip to an end, resolved at once to stop the progress of Antiochus; and their ambassadors, who found him at Lysimachia, required him to restore every place that he had taken from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and to leave those cities independent, which, having lately belonged to Philip, were now destined by the Romans to enjoy their liberty.

Antiochus replied, that the Romans had no more concern in the affairs of Asia than he had in those of Italy; and the ambassadors departed without gaining their demands. In this state of things, the *Ætolians*,<sup>8</sup> who were now totally alienated from the Romans, in consequence of the neglect with which they had been treated in arranging the terms of the peace with Philip, eagerly solicited the king of Syria to enter Greece, encouraging him to hope, that, with their assistance, he might destroy the influence of Rome in that country altogether. He accordingly crossed over with a small force, and was admitted, through the intrigues of the *Ætolians*, and the disposition of the inhabitants, into several places of importance; but<sup>9</sup> the Achæans and Eumenes, who had

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, XVIII. 29, et seq.

<sup>8</sup> Livy XXXV. 12. 33. 43, &c.

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, XVIII. 32, 33, and Livy, XXXIII. 19. 38.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, XXXV. 50, 51; XXXVI. 14, et seq.

lately succeeded Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, declared against him, and their forces occupied Chalcis, in Eubœa, to secure it from his attacks. Philip, king of Macedon, also decided on taking part with the Romans; yet, notwithstanding, Antiochus succeeded in reducing Chalcis, and the whole of Eubœa, and won besides several cities in Thessaly. He returned to Chalcis to pass the winter; and the consul, Manius Acilius Glabrio, arriving in Epirus in the ensuing spring, and having marched thence into Macedonia to concert measures with Philip, and afterwards having advanced into Thessaly, Antiochus took post at the famous pass of Thermopylæ to oppose his further progress. He was easily dislodged, however, by the Romans; and that with such severe loss, that he thought it prudent at once to abandon Greece, and to return to Asia by sea from Chalcis, leaving the Ætolians to bear, as they best could, the whole weight of the Roman vengeance.

They were accordingly attacked by the consul, Manius Acilius,<sup>10</sup> and, after seeing some of their towns taken, they implored and obtained an armistice for a certain period, in order to allow them time to send ambassadors to Rome. But the demands of the senate being more exorbitant than they could yet bring themselves to accept, the war was again renewed, and Manius<sup>11</sup> was actively employed in besieging Amphissa, when the arrival of his successor, L. Cornelius Scipio, afforded the Ætolians another respite. The new consul, who was wholly bent on crossing over into Asia, to finish the war with Antiochus, was easily persuaded to grant the Ætolians a truce for six months: and their affairs were in so desperate a state, that even this doubtful favour seemed to them most acceptable.

Having thus freed himself from the possible danger of leaving an enemy in his rear, L. Scipio set forward for the Hellespont,<sup>12</sup> accompanied by his brother, the famous Scipio Africanus, who acted under him as his lieutenant. The march of the army was facilitated to the utmost by Philip, king of Macedon; who seems vainly to have hoped that by a faithful and zealous observance of the treaty of peace, he might soften the remorseless ambition of the Romans. A naval victory, won by the Roman fleet, ensured the safety of the passage into Asia; and Antiochus,<sup>13</sup> distrusting his own strength, abandoned the sea coast, and concentrated his army near Magnesia and Thyatira. Here he was

attacked by the Romans, and totally defeated. Sardis and several other places surrendered immediately after the battle; and Antiochus, completely<sup>14</sup> panic-struck, sent ambassadors to the consul and his brother, soliciting peace

<sup>10</sup> Livy, XXXVI. 22-35.

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, XXI. 1, 2, &c.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, XXXVII. 1. 7.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, XXXVII. 30, 31. 33, et seq.

<sup>14</sup> Polybius, XXI. 13, &c.

on their own terms. He was ordered accordingly to resign his pretensions to any dominion whatever in Europe, and to cede every thing that he possessed in Asia westward of Mount Taurus; to pay fifteen thousand talents to the Romans within twelve years, to reimburse them for the expenses of the war; to pay to Eumenes, king of Pergamus, four hundred talents in money, and a certain quantity of corn, which he had engaged by treaty to pay to the late king Attalus; to give up Hannibal and some other individuals who were obnoxious to the Romans; and to give twenty hostages immediately, as a pledge of his sincerity, to be selected at the pleasure of the consul. These terms were accepted by Antiochus, and hostilities ceased therefore on both sides. Ambassadors were then sent to Rome by Antiochus, to procure a ratification of the peace from the senate and people; and by Eumenes, the Rhodians, and almost every state within the limits ceded by the vanquished king, to court the favour of the new arbiters of the fate of Asia, and to gain for themselves as large a share as possible of the spoils of the Syrian monarchy. After the several embassies had received an audience of the senate, the peace with Antiochus was ratified, and ten commissioners<sup>15</sup> were appointed to settle all disputed points in Asia; with these general instructions, that all the dominions ceded by the king of Syria to the Romans should be given to Eumenes, with the exception of Lycia and part of Caria, which were bestowed on the Rhodians, and those Greek cities which had paid tribute to Antiochus, and which were now declared independent. But before these commissioners arrived in Asia, the Roman arms had been employed in another successful war. Cn. Manlius<sup>16</sup> Vulso, who succeeded L. Scipio in the consulship and in the command of the army in Asia Minor, anxious to distinguish himself by some conquest, had attacked the Galatians, or Asiatic Gauls, on the pretence that they had furnished assistance to Antiochus; and, after several engagements, had obliged the different tribes to sue for peace. Their ambassadors came to him towards the close of the winter to receive his answer; and about the same time Eumenes and the ten commissioners arrived from Rome. A definitive treaty of peace was then concluded with Antiochus, in which, besides the concessions formerly mentioned, he agreed to give up almost the whole of his navy, and all his elephants, and not to make war in Europe, or in the islands of the Ægean.

Defeat of the Galatians.

The Galatians, having been already plundered to the utmost during the war, were only warned to confine themselves within their own limits, and not to molest the kingdom of Eumenes; and

<sup>15</sup> Polybius, XXII. 7.

<sup>16</sup> Polybius, XXII. 16. 24, et seq. Livy, XXXVIII. 12, et seq.



Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, who had also given assistance to Antiochus, was obliged to deprecate the anger of Rome by the payment of six hundred talents; half of which, however, was afterwards remitted to him at the intercession of Eumenes. This last prince received a great increase of territory, both in Asia and in Europe; and, together with the commonwealth of Rhodes, was in appearance the greatest gainer from the victory of the Romans. However, in the mere act of giving away kingdoms at her discretion, Rome plainly declared the pre-eminence of her own power; and she soon after showed, that she could resume her gifts as easily as she had made them, whenever the conduct of her allies began to excite her jealousy.

It has been already mentioned, that L. Scipio, when marching towards Asia, granted a truce for six months to the *Conquest of Ætolia.* Ætolians; but as they could not yet be induced to surrender at discretion to the mercy of the Romans, the war was again renewed, and M. Fulvius Nobilior,<sup>17</sup> the colleague of Cn. Manlius in the consulship, crossed over into Greece to complete their subjugation. He first laid siege to Ambracia, which was vigorously defended; but the Ætolians, now convinced of their inability to maintain the contest, sued for peace through the intercession of the Rhodians and Athenians; and terms were at length granted them, which besides diminishing their territory, and obliging them to pay a sum of money, reduced them to a state of entire dependence on Rome, by obliging them to follow the Romans in all their wars, and to acknowledge and obey the power and sovereignty of Rome. Their fate excites the less compassion, when we remember that they first invited the Romans into Greece; and that their faithless and ambitious policy had mainly contributed to prevent the union of the Greeks in one powerful state, which might have been able long to maintain its independence against every enemy.

Eleven years had not passed since the conclusion of the last war with Macedon, when it became apparent that *Intrigues of Philip.* another was likely to commence. In the late war with Antiochus, Philip, as has been seen, sided with the Romans; and thus took from the king of Syria the towns of Ænus and Maronea, and some other towns and fortresses on the coast of Thrace; and from the Ætolians, several cities which they had occupied in Thessaly and Perrhæbia. All these places, at the conclusion of the war, he proposed to retain in his possession; but on one side, Eumenes laid claim<sup>18</sup> to the towns of Thrace, insisting that the Romans had given to him that portion of the territories conquered from Antiochus; and on the other, the Thes-

<sup>17</sup> Livy, XXXVII. 49; XXXVIII. 3, et seq. Polybius, XXII. 9, et seq.

<sup>18</sup> Polybius, XXIII. 6. 11. Livy, XXXIX. 23, et seq.

salians and Perrhæbians demanded the restoration of the cities taken possession of by Philip in their country, urging that the Ætolians had unjustly seized them, and that on their expulsion, they ought to revert to their original and rightful owners. The senate, as usual, appointed commissioners to hear and to decide on this question; and sentence was given, as might have been expected, against the pretensions of Philip. He had no intention, however, to yield without resistance; but not being yet prepared for war, he sought to gain time by sending his son Demetrius<sup>19</sup> to Rome to plead his cause. This prince had formerly been one of the hostages given by his father for his faithful execution of the terms of the last treaty with the Romans; and he had then so won the favour of many of the Roman nobility, that Philip trusted much to the influence he might possess on the present occasion. Nor was he disappointed; for Demetrius was sent back with renewed expressions of the kindness entertained for him by the senate, and<sup>20</sup> with a promise that out of regard for him, a fresh commission should be appointed to reconsider the points in dispute between Philip and his opponents. Yet the new commission confirmed the judgment of the former one; and Philip was obliged to withdraw his garrisons from all the contested towns both in Thrace and Thessaly: nor did the favour shown by the Romans to Demetrius produce any other result than his destruction. A suspicion arose that he aspired to succeed to the throne, through their support, to the exclusion of his elder brother Perseus. This produced an open enmity between the brothers; and after many mutual accusations of each other, Philip, it is said,<sup>21</sup> was induced to order the death of Demetrius by poison: but, according to the Roman writers, being afterwards convinced of his innocence, he intended to deprive Perseus of the succession, in abhorrence of his treachery towards his brother. He died, however, before his intentions could be carried into effect, and Perseus ascended the throne without difficulty. This account of the private affairs of the royal family of Macedon, as it relates to matters not likely to be known with certainty by the public, and as it comes to us from writers disposed to believe every calumny against Perseus, merits very little attention. It is only known, that the Romans were disposed, from the very beginning of his reign, to regard the new king of Macedon with aversion; and that he, foreseeing that a war in defence of the independence of his crown would soon be inevitable, took every method of rendering himself popular in Greece, and of strengthening the internal resources of his kingdom.

Tragical end of his son, Demetrius.

Accession of Perseus.

U. C. 575. B. C. 179. OL. 144, 2.

<sup>19</sup> Polybius, XXIII. 14.

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, XXIV. 2. 6.

<sup>21</sup> Livy, XL. 24. 55, 56.

The Romans alleged,<sup>22</sup> as the causes of their quarrel with Perseus, that he had made war on some of their allies; that he had endeavoured to draw away others to a connexion with himself, incompatible with their duty to Rome; and that he had hired assassins to make an attempt on the life of king Eumenes, when returning from Rome, whither he had gone to instigate the senate to declare war against Macedon. In answer<sup>23</sup> to these charges, Perseus replied, that his hostilities with the allies of Rome were purely defensive: and the charge of intended assassination he strongly and flatly denied. With regard to his endeavouring to seduce the allies of Rome from their fidelity, he is made by Livy to refer to a former justification of himself on that point, which is not at present to be found in Livy's history. However, it is evident that the Romans were determined on war, and that the king of Macedon took every step, consistent with the independence of his crown, to avoid it. Although the Romans<sup>24</sup> had accused him of making great military preparations in time of peace, and he was, in fact, in a far better condition to commence immediate hostilities than they were, yet he lost the opportunity thus afforded him, from his anxious desire to negotiate with the enemy; and when he was actually driven to take up arms,<sup>25</sup> and had gained some advantage over the consul Licinius, he instantly renewed his<sup>26</sup> offers of peace, consenting to the same terms which his father had only submitted to after his total defeat at Cynocephale. The most open and unprincipled ambition in modern times, would hardly dare to avow such an answer as that made by the Roman general, to a proposal so conciliatory. He replied, that Perseus must submit himself to the discretion of the senate, and allow it to decide on the state of Macedon as it should think proper. In other words, the time was now come, when the Romans, in their career of conquest, had reached the kingdom of Philip and Alexander, and nothing could induce them to delay, far less to renounce, their resolution of sacrificing it to their lawless and systematic ambition.

This refusal to negotiate after a defeat, was a general maxim of Roman policy, and has often been extolled as a proof of heroic magnanimity. It should rather be considered as a direct outrage on the honour and independence of all other nations, which ought, in justice, to have put the people who professed it out of the pale of all friendly relations with mankind. In a moment of madness, the French Convention, in 1794, passed a decree, that the garrisons of the four fortresses on the northern frontier, then in the possession of the allies, should be put to the sword, if they

<sup>22</sup> Livy. XLII. 30. 40.

<sup>23</sup> Livy, XLII. 41.

<sup>24</sup> Livy, XLII. 43.

<sup>25</sup> Livy, XLII. 47.

<sup>26</sup> Polybius, XXVII. 8.



did not surrender within twenty-four hours after they were summoned. To this decree, a notice of which accompanied the summons of the besieging general, the Austrian governor of Le Quesnoy nobly replied, "No one nation has a right to decree the dishonour of another: I shall maintain my post so as to deserve the esteem of my master, and even that of the French people themselves." In like manner, a refusal to make peace except on their submission, was to decree the dishonour of every other nation: nor had Rome any right to insist, that whatever were the events of a war, it should only be terminated on such conditions as should make her enemy the inferior party. Had other nations acted on the same principle, every war must necessarily have been a war of extermination; and thus the pride of one people would have multiplied infinitely the sufferings of the human race, and have reduced mankind to a state of worse than savage ferocity. The avowal of such a maxim, in short, placed Rome in a condition of actual hostility with the whole world; and would have justified all nations in uniting together for the purpose of forcing a solemn and practical renunciation of it; or, in case of a refusal, of extirpating utterly the Roman people, as the common enemies of the peace and honour of mankind.

After the refusal of the consul Licinius to negotiate with Perseus, the war was protracted for two years more without any decisive success; the Roman officers who were employed in it displaying little ability or enterprise, and disgracing themselves by flagrant<sup>27</sup> acts of extortion and oppression towards their allies. At last L. Æmilius Paullus, son of the consul who was killed at Cannæ, and himself inheriting his father's reputation for wisdom and valour, was chosen consul; and the province of Macedonia falling to his share, he took every method to bring the war to a successful issue. Great care was<sup>28</sup> observed in the appointment of the officers who were to serve under him; and when he arrived in Greece and took the command, he greatly reformed the discipline of the army, and brought it into a high state of order and activity. His exertions were soon rewarded by the battle of Pydna, of the details of which we have only the account of Plutarch, but the event is abundantly known. The Macedonian army was totally destroyed; the cities of the kingdom successively surrendered to the conquerors; and Perseus himself shortly after gave himself up to the consul's mercy. He was taken to Rome with his family, to adorn the triumph of Æmilius; and, according to Paterculus, died about four years afterwards at Alba,<sup>29</sup> which was assigned as the place of his confinement. His

Battle of Pydna. End  
of the kingdom of Ma-  
cedon.  
U. C. 586. B. C. 169.  
OL. 153, 1.

<sup>27</sup> Livy, XLIII. 4, 5, 6, &c.

<sup>28</sup> Livy, XLIV. 21. 34.

<sup>29</sup> Vid. Vell. Patercul. I. 11.—But it

would be nearer the truth to say, that  
Perseus was murdered by the Romans;  
for after having suffered such cruel treat-

principal nobility, and every man <sup>30</sup> who had ever held any office under him, were ordered to transport themselves into Italy, on pain of death, lest they should disturb the new settlement of their country. Macedonia was then divided into four districts; each of which was to be under a republican government. Half the tribute formerly paid to the king, was henceforward to be paid to the Romans, who also appropriated to themselves the produce of all the gold and silver mines of the kingdom. The inhabitants were forbidden to fell timber for ship-building; and all intermarriages and sales of land between the people of the several districts were forbidden. With these marks of real slavery, they were left, for the present, nominally free; and Macedonia was not yet reduced to the form of a Roman province.

Conduct of Rome to  
her allies.

It is curious to observe, how, after every successive conquest, the Romans altered their behaviour to those allies who had aided them to gain it, and whose friendship or enmity was now become indifferent to them. Thus, after their first war with Philip, they slighted the *Ætoli*ans; after they had vanquished Antiochus, they readily listened to complaints against Philip; and now the destruction of Macedon enabled them to use the language of sovereigns rather than of allies to their oldest and most faithful friends, Eumenes, the Rhodians, and the Achæans. The <sup>31</sup> senate first tampered with Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, hoping that he might be persuaded to accuse his brother, and to petition for a share of his dominions; but when they found him deaf to their temptations, they retracted some promises which they had before made him, in the hope that he would listen to them. Afterwards, when Eumenes himself landed in Italy on <sup>32</sup> his way to Rome, with the view of removing the suspicions entertained against him, the senate, aware of his purpose, issued an order that no king should be allowed to come to Rome; and despatched one of the quæstors to announce it to him at Brundisium, and to command him to leave Italy immediately. The Rhodians had offended by declaring openly, "that they <sup>33</sup> were tired of the war with Perseus; that he, as well as the Romans, was the friend of their commonwealth; that they should wish to see the contending parties reconciled; and that they would themselves declare against those whose obstinacy should be an impediment to peace." This declaration, which was received at Rome most indignantly, had been privately re-

ment in the dungeon to which he was at first consigned, that *Æmilius Paullus* complained of it in the senate as a national disgrace, he was removed to a less miserable prison; and there having offended the soldiers who guarded him, they, in revenge, harassed him night and day, and never allowed him to sleep till he expired

under their persecutions.—Vid. Fragment. Diodor. Sicul. XXXI. 893, edit. Rhodom.; and Mithridatis Epistolam, apud Fragm. Sallust.

<sup>30</sup> Livy, XLV. 32. 29.

<sup>31</sup> Polybius, XXX. 1, et seq.

<sup>32</sup> Polybius, XXX. 17.

<sup>33</sup> Polybius, XXIX. 7. Livy, XLIV. 14.

commended by Q. Marcius, the Roman consul, to one of the Rhodian ambassadors, who had visited him in his camp in Macedonia, during the preceding year: and Polybius<sup>34</sup> reasonably conjectures, that Marcius, confident of a speedy victory over Perseus, gave this advice to the Rhodians with the treacherous purpose of furnishing the senate with a future pretence of hostility against them. However, their fault was punished by the loss of Lycia and Caria,<sup>35</sup> which the senate now declared independent; and the individuals who were accused of favouring Perseus were given up to the Romans,<sup>36</sup> or at the instigation of Roman officers were put to death by the Rhodian government. Nor should it be<sup>37</sup> omitted, that a general inquiry was instituted throughout Greece into the conduct of the principal men in the several states during the late war. Those who were accused by their countrymen of the Roman party of having favoured Perseus, were summoned to Rome to plead their cause as criminals; and some were even put to death. But if the mere opinions and inclinations of individuals were thus punished, the states which had actually taken part with Macedon met with a still heavier destiny. Let it be for ever remembered, that by a decree<sup>38</sup> of the senate, seventy towns of Epirus were given up to be plundered by the Roman army, after all hostilities were at an end; that falsehood and deceit were used to prevent resistance or escape; and that in one day and one hour seventy towns were sacked and destroyed, and one hundred and fifty thousand human beings sold for slaves. The instrument employed on this occasion was L. Æmilius Paulus, the conqueror of Macedon, and one of those whom we are taught to regard as models of Roman virtue. There is no reason to doubt his sincere affection for his country, his indifference to money, and his respectability as a citizen, husband, son, and father. But it is useful to see what dreadful actions the best men of ancient times were led unhesitatingly to commit, from the utter absence of a just law of nations, and the fatal habit of making their country the supreme object of their duty. Nor is it possible that these evils should be prevented, unless truer notions have insensibly established themselves in the minds of men, even of those who are least grateful to the source from which they have derived them; and if modern Europe be guided by purer principles, the Christian historian cannot forget from what cause this better and happier condition has arisen.

It remains now that we speak of the conduct of the Romans towards the Achæans. The early history of the Achæan league, and the leaning of its councils towards a friendly connexion with

<sup>34</sup> Polybius, XXVIII. 15.

<sup>35</sup> Polybius, XXX. 5. 8.

<sup>36</sup> Livy, XLV. 10.

<sup>37</sup> Livy, XLV. 31.

<sup>38</sup> Polybius, XXX. 15. Livy, XLV.

34. Plutarch, in Vitâ Æmilii Pauli, c. 29.



Macedon, has been already noticed. In the war between the Romans and Philip, however, the Achæans were persuaded to join with the former; a step which Polybius<sup>39</sup> describes as absolutely necessary for their safety; whether it were altogether equally honourable, we have hardly the means of deciding. But their new connexion, whatever may be thought of its origin, was ever afterwards faithfully observed; insomuch that the Romans, though sufficiently adroit in finding matter of complaint, when they were disposed to do so, and though offended by the free and independent tone which the Achæan government always maintained towards them, could yet obtain no tolerable pretext for attacking them. There was, however, a traitor amongst the Achæans, named Callicrates,<sup>40</sup> who, jealous of the popularity of the ruling party in the councils of his country, endeavoured to supplant them through the influence of Rome; and to ingratiate himself with the senate by representing his opponents as despisers of the Roman authority, which he and his friends vainly endeavoured to uphold. After the Macedonian war, his intrigues<sup>41</sup> were carried to a greater extent than ever. He accused a great number of the most eminent of his countrymen of having favoured the cause of Perseus; and although the conduct of the Achæan government towards Rome had been perfectly blameless, and nothing was found among the papers of the king of Macedon which confirmed the charge, even against any of its individual citizens, yet, on the demand of the Romans, more than a thousand of the most eminent men in the commonwealth were arrested and sent into Italy, under pretence that they should be tried for their conduct at Rome. On their arrival in Italy, they were confined in the different cities of Tuscany, and there remained nearly seventeen years. The senate repeatedly refused the petition of the Achæan government, that they might either be released, or else be brought to trial. It is added, that whoever among them were at any time detected in endeavouring to escape, were invariably put to death. At last,<sup>42</sup> after most of them had died in captivity, the influence of Cato the censor was exerted in behalf of the survivors, at the request of Sicpio Æmilianus, who was anxious to serve one of their number, his own familiar friend, the historian Polybius. But the manner in which Cato pleaded their cause deserves to be recorded. He represented the Achæan prisoners as unworthy of the notice of the senate of Rome: "We sit here all day," said he, "as if we had nothing to do, debating about the fate of a few wretched old Greeks, whether the undertakers of Rome or Achæa are to have the burying of them." We have dwelt the more fully on this treatment of the Achæans,

<sup>39</sup> Polybius, XVII. 13.

<sup>40</sup> Polybius, XXVI. 1, et seq.

<sup>41</sup> Polybius, XXX. 10. Pausanias, Achæa, 10.

<sup>42</sup> Polybius, XXXV. 6.

because it sets in the clearest light the character of the Roman government ; and enables us to appreciate the state of the world under the Roman dominion, when such men as Polybius were subject to the worst oppression and insolence from a nation which boasted of Cato the censor as one of its greatest ornaments.

Hitherto, however, Achæa and the rest of Greece still enjoyed a nominal independence, notwithstanding the real supremacy of the Roman power. But within little more than twenty years from the overthrow of Perseus, even these poor remains of freedom were destroyed. A man<sup>43</sup> of low condition, named Andriscus, availing himself of his personal resemblance to the royal family of Macedon, assumed the name of Philip, and pretending that he was the son of Perseus, was joyfully received by the Macedonians. After a short contest, he was defeated and led prisoner to Rome by Q. Cæcilius Metellus ; and from henceforward Macedon was placed entirely on the footing of a Roman province. The fall of Achæa followed almost at the same time. It appears<sup>44</sup> that a party had lately acquired an ascendancy in the Achæan councils, warmly inclined to throw off the control of Rome ; but without the wisdom or integrity which had enabled Philopœmen and Lycortas to command respect from the Romans, while they avoided giving them the slightest pretence for attacking their independence. The party now in power, on the contrary, seemed bent upon provoking a war with Rome. They attacked Lacedæmon,<sup>45</sup> which, although obliged to become a member of the Achæan confederacy, was on all occasions ready to break off its connexion ; and when the Lacedæmonians appealed to Rome, and commissioners were sent as usual to give their judgment, the Achæan government treated them with the utmost indifference, and took the most violent measures for exciting popular feeling throughout Greece against the arbitrary interference of the Romans. The ferment was at its height when the commissioners, who had arrived at Corinth,<sup>46</sup> pronounced it to be the pleasure of the senate, that not only Lacedæmon, but Corinth also, and Argos, and several other states which had been united with the Achæans, should now be separated from them, because they had originally formed no part of Achæa. Nothing can be said in excuse of this decision, which was alike insolent and unjust ; yet where resistance is so evidently hopeless, as it was at this time in Greece, it must ever be condemned as a useless aggravation of a people's sufferings. The whole frame of society was loosened by the Achæan leaders ; and great immediate evils were occasioned with no reasonable prospect of their leading to permanent good. Slaves<sup>47</sup>

Importance of Andriscus.  
U. C. 603. B. C. 151.  
OL. 157, 2.

Achæan war.

<sup>43</sup> Livy, Epitom. XLIX. 1. Florus. II. 14. Jornand. I.

<sup>45</sup> Pausanias, Achaica, 8, et seq.

<sup>46</sup> Pausanias, Achaica, 14.

<sup>44</sup> Polybius, XXXVII. 1, &c.

<sup>47</sup> Polybius, XL. 2 ; XXXVIII. 3.

were set at liberty, and enlisted to swell the Achæan army; debtors were protected from their creditors; and heavy requisitions were laid on all individuals, male and female, to contribute to the wants of the commonwealth. But there was no corresponding spirit in the people; and these strong measures which, if adopted voluntarily, often produce effects so wonderful, were considered vexatious and oppressive when enforced by an unpopular government. Metellus at this time commanded in Macedonia; and wishing to win the double glory of being the pacificator of Macedon and Achæa, he was anxious to persuade the Achæans to submit before Mummius the consul should arrive to take the command against them. His advances were slighted, because they were attributed to fear; and an Achæan army<sup>48</sup> marched towards Thermopylæ to oppose his march into Greece. But so totally unequal were the Greeks to the maintenance of this contest, that they abandoned their ground on the first approach of Metellus; and, being overtaken on their retreat, were immediately and completely routed. Metellus then advanced towards Corinth, having reduced Thebes and Megara on his march; and his offers of peace being again rejected, he was obliged to surrender the task of finally subjugating Greece to L. Mummius, who about this time arrived from Italy. The new commander finished the war in a single battle, under the walls of Corinth.

Capture of Corinth.  
U.C. 608. B.C. 146.  
O.L. 158.

Diæus, the Achæan general, fled to Megalopolis, and there destroyed himself by poison; the Corinthians, for the most part, abandoned their city, and Mummius entered it with little or no resistance. But every horror that follows the most hardly-won capture of a town by storm, was practised with deliberate cruelty. Most of the citizens were slain; the women and children were sold for slaves; the temples and houses were alike ransacked; and Corinth, finally, was burnt to the ground. The Achæan league was then dissolved, and Greece was henceforward treated as a province, was subjected to tribute, and was governed by a Roman proconsul, or prætor.

We have thus related the final overthrow of Grecian independence somewhat more particularly than the difficulty of the conquest or its particular importance might seem to demand. Something, however, is due to the memory of illustrious names; and interested as we are from our childhood in the fortunes of Greece, the story of its fall cannot be read without attention. It now remains that we turn to a scene in itself far more striking, and presenting a still more painful picture of misery and atrocious ambition, the third Punic war, and the destruction of Carthage.

Since the time at which Hannibal was obliged to abandon his

<sup>48</sup> Pausanias, *Achaica*, 15, 16.



country, by the animosity of those whose corruptions he had exposed and checked, and by the jealousy of the Romans, Carthage seems to have rested quietly in the state of humiliation to which the event of the second Punic war had reduced her. Forbidden as she was, by the terms of the treaty of peace, to take up arms against the allies of the Roman people, she was obliged to suffer repeated aggressions on the part of Masinissa, king of Numidia; and when, as her only resource, she applied to Rome<sup>49</sup> for protection, she found a tardy and insufficient redress. She observed, however, faithfully, the conditions of her submission; and Carthaginian ships formed a part of the Roman fleet, in the wars with Antiochus, and with Perseus.<sup>50</sup> But when some years had elapsed after the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy, the Romans, having no other enemy to attract their attention, felt their hatred of Carthage revive; and it was openly professed by some members of the senate, that the very existence of that commonwealth ought no longer to be permitted. The resistance which the Carthaginians had been at last driven to make to the continued encroachments and hostilities of Masinissa, furnished the Romans with a pretext for declaring war; and the two consuls, with two consular armies and a large fleet, were despatched to Sicily, in order to cross over from that island into Africa as soon as possible. The Carthaginians had tried every means of pacifying the Romans, without throwing themselves entirely upon their mercy; but when they found that an army was actually on its way to attack them, and that Utica,<sup>51</sup> the most important of all their dependencies in Africa, had already offered an entire submission to the Romans, the danger seemed too great for any further hesitation; and their ambassadors at Rome announced to the senate, that Carthage yielded herself up entirely to its disposal. In return, they were promised the enjoyment of their laws and liberty, and the uninterrupted possession of their lands and moveable property, on condition that they should send over to Lilybæum, within thirty days, three hundred children, of the first families in Carthage, as hostages, and that they should obediently receive the commands which the consuls should deliver to them on their arrival in Africa. A vague suspicion of the fate that awaited them possessed the Carthaginians on the return of their ambassadors; still they resolved to persevere in their submissions. The hostages were sent to Lilybæum, and then were despatched to Rome; and a deputation waited on the consuls, soon after their landing at Utica, to know the final pleasure of the senate, and to express the readiness of Carthage to obey it. The consuls commanded that all

State of Carthage.

<sup>49</sup> Appian, *Punica*, 68, 69.<sup>50</sup> Livy, XXXVI. 42; XLII. 56. Polybius, XXXVI. 1, et seq.<sup>51</sup> Appian, *Punica*, 69, et seq.

arms, offensive and defensive, and all engines of war, should be surrendered to them ; and even this was complied with.<sup>52</sup> A number of members of the supreme council, of priests, and of other individuals of the greatest distinction in Carthage, followed the long train of wagons in which the arms were carried to the Roman camp. They hoped to move compassion, by the sight of all that was most noble and most venerable in their country reduced to the condition of suppliants. But one of the consuls, L. Marcius Censorinus, having arisen, and composed his countenance, says Appian, to an expression<sup>53</sup> of sternness, briefly told them, "That they must abandon Carthage, and remove to any place more inland, that should be about nine or ten miles distant from the sea ; for Carthage," said he, "we are resolved to raze to the ground." This declaration was received by the Carthaginians who heard it, with the most lively emotions of rage and despair ; they vented curses against the Romans, as if wishing to provoke them to forget the sacred character which they bore. To this burst of passion the deepest grief succeeded ; they bewailed the fate of their country with such agony of sorrow, that it is said even the Romans were moved to tears ; and they attempted even yet to obtain from the consuls a mitigation of their sentence. But when Censorinus repeated that the orders of the senate must be performed, and *that* immediately, and when the lictors began to drive the deputation from the consuls' presence, they begged to be heard again for a few moments ; and then said, that they only entreated the Romans to advance with their fleet instantly to the city, to prevent the people from provoking their utter destruction by some act of despair. Censorinus accordingly moved forwards with twenty ships, and remained off the mouth of the harbour, while the Carthaginians brought back the report of their doom to Carthage.

The tidings were received with one common feeling of indignation by the supreme council and by the people.  
Third Punic war.  
 U. C. 605. B. C. 149. Generals were chosen immediately ; and when the consuls refused to grant a truce for thirty days, in order that ambassadors might be sent to Rome, war was at once resolved on ; and the whole population, men and women alike, began to labour night and day in the fabrication of arms, to supply the place of those which they had surrendered. The consuls, after waiting some days, to see if the ferment would subside, at length marched towards Carthage and the operations of the siege commenced. But such was the strength of the fortifications, and such the spirit of their defenders, that, notwithstanding their want of arms, they repulsed every attempt of the enemy ; and the Roman army, baffled by the Carthaginians, and suffering from sickness, saw

<sup>52</sup> Appian, Punica, 80, et seq.<sup>53</sup> Appian, Punica, 80.

the year draw to a close without having obtained any other success than such as the extreme wickedness of the cause deserved.<sup>54</sup> Nor were the consuls of the following year more fortunate; and the spirit of the Carthaginians, encouraged by their long resistance, began to anticipate a final deliverance. Masi-nissa, the old ally of Rome, was drawing near the end of his life; and whilst promising succours to the Roman army, evidently showed no real disposition to assist it.<sup>55</sup>

But in the third year of the war, P. Scipio Æmilianus, the son of Æmilius Paullus, but adopted into the family of Scipio by the son of the famous Africanus, was elected consul, and appointed to the command in Africa by an especial vote of the people. He had greatly distinguished himself under the former consuls, when serving as a military tribune; and there was besides a superstitious persuasion among the people in his favour, that the Scipios were destined to be the conquerors of Carthage. On his succeeding to the command, his first care was to restore the discipline of the army, which had suffered greatly from the misconduct of the last consul; and by his ability in this respect, as well as by his skill in the conduct of the war, he soon destroyed all the hopes of the Carthaginians. The situation of Carthage, from this time, began to resemble the picture left us of the miseries of Jerusalem in its last siege by Titus. Numbers died of famine through the strictness of the blockade; numbers deserted to the enemy; while As-drubal, who commanded the principal military force in the town,<sup>56</sup> was himself rioting in luxury, and exercising the greatest tyranny over his countrymen; his conduct, as a general, at the same time, being totally destitute of courage and wisdom, and marked only by savage cruelty towards the prisoners who fell into his power. Yet<sup>57</sup> the city continued to hold out during the year of Scipio's consulship; and the winter was employed by him, successfully, in reducing the strongholds which still remained in the power of the Carthaginians in the neighbouring country. In the following spring, his command being still continued, he resumed the siege with vigour; and, by a combination of assaults, succeeded in forcing his way into one of the quarters of the city, when famine had enfeebled the bodies and the spirits of its defenders. But the Byrsa, or citadel, still remained untaken; and six days were consumed in a horrible struggle from street to street, and from house to house; in the course of which, fire and the sword, and the ruin of falling buildings, combined to carry on the work of destruction to the uttermost. At last the remnant of the inhabitants sued for mercy, and it was granted them; such mercy as

Siege, capture, and  
destruction of Car-  
thage.  
U. C. 608. B. C. 146.

<sup>54</sup> Appian, *Punica*, 97, et seq.

<sup>55</sup> Appian, *Punica*, 94.

<sup>56</sup> Polybius, XXXIX. 2.

<sup>57</sup> Appian, *Punica*, 126, et seq.



was practised in ancient times, when hopeless slavery, without distinction of sex or age, was the lot of all whom the sword had spared. Fifty thousand individuals were thus made prisoners, to enrich their conquerors by the price to be paid for them in a slave market at Rome; and the victorious army was then allowed to plunder the city for several days. Shortly after, a commission<sup>58</sup> of ten senators was sent from Rome, as usual, to determine the future condition of the conquered country. By their orders, whatever part of the buildings of Carthage had survived the siege, was now levelled with the ground; and curses were imprecated on any man who should hereafter attempt to build on the spot. The territory was subjected to a tribute, and governed henceforth as a Roman province, with the exception of certain portions which were given to the people of Utica and Hippo, as a reward for their timely desertion of the Carthaginian cause. Thus was the great rival of Rome totally destroyed, only a few months before the final conquest of Greece, in the year of Rome 608, and about a hundred and forty-six years before the Christian era.

It will now, perhaps, be most advisable to trace the progress of the Roman arms in Spain and Gaul; then to notice the accessions to their empire gained in Africa by the conquest of Jugurtha; and to conclude with a general view of the extent of their dominion at the period which forms the limit of the present sketch. The end of the second Punic war had left the Romans no other enemies in Spain to contend with than the natives themselves; but these were of so stubborn and warlike a temper, that it was not easy to effect their subjugation. It may be asked, what claim of right could be advanced by the Romans in attempting this conquest; and no answer can be given, except that a civilized nation, in its intercourse with an uncivilized one, easily finds grounds of quarrel, while it exacts from men, ignorant of all law, an observance of those rules, which men, in a more advanced state of society, have agreed to call the law of nations. Those Spanish tribes that had been subject to Carthage, were treated by the Romans, on the defeat of the Carthaginians, as a conquered people, were subjected to a tribute, and governed with the usual arbitrary authority of the Roman provincial magistrates. If they attempted to shake off the yoke, it was not unnatural that some warriors of those tribes, which were yet independent, should join the armies of their countrymen; and this afforded the Romans a pretext, sometimes, for demanding hostages from the people whose citizens had been found in arms against them; or, sometimes, for requiring the surrender of their arms; conditions which, since in their eyes they implied degradation,

<sup>58</sup> Appian, *Punica*, 135, et seq.

were generally refused, and thus gave occasion to war. If, on the contrary, they were acceded to, the Romans would proceed to exercise some acts of sovereignty which would provoke the tribes to take up arms; or the mere detention of their hostages was a continual irritation to their minds, which at last would break out in open hostility. Or, if this pretence failed, there was another which could scarcely ever be wanting. If the vanquished soldiers of any tribe engaged in war with Rome, received from their countrymen the ordinary succours of humanity; if they were entertained or sheltered, this was called assisting the enemies of the republic, and was supposed to justify a Roman general in demanding satisfaction from those who had been guilty of it. This was the original cause of the quarrel between Rome and Numantia.<sup>59</sup> Thirdly, if there were any tribes whose situation, or whose caution, had preserved them from any sort of connexion with the enemies of the Romans, some dispute amongst themselves was likely, sooner or later, to arise, and the vanquished party was always sure to find in the Romans, willing and effectual supporters. The Roman<sup>60</sup> generals instantly interfered as arbiters; and if their decision was not submitted to, they presently proceeded to enforce it by arms. A system like this steadily pursued amongst a warlike and independent people, naturally furnished the Romans with an occasion of attacking, in their turn, the inhabitants of every part of the peninsula. Of all these, the most obstinate and successful in their resistance were the Lusitanians and Numantians. The first, under<sup>61</sup> the command of Viriathus, a chief of remarkable enterprise and ability, maintained the contest for several years, and defeated several of the Roman officers; till their leader was assassinated by three of his followers, at the instigation of Servilius Cæpio, the Roman general, then commanding against him. Numantia has acquired still greater fame, by the disgraces which its inhabitants inflicted on the Roman arms, and the desperation of their final defence. They obliged a Roman consul,<sup>62</sup> C. Hostilius Mancinus, to purchase the safety of his army by an unfavourable treaty; and when the senate, in contempt of the public faith, refused to ratify the terms, and ordered Mancinus to be given up to the enemy to expiate his act with his own life, the Numantians refused to accept him: and the Roman writers record, without a blush, this contrast between the honour of the barbarians and their own perfidy. At last, Scipio Æmilianus, the conqueror of Carthage, was elected consul, on purpose to carry on the war with Numantia. With an army of 60,000 men, he blockaded the

Lusitanian war ends.  
U. C. 614. B. C. 140.  
Numantian war.

<sup>59</sup> Florus, II. 18.

<sup>60</sup> Appian, *Hispanica*, 51.

<sup>61</sup> Appian, *Hispanica*, 61, et seq. Florus, II. 17. Velleius Paterculus, II. 1.

<sup>62</sup> Appian, *Hispanica*, 80. 83. Velleius Paterculus, II. 1. Florus, II. 18.

city, the armed population of which had never exceeded<sup>63</sup> 8000 ; and fearing to encounter the despair of the inhabitants, he hemmed them in, with lines of circumvallation, and waited patiently till famine should do his work for him without danger to himself. The Numantines tried to obtain tolerable conditions ; but they had been too formidable to find mercy from an enemy like the Romans, who never had any sympathy with courage from which they themselves had suffered. Finding that they had no hope

Destruction of Numantia.  
U. C. 621. B. C. 133. left, the besieged mostly destroyed themselves and their relations, and a few only surrendered alive to the conqueror. He selected<sup>64</sup> fifty of their number to adorn his triumph, the rest he sold for slaves, and then levelled Numantia to the ground ; and for such a victory, so hardly won, over an enemy so inferior in numbers and resources, he was extolled with the highest praises at Rome, and received the surname of Numantinus. Still, even after the destruction of Numantia, the Spaniards continued, at various times, to maintain the struggle for liberty ; nor were they fully reduced to obedience till a much later period than that with which we are now concerned.

The Romans were first led to carry their arms into Transalpine Gaul, by an application from the people of the Greek colony of Marseilles to protect them against the assaults of some of the native tribes in their neighbourhood. An embassy to this effect remains recorded in one of the Fragments<sup>65</sup> of Polybius, and appears to have taken place as early as the year of Rome 600 ; but no important consequences seemed to have followed from it immediately. About twenty-eight years afterwards, however, on a new complaint from the people of Marseilles, a Roman army attacked and conquered the Salyes,<sup>66</sup> a tribe of Transalpine Gauls ; and after their defeat, the Allobroges and Arverni, their neighbours, were accused of having given them assistance, and of having offered injuries also to the Ædui, another Gaulish tribe, which had before obtained the friendship of Rome. Several victories were gained over these new enemies, and one or two colonies were founded in Gaul, such as<sup>67</sup> Aquæ Sextiæ, or Aix, in Provence, planted by C. Sextius, and Narbo,<sup>68</sup> or Narbonne, the origin of which is fixed a little later. By these means the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, on both sides of the Rhone, from the Alps to the Pyrenees, and extending inland as far as the Jura<sup>69</sup> and the mountains of Auvergne, were reduced to the form of a Roman province, about the year of Rome 632.

<sup>63</sup> Appian, *Hispan.* 97. Florus makes them only four thousand, II. 18.

<sup>64</sup> Appian, *Hispan.* 98.

<sup>65</sup> Polybius, XXXIII. 4.

<sup>66</sup> Florus, III. 2. Livy, *Epitom.* LX.

LXI. Appian, *Gallica*, 12.

<sup>67</sup> Livy, *Epit.* LXI.—Cassiodori *Chronicon*.

<sup>68</sup> Velleius Paterculus, I. 15.

<sup>69</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* III. 4.



While the republic was thus extending its dominion in Spain and Gaul, its empire in Africa received an important addition in the conquest of Numidia. After the destruction of Carthage, the principal part of the territories of that commonwealth were at once subjected to the Roman government; and thus the Romans were brought into close contact with the kings of Numidia, whose dominions lay to the west and south-west of Carthage, and stretched along the coast of the Mediterranean till they were bounded by the confines of Mauritania. The name of Numidians, borrowed from the Greek term Nomades, signifies a people who live by pasturage, and has accidentally become the peculiar appellation of the native tribes in the west of Africa; although under the government of Syphax, Masinissa, and Micipsa, they seem to have been in many respects advanced far above a mere pastoral life. Micipsa,<sup>70</sup> the son of Masinissa, divided his kingdom between his sons Hiempsal and Adherbal, and his nephew Jugurtha; but on his death, Jugurtha, who was much older than his cousins, and who had acquired military experience and high distinction by serving in the Roman army at the siege of Numantia, at once proceeded to assassinate Hiempsal, and then openly invaded the dominions of the surviving prince Adherbal. He easily overcame him, stripped him of his territories, and obliged him to fly to Rome for refuge and redress. But dreading lest the Romans should avail themselves of so fair a pretext to seize upon the kingdom of Numidia for themselves, he strove to deprecate their enmity by employing bribery to a large extent among the members of the senate; and thus nothing was done in favour of Adherbal, except the sending a commission of ten senators to Africa, to divide the kingdom between him and Jugurtha. It is said,<sup>71</sup> however, that this commission was also corrupted by Jugurtha, and thus was induced to assign to him by far the most valuable share of Micipsa's inheritance. Of this he took advantage, and in a short time he again attacked Adherbal, defeated him, shut him up in the strong town of Cista, and there besieged him for some months, till the Italian soldiers, who formed the most effective part of the garrison, persuaded Adherbal to surrender himself to his rival, and stipulating only for his life, to rely for every thing else on the interposition of Rome. But no sooner had he given himself up, than Jugurtha ordered him to be put to death in torments.

Sallust, the warm partisan of Cæsar, and anxious, therefore, to vilify to the utmost the character of the senate, asserts<sup>72</sup> that even this flagrant crime would have been passed over with impunity, owing to the influence which Jugurtha had obtained by

<sup>70</sup> Sallust, *Bell. Jugurthin.* 9, et seq.

<sup>71</sup> Sallust, *Bell. Jugurthin.* 16.

<sup>72</sup> *Bell. Jugurthin.* 27.

his bribes among the nobility, had not one of the tribunes roused the feelings of the people, and denounced the scandalous motives to which, as he said, the senators were sacrificing the honour of their country. However this be, war was declared against Jugurtha, and L. Bestia Calphurnius, one of the consuls, was sent over to Africa to commence hostilities against him. Still, we are

Jugurthine war.

told,<sup>73</sup> Jugurtha continued to employ his usual arts ; and the consul, after suffering the campaign to be protracted in fruitless negotiations, at last granted his enemy peace, on condition of his laying down his arms, and submitting himself and his kingdom to the Romans. But only a small part of Jugurtha's resources were in fact surrendered, and the consul returning to Rome to preside at the elections for the ensuing year, the war was as far from conclusion as ever. The succeeding season was equally unproductive of any decisive event ; but towards the close of it, when the consul Sp. Albinus had, as usual, returned to Rome, the army which he left under the command of his brother, sustained a severe defeat from the enemy, and was reduced to such difficulties as to purchase its retreat by a promise of evacuating Numidia within ten days ; and, it is added, by concluding a treaty of peace. But Jugurtha, who had served at Numantia, must have remembered how lightly the senate could violate the stipulations made by its officers ; and he could not reasonably calculate on gaining any other advantage from his agreement, than the getting rid of the Roman army for the present. The treaty, as he might have expected, was immediately disavowed at Rome, and the new consul, Q. Cæcilius Metellus, was likely to prove a far more formidable adversary than those whom he had hitherto encountered. Metellus was bent on prosecuting the war in earnest. He reformed the discipline of the army, which is always described as faulty, when the usual career of Roman victory was delayed or interrupted ; but he did not scruple, at the same time, to tamper<sup>74</sup> with the several officers whom Jugurtha sent to him to propose terms of peace, and to tempt them to betray, or even to assassinate their master. He evaded giving any decisive answer to the offers made to him, but continued to advance into the heart of Jugurtha's country, and had deprived him of a large portion of his resources, before the Numidian perceived that his enemy was merely amusing him, and that he had nothing but the sword to trust to. In the course of the campaign, Metellus gained some advantages, but he received also several severe checks from the activity of Jugurtha, who turned to the best account his own perfect knowledge of the country, and the peculiar excellence of his subjects in desultory warfare. Experience, however, taught Metellus to guard more completely against this

<sup>73</sup> Bell. Jugurthin. 29.

<sup>74</sup> Bell. Jugurth. 46.

kind of annoyance ; and his intrigues were so successful with the principal officers of his enemy, that Jugurtha found those whom he had most trusted engaged in a conspiracy against his life ; and although he escaped the immediate danger by putting them to death, his prospects for the future were overcast with fear, and he regarded every one about him with suspicion. Meantime the famous Caius Marius,<sup>75</sup> who had served with distinction under Metellus as his second in command, impatient of holding an inferior station, and coveting to himself the glory of conquering Jugurtha, had obtained leave to go to Rome, and offer himself as a candidate for the consulship. He was a man of low birth, and totally illiterate, but active and able, with power sufficient to make him feared by the nobility, and with an inveterate hatred against them, because their scorn of his mean condition galled his pride, and impeded his way to greatness. By depreciating<sup>76</sup> Metellus, and promising soon to end the war if the command were in his own hands, he won the favour of the multitude ; for invectives against high birth and station, joined to an unabashed self-assurance, are powerful pleaders with the low and the ignorant ; and he was elected for the first time to that office which he afterwards filled more frequently than any other Roman, and in which he was the author of as signal military services, and as great domestic injuries, as any one individual has ever been known to bring upon his country.

Rise of Caius Marius.

His first consulship.

Marius, soon after his election, received from the people, in spite of a contrary resolution of the senate, the command of the army in Numidia, and the conduct of the war with Jugurtha. On his arrival in Africa, he found that some of the most important towns in Numidia had been taken by Metellus, and that Jugurtha had implored and obtained the assistance of Bocchus, king of Mauritania, so that he had an additional enemy to encounter. But Bocchus, having no direct interest in the quarrel, did not refuse to listen to the overtures of the Roman general, and promised himself, if the fortune of war should prove adverse, to secure his own interests by surrendering Jugurtha to his enemies. However, for the present, the two kings were in close alliance with each other ; and Marius, in hopes of bringing them to action, employed himself in besieging some of the most valuable towns and fortresses in the Numidian dominions. It is worthy of notice, that at Capsa,<sup>77</sup> a strong place in one of the remotest parts of the country, after it had been surrendered, the whole male population was massacred, the women and children were sold for slaves, and the city was plundered and

He is appointed to command against Jugurtha.

<sup>75</sup> Bell. Jugurth. 63, 64, &c.

<sup>76</sup> Sallust, 64.

<sup>77</sup> Sallust, 91.



burnt, for no other reason than because the place was inconvenient for the Romans to garrison, and the people were not thought trustworthy. If we remember how strong a sensation has been excited in our own times by the massacre of the Turkish prisoners at Jaffa, and then observe how Sallust excuses<sup>78</sup> the conduct of Marius at Capsa, we shall somewhat understand how dreadful were the atrocities of Roman warfare, and how degraded the condition of Roman morality.

The loss of these towns drove Jugurtha and Bocchus, as Marius had hoped, to try their fortune in the field, and he defeated them in two battles with severe loss. This disposed the king of Mauritania to open a communication with the Romans, the management of which was intrusted by Marius<sup>79</sup> to L. Cornelius Sylla, his quæstor, and after much debate, Bocchus consented to win the favour of Rome, by betraying Jugurtha.

Betrayal of Jugurtha.

Accordingly, having allured both Sylla and Jugurtha with the hope that he was going to deliver their enemy into their hands, he proposed that they should have a meeting with each other, to discuss the possibility of concluding a peace, and when the appointed time came, he ordered Jugurtha to be seized, and delivered him bound to Sylla. He was by him taken to the head-quarters of Marius, and from thence conducted to Rome, led in triumph<sup>80</sup> with his two sons before the chariot of the conqueror, and then put to death in prison. His own crimes had well deserved his punishment, but they in no way lessen the iniquity of the Romans in inflicting it, by no other right than that of conquest.

Death of Jugurtha.  
U. C. 648. B. C. 106.

By the event of this war, Numidia was added to the list of Roman provinces. It was not till a somewhat later period that the republic acquired Cyrene and its dependencies, by the bequest of their king, Ptolemy Appion; and Egypt and Mauritania remained unconquered till the times of the Cæsars. In the year of Rome 652, the date at which the present narrative closes, the dominions, formerly subject to Carthage, and the kingdom of Numidia, were all that the Romans possessed in Africa; and these extended, to speak generally, along the coast of the Mediterranean from the greater Syrtis<sup>81</sup> to the river Ampsaga, or the town of Sardis, corresponding nearly with the limit between the modern governments of Tunis and Algiers. Their limit towards the interior, it is impossible precisely to ascertain; and indeed, in fixing the extent of the Roman empire at any one

<sup>78</sup> Id facinus, contra jus belli, non avaritiâ neque scelere consulis admissum: sed quia locus Jugurthæ opportunus, nobis aditu difficilis: genus hominum mobile, infidum, neque beneficio neque metu coercitum. 91.

<sup>79</sup> Sallust, 102, et. seq.

<sup>80</sup> Livy, Épitom. LXVII.

<sup>81</sup> Pliny, Histor. Natur. V. 2, 3. Strabo, XVII. p. 972. edit. Xyland.

period, minute accuracy, if attainable at all, would not repay the labour of arriving at it ; because, our materials for the history of Rome are by no means full and uninterrupted ; and many countries were at one time given away to some ally, and then again united to the empire, and thus are sometimes included amongst the provinces, and sometimes spoken of as independent. Again, in some parts, as for example, in the countries between Macedonia and the Danube, continual warfare was carried on for ages between the Romans and the natives ; and whilst a victory would nominally extend the bounds of the empire, by leading to the submission of various tribes, any change of circumstances would presently contract them, by exciting the new subjects to revolt. Besides, the imperfect state of ancient, and we may add, of modern geography, makes it difficult, if not impossible, with regard to many quarters of the Roman empire, to fix the limits of provinces or of countries loosely inhabited by barbarian tribes ; and even where there is any great natural division spoken of as the boundary, such as the Rhine and the Danube, at a later period, or the chain of Mount Taurus, after the war with Antiochus, there might be natural fastnesses, and wild districts, even within the general frontier, which defied the Roman authority, and furnished the provisional officers with occasions of victories and triumphs. These considerations may excuse the imperfections, or even the inaccuracies, of that sketch of the extent of the empire, which we now propose to offer.

What has been already said in the course of the narrative, will sufficiently show the nature and extent of the Roman power in Africa, Spain, and Gaul. The Balearian<sup>82</sup> islands were conquered by Q. Metellus about the year 630, complaint having been made that the inhabitants infested the sea with piracies. Sardinia and Sicily had been gained from Carthage, as has been mentioned in a former part of this history, before the second Punic war ; and Corsica had been conquered at the same time with Sardinia, but it seems to have been considered of little importance ; and there is no mention of any attempt having been made on it by either party, during the war with Hannibal. Melita, or Malta, of which we speak only on account of its modern celebrity, was first taken, according to Livy,<sup>83</sup> in the very first year of the second Punic war ; and at the end of that war, was finally ceded by the Carthaginians, together with their other islands in the Mediterranean. The whole of Italy, in the modern sense of the term, was already subject to the Romans ; although the Ligurians and Istrians were still probably in a state of imperfect obedience. To the eastward, the countries between the Danube and Greece offer, as

<sup>82</sup> Strabo, III. p. 177. edit. Xyland.  
Florus, III. 8.

<sup>83</sup> Livy, XXI. 51.

we have said, the most indistinctly marked portion of the empire. A part of the eastern coast of the Adriatic had been conquered, even before the second Punic war; or rather underwent the first introduction to conquest, in becoming<sup>84</sup> allied to the Romans. In the second Macedonian war, Gentius, a king<sup>85</sup> of a large part of Illyria, having allied himself with Perseus, paid the penalty of losing all his dominions. Dalmatia, to the north-west of Illyria, skirting the Eastern coast of the Adriatic, had been first attacked and partially subdued by C. Marcius Figulus<sup>86</sup> and P. Scipio Nasica, in the years of Rome 597 and 598; but triumphs continued to be earned, by victories in Dalmatia, even down to the time of Augustus: and the same may be said of Thrace, and the other countries to the north of Macedonia, which remained so long in a wild and unsettled state, that we read of revolts in Thrace<sup>87</sup> even in the reign of Tiberius Cæsar. If we turn to the southward, Macedonia,<sup>88</sup> Thessaly, and Epirus, are said to have been reduced at one time to the form of a province, at the end of the third Macedonian war, in the year of Rome 608. The southern states of Greece were also subjected to the government of a Roman prætor, by the decree of the ten commissioners, who, as usual, were sent to determine<sup>89</sup> the future condition of the country, after the destruction of Corinth. By their decision, the popular assemblies were every where abolished, and the local administration was made strictly oligarchical; but afterwards, the old assemblies were restored, when the power of Rome was so securely established, that such empty shows of liberty might be granted without danger.

By the termination of the war with Antiochus, Rome, as we have seen, gained to herself, nominally, no dominion in Asia. But as she claimed<sup>90</sup> the right of resuming at pleasure, such gifts of territory as she awarded to her allies, she may thus be considered the actual sovereign of Lycia and Caria, which she bestowed on the Rhodians, and of Phrygia, Lydia, and several other provinces, which were given to the king of Pergamus. The first actual province,<sup>91</sup> however, which the Romans formed in Asia, consisted of the dominions of their oldest allies; of those very kings of Pergamus, who had given them such useful aid in all their wars with the Greek princes and commonwealths, from the first contest with Philip, king of Macedon, to the final overthrow of the Achæan confederacy.<sup>92</sup> Attalus, the son of Eumenes, dying in the year of Rome 620, left his dominions by will to

<sup>84</sup> Polybius, II. 11; III. 16.

<sup>85</sup> Appian, *Illyrica*, 9.

<sup>86</sup> Appian, *Illyrica*, 11. Livy, *Epitom.* II.

<sup>87</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* II. 64; IV. 46, et seq.

<sup>88</sup> Rufus Festus. Jornandes.

<sup>89</sup> Pausanias, *Achaica*, 86.

<sup>90</sup> Appian, *Numidica*, § 3, edit. Schweighæuser.

<sup>91</sup> Jornandes, I. Florus, II. 20.

<sup>92</sup> Strabo, XIII. p. 721; and XIV. p. 744, edit. Xyl. Livy, *Epit.* LIX.



the Roman people. But Aristonicus, a natural brother, as some say, of the late king, endeavoured to obtain the kingdom for himself, and at first met with some success, but was afterwards defeated and taken, and according to the usual practice of the Romans, was led in triumph, and afterwards put<sup>93</sup> to death. It is mentioned by Florus,<sup>94</sup> that Manius Acquilus, by whom this war was brought to an end, did not hesitate to poison the wells, in order to reduce some of the revolted cities to submission; nor does it appear that for so dreadful a crime, his conduct was ever called in question by his government. In this manner, by the overthrow of Aristonicus, the kingdom of Pergamus was reduced into the form of a province, which was called peculiarly the province of Asia. Along the southern shore of the Euxine, the kingdoms of Bithynia, Cappadocia, and Pontus, still subsisted under their native sovereigns; and from the last of the three, was soon to arise an enemy, only second to Hannibal in the abilities and obstinacy with which he so long combated the Romans, the famous Mithridates. To the south of the province of Asia, the countries of Lycia, Pamphylia, and Cilicia, were not yet formally annexed to the empire; although Lycia and Pamphylia, having been among the districts ceded by Antiochus, enjoyed their liberty only as a gift from Rome. Further to the eastward, the Romans, as yet, had made no advances: Crete and Cyprus were untouched; and Rhodes, taught<sup>95</sup> by the treatment it received after the war with Perseus, had been since careful to purchase its municipal independence by the utmost deference to the will of the senate and its officers.

Great as was the empire which the Romans had by this time acquired, none of their conquests, since the end of the second Punic war, were such as can at all surprise us. The ascendancy of a well constituted army, and a good system of military policy, over the utmost perfection of rude courage or individual ability, is so well known, that the gradual reduction of Spain, of Gaul, of Thrace, and of Illyricum, as well as the subjugation of Numidia, may be considered as matters of course. Carthage, at the time of its final struggle, was hardly more than a single city; and the long disuse of arms had taken away all the opportunities, by which good officers, and an efficient military system are created; to which we may add, that the Carthaginians helped their own ruin, by the surrender of their arms and engines of war, at the very moment when they were most needed. Antiochus was a prince of little ability or courage, and the event of the first general battle frightened him into submission; nor can the issue of that battle in itself appear wonderful, when we

Causes of the Roman conquests.

<sup>93</sup> Paterculus, II. 4. Strabo, XIV. p. 744. Sigonius, Comment. in Fest. et Triumph. Romanorum.

<sup>94</sup> Florus, II. 20.

<sup>95</sup> Rufus Festus. Jornandes.

remember how little skill and discipline have ever been found in the organization of Asiatic armies ; and that the kings of Syria were, by this time, fully infected with the ignorance and weakness of Asia. It is only in Greece and in Macedon that we might have expected a longer and a more doubtful contest. The country which first sent forth regular armies to war, and the infantry of which had long maintained so complete a superiority over the soldiers of all other nations, ought not, we may think, to have bowed beneath the yoke of Rome, without signalizing its fall by some heroic effort, and yielding to its enemy a dearly purchased victory. The posterity of Xenophon, of Epaminondas, and of Alexander, might surely have inflicted on Rome a second Cannæ, before they suffered defeats more humiliating than that of Zama.

But, in fact, the circumstances of the Macedonian and Achæan wars abundantly explain the easiness with which the Romans obtained their successes. In their first contest with Philip they hemmed him in on every side with enemies, and the resources of Macedon were exhausted by the plundering parties of the Ætolians and Dardanians on one side, and, on the other, by the united fleets of Rome, Pergamus, and Rhodes, which infested the coasts ; and by the main consular army, the ranks of which were swelled by the contingents of half the states of Greece. The battle of Cynocephale was the only regular action in the whole war ; and its result laid open to the victorious army the whole of Thessaly, and the entrance into Macedon itself. As for the event of that battle there is no reason to dispute the judgment of Polybius, who pronounces the Macedonian tactics to have been unable to compete with the Roman ; and Hannibal's authority ought to have determined all other commanders to oppose the Roman legion with troops armed and organized in the same manner. Neither Philip nor Perseus were able generals ; and the monarchy of Macedon was so rudely constituted, that all depended on the personal character of the sovereign ; nor could the king have seen, without jealousy, and probably without danger, the actual control of his armies in the hands of a subject, whose ability might supply his own deficiencies. Had Hannibal been the general of the Macedonians, his genius would probably have so modified the Grecian tactics, as, without forfeiting their own peculiar advantages, to have given them some of the improvements of the system of their enemies, and thus he might have changed the fortune of particular battles ; but, where the force of the two contending powers was so unequal, he could scarcely have hoped to alter the event of the war.

With regard to the Greek republics, in addition to the inferiority of their tactics, which they shared in common with the Macedonians, they laboured under a defect peculiar to themselves, and arising naturally from their inconsiderable extent and power,

and the insignificant scale on which they had been used to see military operations conducted. Though much individual courage existed amongst the generals and soldiers, yet war had assumed a character of less horror, from the balanced strength of the several commonwealths, the habit of avoiding extreme measures on either side, and the comparatively little slaughter with which their battles were accompanied. The Romans, on the contrary, made it a part of their policy to give war its most terrible aspect. Their battles were decisive and bloody; the very wounds which were inflicted by their favourite weapon, a heavy sword, equally calculated for stabbing or for cutting, wore an appearance of peculiar ghastliness; and in the storming<sup>96</sup> of towns, they added to the usual horror of such scenes by deliberately lopping the limbs of the dogs and other animals which fell in their way, on purpose to exaggerate the impression of the destruction occasioned by their arms. A large army of twenty or thirty thousand men, conducting a campaign on this system, and regarded, besides, with that terror which civilized nations usually feel towards those whom they consider barbarians, filled the minds of the Greeks with fearful imaginations of its superior strength and ferocity; exactly in the same manner, and from the same causes, as the little states of Italy, in the fifteenth century, trembled before the impetuous courage of the French; when they found that the field of battle was made the scene of actual and terrible slaughter, and not, as in their own insignificant encounters, a mere stage for the display of their arms and their manœuvres.

Thus victorious over every enemy, and removed, as it might have seemed, far above any apprehension of danger, the Roman republic was suddenly obliged to struggle for its very existence; and amidst all its warlike population could find one man alone to whose guidance it could venture to trust its armies in this alarming emergency. The reader will perceive that we are alluding to the invasion of Italy by a vast swarm of barbarians from the north of Europe, known by the various names of Cimbri, Teutones, Ambrones, and Tigurini. And here we cannot but remark a striking peculiarity in the state of the most civilized of the ancient nations, which widely distinguishes them from the empires and kingdoms of modern Europe. The Greeks and Romans saw almost before their eyes the limits of that world with which alone they were concerned, and beyond which they knew nothing. The Alps and the mountains of Thrace were like the enchanted barriers of romantic story, beset with so many various perils, that the inhabitants of the region which they inclosed attempted not to surmount them. A few vague reports, brought by some enterprising trader,

Sketch of the nations  
inhabiting the north of  
Europe.

<sup>96</sup> Polybius, X. 15.



and collected amidst the difficulties of imperfectly understood dialects, from the fabling ignorance of barbarians, were the only information which could be gained concerning those vast countries which are now the seat of so many mighty empires, from the Danube to the Frozen Ocean, from China to the British Isles. Yet this unknown region was not like the sands of Africa, the unpeopled and impracticable wastes of which afford the countries on which they border their best security against the attacks of an enemy ; on the contrary, the north of Europe teemed with inhabitants, and might be likened to a volcano, the inward workings of which cannot be seen, nor the causes of its eruptions traced, but which, from time to time, pours forth upon the cities at its base a sudden and unforeseen destruction. In this manner the earliest Greek historian<sup>97</sup> records the irruptions of Cimmerian and Scythian tribes into the more civilized parts of Asia, the dominions of Lydia and Media ; and the earliest memorials of Italy bear testimony to similar invasions of the Celts or Gauls, who sometimes overran, and sometimes permanently occupied, the countries to the south of the Alps. In process of time, as the Roman power extended itself, Gaul became better known, and it was found that inroads from that quarter were no more to be dreaded, for the Gauls were now become a settled people, and, instead of wandering forth to prey on others, had acquired those comforts which began to induce their more barbarous neighbours to prey upon them. But if Gaul had ceased to inspire alarm, it was not so with the wide tract of country, which from the Rhine and the Alps extended eastward and northward, far beyond the knowledge or even the reasonable conjectures of the Romans. Amidst the forests with which Germany was then overspread, there was nurtured a race of men, bold, strong, hardy, and totally uncivilized, delighting in war, and despising the confinement of a settled habitation ; numerous, from the unchecked instinct of population, where nothing more was coveted than a bare subsistence, yet still occasionally multiplying to such a point that even this could not readily be found, and then pouring forth upon wealthier countries, to gain by their swords, in a manner to them most welcome, indulgences which not even the labour that they hated could have procured for them at home. We are now to record the first assault made by this people on the dominions of Rome ; from which period the Romans, as their power increased, for a long succession of years were in their turn the assailants, and advanced the limits of their empire and their knowledge from the Alps to the Danube. Beyond that river they could never penetrate ; and soon after they had ceased to go forward with their conquests, the Germans renewed their old incursions upon them,

<sup>97</sup> Herodotus, *Clio*. 15. 103.

till the empire was totally dismembered, and Italy itself, together with its provinces, submitted to the sceptre and the laws of a northern conqueror.

It was just at the close of the war with Jugurtha, that the alarm of the Cimbri and Teutones was at its height in Rome. They had been first heard of about eight or nine years before, when they attacked the province<sup>98</sup> of Illyricum, and there defeated Cn. Papirius Carbo, one of the consuls, with a consular army. After this victory they turned their course in another direction, and are said to have attacked several nations<sup>99</sup> of Gaul, and even to have penetrated into Spain ; but being repelled from that country, they presented themselves on the frontiers of the Roman province of Transalpine Gaul ; and requested admittance, as settlers, into some part of the Roman dominions, offering to employ their arms in the service of the republic, as a return for the lands which they should hold. On receiving a refusal, they proceeded to gain their ends by force ; and in two successive years they defeated two other Roman consuls in Gaul : but, with the caprice of barbarians, instead of following up their successes, they were allured in pursuit of some other objects, and left the Romans for two years unmolested. But in the year of Rome 648, they again fell upon them, and defeated two consular<sup>100</sup> armies united, with such terrible slaughter, that the capital itself was filled with alarm, and all men concurred in raising Marius to the consulship, as the only commander capable of saving his country. Fortunately, perhaps, for his reputation, the Germans again forbore to cross the Alps, and moved off into Spain ; and being a second time driven back by the natives, they re-crossed the Pyrenees, and spent another year in wandering over Gaul ; while Marius had been re-elected a third and a fourth time to the consulship, and had thus the rare advantage of becoming thoroughly acquainted with his army, and inuring them to exertion<sup>101</sup> and implicit obedience by the strictest discipline, and by employing them in some of those laborious works which afterwards became so familiar to the Roman legions in all parts of the empire. Thus when, in his fourth consulship, the Cimbri, reinforced by some other German hordes, attacked the Romans at once in Transalpine Gaul and towards the north-eastern side of Italy, Marius not only completely destroyed the multitude by which he was assaulted in Gaul, but hastening immediately after his victory to the support of Lutatius Catulus, his colleague, engaged the other division of the enemy in conjunction with him, and gave them a second overthrow as complete as the first, in the neighbourhood of Verona.

<sup>98</sup> Appian, *Gallica*, 13. Livy, *Epitom.* LXIII.

<sup>100</sup> Sallust, *Bell. Jugurth.* 114. Livy, *Epit.* LXVII.

<sup>99</sup> Cæsar, *Bell. Gallic.* VII. Florus, III. 3.

<sup>101</sup> Plutarch, in *Mario*, 13, et seq.

By these battles their force was entirely broken, and the alarms which had so long disturbed the minds of the Romans were totally dispelled.

Here, then, this portion of our narrative closes. From the period at which we are now arrived, ten years only elapsed before the beginning of the war between Rome and the states of Italy, and thirteen before the first expulsion of Marius, and the commencement of the civil war. These transactions, together with some of an earlier date, such as the seditions of the Gracchi, and the revolt of the slaves in Sicily, will form a fit introduction to that history of the domestic affairs of the republic, upon which we now propose to enter.



## CHAPTER II.

TIBERIUS GRACCHUS.—U.C. 621, B.C. 133.

THERE are few portions of history more deserving our attention than that to which we now return, the civil wars of the Romans. The origin of these wars arose from the conflict between the interests of the two great divisions of society—the rich and the poor. The characters and events which marked their progress, possess every quality most fitted to awaken a lively interest in the reader ; and their final issue in establishing a monarchy as the government of the civilized world, may possibly have exercised an influence over the fate of Europe, which we feel even at this day. They are most remarkable also, as they exhibit the state of mankind at the period immediately preceding the promulgation of Christianity : when, therefore, if experience be the measure of knowledge, the world must have attained to the highest point in intellectual and moral discoveries which it has ever reached without the assistance of revelation. It will surely be no uninteresting inquiry to collect, so far as we can, the general amount of human virtue and happiness antecedently to the great revolution introduced by the preachers of the Gospel, in order that we may judge of the probable result of the destruction of Christianity, which some avowedly, and many indirectly, consider as desirable.

The period then of the civil wars of Rome, which comprises somewhat more than a hundred years, from the tribuneship of Tiberius Gracchus to the final establishment of monarchy in the person of Octavius Cæsar, divides itself naturally into two portions. The first of these ends at the death of Sylla, and the ascendancy of the aristocratical party, which was effected by his government. And it is upon this first division that we now prepare to enter.

At Rome, as in many other countries, the original distinctions between the different ranks of society were wholly arbitrary. The patricians and plebeians were two separate castes, between which insurmountable barriers existed. No wealth, nor talents, nor virtues, could raise a plebeian to the rank and pri-

vileges of a patrician ; and as all intermarriages between the two classes were unlawful, the government was an hereditary oligarchy, from which the bulk of the nation, with their posterity for ever, were by law utterly excluded. The details of the particular events by which this system was overthrown, belong to the earlier period of Roman history. Before the Punic wars, however, it was entirely subverted ; all offices of state were laid open to the plebeians, while the tribuneship was still, as before, exclusively their own : and a more liberal aristocracy was formed, in which nobility began to be derived from the possession of high political dignities, instead of being the necessary previous qualification for obtaining them. But a third caste in the commonwealth still subsisted, composed of those persons who either by birth, or by captivity in war, or by the violence of regular slave traders, were doomed to the condition of slavery. The fortune of this caste was not so totally without hope as that of the old plebeians, because a slave might be enfranchised ; and when once a free-man, the course of time, or extraordinary personal merit, might remove the taint of slavery from his blood, and raise his posterity to honours and power. But so long as he remained a slave, his degradation was complete ; he was not considered as a member of the commonwealth, he could hold no property except by his master's sufferance ; and his protection from the extremity of personal violence was little better than nugatory. The little notice which the ancient writers have paid to this class of men, has perhaps prevented us from sufficiently estimating their effect on the state of society. We cannot, however, form a correct notion of the relative situations of the rich and the poor at Rome, without keeping in mind the existence of so large a proportion of the whole population in the condition of slavery. The numbers of slaves increased greatly with the increasing dominion of the republic ; we have already seen how many were carried off from Africa, in the descents made on that coast in the two first Punic wars ; fifty thousand more are mentioned as having been taken at one time in the destruction of Carthage ; and no fewer than a hundred and fifty thousand were sold for the benefit of the army that had defeated Perseus, collected from the sack of seventy towns in Epirus. These were purchased in large multitudes, and probably at a low price, by the great landed proprietors of Italy, and generally superseded the use of free labourers, as their work was much cheaper, and could be exacted with greater severity. In consequence of this, the lower orders of freemen were reduced to great distress, and their numbers were rapidly diminished, insomuch, that in process of time, there was no such thing as a free peasantry to be found in some parts of Italy, slaves being used almost exclusively as agricultural labourers, and forming probably by much the largest proportion of those employed in trade or man-

ufactures. At the same time, the legions were filled with none but freemen; and they whose swords gained the republic her conquests, were impatient at seeing the fruits of their victories pass into the hands of others, while their own condition was absolutely rendered worse by the consequences of their own valour. For we must not attribute our own notions on public matters to the citizens of the ancient commonwealths. The states of antiquity being for the most part only single cities, political association was regarded very much in the light of a commercial partnership, of which national property formed as it were the stock; and any acquisitions made by the national arms were looked upon as the profits of the trade, in which every partner ought to share. Thus, when territory was gained in war, the bulk of the people wished to have an immediate division of it made amongst them; whilst the government or managing partners, were anxious that it should still be employed in advancing the joint interests of the whole body, instead of enriching the individual shareholders. In other words, they wished it to be sold to the highest bidder, and the price to be thrown into the treasury to supply the usual wants of the public service. This in fact was the system usually adopted at Rome; and thus large landed estates came into the hands of the rich, whilst the poor fancied that they did not gain in their due proportion from the growing greatness of their country. To remedy the evil, a popular tribune in the early ages of the republic, C. Licinius, had proposed and carried the famous law which bears his name, and which limited the amount of land which any citizen might possess, to 500 jugera, calculated by Arbuthnot at equal to 330 English acres. But this law was sometimes evaded by land being held for the proprietor under other names,<sup>1</sup> and was sometimes openly disregarded. During the second Punic war, however, and the period that followed it for several years, the nobility enlarged their estates without opposition, partly, perhaps, because the aristocratical interest was at this time all powerful, and partly, because as the lands were alienated by regular sale, so long as the former owners could find employment as tenants or labourers, and were not superseded by the general substitution of slaves, the change in their condition was patiently borne. But when they found themselves every where supplanted by a class of men whom they so thoroughly despised, they either saw themselves debarred altogether from rearing a family, or they were forced to migrate to Rome, and swell the multitude of needy citizens in that city. The temptation thus offered to them to disturb the existing order of things, was peculiarly strong. As individuals, the poor often suffered from the grasping and oppressive spirit of the rich: yet,

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Vita Tib. Gracchi*, 8.



as members of the popular assembly, they formed a part of the sovereign power in the state, and might amply retaliate on the higher orders for the losses they had suffered. And here it becomes an exceedingly curious question, what was the general character of the popular party at Rome; what was their station in society; and what were their moral and intellectual attainments? as it is on a knowledge of these points that our judgment of the disputes which so long distracted the commonwealth must mainly depend. For if the comitia were no better than an ignorant and profligate rabble, no true friend to liberty can possibly sympathize with their cause: but if they consisted of men industrious though poor, of men whose views were directed towards a reasonable and definite object, whose private morals were fair, and who respected law and order, we shall then not brand them with the name of anarchists, merely because the reform which they proposed to effect, could in our days be attempted by none but the most desperate enemies of the peace of society.

The Roman plebeians, or all those citizens not of patrician extraction, whose property did not entitle them to be ranked among the equestrian order, may be divided into two classes; those who lived habitually in Rome, and those who were settled as small landed proprietors, as tenants of national property, or as labourers, in different parts of Italy. The former were naturally those who chiefly composed the popular assemblies, and they consisted of shop-keepers and mechanics, and of that lowest description of populace by which great towns in a genial climate are especially infested; where shelter and fuel and clothing being less important, they can more easily live without regular employment, as having fewer wants to provide for, and where even the food required is of a lighter quality, and consists of articles procurable at the cheapest rate, such as fruit, vegetables, oil, and the light wine of the country. These men would have all the qualities fitted to make them mischievous: idleness, improvidence, a total absence of all the feelings of honest independence, and a great sense of their own importance, both as freemen, while so many who enjoyed far more personal comforts were slaves, and as members of a body whose power was the greatest in the world. Nor must we at all judge of the shop-keepers at Rome by those of London or Paris. The sale for their goods would lie chiefly among the common people, because the rich supplied themselves with most of the articles they consumed, from the produce of their lands and the labour of their slaves. Their profits therefore were not likely to be very considerable, and their rank in society would be proportionably low. If we then remember the illiterate state of the Roman people in general at the period of which we are now speaking; and if we reflect besides, that whatever literature did exist must have been confined almost exclusively to the higher

orders from the expensiveness of books ; we cannot ascribe much general or political information to the plebeians of the city. Last of all, we know what the morals of the lower classes in large cities are at this day, when their opportunities of being rightly taught are far greater than could possibly have been enjoyed at Rome. Without descending to the mere idle and dissolute populace, we should probably have found in the bulk of the plebeian inhabitants a sense of their own interest generally predominant, a violent and cruel spirit towards those whom they looked upon as their opponents, and an obstinacy in maintaining blindly their own notions, mixed at the same time with many kind and generous affections towards their families and friends, and an attachment to the name and institutions of their country, which was liable indeed to be misled or overpowered for a time, but which was in the main strong and sincere. The plebeians of the country are generally spoken of by Roman writers as a more respectable class than those of the city. They were more steadily industrious, as having less to call off their attention from their own employment : they were more domestic in their habits, and not only less apt for political contests from their manner of living, but in their houses and fields they possessed a property which they were less willing to hazard in civil commotions. The beautiful picture which Virgil gives of the simplicity and happiness of the small landed proprietors of Italy, although of course highly embellished, was doubtless not altogether imaginary ; and it may be added, that the hardheartedness to the general welfare of the poor, which is so often the fault of our farmers, was less called into action among the Romans, in whose country there were no poor-rates nor parochial offices to excite a continual soreness in an uneducated mind ; and where the farmer had scarcely any connexion with more than his own household and labourers, a class of people whom it is most natural and obvious to treat with kindness and familiarity. Yet the agricultural plebeians must have been ignorant, and were likely to inherit the violence and obstinacy by which ignorance is ever accompanied. They must have entertained too, a peculiar jealousy of the great nobility, by whom their own rank in society had been in so many instances overwhelmed ; and when they came to the comitia in the city, they were incapable of resisting the eloquence of popular orators, ever ready to encourage their angry feelings against the rich, to flatter their self-importance, and to persuade them that their interests were the same with the public good. Above all, the nature of mankind is such, that even the best and most highly educated individuals, when assembled together in a numerous body, are apt to be more swayed by passion and less by principle, than if they were deliberating alone, or in a small society. Much more is this the case, when the inhabitants of a

great city are promiscuously crowded together; for then the evil predominates with a fearful ascendancy, and a physical and moral excitement is created, which destroys the exercise of the judgment, and drowns the voice of moderation and self-restraint; leaving the mind open to any unreasonable impression that may be produced, whether of ridicule, of indignation, of compassion, or of pride.

It results then, from this view of the state of the plebeians, that the popular party in the times of Tiberius Gracchus was made up of very heterogeneous elements; that one division of it, the mere city populace, was thoroughly worthless, but that others were composed of industrious and often well meaning men, whose great misfortune was to have a power placed in their hands collectively, far more than proportioned to their knowledge. On the other hand, the aristocratical party consisted of materials not less discordant. Among those who had engrossed the landed estates of Italy, there were many who in the command of armies, or in the government of provinces, had given the utmost proofs of cruelty and rapacity, and who displayed the same temper to their poorer countrymen at home. Others again, sought merely to gratify the pride of nobility by the enjoyment of a large fortune and influence: these were men whose selfishness was passive, so long as it was indulged to the utmost, but who could behave with the most unscrupulous cruelty towards any who should attempt to restrain it. A third class consisted of those whose minds were loftier, and whose ambition was of a nobler character: men who delighted in conducting the councils or heading the armies of the state; who wished to promote the greatness of their country, perhaps without being conscious to themselves how far a love of their own individual greatness mingled in the wish; and who felt the besetting vice of great abilities, contempt for the ordinary race of mankind. Such persons, like the magnanimous man of Aristotle's philosophy, having done the state great service, thought it just that their station in it should be pre-eminent; and scorned the thought of admitting the lower classes of the people to a participation in their grandeur as an outrage on the majesty of Rome. So complicated are the motives by which we are actuated, and so hard is it where our own welfare coincides with what we deem the public good, to decide how much of a selfish bias determines us in forming our opinion. There yet remained a fourth description of supporters of the aristocracy, in those who by their own merit had raised themselves to a fair and honourable affluence; those who had inherited, or acquired by commerce, a respectable but not an overgrown fortune; those who, content with little, had obtained consideration by their eloquence, their military services, or their tried integrity; and those of the nobility themselves, who though



poor, were without covetousness, and were more aristocratical from the influence of birth and connexions, than inclined to take the popular side from their poverty. Amongst this last class were numbered the majority of the equestrian order, and some of the most eminent individuals in Roman history ; Scipio Æmilianus, in the times of the Gracchi, and at a later period M. Cicero and M. Cato.

Many years had now passed since Rome had been disturbed by civil dissensions. We are told, indeed, that when the senate, immediately on the conclusion of the second Punic war, proposed to begin a fresh contest with the king of Macedon, the people were strongly disinclined to the measure,<sup>2</sup> and complained that the nobility sought to involve the nation in perpetual hostilities, for the gratification of their own ambition. But when the seat of war was removed far away from Italy, and an uninterrupted succession of conquests flattered at once the national vanity, and often enriched the soldiers by the plunder which it threw into their hands, the popular aversion to war probably subsided. It was likely to be changed into fondness for it, from the period that the acquisition of the revenues of Macedon, added to the large income derived from other provinces, relived the citizens of Rome from taxation altogether. Those changes, indeed, in the state of property, which were afterwards to occasion such fatal quarrels, were in the meanwhile silently being effected ; but they were not yet so great as to call off the public attention from subjects of more immediate interest ; and it has ever been the case, that the gradual approach of financial troubles has been unheeded, till the moment when the clouds have covered the whole face of the sky, and the storm has burst in thunder.

It has already been mentioned when speaking of the war with Numantia, that C. Mancinus, one of the consuls employed in that service, was obliged to purchase the safety of his army by an unfavourable treaty ; that the senate violated the agreement thus made, and ordered the general who had concluded it to be delivered up to the enemy, as if the perfidy of the government could be so atoned for. The officer who had been particularly employed in drawing up this obnoxious treaty, was the consul's quæstor,<sup>3</sup> Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus ; and it was said that the Numantines were chiefly induced to treat, from their respect to his name ; his father having served in Spain, and by his honourable conduct having won the esteem and regard of the natives. When then the senate resolved to surrender to the Numantines not only the consul but all his principal officers, the popular assembly interfered ; and considering that Gracchus had done no more than save the lives of many thousand citizens, when the consul's mis-

<sup>2</sup> Livy, XXXI. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Vita Tib. Gracchi, 5.

conduct had exposed them to destruction, it determined that all the other officers should be exempted, and that Mancinus should be given up alone. The different treatment which Gracchus on this occasion received from the senate and from the people, is said to have predisposed him to thwart the one, and to enlist on the side of the other. About three years afterwards, in the year of Rome 621, he was elected one of the tribunes of the people.

The great accumulation of slaves in Italy, and the consequent dearth of free labourers, was now become a serious evil. Gracchus had been struck with it, we are told, as he passed through Tuscany, on his way home from Spain; observing, that the visible population consisted for the most part of foreign slaves, who were working in fetters under their task-masters. The dangers of this system had been also made manifest, by an insurrection which had lately broken out among the slaves in Sicily; for the immense estates possessed in that island by Roman or Latin citizens,<sup>4</sup> were, like those in Italy, cultivated entirely by slaves, whose numbers became so formidable, that being roused to arms by one of their body, they maintained a long and bloody war with the Roman government, spread devastation over the whole island, and defeated no fewer than four Roman prætors, who were sent against them. Plutarch tells us besides, that Gracchus being known as a young man of enterprise and ability, was called upon in many addresses written upon the walls in different parts of the city, to stand up in the cause of the poor, and to recover for them the public lands which the rich had monopolized.

Thus instigated at once by the pressing evils of the existing system, by personal predilections, and by the allurements of an evident popularity, Tiberius Gracchus entered on his unfortunate career. The remedy which he proposed for the growing distresses of the poor, consisted in a revival of the Licinian law, with certain modifications; that is to say,<sup>5</sup> he allowed a father of a family to hold 500 jugera of public or conquered land in his own right, and 250 more in right of each of his sons; but any man who possessed more than this amount, was to restore it to the nation on receiving a price for it from the treasury. To this proposition was added, that the lands thus recovered, should be divided among the poorer citizens, and that it should be unlawful at any time that any of these allotments should be sold: and finally, in order to provide for the execution of the law, three commissioners were to be appointed annually, with powers to see it duly carried into effect, and its enactments observed unbroken. It is said by Plutarch, that in proposing these measures, Gracchus acted with

<sup>4</sup> Florus, III. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, *Vita Gracchi*, 9. Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* I. 9, 10.

the concurrence of some individuals of distinguished rank, and of great legal knowledge; such as P. Crassus, then Pontifex Maximus, and P. Mucius Scævola, one of the consuls; both of whom are often mentioned by Cicero<sup>6</sup> as eminent for their acquaintance with the civil law, as well as for their general eloquence and ability. If this be true, it is a proof that the mischievous tendency of an agrarian law was not so palpable to the Romans as it is to us, and the apparent extravagance of Gracchus's conduct is much lessened. Indeed, we should remember, that he only professed to enforce, even in mitigated severity, an actually existing law; and that though time had seemed to sanction the encroachments of the rich, he might yet not unnaturally think that the people could never lose their rights by mere disuse; and that his proposed indulgences to the holders of national property, abundantly compensated for any wrong they might sustain by the sudden revival of a long dormant claim. It is not possible that we, with the added experience and knowledge of more than nineteen centuries, can hesitate to condemn his scheme as pernicious and impracticable; nor, indeed, did it appear otherwise to calm and sensible men at that very time; for C. Lælius, known by the name of the Wise, endeavoured in his tribuneship, a few years before, to remedy the evils arising from the accumulation of estates; but finding that they could not be removed without greater mischief, he abandoned the attempt altogether. But still, although the conduct of Gracchus was violent and unwise, it does not imply in him such a degree of profligacy or folly, as would be justly imputed to a similar proposal now.

The aristocracy in general warmly opposed the projected law; and Gracchus, impatient of any opposition to a scheme which he deemed so beneficial, at once lost his temper; and dropping the more conciliatory clauses, proposed merely that the holders of national lands beyond the legal amount, should be obliged to give them up immediately.<sup>7</sup> This only added to the vehemence of the opposition against it; and the question being one of such universal interest, great crowds of people flocked to Rome from all quarters of Italy, to take part with the friends or enemies of the law.<sup>8</sup> But the aristocratical party, well knowing how the tribes were likely to vote if it were left to their decision, had secured the negative of M. Octavius, one of the tribunes: and this being resolutely interposed, whenever the measure was brought forward, it was impossible for Gracchus, according to the forms of the constitution, to carry his point. He too, however, availed himself of his power as tribune to embarrass his opponents; for he suspended by his negative the functions of every officer in the state,<sup>9</sup> and sealed up

<sup>6</sup> De Claris Orator. 26. De Oratore, I. 50. 56. De Officiis, II. 13.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 10.

<sup>9</sup> Plutarch, Vita Gracchi, 10.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch, Vita Gracchi, 10.



the doors of the treasury, thus stopping all issues or receipts of money for the public service. So strange was the extent of the tribunitian authority, that Gracchus in these violent proceedings was acting agreeably to law ; and the nobility, unable to resist him, went into mourning, to show their sense of the distress and dangerous state of the republic.

Still, while Octavius persisted in his opposition, the law could not be carried.<sup>10</sup> Gracchus, therefore, resolving to overbear every obstacle, and having endeavoured to win over his colleague by entreaty, as he was personally well known to him, and by the utmost efforts of his eloquence, at last finding him immovable, openly declared, that two men so opposed to one another ought not to continue in office together ; that either Octavius or himself ought therefore to be forced by the people to lay down the tribuneship. And with a mockery of fairness, he desired Octavius first to submit to the comitia the question, that Tiberius Gracchus should be no longer tribune. When this was declined, he announced his own intention of proposing a similar resolution on the following day with regard to Octavius. Accordingly, when the assembly met, Gracchus, after another personal appeal to his colleague, entreating him to yield to the wishes of the people, and finding him still resolute in his refusal, proposed to the tribes the sentence of degradation. Seventeen successively voted for it, and as the total number of the tribes was thirty-five, the votes of one more would constitute a majority. At this point, then, Gracchus paused and once more conjured Octavius to spare him the necessity of proceeding to such a painful extremity. Octavius, it is said, was staggered ; but the sight of the nobility, who anxiously watched his behaviour, and the shame of being intimidated by personal considerations, gave him fresh firmness, and he told Gracchus to do whatever he thought proper. The eighteenth tribe then gave their votes for his degradation, and the measure being carried, Gracchus sent one of his officers to drag Octavius down from the seat which he occupied as tribune. When this had been done, and Octavius had been thrust out among the people, the mob immediately fell upon him, and although Gracchus tried to check them, he found that a demagogue has little power in restraining his followers from violence, and Octavius with difficulty escaped from their fury by the efforts of the nobility and the zeal of his own slaves, one of whom lost his eyes in defending his master.

After such an example, no tribune ventured any more to impede the progress of the law, which was passed immediately without difficulty. But it appears that Crassus and Mucius were either disgusted at the late conduct of Gracchus, or that he began

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch, *Vita Gracchi*, 11, 12. Appian, 12.

now to throw himself entirely into the arms of the common people, for neither their names, nor those of any other distinguished senator unconnected with the tribune, were to be found among the commissioners appointed to carry the law into effect. The list consisted of Gracchus himself,<sup>11</sup> of his younger brother Caius, a youth of only twenty years of age, and at this time serving under Scipio in Spain, and of his father-in-law, Appius Claudius. It was evident that the real power of the commission would rest solely with Tiberius Gracchus, and this circumstance was likely to embitter still more the feelings of the senate towards him. Their hatred betrayed itself in a manner at once impolitic and mean, for they refused him the usual allowance granted to a public commissioner,<sup>12</sup> and reduced it to a denarius and a half, or about one shilling a day. Both parties were full of suspicion against each other; a friend of Tiberius happening to die suddenly, the appearance exhibited by his body was attributed to the effects of poison, and Tiberius himself, as if afraid for his own life, put on mourning, and with his young children in his hand, went round among the people, recommending his family to their protection, in case he himself should fall a victim to his enemies. On the other hand, Gracchus began to incur the imputation which had proved so often fatal to former demagogues, that of aspiring to make himself tyrant of Rome.<sup>13</sup> Attalus, the last king of Pergamus, was lately dead, and one of his ministers had arrived in Rome with his will, by which he bequeathed his dominions and treasure to the Roman people. Gracchus immediately proposed a law, that the treasure should be divided among those citizens who should receive allotments of land under the new commission, in order to enable them to stock their farms, and that the disposal and management of the kingdom should be lodged exclusively with the popular assembly. Under the odium which such conduct excited, any accusation against him was readily listened to; and a senator, whose house was next to that of Gracchus, stood up in the senate, and asserted on his own knowledge, that the minister of the late king of Pergamus had presented Gracchus with a diadem and a scarlet robe, preparatory, as he insinuated, to his usurping the regal state of which those decorations were the insignia.

But his conduct towards Octavius afforded his enemies a surer ground of censure. Even many of the people, it is said, were struck with the unprecedented violence of that measure; and Gracchus thought proper to justify himself at some length, and endeavoured to show that the sacredness of the tribunitian office was destroyed, when a tribune turned his power to the injury of

<sup>11</sup> Appian and Plutarch, *ubi suprâ*. Vel-  
leius Paternulus, II. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Plutarch, *Vita Gracchi*, 13.

<sup>13</sup> Plutarch, 14.

that part of the people whose interests he was especially appointed to guard. What effect his arguments produced on the minds of his hearers cannot be known; but in the judgment of posterity his conduct has appeared indefensible. The negative of the tribunes was their peculiar and constitutional privilege, and it had often been exerted in defence of individuals against popular violence, as well as in behalf of the interests of the commons collectively against the encroachments of the aristocracy. To set it aside whenever it opposed the inclinations of a majority of the comitia, and far more to degrade the tribune who interposed it, was a direct injury to the personal liberty of every citizen, and left him absolutely without defence against the wildest tyranny which the popular assembly might be excited by its orators to commit. It was a violation of the letter of the constitution, not on the plea of necessity, but merely of expediency; and it furnished a pretence for the more flagrant violation of it, of which the opposite party, in their turn, were soon proceeding to be guilty. Meanwhile the crowds who had flocked to Rome, during the discussion of the agrarian law, had left the city and returned to their homes, elated with their triumph.<sup>14</sup> It was possible that Gracchus might not always be able to command a majority in the comitia, and in that case he had the prospect before his eyes of impeachment, condemnation, and exile. He resolved, therefore, to avail himself of his present popularity, for the purpose of being re-elected tribune for the following year, and he trusted that his supporters from the country would re-assemble on such an occasion, and would secure his election. To win still more the favour of the multitude, he allured them with the hope of a number of popular measures which he proposed to carry in his next tribuneship: the term of military service,<sup>15</sup> to which every citizen was bound by law, was to be shortened; the judicial power in ordinary criminal causes, which had hitherto been confined to senators, was to be shared with the equestrian order; and Paterculus adds,<sup>16</sup> that he promised to procure the freedom of Rome for all the inhabitants of Italy. These were indeed the proceedings of a dangerous demagogue; but it is impossible to decide whether Gracchus desired a second tribuneship as a defensive or an offensive measure: whether he wished it only as a protection for himself, or whether he meditated plans still more subversive of all good government than those which he had already avowed. But fear has been justly numbered among the causes which led them into

<sup>14</sup> Appian, 13.

<sup>15</sup> Plutarch, 16, seems to speak of these laws as actually proposed by Tiberius Gracchus; but as the one which regards the judicial power is ascribed both by Paterculus and Appian to his brother Caius,

and no one mentions any of these measures among the actual offences of Tiberius, I have thought it most probable that they were only talked of by him, and were never carried into effect.

<sup>16</sup> Velleius Paterculus, ubi suprâ.



injustice ; and acts which he might have deemed necessary to his own safety, might have been of a nature no less violent than such as the most deliberate treason against his country would have dictated.

The season of election was now approaching,<sup>71</sup> and the friends of the aristocracy insisted that the same person could not legally be appointed tribune two years successively. Accordingly, on the day of election, a demur on this point was made by the tribune who presided at the comitia, and who accepted or refused the votes of the citizens. He was requested to resign his office to Mucius or Mummius, a warm partisan of Gracchus, and the man who had been lately elected to fill the place of Octavius. But the other tribunes objected to this arrangement, and a dispute ensuing, the friends of Gracchus perceived that the result was likely to be unfavourable to them, and contrived to protract the discussion to so late an hour, that the assembly was obliged to be adjourned to the following day. During the remainder of the afternoon and evening, Gracchus again went about in mourning with his children, appealing to the compassion of the people ; and so strong a sentiment was excited in his behalf, that a great crowd watched through the night around his house, in order to secure him from the violence which he affected to dread. He himself meanwhile was concerting with his friends the measures to be pursued on the morrow ; and a signal was agreed upon amongst them,<sup>18</sup> to be used in case it should be necessary for them to employ force. The capitol was occupied by his party while it was yet dark, and in the morning he left his house to join them, and was received with the loudest acclamations ; a crowd of his friends ranging themselves around his person, in order that no one on whom they could not depend might approach too near him.

From this point the relations of Plutarch and Appian vary ; nor have we any contemporary account which might teach us how to reconcile them with each other, or assist us in judging which of the two we ought to follow. We shall attempt to compose such a statement as may be probable in itself, and not inconsistent with either of our authorities. At the first outset, the tribunes who were opposed to Gracchus,<sup>19</sup> and the partisans of the nobility, endeavoured to interrupt the election, on the ground which had been urged on the preceding day, that a tribune could not be re-elected for the following year. A disturbance thus arose among the multitude,<sup>20</sup> and at the same moment Fulvius Flaccus, a senator attached to the popular party, arrived in haste from the senate, and making signs that he wished to speak to Gracchus,

<sup>17</sup> Plutarch and Appian, *ubi suprâ*.

<sup>18</sup> Appian, 15.

<sup>19</sup> Plutarch and Appian.

<sup>20</sup> Plutarch, 18.

obtained a passage through the crowd. He brought information that the nobility, being unable to procure the sanction of the consul, were preparing of themselves to attack the comitia, and had armed for this purpose a considerable body of their friends and of their slaves. The popular faction, already in a high state of agitation, were roused to the utmost by these tidings. They tucked up their gowns to prepare for action, seized the staves from the hands of the ordinary officers who kept order in the comitia, broke them, and distributed the fragments among their own party, and when Gracchus gave the concerted signal<sup>21</sup> by raising his hand to his head, they at once fell upon the tribunes who had opposed them, and on the rest of the supporters of the senate, and drove them from the place of assembly. All now became tumult; the priests of Jupiter shut the gates of the temple in the capitol, and a thousand vague and exaggerated rumours were carried to the senate; some saying that Gracchus was deposing the other tribunes from their office; others that he was nominating himself to a second tribuneship, without waiting for the votes of the people; while a third set, who had from a distance seen him raise his hand to his head, affirmed that he was instantly to be appointed king, and that he had actually signified his desire to receive from the people a crown.

These several reports reached the senators who were assembled in the temple of Faith. P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, a man of the highest nobility, of great landed property, and of a stern and determined temper,<sup>22</sup> called upon P. Mucius, the consul, to take instant and vigorous measures for the destruction of the tyrant. To this Mucius answered, that he would not set the example of shedding blood, nor destroy any citizen without trial; but if the people were seduced or terrified by Gracchus into any illegal resolutions, he should consider such resolutions to be of no authority. Nasica then exclaimed, "The consul deserts the republic; let those who wish to preserve it follow me." At once the senators arose, wrapped their gowns around their left arms as a shield, and proceeded in a body towards the capitol. Nasica led them, with a fold of his robe thrown over his head; and the train was swelled by the friends and slaves of the senators, who had provided themselves beforehand with clubs and sticks. On the approach of this band, consisting of all the nobility of Rome, the people made way before them, and fled in all directions. The senators seized the staves which their opponents dropped in their flight, or armed themselves with the fragments of the benches which had been broken down in the confusion of the crowd. With these weapons they attacked all who fell in their way; and Gracchus

<sup>21</sup> Appian, 15.

<sup>22</sup> Cicero, de Officiis, I. 30. De Claris Orator. 28.

himself endeavouring to escape, and stumbling over those who had already fallen, was killed by repeated blows on the head. About three hundred of his friends shared his fate, being all killed by clubs or bludgeons, which were the only weapons employed. The bodies of all the slain, including Gracchus himself, were ordered to be thrown into the Tiber, and the senate following up their victory, put to death afterwards several of the partisans of the late tribune; some of them, it is said,<sup>23</sup> with circumstances of atrocious cruelty.

It throws a remarkable light on the notions entertained by the Romans on political justice, that Cicero, a man whose moral principles were far purer than those of his countrymen in general, speaks more than once of the murder of Gracchus in terms of the warmest praise.<sup>24</sup> So accustomed were the Romans to have recourse to the plea of necessity or public utility, to justify the violation of the existing laws of the commonwealth. Now, as it is obvious that these abstract principles are of a far more pliable nature than written forms of law can be, all parties in turn might appeal to such an excuse, with plausibility, when the laws, if duly observed, would have passed on each a just condemnation. No doubt there is an extreme on the other side; and a blind devotion to the letter and forms of the constitution on all occasions, may really compromise those great interests for the sake of which alone forms are valuable. But there cannot be a question that the adherence to rules, and the respect for particular institutions, which remarkably distinguish our English lawyers, are a most valuable security to personal liberty, and that they serve to subject the fury of contending factions to one impartial and unimpassioned decision. At Rome, public expediency was successfully appealed to, to justify the degradation of Octavius and the death of Gracchus; whereas a truer knowledge of the interests of justice and liberty would have taught them to abhor both those actions as illegal and tyrannical: the last, as is usual in cases of retaliation, far exceeding the former by which it was provoked, in violence and atrocity.

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch, *Vita Tib. Gracch.* 20. — <sup>24</sup> *De Officiis*, I. 22. 30.



## CHAPTER III.

CAIUS GRACCHUS.—FROM U.C. 621, B.C. 133, TO U.C. 633, B.C. 121.

THE murder of Tiberius Gracchus was so much a sudden and isolated act, that it did not at all interrupt the execution of those laws which he had proposed and carried in his tribuneship. His death occasioned a vacancy among the commissioners for carrying into effect his agrarian law ; and P. Licinius Crassus,<sup>1</sup> who was nominated to succeed him, perishing shortly after in the war against Aristonicus,<sup>2</sup> in Pergamus ; and Appius Claudius,<sup>3</sup> another of the original commissioners, dying also about the same time, the commission finally was composed of C. Gracchus, the younger brother of Tiberius, C. Papirius Carbo, and M. Fulvius Flaccus. But the extreme youth of C. Gracchus, and possibly the impression produced on his mind by the fate of his brother, prevented him from immediately taking an active part in public affairs. His colleagues, however, were well disposed to make up for his absence ; and they proceeded to fulfil the duties of their appointment in that summary and absolute manner which was so familiar to the magistrates of Rome. They readily received accusations against any persons who were charged with holding national lands ;<sup>4</sup> and decided on all these cases by their own sole authority. It often happened that property alleged to be public, was intermixed with estates lawfully belonging to the inhabitants of the allied states of Italy ; and now the present commission extended its inquiries to the titles by which these estates were held ; and their owners were called upon to show how they had acquired them, and to produce either the deeds of the purchase, or the grants by which they had received them from the Roman government. Sometimes these documents were not to be found ; and then the commissioners decided at their discretion upon the property of the land ; and removed at pleasure from their estates men who had peaceably inherited them from a remote period. It appears, also, that for the encouragement of agriculture, permission had been

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in Tib. Gracch. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epitom. LIX.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 18.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 18.

given to individuals on former occasions, to inclose and cultivate the waste lands in their neighbourhood, on the payment probably of a rent, scarcely more than nominal, to the treasury. In process of time, the distinction between the freehold and rented parts of an estate was forgotten; the boundaries between the two were removed; and the whole was looked upon as held by the same tenure. But no prescription was any security against the new commissioners; all public land whatever was to be recovered out of private hands, and to be divided amongst the poorer citizens, according to the provisions of the Sempronian law. Nor was the distribution of the lots to be thus assigned less arbitrary.<sup>5</sup> The law allowed an individual to hold 500 jugera of national property; but it seems that the commissioners might allot them to him in whatever part of Italy they thought proper. Many persons, therefore, were deprived of the lands which they held adjoining to their own estates; and received in exchange an allotment often less valuable in itself, and generally far less conveniently situated. Men obnoxious to the commissioners, either on political or personal grounds, were thus subjected to numberless vexations; while their partisans, their creatures, and their friends, might be most unduly favoured. It is probable, indeed, that the most industrious and peaceable among the poorer citizens, would be by no means the greatest gainers from the distribution of land;<sup>6</sup> but that the opportunity would be seized to reward the most violent supporters of the democratical party in the popular assembly, and to encourage the riotous and seditious for the future, with the hope of earning for themselves a similar prize, by an active and unscrupulous obedience to the prevailing demagogues of the day.

It strongly marks the character of the Roman constitution, that at the very time when a commission so favourable to the wildest claims of the democratical party was actually in existence, the consuls,<sup>7</sup> P. Popilius and P. Rupilius, were proceeding to inflict the penalty of banishment on several of the partisans of Tiberius Gracchus, by no other authority than a vote of the senate, and in manifest contempt of the Valerian law. This, as was natural, was on a future occasion strongly resented by the popular party; and thus in the tyrannical powers which both sides in turn allowed themselves to exercise, there never were wanting to either pretences of retaliation, whenever they could gain the ascendancy.

Meantime, the proceedings of the agrarian commissioners excited a general indignation amongst the inhabitants of the provinces of Italy,<sup>8</sup> many of whom had been

P. Scipio opposes the commissioners of the agrarian law.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 18.

<sup>7</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 7. Plutarch,

<sup>6</sup> Conf. Cicero, de Lege Agraria contra in C. Gracch. 4.

Rullum; Orat. II. 29. 31.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 19.

dispossessed of estates to make room for some of the poor citizens of Rome. In looking out for a man who might espouse their cause with effect, they were led to fix their eyes on P. Cornelius Scipio Æmilianus, who was distinguished for his military services, and had lately returned to Rome, after having effected the destruction of Numantia. Scipio had become acquainted with many of the Italians, when serving under him as allies in the Roman army, and was well able to appreciate their value ; he was inclined also of himself to oppose the popular party ; and he came forward therefore with complaints of the excessive power vested in the hands of the commissioners, and proposed that all points in dispute between them and the occupiers of land should be decided, not by themselves, but by a more impartial jurisdiction. This seemed so fair, that it was acceded to ; and C. Sempronius Tuditanus, one of the consuls, was appointed judge of all appeals against the measures of the commissioners. But this officer, disgusted with the difficulties of the office, soon resigned it, and departed to his province of Illyricum ; whilst, as no one acted in his place, the commissioners again were enabled to defy all opposition. The attempt, however, to lessen their power had rendered Scipio odious to their party ; nor was this the only way in which he offended them ; for he had on a former occasion procured the rejection of a law brought forward by Carbo,<sup>9</sup> and supported by Gracchus, to allow the same person to be re-elected tribune as often as the people should choose.

U. C. 623. U. C. 624.

He did not abate in his opposition to their power as commissioners, till, on the night preceding the day on which he was going to address the people fully on the subject, he died suddenly in his bed :<sup>10</sup> and his death was attributed by the violence of party to the contrivances of Carbo and Gracchus.

Death of P. Scipio.

But the general, and the most probable account was, that his death was natural ;<sup>11</sup> nor, indeed, is secret assassination a crime consistent with that which we know of the character of the Roman political quarrels at this period of the republic.

The agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus, which had arisen immediately out of the relative situation of the rich and poor citizens of Rome, began now in its operation to affect other interests, and to bring forward new claims, and new changes. It has been mentioned, that the landholders among the allied states of Italy, felt themselves particularly aggrieved by it, and that they had applied to Scipio to undertake the defence of their cause. After his death they continued their opposition to it,<sup>12</sup> in conjunction with the aristocratical party at Rome ; and thus the execution of

<sup>9</sup> Livy, Epitom. LIX. Cicero, de Amicit. 25.

<sup>10</sup> Appian, 20. Velleius Paterculus, II. 4. Livy, Epitom. LIX.

<sup>11</sup> Vid. Paterculus.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 21.



the law was delayed and impeded, and its supporters might have despaired of ever carrying it into full effect, while there were such powerful interests arrayed against it. Upon this a scheme was devised, which should at once conciliate one part of the opponents of the laws, and set them at variance with the other part. Hopes were held out to the Italian allies, that they should be admitted to all the privileges of Roman citizens; and in return for so splendid a gift, it was expected that they would renounce their opposition to the agrarian law. Besides, the popular leaders might probably calculate on making the strength of their party irresistible, if so many thousand members, indebted to them for their right of voting, should be added to the popular assembly; and as the number of citizens would then be so great, that the actual meeting of the whole people in one place would be impracticable: the comitia were likely to consist of an assemblage of the idlest and most worthless of the community; to be more than ever incapable of reason, and more than ever liable to become instruments of mischief in the hands of their favourite orators. However, the proposed grant of citizenship completely answered the views of the popular leaders: the Italians, forgetting the agrarian law in the seducing prospect now opened to them, crowded to Rome to witness the decision of the question, and to influence it in their favour by every means in their power. While, on the other hand, the senate, considering this new measure as more dangerous than even the division of the national lands, prepared vigorously to oppose it; and M. Junius Pennus,<sup>13</sup> one of the tribunes, brought forward a law under their authority, commanding all aliens to depart from Rome, and prohibiting them generally from access to it. The law was carried, and the success of the senate in this previous struggle deterred, as it seems, the popular leaders from bringing on the main question for the present. At this time, also, they lost one of their number, C. Gracchus, who having been elected quæstor, was sent into Sardinia with L. Aurelius Orestes,<sup>14</sup> one of the consuls, to quell some disturbances in that island.

The popular leaders conciliate Italian allies by the hope of obtaining the rights of Roman citizens.

The scheme defeated by the senate.

U. C. 627. U. C. 628.

In the succeeding year, M. Fulvius Flaccus, one of the commissioners of the agrarian law, was elected consul; and availing himself of the power of his office, he threatened to bring the question concerning the Italian allies to an issue. The senate conjured him, it is said,<sup>15</sup> to desist from his purpose; and finding that he treated them with contempt, they averted the evil for the time by sending Fulvius on foreign service;<sup>16</sup> availing themselves of the opportunity afforded by the

Renewed unsuccessfully by M. Fulvius Flaccus.

<sup>13</sup> Vid. Ciceron. de Claris Orator. 28. De Officiis, III. 11.

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, 1.

<sup>15</sup> Valerius Maximus, IX. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 34. Livy, Epitom. LX.

Salyes, a tribe of Transalpine Gaul, who had attacked the dominions of the city of Marseilles, an ally of the republic. But the hopes which his proposed measures had excited in the minds of the Italians could not be at once forgotten; and some among them were disposed to assert their claims by force, without depending on their friends at Rome. The people of Fregellæ are mentioned as having revolted from the Romans; and Cicero goes so far as to speak of the "war with Fregellæ."<sup>17</sup> But the war which a single city could maintain against the Roman empire could not have been very serious. Fregellæ was betrayed by one of its citizens,<sup>18</sup> and the prætor, L. Opimius, who was employed on this occasion, after having killed so many of the inhabitants as to encourage him to claim a triumph,<sup>19</sup> received the submission of the survivors,<sup>20</sup> and razed their city to the ground.

It was late in the succeeding year, when C. Gracchus, after an absence of about two years, returned from Sardinia without the permission of his general, intending at the ensuing elections to offer himself as a candidate for the tribuneship.<sup>21</sup> His conduct in thus leaving his province was complained of, and was noticed by the censors; but he defended himself successfully both on this and on other occasions, when he was accused of having been concerned in the revolt of Fregellæ. He obtained also the office of tribune which he desired, but was so vigorously opposed by the senatorian party, that he could only obtain the fourth place in the list. He was now about thirty years of age, and possessed all the qualifications requisite in a popular leader. His eloquence was of a very high order,<sup>22</sup> at once sensible and commanding; his education<sup>23</sup> had begun early under the care of his mother Cornelia, and exceeded that of most of his contemporaries: his activity and diligence were great, and the fate of his brother, as well as the circumstances of his early political life, marked him out as a determined enemy of the senate and partisan of the popular cause. Accordingly his tribuneship was marked by a succession of acts, all prompted evidently by party views, and which appear to have originated far less in honest feelings of compassion for the sufferings of the poor, than the laws of his brother Tiberius. The truth is, that there were now two parties in the state more distinctly formed; and men under such circumstances are too apt to believe that the good of their country can only be promoted through the medium of the ascendancy of their party.

In the accounts which we are now to give of the measures pursued by C. Gracchus, the want of a good contemporary his-

<sup>17</sup> De Lege Agrariâ, II. 33.

<sup>18</sup> Cicero, de Finibus, V. 22.

<sup>19</sup> Valerius Maximus, II. 8.

<sup>20</sup> Livy, Epitom. LX.

<sup>21</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, 2.

<sup>22</sup> Cicero, de Claris Orator. 33. 58.

<sup>23</sup> Cicero, de Claris Orator. 33. 58.

torian whom we may follow with confidence will be severely felt. And here it may not be improper, once for all, to acquaint the English reader with the nature of those materials from which our knowledge of this part of Roman history is derived ; for this is not made sufficiently clear by the generality of modern compilers, and their narrative proceeds with as little hesitation as if they were copying from the fullest and most respectable authorities. The most detailed account of the times with which we are now engaged, is to be found in Plutarch's life of Caius Gracchus. Now from whom Plutarch chiefly copied he does not inform us ; and neither his knowledge of the Roman laws and forms, nor his general accuracy, nor even his object in writing, are such as to render him a valuable guide in stating the provisions of particular statutes with exactness, or the order in which they were proposed. Appian, who has written more briefly, is equally silent as to the authorities for his history, and quotes the enactments of the different laws too vaguely. It is to be observed, that he relates several facts in a different order from that followed by Plutarch. We should remember, then, that the writers whom we must chiefly consult were two foreigners, who lived more than two hundred years later than the period for which we refer to them, in whose times a totally new order of things had succeeded to the old government, and who appear to have had a very superficial knowledge of the laws and constitution of the republic. In addition to Plutarch and Appian, we have the sketch of Roman history drawn by Velleius Paterculus, in which the acts of Gracchus are enumerated all together without any detail of circumstances : we have the epitomes of the lost books of Livy, which are also a mere sketch, and compiled by an uncertain author, and we have the meagre outlines of the life of Gracchus given by Florus and Aurelius Victor. When these writers differ from one another, we know not to whose statements we ought most to listen, unless the point be determined accidentally by some allusion to it in an earlier writer : or unless we venture to decide by internal probability. The voluminous works of Cicero do indeed often throw light on the affairs of the times preceding his own ; and his legal and constitutional knowledge make his authority highly valuable. But it is easy to understand how very insufficient such scattered fragments of information must be towards giving a full and connected history of any transaction. We proceed then, but with hesitation and doubt, to offer the best account in our power of a period which well deserves to have been commemorated by able and more careful historians.

According to Plutarch, C. Gracchus commenced his career as tribune by inflammatory addresses to the people, in which he bewailed continually the fate of his brother,

U. C. 630.

Laws of C. Gracchus  
Leges Sempronie.

Sketch of the authorities for this part of Roman history.



and painted the iniquity of his murder. He then brought forward two laws, the one to disqualify any magistrate who had been deprived of his office by the people from being afterwards appointed to any other post of authority; the other making it a crime cognizable by the popular assembly, if any magistrate banished a Roman citizen without trial. The former of these was merely a fresh mark of the hatred of the popular leaders towards M. Octavius, who had been degraded from the tribuneship, as has been already mentioned, for his opposition to the agrarian law when first proposed by Tiberius Gracchus; and the unworthy feelings in which the measure originated were so evident, that C. Gracchus himself was persuaded by his mother to procure its rejection. The second law was particularly directed against P. Popilius, who, as we have seen, had during his consulship exercised the vengeance of the senate against several of the partisans of Tiberius Gracchus. Popilius, fearful of being brought to trial, withdrew from Rome; and Gracchus then carried a law,<sup>24</sup> by which he was forbidden the use of fire and water in Italy, the usual form of passing a sentence of banishment. After these preparatory acts, intended perhaps to intimidate the friends of the aristocracy, Gracchus brought forward such measures as, by gratifying the common people, were likely to bind them to support him in all his future proceedings. The agrarian law, passed during the tribuneship of his brother Tiberius, was again confirmed,<sup>25</sup> and some provisions were probably made to insure its execution. By another law it was ordered<sup>26</sup> that the soldiers should be provided with clothing without deducting from their pay the money thus expended; and that no one should enlist under seventeen years of age. A third enacted, that corn should be distributed monthly to the people,<sup>27</sup> at the price of five-sixths of an as for the modius or peck: which would make the value of the quarter nearly one shilling and eightpence of our money. What quantity was thus to be given to every citizen, we have not been able to find; but whether it were much or little, the injustice and impracticability of this Roman poor-law are equally striking; for its operation would in the end have fed the Roman people at the expense of the subject provinces, and by discouraging industry and encouraging population would have filled Rome with a mere multitude of idle paupers, incapable of government, and so completely worthless, that the rest of the world would not long have endured their dominion or their existence. This law was warmly opposed by the aristocratical party, and amongst the rest by L. Calpurnius Piso,<sup>28</sup> who had been

Corn law. *Lex frumentaria*.

<sup>24</sup> Cicero pro Domo sua, 31.

<sup>25</sup> Livy, Epitom. LX. Plutarch, in C. Graccho, 5.

<sup>26</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, 5.

<sup>27</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 21. Livy, Epitom. LX.

<sup>28</sup> Cicero, Tusculan. Disputat. III. 20.

consul during the year in which Tiberius Gracchus was killed. It passed, however, in spite of their opposition, and soon after Piso was seen amongst the crowd of poor citizens, who came to receive their portion of corn. Gracchus observing him, charged him with inconsistency for taking the benefit of a law which he had so strongly opposed; to which Piso replied, "I should very much object to your giving away my property amongst the people; but if you were to do it, I should certainly try to get my share of it." In addition to all these acts, another was attempted to be passed to gratify the Italians,<sup>29</sup> by granting them the right of voting in the assemblies at Rome, but without communicating to them the other privileges of Roman citizenship. But the most formidable attack upon the senate still remained to be made: the judges who sat with the prætors for the ordinary trial of criminal causes, had hitherto consisted of Law concerning the judicial power. senators alone;<sup>30</sup> and in the strong party feeling which bound the members of the different orders of the republic to the support of each other, a senator when tried by senators was likely to meet with more favour than justice. This was particularly the case when officers of high rank were tried for corruption or misconduct in the provinces: and instances of partiality had lately occurred in the acquittal of L. Aurelius Cotta and Marcius Aquilius, the former of whom had been accused by P. Scipio Æmilianus,<sup>31</sup> and had been brought before the court eight successive times; and the latter may be well judged capable of any crime, since he has been already mentioned as guilty of poisoning the wells, when engaged in the war against Aristonicus in Asia. The odium excited by these cases favoured the wishes of Gracchus, and he succeeded in introducing a most important change in the constitution, by transferring the judicial power from the senate to the equestrian order, either by ordering that the judges should henceforth be appointed solely from the latter, or, as the account of Livy's Epitomizer leads us to suppose, by providing, that for every senator among the judges there should be henceforth named in addition two equites or knights, thus giving a decided majority to their order. Plutarch here gives us an instance of his ignorance respecting the simplest facts in the history of the Roman constitution. For he tells us, that whereas there were before three hundred judges, all senators, by the law of Gracchus three hundred from the equestrian orders were added to them, so that the influence of the two orders in judicial proceedings was henceforward equal. He confounds the Sempronian law with the laws of Plotius and Lirius, which were passed on purpose to alter its pro-

<sup>29</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, 5. Appian, 23.

<sup>30</sup> Appian, 22. Velleius Paterculus, II. 6.

<sup>31</sup> Cicero, *Divinatio* in Cæcil. 21. Valerius Maximus, VIII. 1.

visions. Of the effects of this alteration it is difficult to judge: Appian asserts that the judges of the equestrian order soon became as corrupt as the senators,<sup>32</sup> and were as unjustly severe towards all senators who were tried before them, as the former judges had been unduly partial. Whereas Cicero declares,<sup>33</sup> that during the whole period of nearly fifty years in which the law of Gracchus continued in force, there had never arisen even the slightest suspicion of any of the judges having received a bribe. It should be remembered, however, that this is said in the course of his pleadings as an advocate, and on such occasions the greatest allowance must be made for the wide deviations from truth continually practised by the orators of both Greece and Rome.

These popular acts raised Gracchus to a height of influence and consideration among the people such as rendered him almost absolute. To increase the number of his dependents at the same time that he was throwing lustre upon his administration, he brought in several laws for making roads,<sup>34</sup> constructing bridges, erecting storehouses for the corn that was to be distributed among the people, and executing various other works of ornament and utility. As Gracchus, from his present popularity, enjoyed the power of appointing the persons who were to be employed in these undertakings, he was constantly surrounded by a crowd of contractors, artificers, engineers, public officers, men of science, and workmen of various descriptions, all courting his patronage, soliciting his judgment on their several proposals, and ready to support him meanwhile in all his enterprises. The activity of his mind, and the versatility of his talents, enabled him to enter into the views of all; the depth of a statesman's knowledge on scientific or common subjects is not very strictly scrutinized by those who are flattered with his attention in noticing them at all; and thus Gracchus obtained the character of a man of universal information, who could at once understand and feel interested in those humbler pursuits, which persons in higher power and station are generally suspected of despising.

The year was meanwhile drawing towards its close; and the law, as it now stood, prevented Gracchus from offering himself a second time as a candidate for the tribuneship. But it appears from Appian,<sup>35</sup> that the force of this law was partly rendered null, by the people possessing the power

Gracchus promotes many public works.

Second tribuneship of Gracchus.

<sup>32</sup> Appian, I. 22.

<sup>33</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, actio prima, 13.

<sup>34</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, 6. Appian, I. 23.

<sup>35</sup> Appian, I. 21. The words are these, *τῆς ἤδη νόμος κεκέρωτο, εἰ δῆμαρχος ἐνδέει ταῖς παραγγελίαις, τὸν δῆμον ἐκ πάντων ἐπιλέγεσθαι.*

We have no doubt that Schweighæuser in his note on this passage has given the true interpretation of it, which we have expressed in the text; but at the same time, we are ignorant what law it is that Appian alludes to, or at what period it was enacted.



of an unlimited choice, in case fewer than ten candidates should offer themselves. It happened on the present occasion that the requisite number of candidates did not come forward; the strong tide of popular feeling towards Gracchus deterring perhaps many from attempting to exclude him; and thus he was again elected, although his own mother, in a letter still extant,<sup>36</sup> dissuaded him most forcibly from taking the office. His career U. C. 631. continued to be the same as before: he now moved that colonies of poor Roman citizens should be planted in several parts of Italy,<sup>37</sup> and that the Latins should be admitted to all the civil rights of Roman citizenship. Finding it hopeless to oppose him in a direct manner, the senate engaged Livius Drusus, another of the tribunes, to bring in measures still more popular under the sanction of the aristocracy, hoping thus to rival the credit of Gracchus, and to conciliate the affections of the multitude to themselves. Drusus proposed to send out no fewer than twelve colonies, a number much exceeding that mentioned by Gracchus; and the colonists were to be exempted from the rent usually paid by them to the treasury for the lands assigned to them.<sup>38</sup> This liberality, which Drusus ascribed entirely to the concern felt by the senate for the welfare of the common people, so far won the gratitude of the multitude, that he ventured boldly to interpose his negative on the other measure brought forward by Gracchus, respecting the grant of citizenship to the Latins.<sup>39</sup> Besides, Drusus carefully avoided assigning to himself any office in the new colonies, and kept himself clear from any suspicion of desiring places of patronage or emolument; thus offering his own conduct as a strong contrast to that of Gracchus, who had taken so large a part in the direction of all the public works executed in compliance with his laws. Thus the credit of Gracchus was somewhat lessened; and to prevent him from regaining his influence by popular speeches, or by any new popular laws, the senate contrived to procure his nomination as one of the commissioners for planting a colony in Africa, near the site of Carthage; for in the present emulation among the tribunes, which should go farthest in gratifying the people, one of them, named Rubrius,<sup>40</sup> had car-

<sup>36</sup> Vid. *Epistolas Corneliæ*, apud *Fragmenta Corneli Nepotis*.

<sup>37</sup> Appian, I. 23. Plutarch, in *C. Graccho*, 8, *Paterculus*, II. 6.

<sup>38</sup> Plutarch, in *C. Graccho*, 9.

<sup>39</sup> Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* I. 23. One concession, however, of considerable importance was made to the Latins by a law of Drusus, to which the senate gave their support; and which enacted that the Latins, when serving in the Roman army, should be exempted from flogging on ordinary occasions. So says Plutarch, in *C. Graccho*, 9. We have added the words

"on ordinary occasions," because otherwise the statement is untrue; for it appears from Sallust, that Metellus ordered one of his officers to be scourged and put to death, which he might do, "because," says Sallust, "the man was a citizen of Latium." Vid. Sallust, *Bell. Jugurth.* 69. But we are by no means clear that Plutarch has not again mistaken a law passed by another Livius Drusus, *U. C.* 662, for one passed by his namesake, the opponent of Gracchus.

<sup>40</sup> Plutarch, in *C. Graccho*, 10.

ried a law, by which this new addition was made to the number of colonies already to be founded under the acts of Gracchus and Drusus. During the absence of Gracchus, his opponents were enabled, as they had hoped, to supersede him more and more in the affections of the people; and they found also a way to attack his measures, by representing it as impious to build again the walls of Carthage, which Scipio had solemnly devoted to perpetual desolation. It was reported also, that several supernatural accidents had delayed the progress of the work; and on these grounds, the party of the senate having gained a zealous and ac-

U. C. 632. tive leader in L. Opimius, the new consul, determined to propose to the people, That the law of Rubrius for planting a colony on the site of Carthage should be repealed.<sup>41</sup> Gracchus had returned to Rome some little time before; and the year of his tribuneship having expired, he was reduced to the condition of a private citizen. What course his own inclinations might have led him to follow, is doubtful; but unfortunately for

Cabals of Gracchus with Fulvius Flaccus. himself, he chose to associate himself to the counsels of M. Fulvius Flaccus, one of the commissioners for the execution of the agrarian law, and a man whose character was respected by no party in the republic. The reputation of Gracchus had already suffered from his connexion with Fulvius; and now he took part with him in designs which can be considered as nothing less than treasonable. Charging the senate with spreading false reports in order to alarm the religious scruples of the people, the two popular leaders assembled a numerous body of their partisans armed with daggers; and being thus prepared for violence, they proceeded to the capitol, where the people were to meet in order to decide on the repeal of the law of Rubrius. Here,<sup>42</sup> before the business of the day was yet begun, a private citizen, who happened to be engaged in offering a sacrifice, was murdered by the partisans of Fulvius and Gracchus, for some words or gestures which they considered as insulting. This outrage excited a general alarm; the assembly broke up in consternation; and the popular leaders, after trying in vain to gain a hearing from the people, while they disclaimed the violence committed by their followers, had no other course left than to withdraw to their own houses. There they concerted plans of resistance, which, however they might believe them to be justified on the plea of self-defence, were justly considered by the bulk of the people as an open rebellion against the government of their country. The consul,<sup>43</sup> exaggerating, perhaps, the alarm which he felt from the late outrage, hastily summoned the senate together;

They openly resist the authority of the government, but are defeated and put to death, by the consul L. Opimius.

<sup>41</sup> Appian, I. 24.

<sup>43</sup> Appian, 25. Plutarch, 14.

<sup>42</sup> Appian, 25. Plutarch, in C. Graccho, 13.

the body of the murdered man was exposed to the view of the people, and the capitol was secured by break of day with an armed force. The senate being informed by Opimius of the state of affairs, proceeded to invest him with absolute power to act in defence of the commonwealth, in the usual form of a resolution, "That the consul should provide for the safety of the republic." At the same time, Gracchus and Fulvius were summoned to appear before the senate, to answer for the murder laid to their charge. Instead of obeying, they occupied the Aventine hill with a body of their partisans in arms, and invited the slaves to join them, promising them their liberty. They sent the son of Fulvius, a youth under eighteen years of age, to the consul with proposals of negotiation; but were answered, that they must first lay down their arms; and till they did so, the senate would hold no intercourse with them. The son of Fulvius, however, was sent back once more, in the hope of better success; but Opimius arrested him, as having come in defiance of the declaration of the senate, and then without further delay proceeded to attack the rebels. He was followed by the senators and the members of the equestrian order, who, with their dependents, had armed themselves by his order; and he had also with him a body of regular soldiers, amongst whom some Cretan archers are particularly noticed.<sup>44</sup> In the mean time, the behaviour of Gracchus was that of a man irresolute in the course which he pursued, and with too much regard for his country to engage heartily in the criminal attempt into which he had suffered himself to be drawn. He had left his house, it is said,<sup>45</sup> in his ordinary dress; he had been urgent with Fulvius to propose terms of accommodation to the senate, and now when the Aventine was attacked, he took personally no part in the action. The contest, indeed, was soon over; the rebels were presently dispersed; Fulvius was dragged from the place to which he had fled for refuge, and was put to death; while Gracchus, finding himself closely pursued, fled across the Tiber, and taking shelter in a grove sacred to the Furies, was killed at his own desire, by a single servant who had accompanied his flight. His head, together with that of Fulvius, was cut off and carried to the consul, in order to obtain the price which had been set upon both by a proclamation issued at the beginning of the engagement; and the bodies, as well as those of all who perished on the same side, were thrown into the river. In addition to this, the houses of Gracchus and Fulvius were given up to plunder, their property was confiscated, and even the wife of Gracchus was deprived of her own jointure. But a yet more atrocious cruelty disgraced the victorious party; for Opimius ordered the son of Fulvius,<sup>46</sup> whom he had detained in

<sup>44</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, 16.

<sup>45</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, 15.

<sup>46</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 6. Appian, 26. Plutarch, 17.



custody, to be put to death ; an act of party vengeance as unjust as it was inhuman. It is said, that in this sedition there perished altogether of the partisans of the popular leaders about 3000, partly in the action, and partly by summary executions afterwards, under the consul's orders.

The career of the two Gracchi was in many respects so similar, and the circumstances of their deaths bore so much resemblance to each other, that it is not wonderful that historians should have comprehended both the brothers under one common judgment, and have pronounced in common their acquittal or their condemnation. But the conduct of Caius admits of far less excuse than that of Tiberius ; and his death was the deserved punishment of rebellion, while that of his brother was an unjustifiable murder. It is true, the aristocratical party were likely to overturn all the measures which he had carried in his two tribunships ; but the ascendancy which they had suddenly gained, was the fruit of no illegal acts or violence ; it arose simply out of the natural revolutions of popular feeling, and from the conciliatory laws which the senate had of late been forward to encourage. If the popular assembly was disposed to take part with the consul Opimius ; if not even a single tribune could be found to interpose his negative against the proposed repeal of the law of Rubrius ; by what pretence of right could Gracchus and Fulvius appear in the capitol at the head of an armed body of partisans ? and still more, when a murder had been committed by some of their friends, and they were called before the supreme council of the state to answer for their violence, by what right could two private citizens defy the authority of their government, and take up a military position with an armed force in the heart of the capital to maintain their disobedience ? Under such circumstances, although there is much in the character of Gracchus to awaken compassion for his fate, he yet only paid the just penalty for conduct which was treasonable in fact, and which on the most favourable construction of his motives, was criminally rash and intemperate. Still, however, the triumph of the senate was more that of an enraged party, than of a firm and impartial government : the execution of the son of Fulvius was an act of gratuitous cruelty ; and the severities exercised after the sedition was over, were conducted without any forms of law, and had no other limit than the inclination of the aristocratical leaders. So bad, indeed, was the constitution of Rome, that the laws for the punishment of state criminals were uncertain and inadequate ; and necessity was thus supposed to allow the correction of an evil by summary and illegal means, because the legal means could not always be depended upon. It may be safely pronounced, that there is no surer criterion of an ill-framed and barbarian government, than the admission of irregular acts of violence by any party on the plea of the public safety.

It is an important inquiry, to find what effect was permanently produced on the condition of the poor by the laws of the two Gracchi; or how long any of their measures were allowed to survive their authors. The agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus was indirectly subverted by a law which permitted the poor to sell the shares of land allotted to them;<sup>47</sup> and which thus exposed them to the temptations of the high prices which the rich could afford to offer them, or of the various vexations by which a powerful neighbour might drive them to give up the land he coveted. But who was the proposer of this law, or at what precise period it passed, we have no information; we can only suppose that it was carried soon after the death of C. Gracchus, when the power of the aristocracy was likely to be most predominant. By two subsequent laws<sup>48</sup> the state of property was restored nearly to what it was before Tiberius Gracchus commenced his career; the first, forbidding any further division of lands, and securing the actual possessors in the enjoyment of the estates which they held, but transferring the rent which they had been accustomed to pay to the treasury, and ordering that it should henceforth be distributed among the poorer citizens: the second, reversing this last provision, and depriving the poor of all share either in the property or income of the national lands. There is great difficulty in settling the precise date of these two laws; but we may suppose them to have been carried before the year of Rome 649, when a new agrarian law<sup>49</sup> was proposed, but soon given up, by L. Marcius Philippus, at which time he asserted, in one of his speeches, that there were not two thousand individuals in the Commonwealth who were worth any property. The duration of the act of C. Gracchus for the distribution of corn appears to have been much longer, though it is hardly possible to conceive that it was always fully executed. It was repealed by M. Octavius,<sup>50</sup> and, as far as can be made out from the scanty information remaining to us, the repeal took place about the year of Rome 678,<sup>51</sup> the new law still providing that some support should

<sup>47</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 27.

<sup>48</sup> Appian, loco citato.

<sup>49</sup> Cicero, de Officiis, II. 21.

<sup>50</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, 60.

<sup>51</sup> Vide Macri Licinii Oration. apud Fragm. Sallust. However, whether the law alluded to in that speech be the Octavian law or not, is certainly a mere matter of conjecture. But Ferguson must be wrong in fixing the Octavian law in the year immediately following the death of Gracchus; for Cicero expressly ranks Octavius with Cotta, Sulpicius, Curio, and others, who flourished after the sedition of Saturnius, v. c. 653, and continued to be

distinguished as orators down to a much later period. In Plutarch's "Life of Marius," it is said that Marius, when tribune, v. c. 634, opposed with success a law for the distribution of corn among the people. But Plutarch is so little to be trusted for accuracy in such matters, that nothing can be concluded from his statement. Possibly the attempt which Marius resisted was one to confirm and enforce the corn-law of C. Gracchus; in the same manner as Gracchus had brought in a law to confirm and enforce the agrarian law of his brother Tiberius, although it had never been repealed since its enactment.

be given to the poor at the public expense, but reducing it to a much smaller amount. But it is probable that the law of Gracchus had long ere this become obsolete, and that the act of Octavius, although far less liberal in its grants, was welcomed as a popular measure, inasmuch as it substituted an actual distribution of corn for one which had been long since abandoned as impracticable. In short, it appears that the reforms proposed by the Gracchi were in the issue most injurious to the interests of the common people, for we are told that<sup>52</sup> for some years after the death of C. Gracchus, the oppression and corruption of the aristocracy prevailed to a greater extent than ever, insomuch that the liberties of the people were well nigh extinguished ; and allowing something for the prejudices of the writer from whom this statement is taken, it is yet too consonant to the usual revolutions of parties to be in the main rejected.

<sup>52</sup> Oratio C. Memmii, apud Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. 31.



## CHAPTER IV.

SKETCH OF THE INTERNAL STATE OF ROME FROM THE DEATH OF  
CAIUS GRACCHUS TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SOCIAL WAR.  
—FROM U.C. 633, B.C. 121, TO U.C. 662, B.C. 92.

THE ascendancy acquired by the party of the senate after the death of C. Gracchus, is marked by a striking fact. From U. C. 633. B. C. 121, to U. C. 662. B. C. 92. C. Papirius Carbo, one of the commissioners under the agrarian law, and formerly so distinguished as a popular leader, deserted his former friends, and was chosen one of the consuls for the ensuing year. During his consulship he undertook the defence of his predecessor in office, L. Opimius, who was impeached by one of the tribunes<sup>1</sup> for punishing citizens in the late tumults in an illegal manner. The trial came on before the people, and Carbo, in the defence of his client, maintained that the resolution of the senate by which the consul had been charged to provide for the safety of the republic,<sup>2</sup> fully justified him in dispensing with all the usual forms of law. And this dispensing power in the senate was so far recognized by the assembly, either from conviction or fear, that Opimius was acquitted. Carbo, however,<sup>3</sup> was accused soon afterwards by L. Crassus, then a very young man, and was charged by him with insincerity in defending Opimius, while the manner in which he had constantly lamented the fate of Tiberius Gracchus, the pernicious laws which he had brought forward in his tribuneship, and above all his share in the murder of Scipio, sufficiently demonstrated his real principles. For what particular crime he was accused we cannot discover; but he was condemned, and destroyed himself in order to escape sentence. It is remarkable also that Crassus might venture to charge him with the murder of Scipio, although no inquiry had ever been instituted respecting that event, nor was it ever proved that Scipio was murdered at all.

During the few years which elapsed between the death of C. Gracchus and the war with Jugurtha, the Roman nobility appear to have been plunged in a state of

Character of the Roman nobility at this period.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXI.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, II. 30, 31.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, II. 40.

extreme corruption. The government of the empire was in their hands, and there were no circumstances of peculiar difficulty to render great public virtues necessary, or to tempt ambitious men in the hope of distinguishing themselves to relinquish the pursuit of selfish enjoyments. Commands in the provinces were sought for as a means of acquiring wealth, either by direct extortion and oppression, or by provoking a war with some neighbouring tribe of barbarians, and acquiring plunder and spoil together with some military renown. At home the rich nobles stood aloof from the bulk of their countrymen, being separated from them by the immense disparity of their fortunes; and having little occasion for their services, while their own numerous slaves supplied them with labourers, tradesmen, stewards, agents, nay even with instructors for their children. In such a state of things it mattered little that the people, as a body, could exercise the most absolute power, and sometimes could enact laws which were very injurious to the interests of the rich. Their force when united was but a poor compensation for their individual weakness; and many a member of the sovereign assembly, when he had left the forum, and became no more than a single poor citizen, was treated by the rich with a pride and oppression from which the humblest labourer in England is secure. The causes of this are to be found in the want of a graduated scale of society, and of an enlightened public opinion. The different parts of the commonwealth were too distinct and too dissimilar to blend together; and too many of the intermediate links in the chain were wanting. And there being thus nothing to answer to that which is with us so emphatically called "the public," public opinion could scarcely exist; and at a distance from the capital it had no means of making itself heard, nor of gaining the information by which alone it can itself be formed. This, it will be observed, is exactly the state of society fitted to breed violent revolutions. A people smarting under individual degradation, ignorant of the true means of delivering themselves from it, and possessing as a body the most sovereign power, were likely, when roused by some active leader, to exert their strength in blind and furious acts of vengeance. An aristocracy, on the other hand, equally ignorant of the real evils of the existing order of things, and seeing nothing but the dangerous violence of the tribunitian seditions, were anxious to keep the people quiet, sometimes by bribes, sometimes by flattery, and sometimes by coercion, so that they might preserve their own ascendancy, and maintain the actual constitution of the republic. Selfishness on both sides, an habitual familiarity with bloodshed, and a general absence of a pure morality with sufficient sanctions, easily gave to the civil wars that ensued, that character of ferocity and rapacity which marks them so peculiarly.

The indifference shown by the nobility towards the crimes of

Jugurtha, an indifference ascribed by the people to the effect of his bribes, first interrupted that ascendancy which the aristocratical party had enjoyed since the death of Gracchus. An active tribune,<sup>4</sup> C. Memmius, availed himself of the favourable opportunity ; the people, roused by his invectives against the corruption of the nobility, began to re-assume their share in the management of affairs ; their voice forced the senate to declare war against Jugurtha ; and the misconduct of the generals employed in the first campaigns, giving additional strength to their complaints of corruption, a formidable court of inquiry consisting of three members was instituted,<sup>5</sup> with a general commission to investigate all cases of public delinquency. The inquisitors conducted themselves with the utmost rigour ; and five persons of the highest rank,<sup>6</sup> amongst whom was L. Opimius, were on this occasion found guilty of corrupt practices, and were either condemned to pay heavy fines or were banished.<sup>7</sup> Soon after, Q. Cæcilius Metellus, a man of spotless reputation, was appointed to take the command in Africa ; and by his ability, and that of his successor, C. Marius, the war with Jugurtha, as has been mentioned in a former part of this work, was brought to a triumphant end.

The popular party begin to recover their strength.  
U. C. 642. U. C. 643.

But we must not omit to notice here a memorable change introduced by Marius, when consul, in the constitution of the Roman army. Hitherto the old aristocratical principle, so universal among the commonwealths of Greece, had been carefully observed ; and none were admitted to serve in the regular infantry of the legions, except they possessed a certain amount of property :<sup>8</sup> the poorest citizens, unless under circumstances of urgent necessity, were only employed in the naval service. But Marius,<sup>9</sup> when raising soldiers to accompany him into Africa, disregarded the usual practice altogether, and enlisted into the legions citizens of the lowest and most indigent classes of society. His motives for this unprecedented measure are variously stated ; but it may be most probably imputed to a mingled feeling of personal ambition, and of hatred towards all those who were any way distinguished for birth or fortune. Himself sprung from the lowest of the people, and having forced his way to the high station which he filled, amidst the scorn and aversion of the nobility, it was his delight to be the consul of the populace ; and as he had risen by their favour, to show that he cared for the support of no order in the state besides. He knew, moreover, that an army formed out of those who have no property to lose, becomes the ready instrument of its general's ambition, and easily

Marius changes the character of the army.

<sup>4</sup> Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. 27. 30, 31.

<sup>5</sup> Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. 40.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, 34.

<sup>7</sup> Opimius was banished, as appears from Cicero, in Pisonem, 40.

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, VI. 19.

<sup>9</sup> Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. 86.



transfers to him the duty and affection which it owes to its country and its government. Marius stands conspicuous among those who have risen to greatness by favouring the envy and hatred of the dregs of the community towards all above them, and who have purchased the forgiveness of the multitude for their crimes and their tyranny, because every thing most noble, most exalted, and most sacred, has been especially the object of their persecution.

About the end of the Jugurthine war, Q. Servilius Cæpio, being then consul,<sup>10</sup> procured an alteration of that law of C. Gracchus, which had committed the whole judicial power to the equestrian order. By the new law, the judges were to be chosen jointly from the senate and the knights. The character of Cæpio seems to render it probable, that the tribunals, as at that time constituted, were very strict in the punishment of corrupt and oppressive magistrates; and that he wished, by restoring a share of the judicial authority to the senate, to secure a greater chance of impunity for such offenders. At least, it is remarkable, that during his command in Gaul,<sup>11</sup> where he was stationed to oppose the expected invasion of the Cimbri, he committed a robbery of the sacred treasure belonging to a temple at Thoulouse, which was held by the inhabitants in particular veneration. Nor was his ability as a general greater than his integrity; for he was accounted the principal cause of the bloody defeat sustained by the Romans in the following year, when the united armies of himself and his successor in the consulship, Cn. Mallius, were overthrown by the Cimbri, with the loss of 80,000 men. The popular cry was loud against him, and he was accused some time afterwards, by C. Norbanus, one of the tribunes;<sup>12</sup> but the aristocratical party made a strong effort to save him, and his condemnation was only procured by actual violence. It appears that his trial was attended by a furious riot, in which M. Æmilius Scaurus, the first on the roll of the senate, was wounded by a stone; and two of the tribunes, who were preparing to interpose their negative on the proceedings of the judges, were driven by the populace from the court. In this manner Cæpio was condemned and banished; and it is said, that his sentence was accompanied by the unusual disgrace of having his property confiscated, by order of the people.<sup>13</sup>

The war with the Cimbri and the other northern tribes was not yet finished, when the most profligate of demagogues, L. Appuleius Saturninus, made himself for the first time conspicuous. His animosity to the senate is attributed by Cicero to a personal slight which he received when he

Career of L. Appuleius Saturninus.

<sup>10</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, 43. De Oratore, II. 49. Cassiodorus, Chronicon.

<sup>11</sup> Strabo, IV. 204. Edit. Xyland.

<sup>12</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, II. 49.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, Epitome, 67.

was quæstor,<sup>14</sup> for at a period of scarcity, the charge of superintending the supply of the markets was taken away from him, and given to M. Æmilius Scaurus, one of the most distinguished of the nobility. He had been one of the tribunes for the year of Rome 650, and in the following year, Q. Metellus,<sup>15</sup> who was then censor, noticed him for the infamy of his general life, and would have degraded him from his rank by virtue of his censorial power, if his colleague in the censorship had not refused to concur with him in the sentence. In the year next succeeding, when Marius was in his fifth consulship, Saturninus declared himself a second time candidate for the tribuneship; but finding himself rejected, he waylaid one of the successful candidates, A. Nonnius, on his way home from the place of election, drove him into an adjoining tavern, and there by the aid of an armed rabble, murdered him. His partisans, availing themselves of the general consternation, assembled early the following morning, and elected him tribune without opposition; and such was the state of things at Rome, that this mockery of all law was submitted to, and Saturninus was recognized in the character which he had usurped by murder. He was not, however, without associates; they were C. Servilius Glaucia, who was at that time one of the prætors, and C. Marius, who, still unsatisfied with the honours he had gained, was now aspiring to a sixth consulship, and was glad to acquire the support of a man so popular with the multitude as Saturninus. It is said, that Marius gained his election as little from the unbiassed choice of the people as his friend Appuleius had done;<sup>16</sup> but that bribery was unscrupulously used, and that his old soldiers at the same time were introduced into the city, to overawe by their tumults the decisions of the comitia. In this manner the cause of the factious and worthless part of the people obtained an unusual triumph, and might well anticipate the gratification of its wildest hopes, when Rome beheld at the same moment C. Marius a consul, C. Servilius Glaucia a prætor, and L. Appuleius Saturninus a tribune of the commons.

The proceedings of the following year seem hardly consistent with the faintest shadow of regular government; for both parties in turn had recourse, without hesitation, to measures of open violence. But we may observe, that Saturninus did not tread in the steps of the Gracchi, nor was it the interest of the poor citizens of Rome that he professed to espouse. He seems to have adopted a policy yet more mischievous, and to have framed his laws for the enrichment of the needy soldiery who had served under Marius in his successive consulships, and who might easily be induced to raise their favourite general to the

<sup>14</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 17.

<sup>15</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 28.

<sup>16</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, 28.

U. C. 653.  
His tribuneship and  
policy.

utmost height of his ambition. He proposed an agrarian law,<sup>17</sup> for the division of certain districts in Gaul, which, having been overrun by the Cimbri, had after their defeat fallen into the hands of the Romans; and he added to the law a clause, by which the senators were bound to swear obedience to it within five days after it should have passed the assembly of the people. But it was apprehended that the soldiers of Marius were likely to be the only gainers from the projected allotment of lands; and among these there was a large proportion of citizens of the allied states of Italy, and also of the agricultural labourers, a class of men which offered an excellent supply of hardy soldiers, and of which Marius had largely availed himself, enlisting, we are told,<sup>18</sup> slaves as well as freemen. Many of these men had received from their general admission to the rank of Roman citizens,<sup>19</sup> for their gallant behaviour in the late war: for example, he had at one time conferred this reward on a thousand soldiers<sup>20</sup> of Camerinum and its district, and had defended himself, when charged with having acted illegally, by saying, that the din of arms had prevented him from hearing the still voice of the laws. So that the party of Marius and Saturninus consisted not so much of the citizens of the capital, as of a country and provincial interest: and in the disturbances that followed, the inhabitants of Rome espoused generally the side of the aristocracy, as feeling that the projects of the three associates were as little favourable to them as to the senate itself. On the other hand, a multitude of citizens,<sup>21</sup> or of men who hoped to become such, flocked in from the country to support the proposed laws of Saturninus; and as force seemed likely to be more employed than any legal methods, many came to Rome on this occasion, who, although they could not vote in a lawful assembly, were yet able to give their party a powerful support by clamour and violence. It was by these arms, indeed, that Saturninus triumphed. Bæbius,<sup>22</sup> one of his colleagues, who interposed his negative on the agrarian law, was driven from the place of meeting by showers of stones; and when some of the aristocratical party exclaimed, "that they heard thunder," a sound which, according to the custom of the Romans, should at once have broken up the assembly, Saturninus replied, "that it would hail presently, if they were not quiet." The people of the city, incensed at this open violence, endeavoured to maintain their ground by force, but they were overpowered by the armed mob at the disposal of Saturninus; and being obliged to abandon the field, the law was passed amidst the shouts of the victorious party. Other laws in the same spirit were carried in the same manner:

<sup>17</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 29.

<sup>18</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, 9.

<sup>19</sup> Cicero, pro Balbo, 20.

<sup>20</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, 28.

<sup>21</sup> Appian, I. 29.

<sup>22</sup> Auctor de Viris illustribus, in Vita Saturnini.



one, decreeing a division of lands in Africa to the veteran soldiers, and assigning a hundred jugera to each man ; another, ordering that colonies should be planted in various parts of Sicily and Greece ; and a third, appropriating the treasure plundered at Thoulouse, by Q. Cæpio, for the purchase of lands to be distributed amongst the poor. To these laws, as has been already mentioned, the senate was ordered to swear obedience within five days ; a step concerted by Marius and his associates, to procure the destruction of Q. Metellus, whose undaunted integrity they knew would never allow him to consent to a measure which he deemed mischievous, or to submit to an usurped and unlawful authority. Saturninus and Glaucia hated him, because he had noticed them both when he was censor, for the infamy of their lives. Marius had been patronized by him and his family in early youth,<sup>23</sup> and had since deprived him of the honour of finishing the war with Jugurtha by his intrigues and calumnies. A vile nature hates none so much as those from whom it has received kindness, and whose kindness it has recompensed with injury ; there was enough, therefore, besides the constant antipathy which evil bears to good, to make Marius the determined enemy of Metellus.

As soon as the law was passed, Marius,<sup>24</sup> in his quality of consul, expressed his indignation against it in the senate, and declared that he would never submit to take the oath required. Metellus made a similar declaration, and the senate applauding their firmness, was prepared to offer an unanimous resistance to the oath. But on the evening of the fifth day, Marius hastily called the senate together, and told them that it was too dangerous openly to oppose the will of the people ; he judged it expedient, therefore, to take the oath with a qualification, swearing to obey the law so far as it was lawful. They would thus pacify the people for the moment, and when the multitude of citizens from the country should have returned to their homes, it would be easy to show that the law had not passed legally, the assembly having continued to vote after thunder had been heard, and thus the obligation of the oath would be null and void. Confounded by this display of the consul's treachery at a moment when there was no time left to concert any new plan of proceeding, the senators listened to him in silence ; and he, without giving them leisure to recover themselves, led them out instantly to the temple of Saturn, and there was himself amongst the first to take the oath. The rest of the senate followed his example, no man being willing to expose himself, as an individual, to the fury of the multitude, with the single exception of Metellus. With admirable firmness that excellent citizen resisted all the arguments and en-

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, 4.

<sup>24</sup> Appian, I. 30.

treaties of his friends, and persisted in his refusal to swear, saying to those around him,<sup>25</sup> "that a good man was distinguished by his adherence to what was right, in defiance of personal danger." On the following day Saturninus exhorted his followers,<sup>26</sup> who now usurped the functions of the Roman people, to pass an act of banishment against Metellus, and to order that the consuls, by a public proclamation, should interdict him from the use of fire and water within the limits of Italy. The citizens of the capital wished to make another attempt on this occasion to shake off the tyranny under which they were labouring, and offered Metellus to oppose to the utmost the sentence that was to be proposed against him. But he, rightly judging it the duty of a good subject to submit peaceably to physical force, as much as it had been to refuse active obedience to an illegal command, declined their proffered assistance, and telling them "that he never would permit the safety of his country to be endangered on his account," withdrew quietly from Rome. The law of banishment passed without opposition, and Marius had the gratification to proclaim it, and to utter the usual prohibition of the use of fire and water.

It is mentioned that Saturninus, amongst his other laws,<sup>27</sup> proposed also to confirm the corn law of C. Gracchus, by which corn was to be distributed monthly to the people at five-sixths of an as for the modius or peck. This sufficiently shows that the law of Gracchus had tacitly become obsolete. Its renewal was resisted strongly by the aristocratical party, and some of the colleagues of Saturninus interposed their negative upon it. But he disregarding all legal impediments, proceeded to put it to the vote, when Q. Servilius Cæpio, one of the quæstors, and son to the consul who had fallen a victim to the indignation of the people on account of his ill success against the Cimbri, made an attack upon the assembly at the head of a body of citizens attached to the senate, overthrew the balloting urns, dispersed the multitude, and prevented the passing of the law. So wretched was the condition of Rome, that those who called themselves the friends of order were driven to support the constitution by acts of illegal violence.

Another law, as is probable,<sup>28</sup> was proposed and carried by C.

<sup>25</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, 29.

<sup>26</sup> Appian, I. 31.

<sup>27</sup> Rhetorica, ad Herennium, I. 12.

<sup>28</sup> Cicero says in his treatise, *De Claris Oratoribus*, 61, that Glaucia had attached to himself the equestrian order by the law which he had carried in their favour; "Equestrem Ordinem beneficio Legis devinxerat." It is supposed that this law was a repeal of that lately passed, v. c. 647,

by Q. Cæpio; because it appears from Cicero, *de Oratore*, II. 48, that the equestrian order were again in possession of the judicial power at the trial of C. Norbanus, which must have taken place within four or five years of the prætorship of Glaucia; and Livius Drusus, v. c. 662, attempted once more to give the senate a place among the judges, which in his time they did not enjoy.

Servilius Glaucia, to repeal the late act of the consul Q. Cæpio, and to restore the judicial power entirely to the equestrian order, according to the law of C. Gracchus. The knights were thus won over to favour the pretensions which Glaucia was now making to the consulship, and their support, together with that of the popular party, was likely to decide the election in his favour. Saturninus also intended to offer himself a third time as a candidate for the office of tribune; and together with himself he brought forward a man of the lowest rank, named Equitius,<sup>29</sup> who professed to be a younger brother of Tiberius and C. Gracchus; and although his claim had been utterly rejected by the family, it yet won him some favour with the people, who regarded the name of Gracchus with great affection. When the elections came on, Saturninus and Equitius were chosen tribunes; but the hopes of Glaucia were in danger of being disappointed, for M. Antonius, so famous for his eloquence, easily obtained his nomination as one of the consuls, and C. Memmius was a formidable competitor for the place of the other. But Saturninus had committed so many outrages with impunity, that he seemed now to bid defiance to the laws; and an Rebellion of Saturninus. armed party, acting under his orders, assaulted and murdered Memmius in the midst of the election, and at once dispersed the people from the comitia in consternation at this new crime. But this last violence awakened the senate, and M. Æmilius Scaurus,<sup>30</sup> the first on the roll of the senators, and the same person who twelve years before had moved that the consul Opimius should defend the republic against the party of Gracchus, now again persuaded the senate to commit the same authority to the consuls Marius and Valerius Flaccus, and to give them the usual solemn charge to provide for the safety of the commonwealth. Alarmed at this resolution, Saturninus, Glaucia, Equitius, and a body of their followers in arms, seized the capitol, and declared themselves in open rebellion. Marius, their old associate, and still secretly their friend, could not however avoid acting upon the orders of the senate, and summoned every citizen to maintain the cause of the republic. All the tribunes,<sup>31</sup> except Saturninus; all the prætors, except Glaucia; all the senators, all the equestrian order, and all the most respectable citizens in Rome, assembled at the consul's call, and formed a force so formidable, that Marius was reduced to the condition of an unwilling instrument in their hands, employed by them against a party with which in his heart he entirely sympathized. The rebels, however, resisted for some time, till Marius cut off the pipes by which the capitol was

<sup>29</sup> Valerius, Maximus, III. 8. Appian, I. 32.

<sup>30</sup> Auctor de Viris illustribus, in Vita M. Æmilii Scauri.

<sup>31</sup> Cicero, pro Rabirio, Perd. 7.



supplied with water,<sup>32</sup> and thus obliged them to surrender. They submitted themselves to him with no great reluctance, relying on his known dispositions in their favour; and he, anxious to save their lives, promised them their safety<sup>33</sup> without the authority of the senate, and restraining the indignation of his followers, shut them up in the Curia Hostilia,<sup>34</sup> the building originally appropriated for the meetings of the senate, under pretence of reserving them for an impartial trial hereafter. But the armed citizens under his

He and his partisans  
are put to death.

command mistrusting the lenity of the consul, assaulted the place of their confinement, and mounting upon the roof of the building, they took off the tiling,<sup>35</sup> and destroyed with missile weapons the whole of the defenceless prisoners below. It is almost peculiar to Roman history, that the vengeance finally inflicted even on so great a criminal as Saturninus, should more resemble a murder than a legal execution.

The late popular leaders were by no means regretted by the people as the Gracchi had been, for not only was their conduct so desperate as to have disgusted all but the most profligate, but their measures, as has been observed, had been less immediately directed to the advantages of the citizens of Rome. It appears rather that Sa-

His memory is held in  
detestation.

turninus was generally regarded as an enemy to his country; and two remarkable instances of this feeling are recorded, which deserve to be noticed as illustrative of the arbitrary and violent spirit by which the administration of justice at Rome was characterized. C. Decianus,<sup>36</sup> a man, it is said, of the utmost respectability, was accusing P. Furius, of whom more will be added presently, before the people. In the course of his speech he happened to complain of the manner in which Saturninus had been put to death; and for this offence he not only lost his cause, although Furius was notoriously a man of most infamous life, but was himself brought to trial and condemned to banishment. Sex. Titus also was tried and condemned<sup>37</sup> for having a statue of Saturninus in his house. Now it is obvious that there could have been no law by which either of these acts was made a crime, and they were punished merely on the principle that a man might be found guilty for any thing which his judges chose to consider as criminal, whether it were an offence defined by law or not. The fate of Furius, who escaped, owing to the imprudent speech of his accuser, was, according to Appian,<sup>38</sup> in itself sufficiently extraordinary. He was one of the tribunes for the year which followed the sixth consulship of Marius; and when, after the death of Saturninus, attempts were made to pro-

<sup>32</sup> Cicero, pro Rabirio, Perd. 11.

<sup>33</sup> Cicero, pro Rabirio, Perd. 10.

<sup>34</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 12.

<sup>35</sup> Appian, I. 32.

<sup>36</sup> Cicero, pro Rabirio, Perd. 9. Valerius Maximus, VIII. 1.

<sup>37</sup> Cicero and Valerius Maximus, ubi suprâ.

<sup>38</sup> De Bell. Civil. I. 33.

cure the recall of Metellus from banishment, he interposed his negative upon them all. The son of Metellus threw himself at his feet in vain before the assembled people, and with tears entreated him to relent. But the people felt so much indignation against Furius, that when he was accused Recall of Q. Metellus. before them for his resistance to their will, the multitude, without waiting to hear his defence, fell upon him and tore him to pieces. This story, however, is only related by Appian, and does not seem altogether probable. So unusual a burst of popular fury is not likely to have been excited by such a cause, when the lapse of some months must have effaced the impression at first produced by the sight of the treatment shown to the prayers of a son in behalf of his father. But here, as in so many other instances in Roman history, the want of good authority, and the imperfection of all existing reports of the times, render it impossible to attain to a knowledge of the truth.

About this time Marcus Aquilius, who commanded in Sicily as proconsul, concluded a bloody war which had long devastated that island. We speak of the insurrection of the slaves, to which we have before briefly alluded, and which may here deserve to be noticed somewhat more particularly.

The termination of the second Punic war had left the whole of Sicily in the quiet possession of the Romans. The Revolt of the slaves in Sicily. inhabitants, when the immediate evils of the contest were over, were on the whole mildly treated. Some of them had indeed adhered throughout to the cause of the Romans; and even in those states which had most vigorously opposed them, there were several considerations which might move the conquerors to forbearance. They had long been the zealous allies of Rome during the reign of Hiero; their revolt had been of short duration, and the bulk of the people had been either deceived or forced into taking a part in it; besides that the importance of the island to Rome, and its neighbourhood to Carthage, rendered it expedient to conciliate the inhabitants as much as possible to the Roman government. Accordingly, whilst some of the Sicilian states were exempt from all taxes whatsoever,<sup>39</sup> the great majority were subject only to the same burthen which they had supported under their native princes, the payment namely of a tenth part of the produce of the soil; and the collection of this tax was so well regulated by law, that the farmer was fully protected from paying more than a just tenth, or from suffering any thing vexatious in the manner of payment. Land, thus comparatively unencumbered, and enjoying the highest reputation for fertility, became a desirable object of purchase to the wealthy citizens of Rome and Latium: large estates were accordingly bought up by

<sup>39</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, III. 6.

them,<sup>40</sup> and were stocked with vast numbers of slaves, the use of whom at this time, as we have already noticed, began almost entirely to supersede that of free labourers. In order to derive from them the greatest possible profit,<sup>41</sup> they were miserably fed and clothed, and were thus driven to support themselves by robbery; their manner of life as shepherds, in which service a large proportion of them was employed, affording them great facilities in the practice of plunder. It is said, moreover, that the governors of the island were deterred from punishing these offenders by the wealth and influence of their masters, who were well pleased that their slaves should provide for their own wants at the expense of the public.

In this state of things<sup>42</sup> the slaves began to entertain projects of a general insurrection, and a leader was not long wanting to call them forth into action. Eunus, a Syrian by birth, was the slave of a citizen of Enna, named Antigene, and had acquired great influence amongst his companions in bondage by pretending to divine inspiration, and particularly to a knowledge of the future. Amongst many guesses into futurity, some were likely to be verified by the event; and these established his reputation, so that at last he professed himself to be favoured with constant communication from heaven; and it is said that he used to secrete in his mouth some lighted combustible substance, and thus amazed the vulgar by seeming to breathe forth smoke and fire, as if under the immediate impulse of the god who spoke from within him. The belief in his miraculous endowments was so general, that the slaves of another citizen of Enna, named Damophilus, unable to bear the cruelty with which they were treated both by their master and his wife, and bent on revenging themselves, applied first to Eunus, and inquired of him if the gods would grant success to their attempts. He eagerly caught at the opportunity thus offered him; assured them of the favour of heaven, and exhorted them to execute their purpose without delay.<sup>43</sup> The slaves employed on the several estates in the neighbourhood of Enna were excited by the call of the slaves of Damophilus; a body of four hundred men was collected, and they entered the town under the command of Eunus himself, whose trick of breathing fire is said to have produced a great impression on the minds of his followers. The insurgents were instantly joined by the slaves in the town, and an indiscriminate massacre of the free inhabitants followed, in which men, women, and children, were treated with equal cruelty. Damophilus and his wife were seized at their country house, dragged

<sup>40</sup> Florus, III. 19. Diodorus Siculus, XXXIV. *Ecloga secunda*, edit. Rhodoman.

<sup>41</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XXXIV. Ecl. 2.

<sup>42</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XXXIV. Ecl. 2.

<sup>43</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XXXIV. Ecl. 2.



in triumph to Enna, and there murdered ; but their daughter was saved by the slaves, in gratitude for the kindnesses which they had always met with at her hands. Meantime Eunus spared out of the general slaughter such of the citizens of Enna as understood the manufacture of arms, and compelled them to labour in order to supply his followers with weapons. He also took to himself the title and the ensigns of a king, while he bestowed those of queen on the female slave who lived with him : and he formed a council, consisting of those of his associates most eminent for their courage or ability. In three days he was at the head of six thousand men tolerably armed, besides a great multitude provided only with hatchets, spits, or any other weapons which they could find ; and the number of the insurgents daily increasing, he was enabled to overrun the country, and several times to encounter with success the Roman forces which attempted to oppose him. The example presently became contagious : a Cilian slave, named Cleon, took up arms in another part of the island ; and far from attempting to rival Eunus, he immediately acknowledged him as king, and acted in every thing by his orders. L. Hypsæus, one of the prætors, who arrived from Rome about a month after the commencement of the revolt, brought a regular army of eight thousand men against the insurgents, but was outnumbered by them and defeated. Several other Roman officers met with the same bad fortune, and the slaves made themselves masters of many of the towns of that island. Their career was first checked by M. Perpena, one of the prætors,<sup>44</sup> and afterwards was finally stopped by the consul, P. Rupilius,<sup>45</sup> who has been already noticed as the author of measures of extreme severity against the partisans of Tiberius Gracchus. This officer first recovered the town of Taurominium, after a long blockade, in which the slaves were reduced to the utmost extremities of famine ; and having put to death all those who fell into his hands, he proceeded to besiege Enna, the first scene of the revolt, and the principal stronghold of the insurgents. The sure process of blockade rendered the condition of the besieged desperate ; Cleon was killed in a sally, and the place was in a short time betrayed to the Romans. Eunus escaped from the town, but was soon afterwards taken, and died, it is said, in prison of a loathsome disease ; after which Rupilius proceeded to regulate the state of the island, and ten commissioners were sent from Rome to assist in the settlement,<sup>46</sup> exactly in the manner which we have seen regularly practised by the senate after the conclusion of its wars with Antiochus, Perseus, Achaia, and Carthage.

<sup>44</sup> Florus, III. 19.

<sup>46</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, II. 13. 16.

<sup>45</sup> Diodorus, XXXIV. Ecl. 2. Livy, Epitom. LIX.

The revolt quelled by  
P. Rupilius.

The revolt was thus apparently suppressed ; but the cause of the insurgents found every where so many who sympathized with it, that similar attempts were made within a few years, in several other parts of the empire. One of these deserves notice from its singularity. A Roman knight, of the name of T. Minucius,<sup>47</sup> having incurred a debt beyond his means, and being pressed for the payment of it, purchased five hundred suits of armour, and having conveyed them secretly into the country, employed them in arming his slaves ; and then usurping the style and dignity of a king, invited the slaves in general to join him, and murdered his creditors, whom he contrived to get into his power. Ridiculous as this leader was, he assembled round him above 3000 followers, and was not reduced by the prætor who was sent against him, without maintaining an obstinate struggle. But a far more serious disturbance soon broke out for the second time in Sicily. When C. Marius was looking for troops in every quarter to oppose the invasion of the Cimbri,<sup>48</sup> a decree of the senate empowered him to demand assistance from the more distant allies of the republic ; and he sent accordingly to Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, requiring of him a certain contingent of soldiers. Nicomedes excused himself, by saying, that so large a portion of his subjects had been carried off and sold for slaves in different parts of the empire, that he was unable to raise the force demanded of him. Upon this, the senate issued an order, that no freeborn native of any state in alliance with Rome, should be kept as a slave in any of the Roman provinces ; and the provincial magistrates were desired to institute inquiries, and to liberate within their several jurisdictions all those who came within the terms of the senate's decree. Licinius Nerva, the prætor of Sicily, began accordingly to set at liberty above 800 slaves within a few days ; but he was soon persuaded by the rich slave-owners in the island to suspend his proceedings, and he in future referred all those who applied to him for their liberty to the decision of their own masters. The slaves thus suddenly disappointed of the hopes which they had felt themselves encouraged by the senate itself to entertain,<sup>49</sup> resolved to obtain their freedom for themselves ; insurrections broke out in several parts of the island, and although at first partially suppressed, revived again with redoubled fury. Sabrius and Athenio were two of the chief insurgents ; and the latter displayed considerable military talents, paying more regard to the quality than to the numbers of his army, and accustoming his men to regular discipline. He also, like Eunus, ap-

<sup>47</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XXXVI. Ecl. 1.

<sup>48</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XXXVI. Ecl. 1.

<sup>49</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XXXVI. Ecl. 1.

It may be observed, that the testimony of Diodorus is more than usually valuable in

his account of these transactions, from his being himself a Sicilian, and always showing a lively interest in events that happened in his own country.

pealed to the superstition of his followers, and declared that the stars had foretold that he should be king over all Sicily. Several Roman prætors were defeated with loss in successive attempts to reduce the revolvers; and the whole of Sicily became a scene of plunder and destruction: many free inhabitants of the poorer class availing themselves of the general confusion, and carrying on an organized system of devastation throughout the country. At length, Marcus Aquilius, the colleague of Marius in his fifth consulship, was sent against this obstinate enemy. He followed the example of Rupilius, by shutting the insurgents up in their strongholds, and surrounding them with lines of circumvallation, till famine obliged them to surrender. Many, however, had fallen by the sword in several previous engagements; and those who at last submitted were sent to Rome, and destined there to afford sport for the populace, by being exposed to fight with beasts in the amphitheatre. But it is said that they preserved their fierceness to the last, and instead of combating with the beasts, turned their swords against one another, and shed their blood upon the altars appointed for the sacrifices usually performed at the games, the last survivor completing the slaughter by killing himself. The peace of the island thus with difficulty restored, was maintained for the future by regulations of extreme severity. No slave was allowed to carry a weapon;<sup>50</sup> and on one occasion, when a boar of remarkable size had been sent as a present to L. Domitius, at that time prætor of the island, he inquired who had killed it, and finding that it was a slave employed as a shepherd, he summoned the man before him, and asked him how he had contrived to destroy so large an animal. The shepherd replied, that he had killed it with a boar spear; upon which Domitius ordered him immediately to be crucified, for having used a weapon in defiance of the law. In consequence of this arbitrary system, we read of no more revolts of the slaves in Sicily for a very long period.

Quelled by Marcus Aquilius.

But whatever were the military services of Manius Aquilius, in subduing the insurgent slaves, his conduct as a man too much resembled that of his father whom we have seen poisoning the wells in Asia, and afterwards tried for his corruption and oppression. His son was in like manner brought to trial on a similar charge; and it appears that his guilt could not be denied; for M. Antonius, the orator, who acted as his advocate, could only save him by a violent appeal to the feelings of the judges.<sup>51</sup> He contrasted the former honours of the accused with his present condition; and at last he tore open the dress of his client, and exposed the wounds which he had received

Trial and acquittal of Aquilius.  
U. C. 654.

<sup>50</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, V. 3.

<sup>51</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, II. 47. In Verrem, V. 1.



in the course of his services as a soldier. So little were the duties of a court of justice observed at Rome, that this most irrelevant mode of defence was completely successful; and Aquilius escaped condemnation. How hard is it for good government and equal justice to exist among a people who allow their feelings to influence them against their reason in the discharge of a solemn duty!

In the following year, an attempt was made to check the violent measures sometimes proposed by the tribunes, and which the people were used to approve without due consideration. A law was passed, which bears the names of both the consuls, Q. Cæcilius Metellus Nepos, a cousin of Q. Metellus Numidicus, and T. Didius, and by which it was enacted, that every law should be published on three successive market days,<sup>52</sup> before it could be submitted to the votes of the people; it was also provided, that the people should not be obliged to accept or reject any clause of a law contrary to their wishes, as was often the case at present, when several enactments being contained in one law, and proposed to the votes of the assembly all together, it was necessary either to approve or to negative the whole without discrimination.

The year of Rome 656, is marked by some discussions which arose on the subject of sumptuary laws. In a constitution which permitted the magistrates to interfere with the private life of every citizen, to the extent practised by the censors, the expenses of the table were not likely to escape the control of the law. We read of various statutes passed from time to time, with a view to restrain what was called luxury: in the year 538, only a year after the battle of Cannæ, C. Oppius, one of the tribunes,<sup>53</sup> brought forward a law to regulate the degree of ornament which might be allowed in female dress, and forbidding the ladies of Rome to use a carriage within the city, except in their attendance on the public sacrifices. But after the end of the second Punic war, it was contended that such provisions were fitted only for a season of national distress, and the Oppian law was repealed. Of the laws directed particularly against the expenses of the table, the first in order of time is fixed about the year 571,<sup>54</sup> and was proposed by Orchius, one of the tribunes, on the recommendation of the senate. It limited the number of guests at any entertainment; and ordered, as we are told, that the doors of the house should be left open during the meal, to guard against any violation of its enactments. A little more than twenty years afterwards, in the interval between the overthrow of Perseus and the third Punic war, the attention of the senate was again directed to the same subject. By a decree

U. C. 655.

The Cæcilian and Didian law.

Origin and progress of sumptuary laws.

<sup>52</sup> Cicero, Philipp. V. 3. Pro Domo, 20.

<sup>53</sup> Livy, XXXIV. 1.

<sup>54</sup> Macrobius, Saturn. II. 13. Apud Facciolati Lexicon, in Voce "Orchia."

of that assembly,<sup>55</sup> the principal citizens who were in the habit of giving entertainments to one another, during the celebration of the games in honour of Cybele, were obliged to make oath before the consuls that they would not expend on any meal more than a hundred and twenty ases, or 7*s.* 9*d.* sterling, exclusive of the sum paid for bread, vegetables, and wine; that they would use no other wine than that made in Italy, and that they would not have more than a hundred pounds weight of silver displayed at their table. Afterwards, in the same year, a law was passed bearing the name of C. Fannius,<sup>56</sup> one of the consuls, which restrained the expense of meals still more. On the greatest festivals no man was allowed to exceed an hundred ases, 6*s.* 5½*d.*; on ten other days in every month he might go as high as thirty ases, or 1*s.* 11¼*d.*; and at all other times he was limited to no more than ten, about 7¾*d.* of English money. By the same law,<sup>57</sup> also, the consumption of poultry, and all kinds of birds, was expressly forbidden, with the exception of a single hen at each table, and this, it was added, must not have been regularly fatted. This was repeated as a favourite clause in all future laws on the same subject; and other articles of food were prohibited by successive enactments; as for example, M. Æmilius Scaurus, one of the consuls in the year 638, excluded dormice from the table,<sup>58</sup> which little animals the Romans, it appears, were accustomed to catch in great numbers, and regarded them when fatted as a peculiar delicacy. It is natural enough that men of small or moderate fortune, who could not indulge in the magnificence of splendid villas, numerous slaves, or costly furniture, should bear with great impatience these restrictions upon that peculiar gratification which was to them most accessible; besides that, they looked upon any interference in such matters as an encroachment on their just liberty of doing what they chose with their own money. We find, accordingly, that M. Duronius, one of the tribunes,<sup>59</sup> procured the rejection of a new sumptuary law brought forward about the year of Rome 656, to enforce the provisions of the law of Fannius. For this action Duronius was shortly after expelled from the senate by the censors M. Antonius and L. Flaccus; and a sumptuary law was in fact carried by the consul P. Licinius Crassus,<sup>60</sup> limiting the quantity of meat which might be brought to table on ordinary occasions, but still permitting an unrestricted consumption of vegetables. There is, in one of Cicero's letters,<sup>61</sup> testimony to show that these regulations remained in force for many years, and that their intention was completely evaded by

<sup>55</sup> Gellius, II. apud Sigonium, Commentar. in Fast. et Triumph.

<sup>56</sup> Macrobius, Saturnal. II. 13. Apud Facciolati Lexicon, in Voce "Fannia."

<sup>57</sup> Pliny, Histor. Natural. X. 50.

<sup>58</sup> Pliny, Histor. Natural. VIII. 57.

<sup>59</sup> Valerius Maximus, II. 9.

<sup>60</sup> Aul. Gellius, II. 24. Apud Facciolati in Voce "Licinius."

<sup>61</sup> Epistol. ad Familiares, VII. ep. 26.

the arts of cookery, which found means to provide a luxurious and expensive meal out of the common productions of the garden.

In the consulship of P. Licinius Crassus, and Cn. Lentulus, is also dated a decree of the senate for the abolition of human sacrifices.<sup>62</sup> When the republic was engaged in any dangerous war, the superstition of the Romans believed that to bury alive in the midst of Rome an individual of the adverse nation, was a powerful charm to secure victory. This had been put in practice in the second Punic war; and although now forbidden, was repeated afterwards on more than one occasion till long after the first preaching of Christianity.<sup>63</sup>

It is with pleasure that we are now called to contemplate two rare instances of integrity and humanity: Q. Mucius Scævola, and P. Rutilius Rufus. Q. Scævola filled the office of consul in the year of Rome 658, together with L. Licinius Crassus, so celebrated as an orator. On the expiration of the year he was appointed as proconsul to the government of the province of Asia,<sup>64</sup> by which name the Romans meant to express those countries on the western side of Asia Minor, which had formerly composed the kingdom of Pergamus. P. Rutilius attended him as his lieutenant,<sup>65</sup> and cordially co-operated with him in all his proceedings. He only held his command for nine months,<sup>66</sup> but during that short period he so endeared himself to the people whom he governed by the equity of his administration, and by the firmness with which he protected them against the oppressions of the farmers of the revenue, that a festival was instituted in commemoration of his goodness,<sup>67</sup> and continued to be observed for many years afterwards in Asia; while at Rome his name became identified with that of an upright and merciful magistrate,<sup>68</sup> and his conduct was long held up by the senate as a model which officers appointed to similar stations should diligently endeavour to copy. Q. Mucius was happy, moreover, in never being exposed to the malice of those whose interests had suffered from his pure and incorrupt government. But his lieutenant, P. Rutilius, was less fortunate. The judicial power, according to the law of C. Gracchus (which after a short interruption had been lately put in force again by C. Servilius Glaucia), was, as we have stated, vested entirely in the equestrian order. This class of men was closely connected with the farmers of the revenue, and entered warmly into their complaints of the treatment which they had received from Mucius and Rutilius. Ru-

<sup>62</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* XXX.

<sup>63</sup> Pliny, XXVIII. 2.

<sup>64</sup> Livy, *Epitom.* LXX. Others place his government of Asia about four years earlier, and say that he obtained the province as *proprætor*.

<sup>65</sup> Livy, *Epitom.* LXX.

<sup>66</sup> Cicero, *ad Atticum*, V. ep. 17.

<sup>67</sup> Cicero, *in Verrem*, II. 21.

<sup>68</sup> Cicero, *in Cæcilius*, 17. Valerius Maximus, VIII. 15.



tilius was accused of corruption in his province, perhaps by some of those very individuals whose own corruption he had repressed, and was brought to trial before a court consisting entirely of citizens of the equestrian order. His conduct on his trial was consistent with the high principles of his general life. He refused to employ any celebrated orator in his defence,<sup>69</sup> nor would he suffer any attempts to be made to work upon the feelings of his judges. His friend, Q. Mucius, spoke in his behalf, confining himself only to a clear and simple statement of the truth. But the tribunal which had so lately acquitted the guilty Aquilius, when defended by an appeal to his passions, now condemned a man of the most spotless innocence, who disdained any support but that of reason and justice. Rutilius was banished, and retired to Smyrna,<sup>70</sup> in the country which was the scene of his alleged corruption, but which was in truth the best witness of his virtue. The people whom he was accused of misgoverning, sent deputies from all their several towns to welcome his arrival once more amongst them; nor did they show less respect to him in his exile than when invested with the authority of a Roman officer.<sup>71</sup> The citizens of Smyrna gladly gave him the freedom of their city,<sup>72</sup> and in this adopted home Rutilius spent in peace the remainder of his life; nor could the solicitations of Sylla, when dictator, ever prevail with him to return to Italy.

Trial of P. Rutilius.

In the year of Rome 661 some curious particulars are recorded of the censorship of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and L. Licinius Crassus. The study of eloquence daily becoming more popular at Rome, there arose a number of persons who professed to teach it, and who opened schools for the instruction of young men in this accomplishment. Of these teachers some were Greeks, and if they only interpreted and expounded the works of some of their distinguished countrymen, they must have communicated to their hearers much new and valuable knowledge. An acquaintance with the rhetoric of Aristotle must have opened an unknown world to the mind of a young Roman, and have furnished him with innumerable subjects of thought, while it lead him to examine the motives of actions, and the causes of feelings; while it embraced, with wonderful conciseness, the principles of almost every argument that could be used in all questions, judicial and political; and while with intuitive good sense it displayed the excellences to be aimed at, and the faults to be avoided, in the language and arrangement of a writer or an orator. But besides these Greek instructors, some of the Romans themselves professed to open schools of rhetoric; and

Censorship of Domitius and Crassus.

<sup>69</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, I. 53.<sup>70</sup> Cicero, de Republicâ, I. 8.<sup>71</sup> Valerius Maximus, II. 10.<sup>72</sup> Tacitus, Annal. IV. 43.

being for the most part men of little education, and delivering their lessons probably on cheaper terms than the Greek teachers, their scholars consisted chiefly of the poorer class of citizens, and particularly, we may suppose, of those individuals who wished to qualify themselves for the part of noisy and factious leaders of the populace. It was on these grounds, as Cicero makes Crassus himself affirm, in the "*Dialogue de Oratore*,"<sup>73</sup> that the censors, in the exercise of their arbitrary power, thought proper to put a stop to the proceedings of the Latin teachers of eloquence; because, in the language of Cicero, "they could teach their pupils nothing but impudence." In the course of the year the two censors are said to have had a very unbecoming quarrel with each other: the expensive habits in which Crassus indulged in his manner of living, appearing to his colleague to be unworthy of his censorian dignity. It appears, that Crassus had six date trees in his garden,<sup>74</sup> of remarkable size and beauty, which he valued very highly; and four pillars of the marble of Mount Hymettus in his house,<sup>75</sup> a material which had not hitherto been used in any public building at Rome, and which, in a private house, was thought to argue excessive luxury. Another ridiculous charge was brought by Cn. Domitius against his colleague;<sup>76</sup> that he had gone into mourning on the death of a favourite fish, which was kept in one of his fish-ponds. Crassus, we are told, confessed the truth of the story, saying, "that he had indeed wept at the loss of a fish; but that Domitius had borne the loss of three wives without shedding a tear." The history of Rome presents us at once with instances of the strangest extravagance of conduct in some characters, combined with a most complete intolerance of every thing eccentric, in the general feelings of the magistrates and the spirit of the laws.

The succeeding year, in which Sextus Julius Cæsar and L. Marcus Philippus were consuls, witnessed the  
A. U. C. 662. A. C. 91. origin of the Italian war. But as the parties formed on this occasion were not without their effect in the civil war that followed, and as Sylla took a distinguished part in the contest maintained by Rome against her revolted allies, we shall include our account of these transactions in the narrative of that individual's life, which we are now preparing to lay before our readers.

<sup>73</sup> III. 24.

<sup>74</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* XVII. 1.

<sup>75</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* XVII. 1.

<sup>76</sup> Macrobius, *Saturnal.* II. 11.

## CHAPTER V.

### PART I.

LUCIUS CORNELIUS SYLLA.—FROM U.C. 616 A.C. 138, TO U.C. 666, A.C. 88.

THE Cornelian family was one of the most ancient and honourable in Rome; and two of its branches, the houses of Scipio and Lentulus, furnished the commonwealth with a long list of distinguished officers, in the several departments of state. A third branch bore the surname of Rufinus; but although its members occasionally appear on the lists of magistrates, none of them, till a much later period, rose to any high personal eminence. In the second Punic war, in the year of Rome 540, P. Cornelius Rufinus, being then prætor, celebrated for the first time,<sup>1</sup> the Ludi Apollinares, or games in honour of Apollo, which the Sibylline books had directed the senate to institute; and from this circumstance he is said to have changed his name of Rufinus, for that of Sibylla;<sup>2</sup> which was afterwards corrupted into the shorter appellation of Sylla. His great grandson was L. Cornelius Sylla, the subject of our present narrative, who was born about the year of Rome 616, in the consulship of M. Æmilius Lepidus, and C. Hostilius Mancinus, four years before the death of Tiberius Gracchus.

The father of Sylla did nothing to promote either the honour or the wealth of his family, and his son was born with no very flattering prospects, either of rank or fortune. We know not by whom his education was superintended; but he acquired, either from his instructors, or by his own exertion in afterlife, an unusual portion of knowledge, and had the character of being very profoundly versed in the literature<sup>3</sup> of the Greeks. But intellectual superiority affords no security for the moral principles of its possessor; and Sylla, from his earliest youth,<sup>4</sup> was notorious for gross sensuality, and for his keen enjoyment of low and profligate society. He is said to have lived in lodgings at Rome,<sup>5</sup> and to

<sup>1</sup> Livy, XXV. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Macrobius, apud. Facciolati Lexicon, in Voce "Sulla."

<sup>3</sup> Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. 95.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 1.



have rented one floor of a house, for which he paid 3000 nummi, or about 24*l.* 4*s.* 4½*d.* a year : a style of living which seems to have been reckoned disgraceful to a man of patrician family, and to have inferred great indigence. For his first advancement in life, he was indebted for the fondness of a prostitute, who had acquired a large sum of money, and left it all to him by her will ; and he also inherited the property of his mother-in-law, who regarded him as her own son. He was chosen one of the quæstors in the year of Rome 646, and accompanied Marius, then in his first consulship, into Africa ; where, as has been mentioned elsewhere, his services were very remarkable ; and it was to him that Jugurtha was at last surrendered by Bocchus, king of Mauritania. This circumstance excited, as it is said, the jealousy of Marius ; but Sylla<sup>6</sup> nevertheless acted under him as one of his lieutenants in the war with the Cimbri, where he again greatly distinguished himself. But finding the ill-will of his general daily increasing, he left him, and served in the army of Lutatius Catulus, the colleague<sup>7</sup> of Marius ; and in this situation, being charged with the duty of supplying the soldiers with provisions, he performed it so well, that the army of Catulus was in the midst of abundance, while that of Marius was labouring under severe privations. This still further inflamed the animosity with which Marius already regarded him.

For some years after this period, Sylla seems to have lived in the mere enjoyment of his favourite pleasures of intellectual and sensual excitement. At length, in the year of Rome 657, he became a candidate for the office of prætor, but without success. He attributed his failure, according to Plutarch,<sup>8</sup> to the disappointment of the people at his not first suing for the ædileship ; it being a long-established custom that the ædiles should exhibit shows of some kind or other for the amusement of the multitude ; and Sylla's friendship with the king of Mauritania, seemed to promise that he would procure from Africa an unusual number of lions and other wild beasts, to be hunted in the amphitheatre. However, in the following year, Sylla was elected prætor,

Sylla obtains the prætorship.

without the previous step of going through the office of ædile ; and not to deprive the people of the gratification they expected, he exhibited no fewer than a hundred lions ; the first time, it is said, that the male lion<sup>9</sup> was ever brought forward in the sports of the circus. On the expiration of his prætorship, he obtained the province of Cilicia ;<sup>10</sup> and was commissioned to replace on his throne Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, who had been lately expelled by Mithridates. This

<sup>6</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 17.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 4.

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 5.

<sup>9</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* VIII. 16.

<sup>10</sup> *Auctor de Viris illustribus*, in Vitâ Syllæ. Plutarch, in Syllâ, 5. Livy, *Epit.* LXX.

he easily effected ; for Mithridates was not yet prepared to encounter the power of Rome ; and it is further mentioned, as a memorable circumstance in the life of Sylla, that while he was in Cappadocia, he received the first communication ever made to any Roman officer by the sovereign of Parthia. Arsaces, king of that country, perceiving that the Romans extended their influence into his neighbourhood, sent an embassy to Sylla to solicit their alliance. In the interview between the Roman prætor and the Parthian ambassador, Sylla<sup>11</sup> claimed the precedence in rank, with the usual arrogance of his countrymen ; and by this behaviour, in all probability, left no very friendly feeling in the mind of Arsaces ; and rather encouraged than lessened that jealousy of the Roman power, which the Parthians, in the sequel, were often enabled to manifest with more success than any other nation since the time of Hannibal.

His proceedings in his province.

On Sylla's return to Rome, he was threatened with a prosecution for corrupt proceedings in his province ;<sup>12</sup> but the matter was never brought to a trial. It is said also, that Bocchus, king of Mauritania, presented to the Romans about this time, a group of figures in gold, representing himself betraying Jugurtha into the hands of Sylla. This excited anew the jealousy of Marius, who is represented to have attempted in vain to hinder the figures from being received and dedicated in the capitol.

We are now arrived at the memorable consulship of L. Marcius Philippus and Sextus Julius Cæsar. Since the death of Saturninus, the state of affairs at Rome had been generally tranquil ; and the accounts

Consulship of L. Philippus and Sex. Jul. Cæsar.  
A. U. C. 662.

given of this period in ancient writers, are proportionably scanty. But to this calm a terrible storm was now to succeed ; and Rome, for the first time since the second Punic war, was to be engaged in a desperate contest in the very heart of Italy. It appears that the senate bore<sup>13</sup> with impatience the great power enjoyed by the equestrian order, in possessing the whole judicial authority in the commonwealth. To attack this formidable body, it was necessary that the senate should effect a coalition with the popular party, and court it by a series of popular enactments. M. Livius Drusus was at this time one of the tribunes ; the son of that M. Drusus, who had been one of the colleagues of C. Gracchus in his tribuneship, and who had greatly undermined the popularity of Gracchus, by proposing, with the authority of the senate, laws even more grateful to the multitude than his. His son was now prevailed upon to act a similar part, and to bribe the people at almost any price to assist in the meditated attack upon the equestrian order. But Drusus was not of

Tribuneship of M. Livius Drusus.

<sup>11</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 5.

<sup>12</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 5, 6.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, Epitom. LXX. Velleius Paterculus, II. 13.

a temper to be the mere instrument of the designs of others. He is described as a man of great talents and great pride ; insomuch, that during his ædileship,<sup>14</sup> when one of his colleagues suggested something as beneficial to the state, Drusus scornfully replied, "What business have you to interfere in the affairs of our commonwealth?" and when he acted as quæstor in Asia, he disdained the usual insignia of the office, as if his own personal dignity needed not any external marks of honour. In his tribuneship, he was willing to promote the popularity of the senate, but not so as to resign to it all the credit that his measures might acquire : he rather aspired to be, as it were, the moderator of the republic, to balance the claims of contending factions, and to secure to himself the respect and gratitude of all. The imperfect accounts of these times which remain to us, do not allow us to arrange

the order of his proceedings with exactness ; but it appears that he at first attempted merely to restrain any abuse of power in those who filled the stations of judges,<sup>15</sup> by making them responsible for their verdicts, and liable to be tried, if there were any grounds for accusing them of corruption. Three of the most eminent individuals of the equestrian order, amongst whom we find the name of C. Mæcenas, an ancestor of the famous minister of Augustus, opposed the law of Drusus in behalf of the whole body to which they belonged ; and their arguments, as recorded by Cicero,<sup>16</sup> are too remarkable to be omitted. They insisted that the Roman knights, in declining to sue for those offices which might have raised them to the rank of senators, had deliberately sacrificed their ambition to their love of security ; that the high dignities which a senator enjoyed, were fairly compensated by his greater liability to have his conduct called in question ; while, on the other hand, the equestrian order, which was obliged by law to undertake the office of judges, ought not to be exposed to prosecution for the manner in which they discharged it. Strange as this reasoning appears to us, it was admitted as just at Rome : the plebeians fully sympathized with the knights, and they succeeded in rejecting the proposed law, and in repelling all inquiry into the conduct of the judges, however great might be the iniquity of their decisions. Thus baffled, Drusus had recourse to a stronger measure, and proposed to restore the law of Q. Servilius Cæpio, by which the judicial power had been divided between the senate and the equestrian order. By a curious coincidence, one of his warmest opponents was a son of the very man in whose steps he was treading, Q. Cæpio.<sup>17</sup> Common report assigned a ridiculous

<sup>14</sup> *Auctor de Viris illustribus*, in M. Druso.

<sup>16</sup> *Pro Cluentio*, 56.

<sup>15</sup> Cicero, *pro Rabir. Postumo*, 7 ; *pro Cluentio*, 56.

<sup>17</sup> Cicero, *pro Domo*, 46. *Florus*, III.



cause to their mutual opposition, by tracing it back, in the first instance, to a dispute at a public sale about a valuable gold ring, which each of them was eager to purchase. Personal motives may very possibly have added virulence to their political differences; but Q. Cæpio, as a member of the equestrian order, was naturally disposed to resist the measures of Drusus; and the same vehemence of temper, which induced him, on a former occasion, to defy the power of the tribune Saturninus, would lead him to take an equally prominent part on the side that he now espoused. The proposed law met with another powerful antagonist in the consul L. Philippus. He seems to have been actuated by a settled feeling of opposition to the aristocracy; as we have seen him, when tribune, eager to bring forward an agrarian law; and now, as consul, he continually, in his speeches to the people, inveighed against the senate<sup>18</sup> with the utmost severity. On the other hand, Drusus pursued his schemes with the overbearing violence to which the pride of his nature prompted him; on one occasion, he threatened Cæpio,<sup>19</sup> that he would order him to be thrown from the Tarpeian rock; at another time, when Philippus was speaking against him in the Forum, he caused him to be seized and dragged to prison; and when, from the tightness with which the officer grappled him, the blood burst forth from his nostrils, Drusus exclaimed, in allusion to the supposed luxuriousness of his manner of living, "that it was the pickle of his favourite fish." In order to further his views, he proposed a new corn law, and a law for the establishment of several new colonies, to conciliate the common people; and to win the favour of the Italian allies, he renewed the hopes formerly held out to them by C. Gracchus and M. Fulvius Flaccus, of obtaining the privileges of Roman citizens. The senate for a long time cordially supported him; and this circumstance gave occasion to the violent speech of the consul, L. Philippus,<sup>20</sup> "That it was impossible for the republic to go on with such a senate." But at length their zeal in his cause began to cool: while he professed to defend their dignity, he almost pretended to act as their patron; and on one occasion,<sup>21</sup> when they sent for him into the senate house, he replied, "That the senate should rather adjourn to the Curia Hostilia," anciently used as the place of their meetings, "that so they might be near him while he was addressing the people, if they wanted him." It is said that the senate actually complied with his proposal; but such an instance of his pride must have taught it, that it was possible to buy too dearly its deliverance from the arbitrary power of the equestrian order. Meanwhile the laws of Drusus were successively carried: the

<sup>18</sup> Cicero, De Oratore, I. 7.

<sup>20</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, III. 1.

<sup>19</sup> Auctor de Viris illustribus, in M.

<sup>21</sup> Valerius Maximus, IX. 5.

judicial power was to be divided between the senate and the equestrian order; new colonies were to be planted; corn was to be sold at the rate fixed by the Sempronian law; all the several parties whom Drusus had courted had received the benefits which he had promised them, excepting only the Italian allies. To admitting them to the rights of citizenship, all orders in Rome were equally averse; and they seemed likely to meet the usual fate of strangers who interfere in domestic quarrels, and whose interests are sacrificed to promote the reconciliation of the contending parties. But finding that Drusus was unable to satisfy their expectations, and that nothing was to be looked for from the freewill of the Romans, they prepared to apply themselves to other measures. A conspiracy is said to have been formed by the Latins<sup>22</sup> to assassinate the consul, L. Philippus, whom they considered as one of their greatest enemies, while he was performing a sacrifice on the Alban Mount. Drusus, aware of their design, warned Philippus to provide for his own safety, and the plan was thus frustrated; but the public mind throughout Italy was in the highest state of agitation, and every thing seemed to presage an impending contest.

It was at this time, when all parties were united in their invectives against Drusus as the author of these disturbances, that one day, when he was returning home from the forum,<sup>23</sup> encircled by an immense crowd of his followers, he was murdered at the door of his own house by some unknown assassin, who stabbed him, and left the knife sticking in his side. He was carried in immediately, and soon after expired; and such was the state of the times, that no inquiry was made to find out the murderer. But it was commonly asserted that Q. Varius Hybrida,<sup>24</sup> a vehement enemy of the senate, was the perpetrator of the crime.

After the death of Drusus, the general feeling ran so strongly against his measures, from the sense entertained of his criminal rashness in encouraging the claims of the Italian allies, that the senate now concurred with the consul Philippus in declaring all his laws invalid;<sup>25</sup> grounding this decision on the authority of the consul, who was also one of the augurs, and who alleged that they had been passed without due attention to the forms of religion in observing the auspices. It is remarkable, that the law for the regulation of the judicial power, which the senate had so strong an interest in maintaining, was notwithstanding annulled, together with the rest; as if the aristocracy had not dared to retain any benefit from the support of a

<sup>22</sup> Auctor de Viris illustribus, in M. Druso.

<sup>23</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 14. Cicero, pro Milone, 7.

<sup>24</sup> Cicero, de Naturâ Deorum, III. 33.

<sup>25</sup> Cicero, de Legibus, II. 6. 12.

man who was now considered as an enemy to his country by all parties equally.

The allies, however, had not yet broken out into open hostilities when the new consuls, L. Julius Cæsar and P.

A. U. C. 663.

Rutilius Rufus, entered upon their office. In the mean time the equestrian order having thus successfully repelled the attack made against it, resolved to follow up its victory, and to terrify its enemies by an unsparing exercise of that judicial power of which it had been vainly attempted to deprive it. A law was proposed and carried by Q. Varius Hybrida,<sup>26</sup> the reputed assassin of Drusus, and now one of the tribunes of the people, that an inquiry should be set on foot in order to discover what persons had given encouragement to the pretensions of the Italians, and that all who had done so should be held guilty of a treasonable offence. This was a favourite method of annoying the nobility ; and we have seen it practised already with success at the beginning of the war with Jugurtha. The knights promised themselves the same results from it on the present occasion. Accusations were brought against M. Æmilius Scaurus,<sup>27</sup> the first on the roll of the senate ; against M. Antonius,<sup>28</sup> the famous orator ; against C. Cotta,<sup>29</sup> Q. Pompeius, L. Memmius, and several others of the senators. But the majority of those whom we have named obtained their acquittal ; and the whole proceeding had little other effect than that of exasperating the Italians still further, when they saw that to have shown any encouragement to their petitions, was considered at Rome as a crime. Accordingly, the different cities of Italy<sup>30</sup> entered into a secret league with each other, and began to make an interchange of hostages. Their intrigues were first discovered at Asculum, a town of Picenum ; and Q. Servilius, with proconsular authority, was sent thither to punish the offenders. But not being supported by a sufficient military force, he provoked the inhabitants to proceed at once to open violence ; and they accordingly massacred him and his lieutenant Fonteius,<sup>31</sup> together with all the other Roman citizens who happened to be found in Asculum. Immediately after the perpetration of this outrage, the Italians with one consent flew to arms : the Marsi,<sup>32</sup> the Peligni, the Samnites, the Lucani, the Vestini, the Marrucini, the Picentes, the Hirpini, and the Japygians ; almost every nation in Italy, except the Latins, Tuscans, and Umbrians, took part in the confederacy. They fixed upon Corfinium as their seat of government,<sup>33</sup> giving it the name of

Confederacy among the Italian states.

Revolt of the Italian allies.

<sup>26</sup> Valerius Maximus, VIII. 6. Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 37.

<sup>27</sup> Cicero, Fragm. Orat. pro M. Scauro.

<sup>28</sup> Cicero, Tuscul. Disput. II. 24.

<sup>29</sup> Cicero, de Claris Orator. 56. 89.

<sup>30</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 38.

<sup>31</sup> Cicero, pro Fonteio, 14.

<sup>32</sup> Appian, I. 39. Livy, Epit. LXXII.

<sup>33</sup> Diodorus Siculus, Eclog. XXXVII.



Italicum ; and there a senate was formed out of the principal individuals in the several states ; and two officers were elected with the title of consuls, to conduct the operations of the war ; each, in imitation of the practice of the Romans, having one-half of Italy assigned him as his province, and six generals, with the title of lieutenants, to act under his command. A deputation was sent to the Roman senate, representing the reasonable claims of the Italians to enjoy their share of the privileges of a city, whose greatness was in so large a proportion the work of their own courage and fidelity ; but an answer was returned with the usual spirit of the Romans, that no proposals would be received until the Italians should express contrition for their rebellion, and return to their obedience. Thus an end was put to all negotiation, and the war was commenced on both sides with the utmost vigour and animosity.

That the reader may more fully understand the nature of this quarrel, and of the connexion which subsisted between Rome and the different nations of Italy, it will be proper to refer to the history of an earlier period, and to notice that system of alliances between the stronger and weaker powers which is one of the most peculiar points in the political relations of antiquity.

Nothing can be imagined more miserable than the condition of the weaker states, in those ages of barbarism which subsisted both in Greece and Italy long after the establishment of political societies or commonwealths. That superior power conferred a right of dominion, and that foreigners might be freely plundered, unless protected by some particular treaty, were two principles generally acted upon, and which exposed all small communities to the double evils of oppression from their neighbours, and of kidnapping and robbery from any one who had the means of occasionally reaching them. Their only resource was to form a connexion with some nation strong enough to defend them, and the protection of which they purchased by binding themselves to serve it faithfully in all its wars ; or, in other words, by surrendering their national independence. Unhappily the system of

Of the nature of the ancient system of alliance between a stronger and a weaker power.

Reasons why alliance was preferred to a complete union.

government which prevailed in those times led them to preserve their municipal independence, and substituted the connexion of alliance for that of union under the same executive and legislative power. The origin of most of the cities of Greece and Italy resembled that of the European settlements in America ; they were the colonies of a more civilized people seating themselves in the country of barbarians ; and thus instead of freely naturalizing themselves and spreading over the face of the land, they advanced timidly and slowly beyond the walls of their first fortified habitation, and were accustomed to contract their feelings of patriotism within the limits of a single

city. The spirit of a town is naturally somewhat republican ; men are thrown more completely together, they live in sight of one another, and all are readily summoned together to consider on any thing that may affect the common interest. Thus the principle of representation does not suggest itself to their minds ; where all can meet to consult for themselves, they are not likely to intrust others with the power of acting for them. In this manner it came to be considered as an axiom amongst the political writers of antiquity, that where any portion of liberty was enjoyed, there some points at least must be subject to the decision of the collective body of the people ; and even where property was made a qualification, and the poorest citizens were excluded from the public assemblies, still those who had a voice in the commonwealth always exercised it in their own persons collectively, and not through the medium of representatives ; and thus the national council, if so it might be called, was always a considerable portion of the whole population, and formed too large a body to be contained within the walls of a single building. This circumstance rendered it impossible for the dependent allies of a state to become incorporated with it ; the inhabitants of many towns could not habitually meet together in one common assembly ; and the citizens of the capital, or seat of government, would then in effect hold in their hands an absolute sovereignty over all the rest of the nation. Whereas, by retaining a municipal independence, the allied cities still enjoyed an entire freedom in their internal government, lived under their own laws, held in their own hands the administration of justice, and confined to themselves all offices of civil honour and emolument. But at the same time their interests were thus kept distinct from those of their protecting ally, they were regarded always as subjects and not as fellow-citizens, and were liable to have their property taxed, their trade shackled, and their people called to serve as soldiers, whenever it suited the policy or pleasure of the sovereign state.

The invaluable histories of Thucydides and Xenophon afford a complete picture of these alliances among the Greeks ; and it is from these that we must derive our knowledge of the same system, as it was practised in Italy. We find that Rome,<sup>34</sup> so early as the first year of the commonwealth, was strong enough to act as the protecting ally of several small adjacent cities, among which Ardea, Antium, Laurentum, Circeii, and Tarracina, are particularly mentioned. They were thus secured against the descents which the Carthaginians often made on the coasts of Italy, for the purposes of plunder, and especially of carrying off the inhabitants as slaves ; for Rome being of importance enough to treat with Carthage, stipulated that all

Causes which placed  
the Romans at the  
head of an alliance.

<sup>34</sup> Polybius, III. 22.

her own dependent allies should be secured from molestation : but with regard to all the other cities of Latium, it was provided, that if the Carthaginians took any of them, they might carry off the people and the moveable property, but might not convert the towns into establishments or garrisons for themselves. Thus they were allowed to plunder all who did not put themselves under the protection of Rome : and this permission was doubtless intended to exalt the benefits of the Roman alliance in the estimation of the neighbouring states. In process of time

Their authority over their allies ; 1. In war.

the Romans found means to include all the nations of Italy in the number of their allies, and thus to place all the military force of the peninsula at their own disposal. They actually were preparing to call it into action when the Gauls invaded Italy between the first and second Punic wars, and caused returns to be made to them of the whole number of citizens able to bear arms in the several states of their confederacy.<sup>35</sup> In every war, the troops of the Italian allies formed one-half of the Roman army : they were levied by orders from the consuls,<sup>36</sup> who named the states from which the contingents were to be drawn, the number of them to be raised, and the time and place at which they were to be ready to put themselves under the command of the Roman generals. They had officers of their own,<sup>37</sup> and their own paymasters, but these were entirely subordinate to generals appointed by the Romans to command them, with the title of prefects of the allies. The prefects had the power of punishing by fine or by flogging ; and the consuls, as appears from a passage in Sallust, to which we referred on a former occasion, might even condemn any of the soldiers of the allies to death.<sup>38</sup> It is

2. In peace.

more difficult to state exactly what was the power of Rome over the Italian nations in time of peace. Generally speaking, the Roman laws were not binding on the allies, unless they themselves chose to adopt them ;<sup>39</sup> but a large reservation was made of all such things as the Romans held to concern their dignity or prerogative, and in all these their decisions were of paramount authority to any municipal laws of their allies. For example, it was held that the senate or people of Rome, or that any of their generals, might confer the freedom of Rome on any meritorious individuals in the allied states,<sup>40</sup> although it seems that the Italians viewed the exercise of this power with some jealousy, probably because they thought that it gave the Romans too great

The allies are anxious to obtain the privileges of Roman citizenship.

an influence among them. But with whatever reluctance they might see the rights of Roman citizenship conferred on individuals amongst them

by the patronage of Roman magistrates, the allies had long en-

<sup>35</sup> Polybius, II. 23, 24.

<sup>36</sup> Polybius, VI. 21.

<sup>37</sup> Polybius, VI. 21. 26. 34.

<sup>38</sup> Sallust, *Bell. Jugurth.* 69.

<sup>39</sup> Cicero, *pro Cornelio Balbo*, 8.

<sup>40</sup> Cicero, *pro Cornelio Balbo*, 9.



tertained a wish to share universally in these rights, and to find the road open before them to the command of armies, to the administration of provinces, to a participation, in short, in all the dignities and emoluments so largely enjoyed by the citizens of Rome. The Latins, or at least some states among them, possessed indeed the right of voting in the Roman assemblies; but it appears that they were all comprehended in one of the Roman tribes,<sup>41</sup> and could influence consequently no more than a thirty-fifth part of the whole number of voters; so that there was little inducement for them as a body to interest themselves in the business of the forum. The rest of the Italians did not enjoy even so much political consequence as this; and both were alike incapable of being elected to any magistracy at Rome, or to any military command in the provinces. It is no wonder, therefore, that they bore with impatience such a state of exclusion: and a modern reader may be surprised that their efforts were directed towards obtaining a closer union with Rome, rather than towards asserting their complete independence; and he may think it strange also, that the Romans should have risked the very existence of their commonwealth, rather than adopt a measure which promised to strengthen it by the accession of so large a number of citizens, whose interests would from henceforth have been identified with that of Rome. But the allies on their part considered, that if they became independent, they would lose the fruits of all those conquests which they had so largely helped the Romans to acquire. Instead of being a sovereign nation, exempted from taxes, and deriving a large accession of wealth every year from its subject provinces, they would have relapsed into the condition of poor and petty republics, none of which had any claim to become a centre of union to the rest, while their separate strength would have been utterly incompetent to withstand the power of Rome, by which, long before it had reached its present eminence, they had already been successively overwhelmed. On the other hand, the pride of the Romans induced them to revolt at the notion of raising their inferiors to the rank of their equals. The senate besides, by admitting so many new competitors, diminished each individual senator's prospects of obtaining honours and emoluments: the equestrian order dreaded, lest their exclusive possession of the judicial power should be invaded, or their profits, as farmers of the taxes, wrested from them by the competition of some of the wealthy Italians; whilst the bulk of the people were unwilling to lessen the value of their votes in the public assembly by extending the right of suffrage so largely. All parties in the commonwealth, trusting to the well-known discipline of the Roman armies, to the superior experience of their generals,

<sup>41</sup> Livy, XXV. 3.

and to the usual dissensions and weaknesses of confederacies, resolved to hazard the issue of a war, not without the hope, perhaps, of establishing their power over their allies on a firmer basis, and silencing for ever all their claims to a participation in the rights of Roman citizenship.

Accordingly, the two consuls, L. Julius Cæsar and P. Rutilius Rufus, took the field, having under them as their lieutenants, all the officers of the highest reputation in the commonwealth.<sup>42</sup> Under Rutilius were employed C. Marius, who seems to have rested in inactivity since the sedition of Saturninus; Cn. Pompeius, the father of Pompey the Great; Q. Servilius Cæpio, who had made himself conspicuous by his opposition to M. Drusus, during his late tribuneship; C. Perpenna and Valerius Messala. Under L. Cæsar, were Licinius Crassus, P. Lentulus, Titus Didius, and L. Sylla. These several officers acted in their different quarters against the generals of the confederate Italians; but as we have no account of the war written by a contemporary, or by a military historian, we know not what were the plans for the campaign on either side; and the reports which we possess, contain little more than an unconnected list of battles and sieges, devoid alike of information and of interest. It is mentioned that the consul, L. Cæsar,<sup>43</sup> was joined by an auxiliary force of Gauls and Numidians; but that the latter were rendered useless to him, by an able expedient of the Italian commander, C. Papius. Oxyntas, a son of the famous Jugurtha, had been detained a prisoner in Italy since the death of his father, and now falling into the hands of Papius, was by him invested with the ensigns of royalty, and studiously presented to the sight of his countrymen in the consul's army. Numbers of them immediately deserted to him, looking upon him as their king; and L. Cæsar, suspicious of those who remained, was obliged to send them back into Africa.

In the first year of the war, the Romans<sup>44</sup> met with some severe losses: the consul, P. Rutilius, and Q. Cæpio, one of his lieutenants, were, on separate occasions, defeated and slain. L. Postumius, one of the prætors, was killed at Nola; and that town, which had been so faithful to Rome in the second Punic war, now fell into the hands of the Samnites. Several other cities were either taken by the Italians, or were encouraged to join their cause of their own accord; and towards the close of the year, the Umbri and the Tuscans showed evident signs of their intention to follow the general example. This last danger seemed so alarming, that the Romans were driven to avert it by concession; and they passed a law, admitting all the Italians who had continued

<sup>42</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 40.

<sup>43</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 42.

<sup>44</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. 43, 44. Livy, Epitom. LXXIII.

faithful to Rome, to the rights of citizenship.<sup>45</sup> This fixed the Latins to their cause, and stopped the Tuscans from revolting as they had meditated; the Umbri, however, probably not being aware of it in time, actually joined the confederates. Yet, although Rome had thus been obliged to concede in some measure, her strength in the field had been too resolutely and successfully exerted, to allow the enemy to calculate on the speedy attainment of his object by force of arms. Sylla and Marius had obtained a great victory over the Marsi;<sup>46</sup> L. Cæsar had defeated the Samnites; and Cn. Pompeius, having obtained some advantage over the Picentes, was enabled to lay siege to Asculum. On the other hand, the Romans were so pressed for want of soldiers, that they enlisted even freed men into the legions;<sup>47</sup> and as their victories had been fully counterbalanced by defeats, it became evident that concessions must be made; and the difficulty consisted in disarming the resentment of the enemy without seeming to be actuated by fear, to yield the point in dispute without sacrificing the national honour.

The military events of the next campaign tended, however, in a great degree, to preserve the reputation of the Romans, and enabled them to extricate themselves without degradation from this alarming war. L. Porcius Cato, and Cn. Pompeius Strabo, were chosen consuls; and the latter brought the siege of Asculum to a triumphant issue,<sup>48</sup> an event which was peculiarly welcome to the Romans, as that town had set the first example of revolt, and had accompanied it with the massacre of two Roman officers, and a number of Roman citizens. Cn. Pompeius gained also a victory over the Marsi, and reduced that people, together with the Vestini, Peligni, and Marrucini, to make a separate peace. Possibly, some intimation was given them, that the object for which they were contending would be granted them on their submission; for we find that the states which first withdrew from the confederacy, were rewarded by receiving the right of citizenship immediately. The seat of government of the Italians was now removed from Corfinium to Æsernia,<sup>49</sup> in the country of the Samnites; that bold people resolving to continue the struggle as obstinately as their ancestors had done in the days of Pontius and Papirius Cursor. But they had to contend with one of the most formidable of the Roman generals, in the person of Sylla, whose exploits in this second campaign had raised him to the highest distinction. The forces under his command were increased early in the season,<sup>50</sup>

Second campaign.  
A. U. C. 664.

<sup>45</sup> Appian, 49.

<sup>46</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 46. Livy, Epitome, LXXIII. LXXIV.

<sup>47</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. 49. Livy, in Syllâ, 6. Epitome, LXXIV.

<sup>48</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXXV. LXXXVI.

<sup>49</sup> Diodorus Siculus, Eclog. XXXVII.

<sup>50</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXXV. Plutarch.



by a mutiny which took place among the troops of A. Postumius Albinus, another of the consul's lieutenants. That officer, being suspected of treason, was murdered by his own soldiers, who then joined themselves to the army of Sylla; nor did he scruple to receive them, but observed, "that they would only fight the better, in order to atone for their crime." Thus strengthened, he took and destroyed the town of Stabiæ,<sup>51</sup> in Campania, defeated a large army with immense loss near Nola, reduced the Hirpini to subjection, and then, invading Samnium, defeated the Samnite general, Papius Mutilus, with severe loss in the field, drove him into *Æsconia*, and attacked and took the town of Bovianum. These successes encouraged him to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship; for which purpose, towards the end of the campaign, he returned to Rome.

A circumstance, which is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus,<sup>52</sup> served, in all probability, as a powerful inducement to the Romans, to reward the submission of the Italians as early as possible with the privileges which they so earnestly desired. It appears that the confederates had applied for aid to Mithridates, king of Pontus, whose power and ambition were now disposing him to enter into a contest with the Romans. Either his pride, or his want of sufficient information, dictated to him his most ill-judged answer, and led him to commit a fault in policy, which the ability and vigour of all his afterlife could never repair. He told the Italians, that he would lead his armies into Italy as soon as he had secured the dominion of Asia Minor. But the fortune of his intended allies could brook no delay; and a bare suspicion of so formidable an accession to their enemy's force, would dispose the Romans to hasten their measures of conciliation. Accordingly, the Italian war vanishes almost instantaneously from our notice; one state after another submitted, and received in return the gift of Roman citizenship; and after the close of the second year of the contest, we only find some faint sparks remaining of the vast conflagration which had so lately involved all Italy. Nola still refused to yield;<sup>53</sup> and the relics of the Samnites and Lucanians were yet in arms, either in their own country, or in the extremity of Bruttium, almost in the same quarter where Hannibal had so long maintained himself under circumstances nearly similar.

The war which we now have been recording, was undertaken for a definite and intelligible object, and naturally ended when that object was attained. But as it had sprung out of the internal dissensions of Rome, so it was lost in them again; and the different interests which had been en-

Mithridates refuses to assist the Italians.

End of the Italian war.

Its connexion with subsequent events should be observed.

<sup>51</sup> Pliny, *Historia Natural.* III. 5. Ap-  
pian, I. 50, 51.

<sup>52</sup> Eclog. XXXVII.

<sup>53</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 17. Diodo-  
rus Siculus, Eclog. XXXVII.

gaged in it, although no longer the leading points in the civil wars that followed, yet became easily connected with the respective parties, and served to prolong and exasperate their quarrel. It is here that we again deeply feel the want of a contemporary, or a sensible historian, to guide our researches. Reduced to connect, as well as we can, the facts incidentally mentioned by the writers whom we are obliged to follow, and forced to supply, often by conjectures, the chasms in their most unsatisfactory narratives, we can only hope at best to present our readers with an imperfect picture, and may be forgiven if it be in some respects even an erroneous one. The name of Marius has scarcely occurred to our notice in the second campaign of the Italian war; whereas the services of Sylla were most eminent. We have seen that Sylla went to Rome to stand for the consulship, and the prospect of his attaining that dignity was most galling to the jealousy of Marius; especially as a war with Mithridates now appeared certain, and if a general of Sylla's reputation filled the office of consul, his claims to the command of the army employed in the contest would prevail over all others: C. Julius Cæsar, and Q. Pompeius, were the two other candidates; the former of whom could not legally offer himself,<sup>54</sup> as he had never gone through the previous office of prætor, and on this account his election was vigorously opposed by P. Antistius and P. Sulpicius, tribunes of the people. Sulpicius was one of the ablest orators of his time,<sup>55</sup> and had lived in habits of familiarity with L. Crassus, with M. Antonius, and particularly with the late tribune, M. Drusus. He is introduced by Cicero as one of the speakers in the dialogue "de Oratore," and is said to have been regarded by the elder part of the nobility, as a man likely to be one of the best supporters of the aristocratical cause. One of his first public acts was the accusation of C. Norbanus,<sup>56</sup> for a riot and sedition in his tribuneship, and this was considered as a favourable omen of his future attachment to the laws and to good order. His opposition to the illegal pretensions of C. Cæsar gained him great popularity,<sup>57</sup> without any prejudice to his character in the opinions of the nobility; but it appears that the favour with the multitude, which he had thus honourably gained, accompanied, perhaps, with an excessive confidence in his own talents as a speaker, excited in his mind a fatal ambition, and led him to tread in the steps of the Gracchi, of Saturninus, and of his friend Drusus, in assuming the character of a popular tribune. Other circumstances may have contributed also to the same effect: he had a violent personal quarrel with Q. Pompeius,<sup>58</sup> who, together with

Sylla a candidate for the consulship.

Consulship of L. Sylla and Q. Pompeius. A. U. C. 665.

Rise, character, and proceedings of the tribune Sulpicius.

<sup>54</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, 62.

<sup>56</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, II. 21. 48.

<sup>55</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, 49. 55.  
De Oratore, I. 7. 21.

<sup>57</sup> Cicero, de Hauruspis. Respons. 19.

<sup>58</sup> Cicero, de Amicitia, 1.

Sylla, proved the successful candidate in the consular election ; and he had, perhaps, already formed that connexion with Marius, which his subsequent conduct so clearly discovered. The measure which he principally endeavoured to carry, seems to have been a favourite one with all the popular leaders since the days of Tiberius Gracchus ; and Sulpicius, in the course of his intimacy with Drusus, probably learned to regard it with peculiar attachment. This was an unlimited communication of the right of citizenship to all the inhabitants of Italy ; a project essentially popular in its principle, as it tended to render the government less exclusive ; and which, though abhorred by the aristocracy, and viewed with jealousy by a large portion of the people at large, possessed notwithstanding great attractions for the very lowest class of citizens,<sup>59</sup> as well as for the turbulent and enthusiastic of all classes ; for not only was it recommended by being of a spirit entirely democratical, but it was obvious that the indiscriminate admission of all the Italians to the privilege of voting at Rome, would greatly lessen the influence of the richer class of Roman citizens, and by rendering the assembly of the people so immoderately numerous, would in fact reduce it to little better than a mere mob, the ready tool of an eloquent and an ambitious leader. Nor had the late grant of citizenship to the allies entirely satisfied their wishes ; for in order to prevent them from exercising a power in the comitia proportionate to their numbers, they had been all admitted into eight only of the thirty-five tribes ;<sup>60</sup> and as all questions were decided by a majority of tribes, and not of individual votes, their weight in the assembly was still much less than they thought themselves entitled to claim. Accordingly, Sulpicius now professed himself the advocate of their complete equality with the natives of Rome, and proposed that they should be admitted into all the tribes without distinction. Finding his project resisted by the aristocratical party, he became only more violent in his proceedings ; he knew that if it became a question of physical force, his partisans were likely to prevail, provided only that he could give them organization as well as numbers, to prevent them from being seized with a panic in the time of danger,

<sup>59</sup> The history of the Catholic question in our own times will greatly illustrate the account given in the text. The cause of the Catholics has been espoused by the popular party, because the principle of abolishing laws of exclusion, and rendering all men equally eligible to a share in the government, is in itself a popular one. Yet considerations of danger or loss to themselves from the consequences of the measure, have often strongly influenced the multitude to oppose it, and to inveigh against its supporters ; although, after the

ferment was over, they have not liked their leaders the less for continuing to be its advocates. Thus Drusus may be said to have fallen a sacrifice to something like the outcry of " No Popery ;" yet Sulpicius, only two years afterwards, could tread in his steps, not only without forfeiting the affections of the people, but as if the side of the question which he espoused were the one which a popular leader would naturally adopt.

<sup>60</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 20.



and leaving him personally exposed to the fate of the Gracchi and of Saturninus. He prepared, therefore, a body of three thousand gladiators,<sup>61</sup> whom he kept always about him ; and he is said, besides, to have been attended by six hundred young men of the equestrian order, whom he called his anti-senate. While we start at such a systematic defiance of the forms of a regular government, we should remember that acts of outrage and violence were not confined to the popular party ; for only two years before this time, a riot had been excited by a class of men necessarily removed far above the mere rabble,<sup>62</sup> those who had large debts due to them ; who had assaulted and murdered A. Sempronius Asellio, one of the prætors, in open day, because, in his judicial capacity, he had issued some decrees for the protection of insolvent debtors. In the meantime, news arrived that Mithridates had actually attacked and overrun the Roman dominions in Asia Minor. War was, therefore, declared against him at Rome ; and Asia and Italy being named as the provinces of the consuls, the latter fell to the lot of Q. Pompeius,<sup>63</sup> and the former to that of Sylla. The army which Sylla was to command, was at this time employed near Nola, as that city still refused to submit to the Romans ; but he himself remained in the city with his colleague, endeavouring to baffle the projects of Sulpicius, by proclaiming frequent holy-days, and ordering consequently a suspension of public business. But Sulpicius,<sup>64</sup> on one of these occasions, attacked the consuls with his armed force, calling upon them to repeal their proclamation for the festival ; and on their refusal a riot ensued, in which Q. Pompeius escaped with difficulty to a place of concealment, his son was killed, and Sylla, finding himself in the power of his enemies, complied with their demands, and annulled his late edict. Then, unwilling to expose himself to similar insults, he instantly left Rome to join the army. Sulpicius carried his favourite measure, and the Italian allies were placed by law on a footing of perfect equality with the Romans in the right of voting.

Sylla had already shown that he possessed none of the virtuous courage of Metellus, who had preferred banishment to compliance with the illegal demands of the popular party in the time of Saturninus. It was soon to appear that he resembled that excellent citizen as little in the readiness with which he had sacrificed his own interests and dignity, rather than endanger the peace of his country. Marius was now to reap the advantage which he had proposed to himself from his connexion with Sulpicius, and from the late triumph of the Italian allies. It should be recollected, that he had supported the interests of the Italians in the tribune-

Sulpicius procures the command of the army, destined to act against Mithridates, to be transferred from Sylla to Marius.

<sup>61</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, 35 ; in Syllâ, 8.

<sup>63</sup> Appian, 55.

<sup>62</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXXIV. Appian, I.

<sup>64</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, I. 56. Plutarch, in Syllâ, 8.

ship of Saturninus, and that he in return relied upon their devotion to him in promoting his views of ambition. His own low birth, his want of education, and the inherent coarseness of his character, had prevented him from ever blending cordially with the aristocracy; he was besides himself a native of a country town, Arpinum, and could have no invincible prejudices in favour of the exclusive possession of power by the inhabitants of Rome. Accordingly, soon after the admission of the Italians into all the tribes, a law was passed in the comitia, by which the people transferred the command of the army, destined to act against Mithridates, from Sylla to Marius;<sup>65</sup> and two military tribunes were sent to notify this change to Sylla. His soldiers are said to have been as indignant as himself at this decree: they had been fighting for two campaigns against the revolted Italians; and now the enemy whom they had vanquished in the field, had acquired an ascendancy in the councils of the state, and would probably deprive them, as well as their general, of the spoils and honours which all anticipated from an Asiatic war. The violence of the comitia was imitated in the camp; the two military tribunes were murdered,<sup>66</sup> and the army, consisting of six legions, immediately broke up from its quarters, and began to move towards Rome. But it is said,<sup>67</sup> that almost all the superior officers, unwilling to fight against their country, resigned their commands, and hastened to escape into the city.

Sylla marches  
towards Rome.

In retaliation for the murder of the two military tribunes, several of Sylla's friends were murdered by the popular party at Rome. The senate was completely overawed; and none of the many illustrious persons whom it contained, are recorded as making any attempt to mediate between the parties, or to prevent the violence that was impending. Sylla was joined, meantime, by his colleague, Q. Pompeius, and the two consuls continued to advance, disregarding the repeated deputations that were sent to stay their march. At last, when they were already in the neighbourhood of Rome, they received a final address, entreating them, in the name of the senate, not to approach within four miles of the capital.<sup>68</sup> Sylla pretended to comply, and gave the usual orders to measure out the ground for his camp, on the spot on which the deputation had met him. But while his antagonists were thus thrown off their guard, he sent off a detachment to follow close after the returning deputies,<sup>69</sup> and to occupy one of the gates of the city. This was effected; and he and his colleague, putting themselves instantly in motion with the main army, and stationing troops on several quarters of the town, proceeded to

<sup>65</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 18. Appian,

<sup>67</sup> Appian, 57.

56.

<sup>66</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 9.

<sup>68</sup> Appian, 57. Plutarch, in Syllâ, 9.

<sup>69</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 9. Appian, 58.

force their way into the streets. Marius and Sulpicius, having in vain tried to strengthen their cause, by inviting the slaves to join them with a promise of freedom, attempted for a time to resist with such a force as they had been able to raise and arm, and with the aid of many of the inhabitants, who annoyed the assailants with stones and arrows, from their houses. But Sylla, without scruple, ordered his men to set fire to the quarters from whence they were thus annoyed, and at the same time prepared to assail the city in an opposite direction, at once to distract the plans of the defenders, and to menace them with cutting off their retreat. Then it was that Marius, Sulpicius, and their principal friends, gave up the contest, and consulted for their safety by flight; whilst the conquerors, halting in the Sacred Way, took instant measures for securing their victory, punished severely some of their soldiers,<sup>70</sup> who were beginning to plunder, stationed guards in the most important positions, and were on the alert the whole night to prevent any new disorders, or any further hostile attempts on either side.

Assaults and takes the city.

On the following morning the Romans, for the first time since the invasion of the Gauls, awoke to the sight of a victorious enemy in possession of their city. Sylla proceeded to assemble the senate, and proposed that Marius,<sup>71</sup> Sulpicius, and their adherents should be declared public enemies, and a price set on their heads. A decree was passed accordingly to that effect, and Sulpicius being betrayed by one of his slaves, was put to death by the consul's orders, and his head exposed upon the Rostra. Marius, after a series of romantic adventures, succeeded in escaping from his pursuers, and sought a refuge for the present in Africa, so that the popular party, deprived of its leaders, and controlled by the presence of a military force, submitted without resistance to the storm. What measures were taken by Sylla to secure the power of the aristocracy for the future, it is difficult to decide;<sup>72</sup> nor is it material, for they were all reversed in the counter-revolution that immediately followed. The laws of Sulpicius were, as might be expected, declared invalid; and the Italians were thus again debarred admission into more than<sup>16</sup> eight of the tribes. But the Epitomizer of Livy tells us,<sup>73</sup> that Sylla at this time planted several colonies, in order, as we may suppose, to reconcile some of the poorer citizens to his party; and

Marius and Sulpicius are declared traitors.

<sup>70</sup> Appian, I. 59.

<sup>71</sup> Appian, 60. Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, 45.

<sup>72</sup> Appian says, that he restored the old custom of voting by centuries instead of tribes; that he revived the practice that nothing should be submitted to the decision of the people, unless it had first passed

the senate; and that the senate itself was swelled by the nomination of three hundred new members from the different orders of the state to be placed on its rolls. But the reality of such important changes must not be admitted on the sole authority of such a writer as Appian.

<sup>73</sup> Epitome, LXXVII.



Election of Cinna and Octavius to the consulship.

he so abstained from interfering in the elections, that L. Cornelius Cinna, a man notoriously devoted to the popular interest, was chosen consul for the following year, together with Cn. Octavius, a partisan of the aristocracy. It is said that he bound Cinna<sup>74</sup> by the most solemn oaths not to disturb the order of things which he had established; a precaution so little likely to be of any avail, that we may almost wonder that Sylla should have adopted it. In fact, no sooner did Cinna come into office, than he began to declare his real sentiments, and induced one of the tribunes to threaten Sylla with a prosecution for his late violent assault on the city and usurpation of the government.<sup>75</sup> It is probable that Sylla now saw too late

Sylla sails with his army to Greece.

how incomplete and shortlived was the victory that he had gained; still, secure of the attachment of his army, he trusted that the senate might be able to maintain their own cause till he should return in triumph from Asia; and to prevent all chance of again being deprived of his command, he at once left Rome, rejoined his soldiers, whom he had some time before sent back to Campania, and then proceeded without delay to sail with them into Greece, there to check, if possible, the alarming career of Mithridates.

His colleague in the consulship, Q. Pompeius,<sup>76</sup> had been also confirmed by the senate in his appointment to the command of the army which was still kept on foot to oppose the remnants of the Italian confederacy. He accordingly set out for the quarters of the troops, which were at this time in the country of the Marsi. But Cn. Pompeius, the general whom he was going to supersede, considered the possession of an army too valuable to be easily relinquished; and the soldiers, at his instigation, as is stated in

Q. Pompeius is murdered by his soldiers.

all our accounts of these times, murdered their intended commander as soon as he arrived among them. Cn. Pompeius thus retaining his station, aspired perhaps to act the part of Sylla, and to become like him the defender of the senate against the enemies who were preparing to assault it; but it was not decreed that his crime should be so successful; and the author of an act, unexampled till now in the Roman history, was not permitted even to reap that poor renown which attends on prosperous wickedness.

<sup>74</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 10.

<sup>75</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 10.

Cicero, de

<sup>76</sup> Appian, 63. Velleius Paterculus, II.

20. Livy, Epitome, LXXVII.

Clariss. Oratoribus, 48.

## CHAPTER VI.

### PART II.

LUCIUS CORNELIUS SYLLA.—FROM U.C. 666, A.C. 88, TO U.C. 677, A.C. 77.

THE former triumphs of the aristocratical party over the Gracchi, and over Saturninus, had been followed by some years of comparative calm. But the popular cause had now gained an accession of strength, more fatally, indeed, to its adversaries than beneficially to itself, in the support of ambitious and powerful men, who hoped to turn its successes to the advancement of their own greatness. Besides this, the Italian war, while it had filled Italy with armies, had degraded the quality of the soldiery: for, in the distress of the state, the Romans had enlisted freedmen into the legions; and this, combining with the example already set by Marius of admitting men to serve without any qualification of property, had rendered the troops readier instruments of the personal schemes of their generals. The Italians also, by coalescing with one of the great divisions of the Roman commonwealth, might hope for more complete success than when they had struggled against the united force of the senate and the people. Added to all this, the late violence of Sylla, although professing to be no more than a necessary retaliation of preceding outrages, yet furnished those who had suffered from it with abundant excuses for a new reaction on their part; while the proscription of Marius, after the signal services he had rendered to his country, exasperated not only his own numerous friends, but a large body of independent citizens, who forgot the associate of Sulpicius, and remembered only the conqueror of the Cimbri.

From U.C. 666. A.C. 88, to U.C. 677. A.C. 77.

Causes which led to a renewal of disturbances.

Immediately, therefore, on the departure of Sylla from Italy, L. Cinna again brought forward the law of Sulpicius,<sup>1</sup> which admitted the Italians into all the thirty-five tribes without distinction. Those whom this law was intended to benefit crowded to Rome in great numbers, to support its author by their swords rather than by their

Cinna proposes to renew the law of Sulpicius, admitting the Italians into all the tribes.

<sup>1</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 20.

votes. If we may believe Appian,<sup>2</sup> hardly a shadow of any constitutional form of proceeding was observed; and no sooner had some of the tribunes of the aristocratical party interposed their negative to stop the passing of the law, than a violent riot broke out, and the lives of the tribunes were threatened. Upon this, Cn. Octavius, the other consul, broke into the forum with an armed force, and drove out the rioters, great numbers of whom were killed by his followers in their flight, but, as we are told, without his orders. Thus far the scene resembles the seditions of the Gracchi; but Octavius was of a mild and scrupulous temper, and had left the principal offender untouched; and Cinna, being fully prepared for the last extremities of civil discord, began to summon the slaves to his standard, in the hope of maintaining his ground in the capital. But finding himself disappointed, he fled from the city with his chief partisans, and the senate, by an act of authority, hitherto unprecedented, declared that he had forfeited the consulship;<sup>3</sup> and the people being called on to proceed to a new election, L. Cornelius Merula, the Flamen of Jupiter, was appointed consul in his room.

The Italian towns, regarding the cause of Cinna as their own, received him with the utmost cordiality,<sup>4</sup> and encouraged by their support, and assisted by their supplies of money, he presented himself at the camp of the army, which still, it seems, was employed in the neighbourhood of Nola. Here, by bribes and promises, he persuaded the soldiers to acknowledge him as their lawful consul, and to take the military oath of obedience to him; and having thus secured a rallying point for his partisans, he was soon joined by many individuals of the popular party from Rome. But his most powerful auxiliaries were the different cities of Italy,<sup>5</sup> who, thinking that now they had a fair opportunity of resuming the contest with Rome under happier auspices, exerted every nerve in the cause, and not only furnished Cinna with money, but took up arms with such spirit and unanimity to join him, that he was able in a very short time to form an army of thirty legions, amounting at the least to a hundred and fifty thousand men. Already, too, Cinna had invited Marius and the other exiles of the popular party to return to their country,<sup>6</sup> and Q. Sertorius and Cn. Carbo were actually holding commands in his army. Hoping, therefore, to imitate the example of Sylla, he moved immediately with his forces towards Rome.

The senate had no hopes of withstanding this assault by the

<sup>2</sup> De Bellis Civilibus, I. 64.

<sup>3</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, 66.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, 67. Paterculus, 20.

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, in Sertorio, 5.

He is driven from Rome, and deprived of the consulship.

Is assisted by the Italians, and gains over a Roman army.



mere efforts of the citizens of the capital. They required the support of a regular army,<sup>7</sup> and implored Cn. Pompeius, who, as we have seen, still retained his command in Umbria, to employ his soldiers in their defence. But he, more anxious to make the troubles of his country an occasion of his own advancement, remained for some time in suspense, as if waiting to see which party would purchase his services at the highest price, and thus allowed Cinna and his faction to consolidate their force beyond the possibility of successful resistance. Marius in the meanwhile landed in Tuscany with a small body of adherents,<sup>8</sup> and studiously retaining all the outward marks of wretchedness and poverty in his person and dress, he appealed to the compassion of the people by contrasting his present miserable condition with his former triumphs and dignities. He is said to have raised by these arts a body of about six thousand men, and to have effected his junction with Cinna, so that their combined forces were capable of being divided into four distinct armies,<sup>9</sup> with two of which Cinna and Carbo took up their positions on both sides of Rome; while Sertorius, with a third, stationed himself so as to command the navigation of the Tiber above the city; and Marius, with a fourth, was master of the course of the river below, between Rome and the sea.

The senate apply to Cn. Pompeius for aid.

Marius lands in Italy and joins Cinna.

Progress of the civil war.

In this state of things Cn. Pompeius at last resolved to espouse the cause of the senate, and marched towards Rome. A battle was fought between his army and that of Cinna, immediately under the walls of the capital:<sup>10</sup> but though the slaughter was great, the event seems to have been indecisive, and soon afterwards Cn. Pompeius was killed by lightning in his own camp. Both parties were suffering severely from the attacks of sickness, and this probably suspended their operations; while Marius was employed in destroying several of the towns in the neighbourhood of Rome,<sup>11</sup> from whence the city might have been supplied with provisions; and a detachment occupied Ariminum to intercept the reinforcements which the senate hoped to receive from Cisalpine Gaul. One hope still remained to the aristocracy. Metellus Pius, the son of that Metellus Numidicus, whose name, combined as it is with the recollection of his virtues, is a beautiful contrast to those which we must now so often mention, was at the head of an army in Samnium, and was still carrying on hostilities against the people of that country, who, with hereditary obstinacy, even now kept alive the last sparks of the Italian war. He was desired by the senate to make

<sup>7</sup> Livy, Epitom. LXXIX. Appian, I. 67. Paterculus, 21.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, 67. Plutarch, in Mario, 41.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXXIX. Appian, 67.

<sup>10</sup> Paterculus, II. 21. Appian, 68.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, 67, 68.

the best terms in his power with the Samnites,<sup>12</sup> and to hasten to the relief of his country. But either some difficulties occurred in the negotiation, or the conditions which he granted were not so favourable as to prevent the popular leaders from turning his retreat out of Samnium to their own advantage. Marius promised to give the Samnites every thing which they required; and accordingly they instantly joined his cause, defeated a Roman officer whom Metellus had left behind him to watch their movements, and added their whole strength to that already overpowering confederacy by which the aristocracy of Rome was assaulted.

The defenders of the old constitution, under the command of Octavius the consul, and Metellus,<sup>13</sup> had established themselves on the hill of Alba, and still presented a force which might have encountered any one of the enemy's armies with a fair hope of victory. But the generals dreaded to expose the whole nobility of the commonwealth, with their wives and children, to the consequences of a decisive defeat; besides this their soldiers could not be fully depended on, for many of them preferred Metellus to Octavius,<sup>14</sup> and entreated him to take the supreme command; and when he refused, and desired them to submit to the consul, who was their lawful general, they went over in crowds to the enemy. The very uprightness, indeed, of the aristocratical leaders, contributed to the present success of their adversaries. Whilst Cinna was seducing the slaves to join him by promising them their liberty, Octavius refused to follow the example, declaring that he would not imitate that conduct which he had himself denounced in his antagonist as treasonable. Thus the consular army was continually diminishing by desertion, without being able to repair its losses; and the enemy had now established so strict a blockade, that the mass of the people were alarmed at the prospect of a famine, and impatient of a longer continuance of this hopeless struggle.

Deputies were accordingly sent to Cinna by the senate to treat of peace.<sup>15</sup> But he insisted on knowing whether they were going to treat with him as consul, or as a private individual; and this difficulty broke off the negotiation for the moment. But the desertion from the city to the besieging army daily increasing, the senate were obliged to yield; they consented to acknowledge Cinna as consul, and only requested him to swear that he would shed no blood after his victory. He received the deputies with all the state of a consul,<sup>16</sup> and refusing to take any oath, merely promised that he would not willingly be the author of any executions. But what little comfort the depu-

Cinna and Marius enter Rome.  
U. C. 668. A. C. 86.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, 68. Livy, Epitome, LXXX.

<sup>13</sup> Appian, 69.

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, 42.

<sup>15</sup> Appian, 69.

<sup>16</sup> Appian, 70. Plutarch, in Mario, 43.

ties might have derived from this assurance was destroyed by the sight of Marius, who stood silently beside the consul's chair, and whose savage glances, rendered more fearful by the assumed wildness of his face and the meanness of his attire, betokened nothing but executions and massacres. Metellus had in the mean time withdrawn from Alba, and retired towards the north of Italy;<sup>17</sup> but Octavius, partly actuated by a courageous sense of duty, partly trusting to the solemn assurances of safety which he received from Cinna and Marius, and partly led away by his prophets and soothsayers, who foretold that he should suffer no injury, and to whose predictions he was habitually too ready to listen, refused to quit his station, and still continued to wear the ensigns of his office, and to show himself in public in the city. Cinna had already entered the walls, and disguise being no longer needful, he sent a party of soldiers to murder his colleague. Octavius quietly waited their approach, refusing either to fly or to conceal himself; the assassins executed their task, and the head of this blameless consul was, by Cinna's orders, suspended over the rostra, as the first victim to his vengeance.

Rome, with every thing that was most noble and most distinguished within its walls, now lay at the mercy of the popular leaders. But Marius professed, that as he had been declared an exile by the people,<sup>18</sup> he could not enter the city till his sentence should be regularly repealed: and the tribes were summoned in mockery, that their votes might enable their conqueror to avail himself of his own victory. His thirst of blood, however, could not brook the delay which he had devised to enhance the delight of his triumph; and when two or three of the tribes had voted, he took possession of one of the gates, and entered the town at the head of a band peculiarly attached to his own person, and which consisted chiefly of the peasants or fugitive slaves who had joined him on his first landing in Tuscany. With these instruments he proceeded at once to the work of murder. The principal nobility were selected as his victims. Some fell by their own hands to anticipate the stroke of their assassins; some were betrayed, and dragged from their places of concealment to death; some were discovered and slain in the houses where they had sought refuge; and others were butchered in the open streets, and gratified Marius with the sight of their agony. In the midst of this carnage, the wretches who were employed in it added to its horrors by all varieties of unauthorized crimes of their own devising. Fugitive slaves availed themselves of the opportunity to murder their masters,<sup>19</sup> to plunder their houses, and to commit the worst outrages on their fami-

*Massacres in Rome  
by order of Marius.*

<sup>17</sup> Appian, 80. Plutarch, in Mario, 42.

<sup>19</sup> Appian, 74.

<sup>18</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, 43.



lies. The wife and children of Sylla were happy enough to escape this fate;<sup>20</sup> though they were especially sought after; they were concealed by some of their friends until means were found to convey them out of the city. That their property should have been confiscated, that all Sylla's laws should have been repealed, and himself declared, in his turn, a public enemy, seemed only the natural retaliation of a party which had so lately suffered at his hands a similar treatment. But the general scene of lawless rapine and murder which was every where exhibited, as it far exceeded any thing which Rome had hitherto witnessed, so it was far too dreadful to be palliated by any plea of former provocations, and has deservedly procured for those who were its actors, the unmitigated abhorrence of all posterity.

In this massacre there perished by the orders of Cinna and Marius, L. Julius Cæsar,<sup>21</sup> who had been consul during the Italian war, and had distinguished himself by a splendid victory over the Samnites; together with his brother, C. Julius Cæsar, whose ill-advised competition for the consulship had first provoked Sulpicius to enter on his career as a demagogue, and was now visited with death by the unforgiving jealousy of Marius. The heads of both these victims were exposed over the rostra; and near them was seen the head of M. Antonius,<sup>22</sup> the most eloquent citizen in the commonwealth, who had filled the offices of consul and censor, and who was respected as the able defender of all who applied for his aid in the courts of justice. His place of concealment was betrayed to Marius,<sup>23</sup> who, although he was then at supper, was on the point of starting up from the table, to be himself a witness of his death; but being restrained by his friends, he sent a party of soldiers instantly to destroy him, and bring back his head with them. P. Crassus,<sup>24</sup> the father of M. Crassus the triumvir, who had also, like M. Antonius, been both censor and consul, being now marked out for destruction, and having seen one of his sons murdered, killed himself. C. Numitorius and M. Bæbius,<sup>25</sup> both apparently men of some consideration, and the latter a name that occurs frequently in earlier periods of the Roman history, were murdered, and their bodies ignominiously dragged through the forum by the common executioners. These, with many others, were sacrificed by mere military execution to the first fury of the victorious leaders. But against L. Cornelius Merula, who had been appointed consul when Cinna was driven from Rome, and against Q. Lutatius Catulus, the colleague of Marius in his fourth consulship, and his companion in his great victory over the Cimbri, it was resolved

<sup>20</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 22. Appian, 73.

<sup>21</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, III. 3. *Tusculan. Disputat.* V. 19.

<sup>22</sup> Cicero, *de Oratore*, III. 3.

<sup>23</sup> Appian, 72.

<sup>24</sup> Cicero, *de Oratore*, III. 3. Livy, *Epitome*, LXXX. Florus, III. 21.

<sup>25</sup> Florus, III. 21.

to proceed with something of the forms of justice. Their condemnation they well knew was the necessary consequence of their trial: Merula, therefore, preferring to die by his own hands, opened his veins,<sup>26</sup> and as his blood flowed upon the altar of Jupiter, he, in his character of Flamen, imprecated the vengeance of his god upon the head of his murderers. Catulus, it appears, had actually co-operated with Sylla in procuring the expulsion of Marius and Sulpicius,<sup>27</sup> and causing them to be declared public enemies. For this, Marius was bent upon his death, and answered every solicitation in his behalf by saying, "He must die;"<sup>28</sup> upon which Catulus, like Merula, to avoid falling by the executioner, shut himself up in a close room, and suffocated himself by burning charcoal.

Often as the leaders of a popular party have made the interests of their followers subservient to their own ambition, yet never was this more shamelessly exemplified than in the behaviour of Cinna and Marius. After having plunged their country into a civil war, under pretence of supporting the just claims of the Italians to an equal share in the right of suffrage, the chiefs of the victorious party would not, or could not, rely on the gratitude of those whose cause they had upheld; nor would they allow the people to exercise the form of an election, even when they could have so certainly commanded the result. Cinna and Marius, by their own authority, declared themselves consuls for the ensuing year;<sup>29</sup> and it is mentioned of the latter, that on the very day on which he entered upon his usurped

U. C. 667. A. C. 87.

office, he ordered a senator, of the name of Sextus Licinius, to be thrown from the Tarpeian rock. The atrocities, indeed, which Marius was daily committing, and the excesses in which his band of fugitive slaves indulged themselves without remorse, at last awakened the shame or the jealousy of his associates. Cinna, instigated, as it is said, by Sertorius,<sup>30</sup> who beheld with indignation the crimes with which his party had disgraced themselves, finding all attempts to repress these disorders fruitless, assembled a body of his Gaulish auxiliary troops, and attacking Marius's band in their quarters by night, put the whole of them to the sword. Such an act was likely to have exasperated Marius against his colleague, had he been capable of revenging the affront; but his career was fast drawing to a close: he was now in his seventieth year, and plunging deeply into the utmost intemperance in his manner of living,<sup>31</sup> he contracted a pleurisy, of which he died after a short illness, having enjoyed his seventh consulship for only seventeen days. It was reported that he became delirious before his death, and

Sickness and death of Marius.

U. C. 668. A. C. 86.

<sup>26</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 22.

<sup>27</sup> Appian, 74.

<sup>28</sup> Cicero, Tuscul. Disputat. V. 19.

<sup>29</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXXX.

<sup>30</sup> Plutarch, in Sertorio, 5. Appian, 74.

<sup>31</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, 45, 46.

imagined himself to be commanding the army against Mithridates, which had so long been the object of his ambition, often shouting aloud, and expressing by the most violent gestures the liveliness of the impression which occupied his mind. But whatever were the scenes which accompanied his last hours, they could scarcely add any thing to the certain horror of a sudden death thus cutting him off amidst the perpetration of so many and such dreadful crimes ; nor are any stories of his late remorse and agony of mind required to aggravate our abhorrence of a life which, in the course of seventy years, presents an unvaried picture of evil passions, darkening more and more as he advanced in age, and growing to the deepest intensity of blackness as he approached the latest period of his earthly existence.

It is mentioned by Cicero,<sup>32</sup> that during the celebration of the funeral of Marius, C. Fimbria, a man whose ungoverned violence in speaking and in acting amounted sometimes almost to insanity, caused an attempt to be made on the life of Q. Mucius Scævola, one of the most virtuous citizens of his time. The assassin only wounded his intended victim ; and Fimbria, when he heard that Scævola had escaped, declared that he would bring him to trial before the people. He was asked what charge he could possibly invent against a character so pure as Mucius ; to which he replied, "I shall accuse him for not having given my dagger a more hearty welcome." Such were the wretches whose crimes were now enjoying a full impunity in the triumph of the professed champions of the cause of liberty.

After the death of Marius, L. Cornelius Cinna remained in fact the sovereign of Rome. His power was little less absolute than that afterwards held by Sylla or Cæsar ; and it is somewhat remarkable that his usurpation should have been so little noticed by posterity, and that he himself should be so little known, that not a single trait of character, and scarcely a single personal anecdote of him is to be found on record. His first step was to supply the vacancy in the consulship occasioned by the death of Marius ; and for this purpose he fixed on L. Valerius Flaccus,<sup>33</sup> who had been the colleague of Marius in his sixth consulship, about fourteen years before. The massacres had now, for the most part, ceased ; and it was intended that the usual forms of the constitution should still be observed. Nothing, indeed, appeared to dispute the power of the victorious leaders : many of the nobility had left Italy,<sup>34</sup> and sought a refuge in the camp of Sylla ; some had retired to their estates in the country, and some still remained in Rome, anxious above all things to avoid participating themselves in a civil war,

<sup>32</sup> Orat. pro Roscio Amerino, 12.

<sup>33</sup> Appian, 75. Paterculus, II. 23.

<sup>34</sup> Paterculus, 23. Plutarch, in Pompeio, 6.



and hoping that they might still possess influence enough to prevent the return of such a calamity altogether. In this last class we find the names of Q. Mucius Scævola,<sup>35</sup> of another L. Valerius Flaccus, and of L. Philippus, the famous antagonist of Drusus, and notorious, during his consulship, for his opposition to the interests of the senate. But the usual freedom of speech allowed in the forum and in the courts of justice was so much abridged, that Cicero describes the three years which followed the victory of Cinna, as a period in which the republic was without laws and without dignity.<sup>36</sup> He himself remained during all this time at Rome,<sup>37</sup> and was employing himself in the study of eloquence and philosophy; attending the lectures of Philo, then a refugee from Athens, and of Molo of Rhodes, and preparing himself at leisure, during this cessation of opportunities for actual practice, for the splendid career which the subsequent triumph of the aristocracy laid open to him.

The scanty reports of these times which remain to us, will assist but little in ascertaining the state of the people at large under the dominion of Cinna. An immense military force was kept on foot throughout Italy; so that even if the Romans were exempted from all share in its support, the burthen must still have pressed heavily on the Italians, in addition to the numerous excesses which troops, so little subject to discipline, would naturally commit in the districts in which they were quartered. In Rome itself there was a large proportion of debtors among the lower orders, who were insolvent either through poverty or dishonesty. To relieve them, was judged a measure becoming a party professedly popular; and L. Flaccus, the consul, brought in a law,<sup>38</sup> allowing a debtor to avoid all further claims upon him, on payment of a fourth part of his debt. It is one of the most difficult problems in legislation, to observe a just balance between severity to unavoidable distress, and indulgence to wilful extravagance or fraud; but at Rome, in this case, as in so many others, the scale vibrated from one extreme of injustice to the other; and the monied interest, who a short time before had murdered a lawful magistrate, because he had defended the poor against their oppressions, now saw their just rights sacrificed in return, because the government wished to conciliate the needy and the desperate.

Meanwhile, the several provinces of the empire submitted, as far as appears, without opposition to the party which prevailed in the capital. Sylla alone remained an object of fear and jealousy. Far from seeking to disarm his enemies by concession, he is said continually to have avowed his intention of punishing them,<sup>39</sup> so soon as he should have finished

Sylla refuses to acknowledge the government at Rome.

<sup>35</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VIII. epist. III.

<sup>36</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, 62.

<sup>37</sup> De Claris Oratoribus, 89.

<sup>38</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 23.

<sup>39</sup> Paterculus, II. 24.

the war with Mithridates; and his confidence in his army was so well grounded, that he had no fears of their allowing any other general than himself to be appointed to command them. L. Flaccus, indeed, was sent into Greece with a new army,<sup>40</sup> as the officer intrusted by the people with the conduct of the war; but he, not venturing to interfere with Sylla, who was at this time wintering in Thessaly, moved through Macedonia, and from thence crossed over into the northern parts of Asia Minor, to attack Mithridates in his own country. Here, however, he was soon assassinated by C. Fimbria, who had accompanied him from Rome as his lieutenant, and whose daring wickedness gladly caught at this opportunity of advancing himself. On the death of Flaccus, he succeeded to the command, and carried on hostilities against Mithridates with some success; but when Sylla, having recovered the whole of Greece, crossed over himself into Asia, and there soon concluded a peace with the enemy, Fimbria was summoned to surrender the authority which he had unlawfully acquired;<sup>41</sup> and finding his soldiers yielding to the ascendancy of Sylla's reputation, and inclined to desert him, he, to avoid the punishment which he deserved, killed himself.

The death of Fimbria, however, did not take place till after the period at which we are now arrived. To resume, then, the regular course of our narrative, we must go back to the conclusion of the year 667, when the time was arrived for the appointment of consuls for the year following. Cinna again re-elected

Cinna associates Carbo with himself in the consulship, and prepares for war.

himself by his own authority,<sup>42</sup> and chose as his colleague, Cn. Papirius Carbo, a man whose very

name was ominous of evil; for of the two individuals of his family who had hitherto been most conspicuous, one had, through his perfidy, embroiled the republic in a quarrel with the Cimbri, and had sustained from them a severe defeat in Illyria; and the other was deeply involved in the mischievous plans of the Gracchi, and when brought to trial, as has been already mentioned, by L. Crassus, the orator, poisoned himself through fear of the sentence of his judges. The consuls, thus self-appointed, began to prepare themselves for the approaching contest with Sylla: they endeavoured to conciliate the rich by showing them unwonted attentions; they appealed especially to the Italian states, of whose interests they always professed themselves the advocates; and endeavoured to secure the coasts of Italy against the expected invasion, by collecting a considerable fleet from the different ports of Italy and Sicily.

In this interval of suspense, a motion was made and carried in the senate, by L. Valerius Flaccus,<sup>43</sup> that deputies should be

<sup>40</sup> Appian, de Bell. Mithridatico, 51. 52. Paternulus, II. 24.

<sup>41</sup> Appian, de Bell. Mithridat. 59.

<sup>42</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 75, Livy, Epitom. LXXXIII.

<sup>43</sup> Livy, Epit. LXXXIII. Appian, 77.

sent to Sylla, to prevent, if possible, the evils of war; and Cinna and Carbo were desired to suspend their military preparations, till the answer to this embassy should be received. The consuls promised compliance, and the deputies were sent over into Greece to treat with Sylla; but Cinna could not consent thus easily to relinquish the sovereignty he had gained, nor to treat on equal terms with an enemy whom he had injured beyond all hope of reconciliation. Once more, therefore, he re-appointed himself and Carbo to the consulship;<sup>44</sup> and both leaders then left Rome, and began themselves to press the levies of soldiers, intending no longer to remain on the defensive, but to cross the Adriatic in person, and to anticipate Sylla in beginning hostilities. But it seems that they had not a fleet sufficient to transport at one passage a force strong enough to maintain itself against the enemy. They resolved, therefore, to send over their troops in successive detachments from the neighbourhood of Ancona, to the opposite coast of Liburnia, a spot so distant from the intended scene of operations, that the whole army might be safely landed, before Sylla could arrive to attack it. But the high reputation of the general against whom they were to act, rendered the soldiers very averse to the expedition: one detachment, after it had set sail, was driven back by a storm; and no sooner did the men find themselves again on Italian ground, than they deserted their standards, and returned to their several homes. This example decided the rest of the army, and they all refused to embark. Cinna called them together, and endeavoured to enforce obedience. They crowded round him with minds prepared for the last extremities; and when one of his lictors struck a soldier, in order to clear the way, the blow was returned by the man's comrade; Cinna called out to seize the offender; a general mutiny broke out at the word, stones were cast at him, and the soldiers who were nearest, drawing their swords, immediately stabbed and killed him. Carbo at once saw that the project of crossing the Adriatic was hopeless; he recalled the few men who had already effected their passage, and resolved to confine his care to the defence of Italy. The death of Cinna, however, and the avowed disposition of the soldiers, encouraged the ordinary magistrates of the commonwealth to resume somewhat of their lawful authority. Carbo was summoned by the tribunes to return to Rome, and to hold the comitia for the election of a consul in the room of Cinna.<sup>45</sup> He obeyed; but on the first day that the comitia were held, the auspices were unfavourable: and on the next, the meeting was broken off by a thunder storm, so that the augurs

U. C. 669. A. C. 85.

Mutiny of the soldiers, in which Cinna is killed.

<sup>44</sup> Appian, 77, 78. Paterculus, II. 24. Livy, Epitom. 83. Auctor de Viris illustribus, in Vita Cinnae: <sup>45</sup> Appian, 78.



Carbo remains sole consul.

forbade the election to take place till after the summer solstice ; and Carbo thus remained sole consul.

About this time, the answer of Sylla to the deputation of the senate was received in Rome.<sup>46</sup> It stated that he would lay aside his purpose of invading Italy, if all those citizens whom Cinna had outlawed, were restored to their country and their honours. The senate, we are told, was disposed to accept these conditions ; but the influence of Carbo and his party procured their rejection, and war now appeared inevitable. Some months, however, intervened, before Sylla commenced his expedition to Italy ; and this delay was occasioned, in part, by an illness which attacked him,<sup>47</sup> and which obliged him to go to Ædepsus, in Eubœa, to try the effect of the warm baths, for which that place was celebrated. Here he passed considerable time, amusing himself with the society of actors,<sup>48</sup> and of those persons, then so common in Greece, who lived upon their several talents of disputation, of eloquence, of wit, or of buffoonery. But he might console himself for this interruption to his plans, by reflecting that the party of his antagonists was by no means rising in the public opinion, and that his own friends on the contrary were daily becoming more numerous ; while the fate of Cinna sufficiently showed, that he was in no danger of being anticipated in his schemes of invasion, and of finding himself obliged to act on the defensive in the country which he now occupied.

In the meantime, Q. Metellus Pius,<sup>49</sup> who, in conjunction with Octavius, had unsuccessfully opposed Cinna and Marius in their attack upon Rome, and who, since their victory, had been living in one of the provinces in obscurity, now endeavoured to raise again the standard of the aristocratical party, and to obtain possession of the province of Africa. His attempt, however, was unfortunate ; he was repulsed by C. Fabius, the prætor, and from thence retired to Liguria, there to wait for a better opportunity of renewing the contest. The senate, though greatly overawed, was yet not entirely subservient to Carbo ; for it is said that he was prevented by them from demanding hostages of all the towns and colonies of Italy,<sup>50</sup> as a security against their supporting Sylla. But in other points the interest of the popular leaders visibly prevailed. The right of voting was solemnly conferred, by a decree of the senate, on all newly admitted citizens, of whom the late war had given birth to a considerable number, not consisting of the inhabitants of the states of Italy, but of enfranchised slaves or foreign soldiers, who had flocked to the the standard of Cinna and Marius, and had contributed to their triumph. These had not

<sup>46</sup> Livy, Epitom. LXXXIV.

<sup>47</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 26. Strabo, I. 56, 80.  
et IX. 487, edit. Xyland.

<sup>48</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 26.

<sup>49</sup> Livy, Epitom. LXXXIV. Appian,

<sup>50</sup> Livy, Epitom. LXXXIV.

only the right of voting now given to them<sup>51</sup> (whereas, before they only enjoyed the personal liberties of Roman citizens), but they were, moreover, allowed to be enrolled indiscriminately in all the tribes; that important point which, in the case of the Italians, had been so warmly contested, and which, in fact, had furnished Cinna with his first pretext for disturbing the public peace. In addition to these acts, a decree of the senate was also passed, commanding all military officers in every part of the empire to disband their forces. That Sylla should obey this order, was scarcely to be expected; but Carbo probably hoped, by its apparent fairness, to throw upon him the odium of being the chief obstacle to peace, and of disobeying that body, whose authority he professed to respect so highly.

The year of Carbo's consulship now drew to an end; and as he could not, or would not, procure his own re-  
Consulship of Scipio and Norbanus.  
U. C. 670.  
 appointment, two new consuls were chosen, C. Norbanus, and L. Cornelius Scipio. We are not informed what circumstances could have connected the latter, a member of one of the noblest families in Rome, with the party of Carbo; or whether, indeed, he may not have been chosen by the most moderate citizens, as a man who might temper the violences of the times; and have been tolerated by the popular party, on account of his want of the vigour and ability which might have made him dangerous to them. But C. Norbanus was a consul such as Carbo might have most desired. We have already noticed his seditious tribuneship, during which, at his instigation, a riot broke out at the trial of Q. Cæpio, and the condemnation of the prisoner was procured by actual force. For this crime, he was accused by P. Sulpicius,<sup>52</sup> who was destined, at no remote period, to tread in his footsteps; and was defended by M. Antonius, whose murder, some years afterwards, might have been justified by the very arguments which he himself, on this occasion, taught the people to approve. It was against these consuls that Sylla now led his army from Greece. All his preparations were completed, his health was fully re-established, and the devotion of his troops had been just proved, by their taking an oath to abide by him when they should be landed in Italy,<sup>53</sup> and by their offering to raise among themselves a supply of money for his use. With soldiers so attached to him, and inured as they were to war, his force was far stronger than the proportion of his numbers seemed to promise; and though it is said that he landed in Italy with no more than 40,000 men,<sup>54</sup> while more than 200,000 were in arms against him, he might yet fairly calculate on meeting his enemies with at least an equal chance of victory.

<sup>51</sup> Livy, Epitom. LXXXIV.

<sup>52</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, II. 49.

<sup>53</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 27.

<sup>54</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 24. Appian, 79.

The expedition set sail from Patræ in Achæa,<sup>55</sup> and arrived in safety at Brundisium. The inhabitants of that town received Sylla without opposition, and he immediately began to move forwards. On his march through Calabria and Sylla lands in Italy. Apulia,<sup>56</sup> his army observed the strictest discipline; and his conduct thus confirmed his professions, that he was ever ready to listen to fair conditions of peace. It is said, that he sent deputies to the camp of Norbanus, to propose a negotiation;<sup>57</sup> and that it was not till they had been insulted and outraged, that he commenced his military operations. He fell upon Norbanus, who was encamped in the neighbourhood of Capua, and defeated him with considerable loss. Over the other consul, L. Scipio, he obtained a still more decisive advantage. With him too he offered to treat, and commissioners from the two armies actually met to deliberate on the terms to be agreed upon.<sup>58</sup> Of the particulars which followed, contradictory accounts are given by different writers, none of whom are of sufficient authority to be confidently followed. The result, however, admits of no dispute; the soldiers of the consular army were corrupted by those of Sylla,<sup>59</sup> and at last, leaving L. Scipio and his son alone in the general's tent, they went over in a body to the enemy. Sylla then attempted to open a communication with the army of Norbanus; but finding that his design was suspected, and that no answer was returned to his proposals, he continued to advance towards Rome, and then for the first time began to lay waste the country through which he passed. He was not, however, yet in a condition to approach the capital, where Carbo's influence prevailed so far as to procure a decree of the people,<sup>60</sup> declaring all those who had joined Sylla, to be public enemies. This denunciation was not issued on light grounds; for the nobility were flocking on all sides to the camp of the invader; and Q. Metellus had joined him with such troops as still adhered to him, and was zealously co-operating with him in the conduct of the war.

It was at this time that Cn. Pompeius, the son of the late pro-consul of that name, first made his appearance as a public character. After the death of his father, and the establishment of Cinna's power at Rome, he had retired into Picenum,<sup>61</sup> where he possessed some property, and where his father's memory, hated as it was by the Romans, was regarded with respect and affection. To account for this, we must suppose, that during the long period of his military command in that neighbourhood, he had prevented his soldiers from being burden-

<sup>55</sup> Appian, 79.

<sup>56</sup> Paterculus, 25.

<sup>57</sup> Livy, Epitom. LXXXV.

<sup>58</sup> Cicero, Philippic. 12. 11.

<sup>59</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 28. Appian, 85. Livy, Epitom. LXXXV.

<sup>60</sup> Appian, 86.

<sup>61</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 6. Paterculus, 29. Appian, 80.



some to the people, and had found means of obliging or gratifying some of the principal inhabitants. Be this as it may, his son possessed so much influence in Picenum, partly hereditary, and partly personal, that he prevailed on the people to drive away the officers sent among them by Carbo, to enlist soldiers for the support of his cause, and succeeded himself in raising an army of three legions, or about 16,000 or 17,000 men. With this force, having obtained also the necessary supplies for its maintenance from the zeal of the Picentes, he set out to join Sylla. He was at this time only twenty-three years of age, and had never filled any office in the state; but his appearance at the head of an army so collected, announced him as a young man of more than ordinary promise; and Sylla, as we are told, received him with the most flattering marks of distinction.

Whilst both parties were endeavouring to strengthen their forces, the season for action gradually passed away, and the armies mutually went into winter quarters. So imperfect are our accounts of this famous war, that we cannot tell how far Sylla had penetrated, nor what positions were occupied by him during the winter. His progress, however, had been such as to fill his antagonists with alarm: Carbo, therefore, caused himself to be appointed consul for the following year,<sup>62</sup> and selected, as his colleague, C. Marius the younger, the Consul-ship of Carbo and the younger Marius. nephew and adopted son of the famous Marius, and who already, at the early age of twenty, seemed to have inherited all his father's wickedness.

The winter was long and severe, and detained the armies on both sides for a considerable time in a state of inaction. Carbo, meanwhile, chose Cisalpine Gaul as his province,<sup>63</sup> and thus reserved the country to the north of Rome for the scene of his operations; while Marius lay between the capital and the main army of Sylla, on the confines, perhaps, of Latium and Campania. It was about this time that Sylla, to quiet the suspicions of the Italian allies,<sup>64</sup> who were afraid that he would rescind the concessions made to them during the ascendancy of Cinna, issued a declaration that he would respect all the privileges which they actually enjoyed; and on these terms concluded, as we are told, a treaty with them. But whether the Samnites were not among those to whom this promise extended, or whether they distrusted his sincerity, and thought they might do better by adhering to their old cause, it is plain that they were amongst his most determined enemies, and, as we shall see presently, did more than any of their confederates to render his victory doubtful. On the part of Sylla, Q. Metellus was opposed to Carbo on the side of Tus-

<sup>62</sup> Livy, Epitom. LXXXVI. Appian, 87.

<sup>63</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, I. 13.

<sup>64</sup> Livy, Epitom. LXXXVI.

cany,<sup>65</sup> and after having gained an advantage over one of his lieutenants, was so hard pressed by the consul himself, that Cn. Pompeius, or, as his celebrity has caused his name to be anglicized, Pompey, was sent to support him; and these two commanders together kept the fortune of the war in suspense. To the south of Rome, Sylla first took the town of Setia;<sup>66</sup> and Marius, retreating before him in the direction of Præneste, halted at a place called Sacriportum, situated apparently between Præneste and Setia, and there drew out his army in order of battle. Sylla instantly proceeded to attack him, encouraged, as it is said, by a dream,<sup>67</sup> which had visited him in the preceding night, and which had named the ensuing day as fatal to the family of Marius. The enemy had broken up the roads, and raised such obstacles to his march, that his soldiers, in their exertions to remove them, were worn down with fatigue, and many of them threw themselves on the ground, with their heads resting on their shields, to seek relief in sleep. It was in vain to persist in forcing them to action under these circumstances; and Sylla, however reluctant to contradict his dream, issued the order to halt, and to begin the usual works for the formation of a camp. But whilst his men were busied in digging the trench, the enemy's cavalry rode up, and began to annoy them; till, irritated into an entire forgetfulness of their fatigues, they at once left their work, and rushed on sword in hand to revenge the insults that had been offered to them. Their vehemence, however, might have proved fatal to themselves, had the soldiers of Marius done their duty; but on the first impression made by the assailants on the adverse line, five cohorts of infantry and two troops of cavalry deserted their standards,<sup>68</sup> and joined the hostile army; and this act of treachery presently decided the fate of the battle. The whole Marian army fled, and was pursued with great slaughter: the fugitives sought a shelter in Præneste; but the victors followed them so closely, that it became necessary to shut the gates in haste, and to exclude the greatest number of them, and even Marius himself was drawn up by ropes thrown down to him from the top of the wall.<sup>69</sup> Thus exposed to the swords of their conquerors, 20,000 of them were said by Sylla to have been slain, and 8,000 made prisoners;<sup>70</sup> while he acknowledged on his own side no greater loss than that of twenty-three men.

It was only a short time before the battle of Sacriportum, that the heads of the popular party added their last and most horrible act to the numerous provocations which were soon to be so mercilessly repaid. At the commence-

Battle of Sacriportum, in which Marius the younger is defeated by Sylla.

U. C. 672. A. C. 82.

Massacre committed at Rome by order of the younger Marius.

<sup>65</sup> Appian, 87. Plutarch, in Pompeio, 8.

<sup>66</sup> Appian, 87.

<sup>67</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 28.

<sup>68</sup> Appian, 87.

<sup>69</sup> Appian, 87.

<sup>70</sup> As quoted by Plutarch, in Syllâ, 28.

ment of the campaign, Marius had fixed on Præneste as the place of support to his operations,<sup>71</sup> and as the intended refuge and bulwark of his partisans, in case they should be defeated in the field. The situation of the town was naturally strong, as it was built on the side of a projecting eminence,<sup>72</sup> connected only by one narrow ridge with that chain of hills which rises immediately from the Campagna, or great plain of Rome, at the distance of about twenty miles from the capital. Standing on the edge of this plain, Præneste is a conspicuous object from the walls of the eternal city; and a strong army occupying this position, might greatly impede or endanger the approach of an enemy towards the capital from the side of Campania. Marius, therefore, had strengthened the place to the utmost, by the assistance of art, and had carried thither the treasure of all the temples in Rome,<sup>73</sup> to be converted into money for the payment of his soldiers. But the advance of Sylla still gave him considerable alarm; and fearing that the aristocratical party in the capital might yet be able to exert itself with effect, should Sylla continue his progress, he sent instructions to L. Damasippus,<sup>74</sup> at that time prætor, to assemble the senate in the Curia Hostilia. When the members were met together, the avenues leading to the spot where secured by armed men, and the individuals most obnoxious to the popular leaders were then marked out to be massacred. Publius Antistius, the father-in-law of Pompey,<sup>75</sup> and C. Papirius Carbo, a relation of the consul, and the son of that Carbo who had shared in the proceedings of the Gracchi,<sup>76</sup> were murdered in the senate house. L. Domitius was killed in endeavouring to escape; of him little else is known, but that his name and noble family were likely to render him an object of suspicion to the enemies of the aristocracy. But the most distinguished victim was Q. Mucius Scævola, the Pontifex Maximus, who had earned the purest and the rarest glory of any of his contemporaries, by his virtuous administration of his province of Asia. Having brought home with him a character of spotless integrity and benevolence, he stained it by no subsequent acts of infamy; his name is charged with no participation in the crimes of either party; but he continued to reside at Rome, and to make himself generally useful to all who asked his advice, by his unrivalled knowledge of the civil law. Though bound by birth, and station, and connexions, to the cause of the aristocracy, and although the attempt made on his life by Fimbria, at the funeral of the elder Marius, might have warned him of the danger to which his virtues exposed him under the sway of the most proflig-

<sup>71</sup> Paterculus, 26.<sup>72</sup> Strabo, V. 261.<sup>73</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* XXXIII. 1.<sup>74</sup> Livy, *Epitome*, LXXXVI. Paterculus,<sup>75</sup> Plutarch, in *Pompeio*, 9.<sup>76</sup> Cicero, *ad Familiares*. IX. *epist.* 21.  
*De Claris Orator.* 60.



gate of mankind, he yet had refused to quit Rome, or to choose any part in the civil war, declaring that he would rather die than take up arms against his countrymen. Marius, however, was bent upon his destruction; and the soldiers of Damasippus advancing to murder him, he fled to the temple of Vesta,<sup>77</sup> and was overtaken and butchered even within the sacred ground. His body, together with those of Domitius, Carbo, and Antistius, was thrown into the Tiber; and by this murder of the most virtuous of citizens, it was hoped that the ascendancy of the Marii, the Carbones, and the Norbani, might yet be maintained.

But the issue of the battle of Sacriportum rendered this massacre as fruitless as it was detestable. Marius, the author of it, was now blocked up in Præneste; and the road to the capital being left open, Sylla advanced towards it with one part of his army, while the other part, under the command of Lucretius Ofella,<sup>78</sup> was pressing the siege of Præneste. Rome received her new master without a struggle; and he who had so lately been regarded as an outlawed rebel, being now in possession of the seat of government, was in a condition to retort the charge of rebellion on his antagonists. He immediately ordered their property to be confiscated; and having then left the city to the care of some of his partisans, he again took the field, and hastened to Clusium, in order to superintend the operations of the war in Tuscany and the north of Italy.<sup>79</sup> His arms were attended with equal success in every quarter: his lieutenants, Metellus Pius, Pompey, M. Crassus, M. Luculus, and others, signalized themselves by several victories over Carbo and his adherents; and in proportion as the Marian party seemed declining, it suffered more and more from the treachery of its own members. Not only did the common soldiers often desert in large bodies to the enemy, but Albinovanus,<sup>80</sup> an officer of considerable rank, purchased his pardon from Sylla by contriving the assassination of several of his colleagues in command; and Verres, on whom the eloquence of Cicero has bestowed such an infamous celebrity, and who was at this time quæstor of Carbo's army, abandoned his general,<sup>81</sup> and carried off with him a considerable portion of the money committed to his charge for the maintenance of the consul's forces. Attempts had been made in vain to raise the blockade of Præneste; and in this state of their affairs Norbanus, being left almost alone at Ariminum by the desertion of his troops,<sup>82</sup> escaped by sea to Rhodes; while Carbo gave up the command of the army which he still possessed in Tuscany, and withdrew with some of his friends into Africa, hoping there to be

<sup>77</sup> Cicero, de Naturâ Deorum, III. 32.

<sup>78</sup> Appian, 88.

<sup>79</sup> Appian, 89.

<sup>80</sup> Appian, 91.

<sup>81</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, I. 13, et seq.

<sup>82</sup> Appian, 91, 92. Livy, Epitome, LXXXVIII.

able to renew the contest, and to obtain the assistance of Hiarbas, the king of Mauritania.

At this late period of the war, when the victory of the aristocratical party seemed decided, one desperate effort was made to wrest it from them, which had well nigh altered the history of the world. The Samnites and Lucanians, alone of all the people of Italy, had not forgotten their own national grounds of hostility towards the Roman government; and whilst they supported the party of Marius against Sylla, they intended to make their assistance subservient to their own views, rather than to sink into the mere adherents of one of the factions of Rome. During the advance of Sylla, their armies rested securely amid their own mountains, and had seen the defeat of Marius at Sacriportum, and the blockade of the remnant of his forces in Præneste, without exerting their main strength in his behalf. Possibly they beheld without regret every field of battle covered with Roman dead, and may have rejoiced in the hope that, when both parties were exhausted by mutual slaughter they might themselves arise to wrest from their weakened hands the prize for which they were contending. But now, when the rapid victories of Sylla threatened them with a speedy termination of the civil war, their generals, Pontius Telesinus and M. Lamponius, saw that it was necessary for them to take a decisive part; and before Carbo and Norbanus had left Italy, the Samnites and Lucanians had endeavoured to relieve Præneste,<sup>83</sup> but were unable to force the strong positions occupied by the blockading army. Still they lingered in the neighbourhood, hoping that some opportunity might arise to facilitate the execution of their object. Meantime Carbo had retired to Africa, and the army which he had forsaken had sustained a bloody defeat at Clusium from Pompey, so that the remaining generals of the popular party, Carinas, Marcius, and L. Damasippus, the agent in the late massacre at Rome, resolved, as their last hope, to effect a junction with the Samnites and Lucanians, and then to attempt once more to deliver Marius and his garrison. The armies were united, and the attempt was made, but still in vain, when the confederate generals conceived the plan of falling suddenly upon Rome, which they thought to find stripped of troops, and utterly unprovided with means to withstand their assault. At this very time they were threatened at once by two armies, that of Sylla on one side, and that of Pompey on the other; yet hoping to win the capital before their purpose could be discovered, they broke up from their camp in the night, hastened towards Rome, and halted till morning<sup>84</sup> at the distance of little more than a mile from the Colline gate. Day dawned, and discovered to the Romans the unlooked-for sight of

The Samnites, with the remains of the Marian party, attack Rome.

<sup>83</sup> Appian, 90. 92.

<sup>84</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 29.

the Samnite and Lucanian army. Some parties of cavalry, consisting of the flower of the youth of the city, immediately sallied to observe and to check the enemy ; but they were routed and driven back within their walls with severe loss. The panic then rose to the greatest height, when L. Balbus arrived with an advanced guard of seven hundred cavalry from Sylla's army, and hardly allowing his horses a moment's respite, he led them at once into action. Sylla himself followed soon after ; he was well aware of the urgency of the danger, and had hurried with the utmost speed in pursuit of the Samnites, as soon as he learnt their object. His men were greatly fatigued, and his officers pressed him to postpone the action, for it was now late in the afternoon of a November day ; but he refused to listen to them, and having ordered his men to eat their dinners as fast as they arrived from their march, he sent them to engage the enemy successively. Telesinus, on his part, forgetting his character as a partisan of Marius, and feeling only as a Samnite general, rode along the ranks repeatedly exclaiming,<sup>85</sup> that this was the last day of the Roman empire, and calling to his soldiers to pull down, to destroy the city, for that those wolves, who had so long ravaged Italy, could only be extirpated by rooting up the wood which used to shelter them. At length M. Crassus, who commanded the right wing of Sylla's army, routed the left of the enemy,<sup>86</sup> and pursued them as far as Antemnæ ; but the wing which was led by Sylla in person, in spite of all the efforts of its general, was driven back under the walls of Rome, and was pursued even to the gates of the city. The gates were hastily closed to prevent the Samnites from entering together with the fugitives ; and the Romans, thus obliged to defend themselves, continued the action till some time after it was dark, although with little hope of resisting effectually. Nay, so great was the general panic, that some of Sylla's soldiers flying from the field arrived at the lines before Præneste, and urged Lucretius Ofella, who commanded the blockading army, to raise the siege, and hasten to the rescue of his general and his country. Night at last stopped the engagement, and the Romans believed themselves completely defeated ; when, about an hour after the close of the action, an officer arrived from M. Crassus, with the tidings of his success, and requiring supplies of provisions to be sent to him at Antemnæ. It then appeared that the enemy's loss had been even greater than that of Sylla ; and the morning displayed more fully the real issue of the contest. Telesinus had fallen, and his soldiers, discouraged by his death and by the terrible slaughter of the battle, had abandoned the field, and had begun to retreat in all directions. Sylla then, to lose no time in

Battle at the Colline gate.

Victory of Sylla, at the Porta Collina, Nov. 1. U. C. 672. A. C. 82.

<sup>85</sup> Velleius Paterculus, 27.

<sup>86</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 29, 30.



improving his victory, set out at an early hour, and immediately joined Crassus at Antemnæ.

The Roman writers, whose accounts of these times remain to us, after following Sylla thus far in his career, and sympathizing in his victories over the popular party, all concur in turning away with unmingled abhorrence from his conduct after the decision of the struggle. One act of cruelty, indeed, follows another so rapidly in this part of his life, that a complete picture of his character cannot be drawn without satiating the reader with details of spoliation, and outrage, and massacre. On his arrival at Antemnæ, three thousand of the enemy sent to implore his mercy,<sup>87</sup> which he promised them, if they would deserve it by helping him to execute vengeance on their associates. Thus encouraged, they fell upon another party of fugitives from their own army, and began to cut them to pieces; and then surrendered themselves to Sylla, to receive his promised pardon. But they, with all the other prisoners taken after the battle, amounting together to eight thousand men, were conveyed to Rome, and orders were issued by Sylla that they should all be put to the sword. The men, thus doomed to be slaughtered, were not the instruments of former massacres and proscriptions, wretches whose punishment, however shocking, might yet have worn the appearance of an awful retribution; but they were mostly Samnite soldiers,<sup>88</sup> who had fought fairly against the Romans in the field, and who were now to be sacrificed to the same atrocious policy which, in former times, had murdered their heroic countryman, C. Pontius; which had driven Hannibal, in old age and exile, to end his life by suicide; which had exercised every extremity of unmanly cruelty against the brave citizens of Numantia, and against the rival people of Carthage. In the mean time,

Sylla commences his massacres.

<sup>87</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 30.

<sup>88</sup> Ferguson has ventured to describe those who were thus murdered, as, "six or eight thousand of those who were supposed to have been the busiest instruments of the late usurpations and murders," who had been "taken prisoners in the war, or surprised in the city." It is not easy to say where Ferguson found his authority for this statement, as he appeals to no ancient writer to justify it; but it is a most blameable misrepresentation, to use the lightest term, as far as it labours to give a colour of retributive justice to a massacre dictated by mere policy and national hatred. In particular the words, "or surprised in the city," are inserted especially to palliate Sylla's conduct, in complete opposition to the truth. That the men who were murdered were soldiers, taken in battle, is the concurrent account of every

writer whom we have been able to consult; and as it is a point of some importance, the references, by which any reader, who has means and inclination, may satisfy himself, are here subjoined.

Livy, *Epitome*, LXXXVIII. *Auctor de Viris Illustribus*, in Syllâ. Florus, III. 21. Valerius Maximus, IX. 2. Seneca, *de Beneficiis*, V. 16.

All these writers agree in the fact, that the men who were massacred were soldiers, and soldiers who had surrendered themselves to the conqueror. Seneca's words are as follows:—"Legiones duas, quod crudele est, post victoriam; quod nefas, post fidem, in angulum congestas contrucidavit."

In addition to these testimonies, Strabo declares that the victims were mostly Samnites, V. 271, edit. Xyland; and Appian agrees with him, I. 93.

while the massacre was perpetrating, Sylla, having returned to Rome, had assembled the senate in the temple of Bellona,<sup>89</sup> and was beginning to address the members upon the state of the republic. The cries of his victims mingled with his first words, and the senators started with horror at the sound; but he, with an unmoved countenance, desired them to listen to him, and not to concern themselves with what was passing elsewhere; what they heard was the correction bestowed by his orders on a few disturbers of the public peace. On the following day, Marcius and Carinas, two of the Roman officers who had joined the Samnite army previously to their attack on Rome, were taken in their flight, and being brought before Sylla, were, by his orders put to death, and their heads, with the head of Telesinus, were sent to Lucretius Ofella before Præneste,<sup>90</sup> with directions that they should be carried around the walls of the town, to inform the besieged of the fate of their expected deliverers.

One signal act of justice was performed by Sylla at this time, which was received with general satisfaction. L. Damasippus,<sup>91</sup> the murderer of Mucius Scævola, had been taken after the late battle, and was instantly put to death. So great indeed were the crimes with which the chiefs of the Marian party were loaded, that men became reconciled to executions from the pleasure with which they regarded the fate of these flagrant offenders. But they soon were taught that the wickedness of the sufferer ought never to lessen our hatred of bloody and illegal acts of vengeance. Numerous victims were every day murdered; some by Sylla's own order; but many more were sacrificed to the rapaciousness or personal enmities of his adherents,<sup>92</sup> whose excesses he took no pains to suppress. At last he was entreated to relieve the commonwealth from its present state of suspense, by assuring of their pardon those whom he did not intend to destroy; but one of his own retainers gave a different turn to this request,<sup>93</sup> by asking him only to name those whom he had marked out for punishment. Sylla answered, that he would do so, and immediately published his first list of proscriptions, containing the names of eighty individuals who were to be put to death: to this, on the following day, he added two hundred and twenty names more; and again, on the third day, the fatal list was increased by an equal number. "These," said Sylla to the people, "are all that I can at present remember; if I recollect any others who must be punished, I will proscribe their names hereafter." It soon appeared that he had good reason to stipulate thus for the further gratification of his vengeance. In proportion as he extended his massacres, reasons would arise for perpetually adding

The proscription lists  
are published by Sylla.

<sup>89</sup> Seneca, de Clementiâ. I. 12.

<sup>90</sup> Appian. 93 Paterculus, 28.

<sup>91</sup> Sallust, Catalina, 51.

<sup>92</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 31. Sallust, Catalina, 51.

<sup>93</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 31.

new victims to the catalogue of the proscribed ; and the more he became deserving of a future retaliation upon himself and his party, the more anxious was he to rid himself of every person who might be likely to assist in effecting it. But it was the most dreadful part of this proscription, that by establishing the reign of wild and unbridled violence, and by trampling under foot not only the laws of the commonwealth, but even the most lax of all the restraints which men under a low system of morals still imposed on themselves, it emboldened every meaner criminal to participate in the license of which the present master of the republic set so large an example. The meanest office, in ordinary times, is obtained from a government by its retainers with less ease than Sylla's followers could gain from their leader the gift of innocent blood. It is mentioned that one Q. Aurelius,<sup>94</sup> an inoffensive individual, who had never mingled in political quarrels, stopped one day in the forum to read the list of the proscribed, and found his own name among the number. "Wretch that I am !" he exclaimed ; "my Alban villa is my death ;" and before he had gone far from the spot, he was followed, overtaken, and murdered. Nor were these scenes confined to the neighbourhood of Rome, but extended over the whole of Italy. All who had rendered any assistance to the Marian party,<sup>95</sup> who had carried arms in their cause, or had supplied them with money ; nay, those who had held any communication even in the commonest civilities of life with the enemies of Sylla, were exposed to the vengeance of the conquerors. It is natural to suppose that subordinate officers, commanding in remote provinces, would exceed the wishes of their chief, and would gratify their cupidity or their cruelty with less scruple. We are told that M. Crassus,<sup>96</sup> who was employed in Bruttium, proscribed a wealthy individual without Sylla's orders, in order to get possession of his fortune ; and that Sylla, being informed of the fact, would never afterwards commit to Crassus any post of importance. But if this be so, Crassus might fairly complain of his ill fortune, for he had done no more than was practised by almost every one in similar circumstances ; and these supernumerary crimes heightened still more the horrors of the original proscription. Murders, it is said, were sometimes perpetrated even in the presence of Sylla himself,<sup>97</sup> when some of the victims, condemned by his proscription, endeavoured to save themselves by a direct appeal to his mercy, and were slain in his sight by their pursuers, who never found any interruption to their work from any touch of compunction in his nature. His doors were beset with the executioners of his orders, who flocked thither with the heads of those whom they had murdered, to claim

<sup>94</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 31.<sup>95</sup> Appian, 96.<sup>96</sup> Plutarch, in Crasso, 6.<sup>97</sup> Appian, 95.



from him the promised reward; and it is said, that this sight so awakened the indignation of M. Cato,<sup>98</sup> who being then a boy was taken by his tutor to visit Sylla, that he could not forbear asking for a sword, with which he might himself despatch the tyrant. Yet, on one memorable occasion the remorseless nature of Sylla listened to the intercession of his friends, and spared a man, whom, if he could have looked into futurity, he would, above all others, have desired to destroy. C. Julius Cæsar,<sup>99</sup> then quite a young man, had married the daughter of Cinna, and, during the ascendancy of his father-in-law, had been designed to fill the office of Flamen of Jupiter. He was further connected with the popular party through the marriage of Julia, his father's sister, with the elder Marius; yet, although thus doubly obnoxious to the victorious party, he refused to comply with the commands of Sylla to divorce his wife; and being exposed in consequence to his resentment, he fled from Rome, and baffled all attempts upon his life, partly by concealing himself, and partly by bribing the officer sent to kill him, till Sylla was prevailed upon, according to Suetonius, to spare him at the entreaty of some common friends. A story was afterwards common, that Sylla did not pardon him without great reluctance; and that he told those who sued in his behalf, that in Cæsar there were many Mariuses. Had he indeed thought so, his was not a temper to have yielded to any supplications to save him; nor would any considerations have induced him to exempt from destruction one from whom he had apprehended so great a danger.

Soon after the defeat of the Samnites before Rome, the garrison of Præneste surrendered. Marius attempted to escape from the town by a subterranean passage, communicating with the open country;<sup>100</sup> but his flight was intercepted, and he fell, either by the hands of the enemy's soldiers, or, according to the more common account, by the sword of his own slave, whom he requested to perform this last service. His head was brought to Rome, and presented to Sylla, who ordered it to be exposed in front of the rostra, in the forum; and as if his triumph were now complete, he assumed to himself, from henceforward, the title of Felix, or the Fortunate. He might have justly claimed this title, says Paterculus, if his life had not been prolonged beyond the hour which thus crowned his victory. Immediately on the surrender of Præneste, Lucretius Ofella put to death several senators whom he found in the town,<sup>101</sup> and detained others in custody, to wait Sylla's decision on their fate. Sylla soon arrived, and having first ordered the execution of all whom Ofella had arrested, and selected from the whole

Surrender of Præneste  
death of the younger  
Marius, and massacre  
of the Prænestines.

<sup>98</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, 3.

<sup>99</sup> Suetonius, in C. J. Cæsar, 1.

<sup>100</sup> Paterculus, 28. Livy, Epitome, LXXXVIII.

<sup>101</sup> Appian, 94.

number of his prisoners some few whom he thought deserving of mercy, he divided all the rest into three parties, one consisting of Romans, another of Samnites, and a third of the citizens of Præneste. To the first he said, that though they deserved death he nevertheless gave them their lives; but the other two divisions were indiscriminately massacred, to the number, as is said, of twelve thousand persons. The women and children were then dismissed, with what prospect of future provision we know not; and the town was given up to plunder. In like manner the towns of Spoletum, Interamna, Fluentia, Sulmo, Norba, Arretium, and Ariminum were plundered,<sup>102</sup> and deprived of their privileges, and their inhabitants were either sold for slaves or massacred. But the Samnites felt the heaviest weight of the conqueror's vengeance; for not satisfied with the slaughter of so many thousands of them in cold blood, both at Rome and at Præneste, he seemed bent on the utter extirpation of the whole people; and his subsequent proscriptions destroyed or compelled to emigrate so large a proportion of them, that in Strabo's time the ancient cities of Samnium had either been reduced entirely to ruins<sup>103</sup>, or were dwindled to the rank of mere villages.

Italy had been filled with murders and devastations from one end to the other, while the author of them was as yet uninvested with any legal authority. His par-  
Deaths of Carbo and Norbanus.  
 tisans, however, were every where inflicting as summary vengeance upon his enemies, as if he had been the lawful sovereign of Rome. C. Norbanus, who had fled to Rhodes,<sup>105</sup> finding that he was proscribed, and fearing that he might be arrested by Sylla's order, even in this remote exile, killed himself. Carbo, after having abandoned Italy, had fled first to Africa;<sup>106</sup> but hearing that some attempts were making to rally his party in Sicily, he crossed over to that island, leaving the command in Africa to Cn. Domitius. But his hopes were blasted by the arrival of Pompey, who, having been dispatched to Sicily by an order of the senate, soon crushed the beginnings of resistance there, and obliged Carbo again to fly to the neighbouring island of Cossura. He was pursued, however, and taken, and brought as a prisoner to Lilybæum, where Pompey then was. It is said, that his treatment was that of a common criminal; that he was brought before the tribunal, where Pompey sat as judge, and, after undergoing a short examination, was ordered away to immediate execution. By his death, added to that of Marius, the republic was left without consuls; and the senate accordingly appointed L. Valerius Flaccus to be interrex,<sup>106</sup> that he might hold the comitia

<sup>102</sup> Florus, III. 21. Appian, 94. Cicero, in Verrem, I. 14; pro Cæcinâ, 33.

<sup>103</sup> Strabo, V. 272.

<sup>104</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXXXIX.

<sup>105</sup> Appian, I. 95, 96. Livy, Epitome, LXXXIX. Plutarch, in Pompeio, 10.

<sup>106</sup> Appian, 98.

for the elections of the ensuing year. But the interrex, having received instructions from Sylla, instead of proceeding to the election of consuls, moved, that the office of dictator, which had been disused almost since the time of Q. Fabius Maximus, should now be revived, and intrusted to the hands of Sylla; proposing besides, that it should be given him for an unlimited period, till he should have restored the affairs of the commonwealth to a state of tranquillity and security. Nor was L. Flaccus content with investing Sylla with absolute power for the future; but he proposed further, that all his acts up to the present time should be ratified;<sup>107</sup> thus giving the sanction of law to all his proscriptions and confiscations. The senate and people, however, felt that resistance was hopeless, and agreeing to both the proposed laws, Sylla was named dictator, and L. Flaccus was by him appointed his master of the horse. Having thus secured all real power to himself, Sylla was still willing that the year should be marked as usual by the names of two consuls; and, accordingly, M. Tullius Decula and Cn. Cornelius Dolabella were selected to wear the titles of the consular office.

Sylla is appointed perpetual dictator.

In this manner the liberties of Rome were surrendered into the hands of a man, whose utter contempt of his fellow-creatures seemed to promise a dreadful exercise of that absolute power with which he was now in some sort legally invested. His dominion, however, did not extend over the whole space of the Roman empire. In Asia, the war with Mithridates, which had been imperfectly smothered by the treaty concluded just before Sylla's arrival in Italy, was now again breaking out; and in Africa, the native force of Mauritania, always destined to assist the unsuccessful party in the civil wars of Rome, was supporting Cn. Domitius, and the last remains of the Marian fugitives from Italy, and was preparing to resist the arms of Pompey, to whom the task of establishing Sylla's authority was intrusted. But the most formidable enemy of the new government was to be found in Spain. Thither Q. Sertorius had retired, after the first successes of Sylla over the consuls Scipio and Norbanus; and there he had organized a force, insignificant indeed at present, in its actual strength, but which became, by the extraordinary abilities of its general, an invincible obstacle for many years to the complete triumph of the aristocratical party. In Italy, however, the power of the dictator was undisputed; there a series of battles, massacres, and proscriptions, had almost annihilated the popular cause; and the Commonwealth lay subdued and exhausted, incapable of resisting any remedies which Sylla might think proper to administer, in order to correct the evils from which it had suffered, and to infuse into it a principle of future health and vigour.

<sup>107</sup> Cicero, de Lege Agrariâ, III. 2.



It is a most certain truth, that the leader of a victorious faction can never safely be intrusted with the task of reforming that which is faulty in the constitution of his country ; and least of all, when he has committed acts so violent as those of Sylla, in humbling the party of his opponents. The eyes of the dictator were blind to all grievances, except those under which the interests of his own friends had suffered ; while he attributed all the disorders of the commonwealth to the turbulence and inordinate authority of the popular assembly and the tribunes. The great object of his measures, accordingly, was to strengthen the senate and the aristocracy, and to weaken the democratical part of the constitution. For this purpose, he transferred the judicial power, which had been so often the subject of dispute,<sup>108</sup> from the hands of the equestrian order to the senate. He deprived the tribunes of the right of proposing laws,<sup>109</sup> and made it illegal for any one, who had filled the office of tribune, to be afterwards elected to any other magistracy. He increased the number of the pontifices and augurs,<sup>110</sup> and repealing the law of Domitius, which had left the appointment of them to the people, he restored to them their ancient right of filling up the vacancies in their own body. He selected the most distinguished individuals of the equestrian order to recruit the numbers of the senate,<sup>111</sup> which had been greatly thinned by the civil wars and proscriptions ; and he pretended to subject the persons, whom he thus named, to the approval or rejection of the assembly of the tribes. Added to these were a great variety of statutes, some amending and strengthening the code of criminal laws, others providing for the better administration of the provinces, and others, again, tending to promote the general regularity and security of the government. In these points, where the interest of the republic did not interfere with any personal or party views of the legislator, his wisdom and experience suggested to him regulations which were really excellent. Of his criminal laws, one was directed against forgeries of wills, or any other instruments,<sup>112</sup> and against coining or adulterating money ; and its object was partly, perhaps, to determine more carefully the penalty for such offences, and also, in the case of forgeries, to render them public crimes, for which any individual might lawfully prosecute. Another law, or rather another clause of the same law, denounced punishment against murders,<sup>113</sup> whether committed by poison or by actual violence ; and a third clause rendered it criminal in any magistrate or senator to have

Laws of Sylla.

<sup>108</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 32.<sup>109</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXXXIX. Appian, de Bell. Civili, I. 100. Cæsar, de Bell. Civili, I. 5. Cicero, de Legibus, III. 9.

Lepidi Oratio, Sallust.

<sup>110</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXXXIX. Cicero,

Agrar. cont. Rull. II. 7. Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 46. edit. Leunclav.

<sup>111</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXXXIX. Appian, I. 100.<sup>112</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, I. 42.<sup>113</sup> Seneca, de Providentiâ, 3. Cicero, pro Cluentio, 54.

conspired or concurred in procuring the condemnation of a citizen in a court of justice.<sup>114</sup> When we find so many various provisions comprehended in one statute, and many of them relating to the first and most natural subjects of criminal legislation, we might be apt to wonder how such enactments could be needed, when the commonwealth had subsisted nearly 700 years, and must have possessed sufficient laws on all such points for many generations before the time of Sylla. But it seems that in all half-civilized countries, and in governments which have often been disturbed by seditious and acts of violence, the time at which a law is considered obsolete commences early, and it soon ceases to regulate the proceedings of the courts of justice, unless it be sanctioned and renewed at certain intervals by the authority of a more recent statute. In this manner, we know that *Magna Charta* was confirmed often after its first enactment, in several successive reigns; and thus, after such violent convulsions as the republic had lately sustained, Sylla might deem it expedient to republish and confirm anew the existing laws, on all points which he considered of importance. With regard to the provinces, Sylla limited the expenses allowed by the provincial cities to their deputies,<sup>115</sup> whom they were in the habit of sending to Rome at the end of every year, to pronounce a compliment before the senate, on the conduct of their late governor. He ordered, also, that every officer should leave his province within thirty days after the arrival of his successor;<sup>116</sup> and for the better prevention of bribery, it was enacted, that if a magistrate, condemned for this crime,<sup>117</sup> should not have property sufficient to refund all that had been corruptly received, the deficiency might be recovered from any other person who had shared in his unjust gains, or to whom any portion of them had descended. The general security of the government was consulted in some provisions of the law of treason, which also derive their origin from Sylla. By these, all provincial governors were forbidden to lead an army out of their province,<sup>118</sup> to carry on any war by their own authority, or to enter any foreign country without the order of the senate and people, to endeavour to tamper with the soldiers of any other general, or to set at liberty any of the enemies of the republic. The last of these, indeed, was an offence of which Sylla could not be accused; but he who had crossed over from his province into Italy with his army, who had made war upon the existing government of his country, and who had seduced the soldiers of the consul Scipio to desert their leader, had good reason to fear lest his own example should in turn be employed to his own disadvantage, and wisely desired to prevent

<sup>114</sup> Cicero, *pro Cluentio*, 54.

<sup>115</sup> Cicero, *ad Familiares*, III. *epist.* X.

<sup>116</sup> Cicero, *ad Familiares*, III. *epist.* VI.

<sup>117</sup> Cicero, *pro Rabirio Postumo*, 4.

<sup>118</sup> Cicero, *in Pisonem*, 21; *pro Cluentio*, 35; in *Verrem*, I. 5.

others from imitating that conduct by which he himself had acquired the dictatorship.

Such are the principal measures by which the new sovereign of Rome proposed to reform the defects of the existing order of things. It now remains to notice the price which the people had to pay for the benefits of his government. The property of all those whom he had proscribed, was declared to be forfeited to the state,<sup>119</sup> and was ordered to be publicly sold before the calends of June. All persons, even near relations, were forbidden to support or to assist any who had been proscribed; and the children of the proscribed were excluded during their lives from the enjoyment of any public office or magistracy. Nor was the forfeiture of property confined to those only whose names Sylla had actually inserted in the lists of proscription. A clause in his law, 'de proscriptis,' was intended to provide for any omissions into which he might have fallen,<sup>120</sup> by including amongst those who were to be stripped of their fortunes, all who had at any time been killed in any of the ports, garrisons, or lines of the adversaries. Yet even this did not carry the evil to its full extent. Long after the proscription lists had been closed,<sup>121</sup> and the war had been generally ended, Sextus Roscius, a wealthy citizen of the town of Ameria, in Umbria, who had attached himself to the party of Sylla, was assassinated in the streets of Rome; his property was sold, and was bought at a price far below its value, by L. Chrysogonus, Sylla's freedman. A deputation was sent by the magistrates of Ameria, to acquaint Sylla with the merits of the case, and to intercede for the son of the murdered Roscius, who was thus deprived of his inheritance. But Chrysogonus, by his entreaties and assurances that he would satisfy their wishes, prevailed with them not to lay the affair before the dictator; and he found also several persons among the nobility, whom he persuaded to join with him in the same request and the same promises. The promises, however, were never fulfilled; and the fortunes of Roscius were divided between an individual of his own name, who was suspected of having procured his murder, and Chrysogonus, who was bribed with a share of the plunder, to contrive and maintain the forfeiture. It is not likely that Sylla was ever aware of the particulars of this transaction; but his indifference to the sufferings of his fellow-creatures, and his pride, which regarded mankind as unworthy of his notice, naturally emboldened his creatures to commit numberless crimes in his name; and the fortunes acquired by his freedmen and low dependents, as they added the severest pang to the sorrow and indignation of the people, so they are alone sufficient to show how

<sup>119</sup> Cicero, pro Roscio Amerino, 43; in Verrem, I. 47; in Pisonem, 2. Velleius Paternulus, II. 28.

<sup>120</sup> Cicero, pro Roscio Amerino, 43.

<sup>121</sup> Cicero, pro Roscio Amerino, passim.



little of real patriotism, or love of justice, was mingled with the pretended reforms of Sylla.

We are told by Appian, that Sylla also passed a law,<sup>122</sup> by which all candidates for the prætorship were obliged previously to have gone through the office of quæstor; and no one could be elected consul, without having before been prætor. To this it was added that a certain interval must pass, before a man who had filled one magistracy could be again elected to another; and he could not hold the same office the second time, till after the expiration of ten years. But this law was dispensed with in favour of his own adherents; as we find, that L. Lucullus was appointed ædile when absent from Rome, and immediately afterwards succeeded to the prætorship.<sup>123</sup> Possibly, Sylla found it necessary to grant this indulgence to his own principal supporters; for, in one instance, he had at first seemed resolved, in a remarkable manner, to enforce the law without distinction. Lucretius Ofella, who had commanded at the siege of Præneste, offered himself as a candidate for the consulship,<sup>124</sup> without having been either prætor or quæstor. Sylla commanded him to desist; and on his still continuing his canvass, ordered him to be slain by a centurion in the middle of the forum. Sylla then summoned the people before him, and told them that Ofella had been put to death by his orders. Appian reports, that he addressed the assembly, on this occasion, in a style characteristic of his deep contempt for those whom he governed. "A labourer, when at plough," said he, "was annoyed by vermin; and he twice stopped from his work, and picked them off his jacket. But finding himself bitten again, to spare himself any farther trouble, he threw the jacket into the fire. Now, I advise those whom I have twice conquered, not to oblige me the third time to try the fire." It was natural, however, that his chief officers should remonstrate strongly against such a precedent as the death of Ofella; and, perhaps, it was owing to his knowledge of their sentiments, that he afterwards especially exempted them from the restrictions of his general law.

During the course of the year, Pompey had completely destroyed all opposition to Sylla's government in Africa.<sup>125</sup> Hiabaras, king of Mauritania, and Domitius, his confederate, were defeated and slain; and Pompey, on his return to Rome, enjoyed the honour of a triumph, although he was not of senatorial rank, nor had ever filled any magistracy.

When the nominal consulship of M. Tullius Decula and Cn. Dolabella was expired, Sylla, while still retaining the dictatorship, caused himself and Q. Metellus Pius to be nominated as consuls for the year following. It ap-

<sup>122</sup> Appian, 100.

<sup>123</sup> Cicero, Academic. prior, II. 1.

<sup>124</sup> Appian, 101.

<sup>125</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXXXIX.

Victories of Pompey in Africa.

Reduction of Nola, and Volaterræ. U. C. 673. A. C. 81.

pears, that amidst the general submission of Italy, two towns remained unsubdued up to this time; Nola, in Campania, and Volaterræ, in Tuscany. The first of these had never been completely reduced since the Italian war: a Roman army had been employed against it at the period of Sylla's first consulship; and again, when Cinna was driven from Rome by his colleague Octavius, it was to the camp before Nola that he first applied for support, and in which his attack upon the government was first organized. Our knowledge, however, of the fate of this town, after so long a resistance, is limited to the simple fact mentioned by the epitomizer of Livy, that Sylla reduced Nola. Volaterræ had been occupied by the remains of one of the Tuscan armies defeated by Sylla in the late war;<sup>126</sup> and numbers of Romans, who had been proscribed, escaping thither, and uniting with them, a force was formed amounting to four cohorts, or about 2400 men. The situation of this town resembled that of the hill forts of India, or of those remarkable fortified heights which are to be seen rising in the midst of the valley close to Luxemburg. It was built on an isolated point, rising abruptly on every side from a deep and narrow valley; on the top was a flat surface of considerable extent, which the town itself occupied; and the ascent was nearly two miles in length, and was every where rough and difficult. These natural advantages enabled the garrison to hold out for two years; and their resistance led Sylla himself to take the field against them,<sup>127</sup> and to preside in person at the siege. Even at last, they would only surrender on a capitulation, by which they were allowed to leave the town unmolested; while the vengeance of the conqueror fell only upon the inhabitants, whom he deprived of their lately-acquired privilege of Roman citizenship. It is remarkable that this alone, of all his measures, was maintained to be illegal,<sup>128</sup> as exceeding even the power of the Roman people to authorize. The right of citizenship, according to Cicero, could never be taken away from any one; and it is doubtful how far Sylla's laws on this subject were observed, even during his lifetime. Thus it is satisfactory to see, that the real and substantial rights acquired by the people of Italy, survived the violence of the storm, by which themselves and their party at Rome had been almost overwhelmed; and amidst such a succession of crimes and miseries, the cause of true liberty had yet gained an advantage which it continued permanently to enjoy.

It is, however, seldom at this period of history, that any thing favourable to human happiness offers itself to our notice. If the privileges of Roman citizenship were  
Violations of property.  
 secured to the Italians beyond the power of Sylla to take away,

<sup>126</sup> Strabo, V. 246.

<sup>128</sup> Cicero, pro Cæcinâ, 33, et seq.

<sup>127</sup> Cicero, pro Roscio Amerino, 7. 37.

it was not so with their properties, over which he exercised the most absolute dominion. Large tracts of land had been wrested from different cities,<sup>129</sup> as well as from proscribed individuals; besides which, there were considerable portions which had never been enclosed or appropriated, and of which Sylla now claimed the right to dispose as he thought proper. On all these he proceeded to settle the soldiers who had enabled him to attain to his present greatness. Their numbers are variously reported; the epitomizer of Livy stating them at forty-seven legions; while Appian, with far greater probability, limits them to twenty-three. To make room for 115,000 new proprietors, for such, at the lowest computation, would be the number of soldiers whom Sylla rewarded with a settlement, we may well imagine how large a proportion of the inhabitants of Italy must have been reduced to poverty, even when every allowance has been made for the probable amount of waste and unclaimed land, which formed a part of the distribution. But as one individual case speaks a far clearer language than any general statement, let the reader consult the first Eclogue of Virgil, and he will there find a picture, drawn from reality, of the dreadful misery occasioned by these gifts of victorious leaders to their soldiers.

Having thus interested so many and such formidable supporters in maintaining his various regulations, Sylla proceeded to secure to himself a party in the assembly of the people of Rome. He gave liberty to more than 10,000 slaves,<sup>130</sup> chiefly belonging to men of the opposite faction, who had been proscribed, or had fallen in battle, and he allowed them to be enrolled freely among the tribes. These new citizens, according to the usual practice of the Romans, adopted the name of him who had given them their freedom, and were all called Cornelii; and they of course would be most anxious to resist any counter-revolution, which, by rescinding Sylla's act, would have restored them also to their former slavery.

The persons nominated to the title of consuls for the following year, were P. Servilius, and Appius Claudius. Sylla's government was now fully established; and the ascendancy of his party, and the validity of his measures, seemed no longer to depend on his continuing to hold the office of dictator. He himself had no fondness for the mere ostentation of power, so long as he possessed the reality; and his favourite enjoyments, the gratification of his sensual and intellectual appetites, might be pursued more readily, if he relieved himself from the ordinary business of the administration of the commonwealth. Accordingly, having assembled the people in the forum,<sup>131</sup> he made a formal resignation of the dictatorship, dismissed his lictors, and

Appian, 100. Sallust, *Oratio Lepidi*,  
in Sullam.

<sup>130</sup> Appian, 100.

<sup>131</sup> Appian, 103, 104.



professing that he was ready to answer any charges against his late conduct, continued to walk up and down for some time, accompanied by his friends, and then withdrew quietly to his own house. This is that famous abdication which has been ever viewed as so remarkable a point in Sylla's character; and which has been sometimes adduced to prove, that he was actuated chiefly by a regard to the public welfare in all that he had done to gain and to secure the sovereign power.

But if the preceding pages have faithfully represented the state of parties at Rome, and have truly related the origin and events of the civil war, we shall form a different estimate both of the act itself, and of the motives which led to it. Sylla was the leader of the aristocratical interest, and it was his object to raise that interest from the low condition to which Marius and Cinna had reduced it, and to invest it with a complete ascendancy in the commonwealth. This he had entirely effected. He had extirpated the chiefs of the popular party; he had plundered, and almost destroyed several states of Italy, who were used to support the popular cause at Rome; he had crippled the tribunitian power; had given to the nobility the exclusive possession of the judicial authority; had enriched the most eminent families by the sale of the confiscated estates, which his principal partisans had purchased at a low price; and he had provided for the security of his triumph, by immense grants of lands to the soldiers, by whose swords he had won it. He had raised to wealth and honours a great number of his own personal dependents;<sup>132</sup> and he was himself in possession of a property amply sufficient to maintain him in a style of magnificence, and to give him the free enjoyment of his favourite pleasures. His pride had been gratified by the fullest revenge upon his own private enemies, and by the absolute control which he had exercised in the settlement of the republic, securing the interests of his party as he thought proper, without allowing them to direct or interfere with his measures. If his object, indeed, had been to convert the government into a monarchy, the resignation of the dictatorship might justly have surprised us; but viewing him as the chief of a party, whose ascendancy he endeavoured to establish, whilst he himself enjoyed a pre-eminent share of the glory, and power, and advantages of their success, his abdication appears to have been a sacrifice of—nothing. It is clear that he was still considered as the head of his party, and that he resigned no more than a mere title, with the fatigue of the ordinary business of the state, while he continued to act as sovereign whenever he thought proper to exert his power. This appears from a speech, which Sallust ascribes to M. Æmilius Lepidus, who was consul the year after Sylla's

<sup>132</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 51. *Oratio Lepidi*, in Sullam.

abdication. It is supposed to be spoken during his consulship; and in it he continually inveighs against Sylla, as the actual tyrant of the republic, without the least allusion to any resignation which he had made of his authority. And another speech, preserved among the Fragments of Sallust, and ascribed to Macer Licinius, tribune of the people, a few years afterwards, speaks of Sylla's tyranny as only ending with his life. "When Sylla was dead, who had laid this bondage upon us, you thought," says Macer to the people, "that the evil was at an end. But a worse tyrant arose in Catulus." It appears, then, that Sylla, while relieving himself from the labours of government, retained at least a large portion of his former power, and that, having completed his work, he devolved the care of maintaining it upon the other members of his party, while he himself retired to enjoy the pursuits to which he was most strongly addicted.

Then it was, when the glare of the conqueror and the legislator were no longer thrown around him, that he sank into the mere selfish voluptuary, pampering his senses and his mind with the excitements of licentiousness and of elegant literature. His principal companions, according to Plutarch, were actors and performers of various kinds, some of whom, indeed, such as the famous Q. Roscius, were of unblemished reputation; but others were of the vilest class of those wretches who ministered to every appetite of their patrons, of those men of prostituted talents, who, above all others, are most deserving of contempt and abhorrence. The intervals which were not passed in such society, Sylla employed in the composition of his own "Memoirs," a work in which he took great interest, and in which he brought down his history to within a few days of his death. It was about a year after he resigned the dictatorship, that he was attacked by the disorder which proved fatal to him; and which is said to have been one of the most loathsome that afflict humanity. We have, in truth, no very authentic accounts of his sickness; but it was the belief of the Romans in the time of Pliny,<sup>133</sup> that he who had shed such torrents of blood, was visited by an awful retribution of suffering; that vermin bred incessantly in his body, and that thus he was in time destroyed. The senate ordered that his funeral should be celebrated in the Campus Martius;<sup>134</sup> and by his own desire his body was burnt, contrary to the general practice of his family,<sup>135</sup> who were accustomed to commit their dead to the ground. But as he had ordered the grave of Marius to be opened, and his remains to be scattered abroad, he possibly departed from the custom of his ancestors, to prevent any similar

His manner of life after his resignation.

His sickness and death.  
U.C. 676. A.C. 78.

<sup>133</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* XI. 33; XXVI. 13; VII. 43.

<sup>134</sup> Livy, *Epitome* XC.

<sup>135</sup> Cicero, *de Legibus*, II. 22.

insults from being hereafter offered to himself. The members of his party, who owed their present greatness to him, testified their gratitude to their departed leader, by lavishing every kind of magnificence on his funeral. The soldiers who had served under him crowded to Puteoli,<sup>136</sup> where he had died, and escorted the body in arms to Rome. All the ministers of the gods, all the magistrates of the commonwealth, in their ensigns of office, all the senate, the equestrian order, and an immense multitude of the people, walked in the procession; and the ladies of the nobility vied with each other in offering perfumes to throw upon the funeral pile.<sup>137</sup> Such was the end of Sylla, in the sixtieth year of his age, 676 years after the building of Rome, and seventy-eight before the Christian era.

His character must sufficiently be collected from the events of his life. Some anecdotes are to be found in Plutarch, respecting his behaviour in his family, which we cannot prevail on ourselves to copy on Plutarch's sole authority. It appears, however, that he was strongly attached to his wife Metella, although he is said finally to have divorced her, and to have married again only a few months before his death. The predominant feature in his character was an intense pride, and a contempt for mankind, feelings which must ever be incompatible with a virtuous and noble nature. Indifferent to the ordinary duties and honours of the republic, he found a stimulus during his early youth and manhood in literature and sensuality; and to these he gladly returned in his last years, when he had fully satisfied the passions which led him to take part in political contests. But when circumstances drew him into public situations, his pride could be content with no second place; and when he found himself slighted and injured, the desire of ample vengeance and of establishing his superiority beyond all rivalry, prevailed in his mind over every other. He found himself individually opposed to a man whom he envied for his military glory, and despised for his low birth and ignorance: as a patrician, he felt an aristocratical contempt for the popular party; as a Roman he looked down with habitual arrogance upon all foreign nations. It happened that Marius, his enemy, was leagued with the popular cause at Rome, and with the Italian states, which were claiming an equality with Roman citizens; and thus his pride as an individual, as a noble, and as a Roman, was wounded beyond endurance by their victory. But when that victory was accompanied by crimes which awakened the abhorrence even of the most moderate men, Sylla set no bounds to his retaliation, and seemed bent upon effecting the utter extirpation of all the three parties who were united against him, Marius and his personal enemies,

And character.

<sup>136</sup> Appian, 105, 106.

<sup>137</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, 38.



the popular interest, and the allied states of Italy. Careless of the means by which this end was to be accomplished, and utterly indifferent to the multiplied miseries with which it must be attended, he commenced a series of boundless cruelties, in which it is impossible to find any resemblance to the just severities of a lawful government exercised upon flagrant criminals. He did not apply himself to a calm review of the causes which had so long disturbed the peace of his country; nor, as some tyrants have done, did he forget in his elevation the character of a party leader, and being placed above all, learn to regard all classes of citizens with an eye of impartiality. No doubt he reformed many things that needed alteration; but they were the abuses of one side only that he removed, and all that he did was to provide for the security of his party, except in those points where the common sense of every government sees, that in the prevention of ordinary crimes its own interest and that of society are identified. The inscription which he is said to have dictated for his own monument, well declares that constant thirst for superiority, or in other words, that unceasing pride, which we have called his characteristic quality. It contained, in substance, that no friend had ever outdone him in the exchange of good offices, and no enemy had done him more evil than he had rendered to him again in return.

The character of Sylla, moreover, exemplifies a truth most useful to be remembered, yet most often contradicted or forgotten. His life, and the lives of many others in every age, and not least in our own, show that a cultivated understanding is no warrant for virtuous principles and conduct, and that the old adage of

“Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,  
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros;”

unless a very strained interpretation be put upon the word *fideliter*, is widely at variance with the evidence of facts. Sylla had a general taste for literature; he was intimately acquainted with the writers of Greece; he delighted in the society of men of talent; and he was himself long and carefully engaged in recording the history of his own actions; yet no man was ever more stained with cruelty, nor was ever any more degraded by habitual and gross profligacy. Nor is this at all wonderful, if we consider that the intellectual faculties, like the sensual, are gratified by exercise; and that the pleasure derived from the employment of talent is quite distinct from the application of the lessons taught by the understanding to the government of the affections and the conduct. In all men, whose mental powers are at all considerable, the indulgence of them is as much an object of mere natural appetite, as the gratification of hunger and thirst is to the mass of mankind; and it is only because it is less common that it is regarded as conferring on the character a much superior value. Bad men, of good

natural faculties, gratify therefore with equal eagerness their animal and their intellectual desires, and are equally ignorant of the government of either. It is the part of goodness to restrain both, and to convert them to their own purposes ; an effort which is as painful to pride in the one case as it is to the ordinary feelings of what is called licentiousness in the other : and it is the presence or absence of this effort which distinguishes talent from wisdom, and forms a perpetual barrier between men like Sylla, and those who have deserved the respect, and admiration, and love of posterity.

It will form a proper conclusion to this part of our history, if we add here a short account of the disturbances that immediately followed the death of Sylla, and which originated in an attempt made by the popular party to procure the repeal of his various laws and measures. The consulship was at this time filled by M. Æmilius Lepidus and Q. Lutatius Catulus ; the former of whom had governed Sicily some years before as prætor,<sup>138</sup> and had rendered himself infamous for his maladministration ; the latter was the son of that Catulus who had been the colleague of Marius in his fourth consulship, when he overcame the Cimbri, and had afterwards killed himself when sentenced to die by the same Marius, at the beginning of Cinna's usurpation. During Sylla's lifetime, Lepidus had attempted to revive the popular cause, and had inveighed against the tyranny under which, as he said, the republic laboured. Upon the death of Sylla he endeavoured to deprive his remains of that magnificent funeral with which the aristocratical party proposed to honour them ;<sup>139</sup> but in this, as we have seen, he failed ; and Catulus, supported by Pompey, succeeded in paying the last tribute to the late dictator's memory. Lepidus, however, having now declared himself the enemy of the party in possession of the chief power in the state, at once proceeded to try his strength, and proposed that Sylla's acts should be rescinded,<sup>140</sup> which was, in other words, to move for a counter-revolution. Attempting to tread exactly in the steps of Cinna, he called on the Italians to support him,<sup>141</sup> as he was labouring to procure a restoration of the privileges of Roman citizenship for those states which Sylla had deprived of them. Disputes and contests, we know not of how serious a kind, were frequently occurring between his partisans and those of Catulus ; the senate, however, bound both consuls by an oath, that they would not carry their dissensions into a civil war. Lepidus, perhaps, consented the more readily to take this oath, as he expected, on the expiration of his consulship, to obtain the government of a province, and consequently the command of an army ; and he

Sedition, rebellion,  
and death of M. Lepidus.

<sup>138</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, III. 91.

<sup>139</sup> Appian, 105.

<sup>140</sup> Florus, III. 23. Livy, Epitome, XC.

<sup>141</sup> Appian, 107. Sallust, Oratio L. Philippi contra Lepidum.

considered himself as only pledged to abstain from arms whilst he was actually consul. The senate, on their part, anxious to remove him from the capital, and either trusting to the obligation of his oath, or despising his means of injuring them by open rebellion, allowed him, on the expiration of his office, to receive the command of the province of Gaul,<sup>142</sup> with the title and authority of proconsul. No sooner did he find himself at the head of an army than he threw aside all reserve; he endeavoured to raise partisans in Etruria, the quarter of Italy in which the latest resistance had been made to the power of Sylla; whilst from his station in Gaul he might easily connect himself with those remains of the Marian party which Sertorius yet kept in the field in Spain. Numbers also of the lowest and most profligate inhabitants of Rome flocked to join him; the same men who had aided the riots of Sulpicius, and had been ready agents in the massacres of Marius and Damasippus. Lepidus marched at once towards the capital, and approached almost as far as the very walls of the city; but the senate were prepared for their defence. Ap-pius Claudius, the interrex, the consuls for the following year not being yet chosen, and Q. Catulus, as proconsul, were charged to provide for the safety of the state; and, by the forces which they collected, Lepidus was easily checked and defeated. Destitute of any further means to continue the war in Italy, Lepidus then retired to Sardinia,<sup>143</sup> where he was soon attacked by sickness, and died in the midst of his plans for renewing the contest. M. Brutus,<sup>144</sup> one of his officers, and the father of the famous assassin of Cæsar, was about this time taken and put to death at Mutina, by Pompey; and thus the ascendancy of the aristocracy remained unimpaired, and was probably rather strengthened than injured by this rash and idle attempt to overthrow it. But the present leaders of the victorious party were men who have left behind them a purer character than most of their countrymen; and Catulus has the rare merit of sul-lying his triumph with no cruelties,<sup>145</sup> and of remaining content with the suppression of the rebellion, without endeavouring to add any thing further to the powers and advantages of his friends, or to the depression of his antagonists.

<sup>142</sup> Sallust and Appian, *locis citatis*.

<sup>144</sup> Livy and Plutarch, *ubi supra*.

<sup>143</sup> Livy, Epitome, XC. Plutarch. in Pompeio, 16.

<sup>145</sup> Florus, III. 23.



## CHAPTER VII.

### PART I.

CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR.—A VIEW OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.—FROM U.C. 676, A.C. 78, TO U.C. 695, A.C. 59.

THE nobility of the Julian family was so ancient and so illustrious, that even after it obtained the imperial dignity, it needed not the exaggeration of flatterers to exalt it. Within thirty years after the commencement of the republic, we find the name of C. Julius on the list of consuls; and the same person, or a relation of the same name, is said to have been one of the decemviri, by whom the laws of the Twelve Tables were compiled. During the Punic wars, and the whole of the sixth century of Rome, the family produced indeed no individuals of distinguished character; but there is a Sex. Julius Cæsar among the prætors of the year 544, a L. Julius among those of the year 569, and a Sextus Julius, who appears as consul in 596, seven years before the third Punic war. In the seventh century we have already had occasion to mention three of the Cæsars; namely, Sextus Julius Cæsar, who was consul with L. Philippus, A.U.C. 662, during the famous year of the tribuneship of Drusus; L. Julius Cæsar, who was consul in the year following, who distinguished himself in the Italian war by a great victory over the Samnites, and who was afterwards murdered by the order of Marius; and C. Julius Cæsar, the brother of Lucius, eminent as an orator, for his wit and pleasantry, whose irregular offer of himself for the consulship, in 665, first led P. Sulpicius to act the part of a popular tribune in opposing him, and who perished, together with his brother, when Marius and Cinna first usurped the government. But the individual to whom the name of Cæsar owes its renown with posterity, was consin in the second degree to these two brothers, and nephew to Sex. Cæsar, the colleague of L. Philippus in the consulship. His father was C. Julius Cæsar, a man of prætorian rank, and who is recorded by Pliny as a re-

From U. C. 676, A. C. 78, to U. C. 695, A. C. 59.  
The Julian family.

markable instance of sudden death,<sup>1</sup> he having expired suddenly one morning at Pisa, while dressing himself. C. Cæsar married Aurelia,<sup>2</sup> of the family of Aurelius Cotta; and of these parents was born the famous Caius Julius Cæsar, about the year of Rome 653, in the consulship of C. Marius and L. Valerius Flaccus.

Some of the incidents of his early life, his marriage with the daughter of Cinna, and his narrow escape from the proscription of Sylla, have been already related. But although there are numerous anecdotes to be found of him in the stories of his two biographers, Suetonius and Plutarch, yet the authority of both these writers is so low, and their accounts are at such variance with one another, that it is useless to repeat that which we have such imperfect grounds for believing. Without pretending to arrange the order of the several events, it will be enough to say, that he commenced his military service at an early age in Asia, and was present at the reduction of Mitylene,<sup>3</sup> the only town which remained in arms against Rome after the end of the first war with Mithridates. He studied eloquence for some time at Rhodes,<sup>4</sup> under Apollonius Molo, from whom Cicero, about the same period, was also receiving instructions. On one occasion he was taken by some of those pirates, who were then so formidable on all the coasts of Greece<sup>5</sup> and Asia, and was detained by them till he collected from some of the neighbouring cities fifty talents for his ransom. No sooner was he released than he procured a small naval force, and set out on his own sole authority in pursuit of the pirates. He overtook them, and took some of their vessels, which he brought back to the coast of Asia with a number of prisoners. He then sent word of his success to the proconsul of Asia, requesting him to order the execution of the captives; but that officer being more inclined to have them sold for slaves, Cæsar crucified them all without loss of time, before the proconsul's pleasure was officially known. Such conduct was not likely to recommend him to those in authority; and we are told, that on several other occasions he wished to act for himself,<sup>6</sup> and even to take part in the war which was now renewed with Mithridates, without any commission from the government, and without submitting himself to any of the regular officers of the republic. These early instances of his lawless spirit are recorded with admiration by some of his historians, as affording proofs of vigour and greatness of mind.

He first brought himself into notice at Rome by bringing a

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* VII. 53.

<sup>2</sup> Suetonius, in *C. Jul. Cæsare*, 74.

<sup>3</sup> Suetonius, in *C. Jul. Cæsare*, 2. Livy, Epitome, LXXXIX.

<sup>4</sup> Suetonius, 4. Cicero, *de Claris Oratoribus*, 91.

<sup>5</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 41, Suetonius, 4.

<sup>6</sup> Suetonius, 4.

charge of corruption in his province against Cn. Dolabella,<sup>7</sup> who had been consul with M. Tullius Decula, under the dictatorship of Sylla, and had since been appointed to the province of Macedonia, and had obtained a triumph for some victories over the neighbouring barbarians. Dolabella, however, was defended by Cotta and Hortensius, two of the most famous orators of that period, and was acquitted. Whatever may have been the merits of this case, Cæsar probably was glad to seize any opportunity of annoying the partisans of Sylla; and even in his early youth he made no secret of his enmity to the aristocratical party, and obtained the credit of boldly supporting the weaker cause, by an ostentation of his regard for the memory of Marius and Cinna. He lost during his quæstorship both his own wife,<sup>8</sup> Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna, and his aunt Julia, who had been the wife of the elder Marius. He pronounced an oration in honour of each of them; and, at the funeral of his aunt, he ordered that the images of her husband Marius should be exhibited amongst those of her other deceased relations and ancestors, which, according to the custom of the Romans, were always carried in the procession on such occasions. Marius having been adjudged a traitor, the sight of his statues produced a great surprise among the people, and the lower populace, looking upon them as a pledge of the revival of the popular party, welcomed them as they passed with the loudest acclamations. But, whilst Cæsar was thus giving tokens of the danger which the aristocracy had to apprehend from his political career, he almost lulled their fears by the unbounded infamy of his personal character. We will not and cannot repeat the picture which ancient writers,<sup>9</sup> little scrupulous on such points, have drawn of his debaucheries; it will be sufficient to say, that he was stained with numerous adulteries committed with women of the noblest families; that his profligacies in other points drew upon him general disgrace, even amidst the lax morality of his own contemporaries, and are such that their very flagitiousness has in part saved them from the abhorrence of posterity, because modern writers cannot pollute their pages with the mention of them.

With such an outline of the family and the early life of C. Cæsar, we shall close his personal history for the present. According to the plan which we have pursued on former occasions, we shall attempt to describe the state of the Roman empire immediately before that period at which his ambition openly aspired to enslave it; and we trust to be forgiven, if we sacrifice to this object some details of particular facts, which are either little

His first public appearance at Rome, where he espouses the popular party.

<sup>7</sup> Suetonius, 4. Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, 92.

<sup>8</sup> Suetonius, 6. Plutarch, in Cæsare, 5.

<sup>9</sup> Suetonius, 49, et seq. et Auctores ibi citati.



worthy of attention, or, from their great notoriety, are already familiar to every reader.

If a merchant of Alexandria had traversed the Mediterranean in the year of Rome 680; if he had been bound in the first instance to Spain; if thence he had been led by circumstances to visit the coasts of Italy, and to pass a short time at Rome itself; if then, while pursuing his voyage homewards, he had met with the fate which at that period was most likely to befall him, that of falling into the hands of pirates; and finally, if he had touched at some places on the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor, while his captors were returning with their prize to their strongholds in Cilicia; and if, having effected his ransom, he had at last been happy enough to reach Egypt in safety, and had there recorded the story of his eventful voyage, and of the various scenes which he had witnessed; with what delight should we have welcomed such a treasure, and how thankful should we feel to that African traveller whose researches should procure for us so valuable a fund of information. The thought, indeed, of the knowledge of antiquity which we desire, is enough to make us discontented with that which we possess. But in imagining the case of the Egyptian merchant, our object is to bring before our readers at one view the state of the different extremities of the Mediterranean; and to enable them to judge of the condition of the times, by describing the scenes which would have presented themselves to the eyes of an individual, in whatever quarter of the Roman empire his fortune might have placed him.

If a trading vessel had approached the more southern parts of Spain, she might have found every thing tranquil; but if her course had been directed towards the mouths of the Sucro or the Ebro, she would have probably been stopped by the light cruisers of Sertorius,<sup>10</sup> which covered the whole coast in order to intercept any supplies coming by sea for the armies of Pompey and Metellus. On shore, the country was suffering under the miseries of a long and dubious warfare. We have already slightly mentioned the beginnings of Sertorius's career, and we shall have occasion to speak of him hereafter more at length. He had at first been opposed in Spain by Q. Metellus Pius; but, when that officer was found unable to bring the war to a conclusion, and Sertorius had been greatly reinforced by the troops which had followed Lepidus in his attempt to revive the popular cause, and which after his defeat M. Perpenna had led into Spain,<sup>11</sup> the senate deemed it necessary to intrust the command to a general of the highest reputation, and accordingly fixed their choice upon Pompey. Sertorius, however, withstood

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch, in Sertorio, 21. Strabo, III. 167, edit. Xyland.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 108.

the united efforts of his two antagonists with great ability and success: he availed himself of the activity and ingenuity of the Spaniards, who were warmly attached to him, and who became most excellent soldiers, when they had received from him some portion of discipline and military skill in addition to their natural excellences. The war which had begun before the death of Sylla, was still in the year 680 maintained with unabated vigour; nor was it terminated till two years afterwards, when, Sertorius having been assassinated by some of his officers, who were jealous of his talents, but very unable to supply his place, Pompey obtained an easy victory, reduced the whole of Spain to a state of obedience, and returned to Rome to enjoy the honours of a triumph, and to enter upon the office of consul. In the mean time we find that his army,<sup>12</sup> for a considerable portion of the time that it had served in Spain, was very irregularly paid, and was obliged to support itself at the expense of the country which was the seat of war. This was also the case with the army of Sertorius; so that the whole northeast of Spain, as may readily be imagined, was reduced to a state of the greatest poverty and desolation.

U. C. 682.

Pursuing a coasting navigation from Spain towards Italy, a vessel would naturally stop at some of the ports of the province of Gaul. It appears that the Gauls on both sides of the Alps had taken up arms in the cause of Lepidus; and Pompey, when marching into Spain, had inflicted on them a severe chastisement,<sup>13</sup> and had expelled many of the Transalpine Gauls in particular from their cities and territories. During the war with Sertorius, the province of Gaul was obliged to contribute largely to the necessities of the Roman armies, and both Metellus and Pompey, on two several occasions, wintered there,<sup>14</sup> when the country to the south of the Pyrenees was too much exhausted to maintain them. Manius Fonteius was about this time governor of the province, and he made himself very odious to the natives, not only by the rigour with which he exacted supplies of horses, corn, and money, for the troops in Spain, but by the duties which he levied on their wines,<sup>15</sup> and, as they alleged, by the partial and corrupt manner in which he demanded their services in making roads.<sup>16</sup> Fonteius was afterwards brought to trial at Rome for his conduct in his province; and while Cicero, in his defence of him, denies strongly the charge of corruption, he admits the severity, or, as he calls it, the vigour, with which he maintained the authority of Rome amongst a people always turbulent and disaffected, and who were so lately in open rebellion.

Of Gaul.

<sup>12</sup> Epistola Cn. Pompeii, apud Fragm. Sallust.

<sup>13</sup> Cicero, pro Fonteio, 2; pro Lege Maniliâ, 10.

<sup>14</sup> Epistola Cn. Pompeii, apud Sallust. Cicero, pro Fonteio, 3.

<sup>15</sup> Cicero, pro Fonteio, 5.

<sup>16</sup> Cicero, pro Fonteio, 4.

From Gaul a short passage would transport the voyager to the mouth of the Tiber, and would place him amongst all the various rumours, and interests, and speculations which abound in the seat of government of a great empire. At the period of which we are now speaking, he would have found the public attention seriously excited by an insurrection of gladiators, which had broken out a short time before. About seventy persons of this class,<sup>17</sup> mostly natives of Gaul and Thrace, who had been either taken prisoners in war, or carried off by slave-traders from their own country, had effected their escape from the place where they were kept in training at Capua. Having fallen in with some wagons on the road, which were carrying a quantity of arms for the use of the gladiators in a neighbouring city, they seized the whole supply, and retired to Mount Vesuvius, as to a post which they might maintain with advantage. Here they chose three leaders, Spartacus, Crixus, and Ænomaus; and having repulsed the first attempts which were made to reduce them, their numbers were rapidly swelled by the concourse of fugitive slaves from all quarters, and by many of the poorest class of freemen, who were allured by the prospect of plunder. They were attacked by a regular force commanded by a Roman prætor; and having completely defeated it, they quitted their asylum of Mount Vesuvius; and receiving daily large additions to their numbers, they plundered several of the principal cities in Campania, intending, when satiated with plunder, to march towards the Alps, and thus to effect their escape in safety to their own countries, carrying with them the spoils of Italy.

An intelligent and curious traveller would naturally have wished to gain some insight into the state of parties in the capital, and into the views and feelings of the people with respect to public affairs. Five years had elapsed since the death of Sylla, and the laws which he had enacted were still almost wholly in force, and the depression of the popular interest was consequently almost the same as after his victory. Since the defeat of Lepidus, one or two tribunes had attempted to restore their office to its former powers and dignities; but their efforts had been ineffectual, and one of them, Cn. Sicinius, is said to have lost his life through the violence of his opponents.<sup>18</sup> C. Cotta, however, who was consul in the year 678, finding the people in a condition of great distress, owing to the disturbed state of many of the provinces which used to supply the capital with corn, and to the extensive depredations committed by the Cilician pirates, deemed it expedient to try some means of con-

Of Italy.

Insurrection of the gladiators under Spartacus.

State of parties in Rome.

U. C. 678.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, Epitome, XCV. Plutarch, in Crasso, 8. Appian, de Bell. Civili, I. 116. <sup>18</sup> Oratio C. Licinii Macri, apud Fragm. Sallust.



ciliating them. Accordingly he procured the repeal of that law of Sylla,<sup>19</sup> by which those who had been tribunes of the people had been declared ineligible to any of the higher magistracies, and he was empowered by the senate to sell the tithes of wine and oil, which the Sicilians always paid in kind,<sup>20</sup> not in Sicily, as had hitherto been the practice, but at Rome, in order somewhat to lower the price of provisions in the Roman markets. A certain distribution of corn was also made among the poorer citizens,<sup>21</sup> by which each man received five pecks at a very low price. But these were only temporary experiments; and we find C. Macer Licinius, one of the tribunes for the year 680, lamenting the humbled and dispirited state of the people, who, so soon as they left the forum, forgot all their political interests, and were desirous only of gaining, undisturbed, a subsistence for themselves and their families. These are the circumstances which are, above all others, most unfavourable to the cause of true liberty; and they are the natural result of bloody civil dissensions, which generally leave behind them a disgust for political business, attended with a large portion of individual distress. In order to rouse the people from their apathy, the popular leaders are then tempted to employ stimulants of the most violent nature; to exaggerate the public grievances, and to misrepresent and traduce the party of their antagonists, thinking that nothing less than an excessive indignation can repair the evils of an excessive indifference. At Rome, however, during the period of which we are now speaking, the moderation and popular virtues of many of the principal individuals of the aristocracy obviated in a great measure the mischief of these invectives. The people were taught to feel their own power, and to exercise it; but they respected the senate, and continued for some time to submit to its regulated influence and authority; till the efforts of some worthless individuals again excited jealousies and dissensions: in the course of which, the senate and the people were opposed to one another in a quarrel which was not their own; and a war, in which no national nor public interests were properly involved, enabled one profligate adventurer to overturn the whole constitution, and to overwhelm all ranks of the commonwealth together under his own despotism.

We have said that a merchant vessel, bound from Rome to the eastern part of the Mediterranean in the year 680, would, in all probability, have fallen into the power of some of the pirates by whom the sea was at this time infested. At no other period in the history of the world has piracy been carried to such a formidable height; and even the ex-

Origin and progress of the pirates of Cilicia.

<sup>19</sup> Asconius, in Ciceron. pro Cornelio Oration. 1.

<sup>20</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, III. 7.

<sup>21</sup> Oratio C. Macri, apud Fragm. Salust.

ploits of the famous buccaneers in America are less wonderful, when we consider that the pirates of Asia did not confine their ravages to a distant quarter of the Roman empire, where the arm of the government would necessarily act with less vigour, but that they insulted and annoyed the neighbourhood of the capital itself. We possess only imperfect accounts of their origin; but we learn that in the wars between Greece and Persia,<sup>22</sup> the Cilicians usually formed a considerable part of the king's navies, and that the nature of their country disposed them to maritime affairs. The chain of Mount Taurus,<sup>23</sup> in its course from the western coast of Asia Minor, approaches nearly to the Mediterranean, towards the southeastern extremity of the peninsula; leaving between itself and the sea a district of unequal breadth and dissimilar character, which was divided into two parts, the mountainous and the plain Cilicia. Of these, the mountainous Cilicia presented a number of strongholds, built on high and steep cliffs overhanging the sea, and each, for the most part, commanding either a small harbour, or a smooth and sheltered beach, which, for the purposes of ancient navigation, was hardly less convenient. With these facilities of access to the sea, and of escape from its violence or from the pursuit of an enemy, were combined the advantages of an inexhaustible store of timber in the cedar forests of Taurus, and the stimulus afforded by the natural poverty of a mountain region, which inclined its inhabitants to a life of plunder. A people of this description can only be civilized by the systematic efforts of a powerful government; but the Cilicians had first been included in the empire of Persia, and after the conquests and early death of Alexander, they formed a part of the kingdom of Syria. But neither the kings of Persia nor of Syria were likely to employ themselves in civilizing their barbarian subjects; and the character and habits of the Cilicians remained unchanged, till, in the seventh century of Rome, the increasing weakness and the constant family dissensions of their sovereigns enabled them to indulge their inclinations with less restraint. The chiefs of the several strongholds along the coast, despising the authority of the Syrian government,<sup>24</sup> commenced a system of plunder; and the circumstances of the times determined them to follow peculiarly the occupation of manstealers. The demand for slaves among the great land proprietors of Italy so far exceeded the occasional supply produced by the conquests of the republic, that the slave-trade was become a most lucrative branch of commerce; and the Cilicians, being bold and able seamen, carried it on with success, by making descents on various parts of

<sup>22</sup> Herodotus, VII. 91; VIII. 68. Thucydides, I. 112.

<sup>23</sup> Strabo, XIV. 766, et seq., edit. Xyland.

<sup>24</sup> Strabo, XIV. 766, et seq., edit. Xyland.

the neighbouring coast, and surprising the persons of the inhabitants. They then carried their captives to Delos, which was so great a mart for this traffic, that many thousands of slaves might be landed there, sold, and exported again on the same day. Doubtless, the well-known horrors of the "middle passage" were experienced often by the unhappy wretches who were crowded together in narrow vessels, built far more for swiftness than for the reception of passengers, and who were exposed to the cruelty and merciless avarice of a crew of barbarian pirates; whilst they themselves would frequently be persons of some fortune and education, torn away, with their wives and children, from the enjoyment of all the comforts of civilized life. Nor did the neighbouring states of Cyprus and Egypt attempt to prevent these atrocities; but they are said to have witnessed them with pleasure through jealousy of the Syrians, who were the chief sufferers. But both they who neglected to crush the evil, and the Romans, who had first given occasion to it, began soon to feel its effects themselves. Gain and impunity encouraged the pirates to extend their robberies: property and merchandise of every kind, and belonging to every nation, were attacked without scruple; insomuch that the Romans were obliged to notice these piracies as early as the year 651, and M. Antonius, the orator, who was then prætor, received Cilicia as his province,<sup>25</sup> and there obtained some victories, which were held sufficient to entitle him to the honour of the smaller triumph, or ovation. The war with Mithridates followed in about fourteen years; and during that war, the Cilician pirates offered their services to the king of Pontus against the Romans,<sup>26</sup> and infested the Ægean so much with their light squadrons, that Sylla often felt considerable annoyance from them. But after the regular war was at an end, the pirates became more formidable than ever; they were joined by many individuals who had been ruined during the late contest; and now no longer wearing the semblance of auxiliaries to a regular government, they extended their cruises to all parts of the Mediterranean, and not only made partial descents, but attacked and often made themselves masters of fortified towns situated on the coast. Under these circumstances, P. Servilius Vatia, who had been consul in the year 674, was in the year following sent to repress the pirates;<sup>27</sup> and he appears to have held the command during some years, in the course of which he defeated them at sea, and also stormed so many of their fortresses in Pamphylia and the neighbouring country of Isauria, that he received the surname of Isauricus, and was considered to have put an end altogether to the evil. These hopes, however, were soon disap-

<sup>25</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, I. 18. Livy, Epitome, LXVIII.

<sup>27</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 3. Strabo, XII. 663, edit. Xyland.

<sup>26</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 24. Appian, de Bell. Mithridat. 92.



pointed. The trade of piracy had been found so profitable, that many others of the maritime states of Asia Minor were engaged in it as well as the Cilicians;<sup>28</sup> and no partial losses could put a stop to a system carried on on so extensive a scale. A more vigorous attempt to repress it had been made, indeed, about the year 678, when M. Antonius, the son of the orator, and father of the triumvir, received an extraordinary command,<sup>29</sup> extending over all the sea coasts of the Mediterranean, that he might be enabled to check the enemy at once in every quarter. But Antonius seems to have distinguished himself by nothing but his oppression and his exactions from the allies of Rome, and his injustice towards neutral states: and the conduct of his subordinate officers greatly resembled his own. The robberies of the pirates continued unabated, and the behaviour of the Roman commanders only added to the general misery. It is, however, by some particular facts that we may best convey a notion of the extent of the public losses and dishonour. In the year 680, the notorious C. Verres was appointed to command the province of Sicily as *proprætor*; and during his administration, a piratical chief named Heracleo,<sup>30</sup> with a light squadron of four vessels, appeared on the coasts of the island, defeated and burnt an ill-provided fleet which had attempted to oppose him, and entered in a bravado into the very harbour of Syracuse, which, having surveyed at his leisure, he again put to sea without molestation. The communication between Italy and Greece was intercepted during the whole summer;<sup>31</sup> several officers going abroad, with commissions from the senate, on the public service, were taken, and released for a ransom; and two *prætors*, with their *lictors*, while going abroad to take the command of their provinces, fell into the hands of the pirates. Descents were made on both coasts of Italy; the harbour of Caieta, which was full of Roman vessels, was entered before the eyes of a Roman *prætor*, and every thing in it was taken or destroyed; the children of M. Antonius, the orator, at the very time, apparently, that their brother was commanding against the pirates, were carried off from the house of their family at Misenum, and were ransomed for a large sum of money. Nay, the mouth of the Tiber itself was not secure from insult; and a fleet, which one of the consuls had been appointed to command, was surprised and taken at Ostia, within twenty miles of Rome. While such were the affronts sustained so near the seat of government itself, it will excite no surprise to hear that Cnidus, Samos, and Colophon, with 400 other cities, were taken at different times by this daring enemy;<sup>32</sup> and that some of the most famous and richest temples, those of Juno

<sup>28</sup> Appian, de Bell. Mithridat. 92.<sup>31</sup> Cicero, pro Lege Maniliâ, 1. 12.<sup>29</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, II. 3, III. 91.<sup>32</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 24.<sup>30</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, V. 34, 35, 37.

at Samos, at Argos, and at Lacinium in Italy; those of Apollo at Leucas and Actium; those of Neptune at the Isthmus of Corinth, and at Tænarus; and that of Ceres and Proserpine in Samothrace, were violated and ransacked. The revenues and the commerce of Rome were alike intercepted or suspended; and the power of the republic was, for awhile, baffled or despised by an enemy, without a country and without a government, who possessed no other resources than the plunder which they had acquired by their piracies.

In describing the progress of the pirates, we have anticipated the mention of the scenes which would have pre-  
Oppression of Roman governors in the provinces.  
 sented themselves to the eyes of a voyager in the seas, and on the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor. If any accident had led him to visit the interior of those countries, he would have found the violences of the pirates almost equalled by the tyranny of the Roman governors and officers. It appears that, for several years after the triumph of the aristocratical party under Sylla, the crimes of the Roman magistrates and generals, and the excesses which their examples encouraged their soldiers to commit, were unusually great;<sup>33</sup> and that the corrupt state of the tribunals at Rome, where the judicial power was vested entirely in the hands of senators, ensured a frequent impunity to such offenders. When Cicero accused Verres, in the year 683, he did not hesitate to declare, that it was the wish of the provinces that the laws against the maladministration of Roman officers might be repealed;<sup>34</sup> for, whilst they existed, corrupt governors increased their extortions, that they might have wherewithal to reward their advocates, and to bribe their judges, in case they should be brought to trial; and the most respectable of the Romans, and the warmest supporters of the cause of the nobility, Q. Catulus and Cn. Pompey, confessed and deplored the truth of this statement. History has preserved to us the names of Cn. Dolabella, who was tried for his misgovernment of Macedonia; of another Cn. Dolabella, who was accused of corruption and cruelty in Cilicia;<sup>35</sup> of M. Antonius, who has been already mentioned as infamous for his general misconduct in the extensive command which had been intrusted to him; of his brother, C. Antonius, who was brought to trial for his exactions in Greece;<sup>36</sup> of Q. Calpidius, who was charged with oppression in Spain;<sup>37</sup> of Manius Fonteius, whom Cicero defended against the complaints of the Gauls; and above all, of C. Verres, who for three years practised every kind of cruelty and corruption in Sicily. Besides these, were officers who are charged with no personal corruption, yet whose conduct towards

<sup>33</sup> Cicero, pro Lege Maniliâ, 13. 22.

<sup>34</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, actio. I. 14, 15.

<sup>35</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, I. 38.

<sup>36</sup> Q. Cicero, de Petitione Consulatus, 2.

<sup>37</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, act. I. 13; III. 25, et Asconius, in act. I. in Verrem.

foreign states was harsh and unjust. P. Servilius has been already mentioned as having gained several victories over the pirates in Pamphylia and Isauria. Amongst other places, they had occupied Olympus, a city of Lycia; and Servilius besieged and took the town from them. The Lycians, to whom it of right belonged, had carefully abstained from imitating the example of their neighbours,<sup>33</sup> and had taken no part in the depredations of the pirates; yet the ornaments of the city were carried off as spoils to Rome, and the people of Olympus were deprived of a portion of their territory.

A Gaulish chief, while exhorting his countrymen to maintain their independence against the arms of Rome, is represented by Cæsar as describing, in two words, the degraded condition of that part of Gaul which was already a Roman province.<sup>39</sup> He called it "*subjecta securibus*," "subject to the lictor's axe;" and although the last extremities of tyranny might have been comparatively rare, yet, in fact, the lives of the provincials were subject to the arbitrary will of the governors, without any immediate protection, and too often with only a feeble prospect of retribution upon their oppressor. When Verres was in Asia,<sup>40</sup> as quæstor to Cn. Dolabella, he was sent by him on a mission to Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, and on his way he passed through Lampsacus. He was there informed that Philodamus, one of the principal citizens, had an unmarried daughter of extraordinary beauty; and in order to effect the infamous design which he instantly entertained, he caused one of his creatures to be lodged at the house of Philodamus. This man, whose name was Rubrius, was entertained with the greatest hospitality, and was desired to name the persons whom he wished to form the company; Philodamus sending even his own son to sup at the house of a friend, that he might have room for a greater number of Roman officers. Towards the close of the evening, Rubrius called upon Philodamus to introduce his daughter to their party; a proposal which, according to the manners of the Greeks, was one of the utmost insult and indelicacy. The father refused, and his guests, assisted by their slaves and by some of the lictors of Verres, proceeded to assault him in his own house, and to threaten the honour of his daughter. He contrived to inform his son of his danger, and the young man instantly flew to the house, followed by a crowd of the people of Lampsacus, who were roused by the report of so gross an outrage. In the scuffle that ensued, Rubrius and some of his slaves were wounded, and a lictor was killed; and on the next day, when it was known who was the original author of the attempt, the people crowded to the house where Verres lodged, and were with difficulty pre-

<sup>33</sup> Strabo, XIV. 762, edit. Xyland.  
Cicero, in Verrem, I. 21. de Lege Agrar,  
I. 2.

<sup>39</sup> De Bello Gallico, VII. 77.  
<sup>40</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, I. 24, et seq.



vented from exercising on him a summary vengeance. He escaped, however, and Philodamus and his son were brought to trial before C. Nero, the governor of the province of Asia, for the death of the licitor. At the earnest request of Verres, Dolabella left his own province of Cilicia to assist at the trial; Verres himself was present also, and he and Dolabella used all their influence, both by vehemence and supplication, to procure the condemnation of the prisoners. Nero, a weak and timid man, yielded to their instances, and Philodamus and his son were beheaded in the market-place of Lampsacus. Dolabella was afterwards accused, as we have seen, of corruption in his own province, and was condemned to exile, which he underwent; but Verres was elected prætor, and exercised jurisdiction both in Rome and in Sicily; nor was he ever questioned for his conduct at Lampsacus, till after the perpetration of numberless additional crimes, when Cicero, his accuser, mentioned this early enormity as preparatory to the series of his greater and more recent offences. Nero, it should be observed, by whose sentence Philodamus and his son were put to death, was never brought to trial at all. It is not possible that actions so dreadful as this should have been of very frequent occurrence; still the circumstances which we have related were far from singular; and every province in the empire could probably at some time have produced instances of equal, or even of greater, enormity. But that one such act should have been committed with impunity, shows how wretched was the condition of those countries that were subject to the yoke of the Roman government.

In tracing the course of events from the year 680 to 690, the only wars which will here demand our attention are those with Spartacus and with the pirates. The beginnings of both have been already noticed; and we have seen that in the year 680, Spartacus was carrying devastation over some of the finest districts of Italy. In the following year a part of his forces was destroyed by Q. Arrius, one of the prætors;<sup>41</sup> but he himself, intending to carry into execution his plan of escaping over the Alps into Germany, was encountered by Cn. Lentulus, one of the consuls, and gained a complete victory over him; after which he engaged and defeated another army, commanded by the other consul, L. Gellius, and the lately victorious prætor, Q. Arrius. All obstacles to his march being thus removed, he continued his course as far as Cisalpine Gaul, where he found himself again opposed by a third army, under the command of C. Cassius, one of the consuls of the former year, and Cn. Manlius, one of the prætors. He attacked this new enemy near Mutina, and gained a third complete victory; but it appears that these repeated successes intoxicated him or his followers, and instead of continuing their

Conclusion of the war  
with the Gladiators.  
U. C. 681.

<sup>41</sup> Livy, Epitom. XCVI. Plutarch, in Crasso, 9. Florus, III. 20.

march to the Alps, which they might have effected with perfect safety, they returned towards the south, dazzled by fantastic hopes of the conquest and plunder of Rome itself. But finding, probably, that any attempt upon the capital was impracticable, Spartacus passed the winter without venturing on any exploit of importance, maintaining his soldiers, we may suppose, upon the plunder of the country. Dissensions, meanwhile, crept in amongst his followers, which proved his ruin. The Gauls and Germans still wished to return to their own country,<sup>42</sup> and finding that they could not prevail on the majority of the army to join them, they separated from Spartacus, and commenced their march to the northward by

U.C. 682.

themselves. The senate, on their part, had committed the conduct of the war to M. Crassus, who was the prætor; and the new general, according to the practice which we have before noticed among the Roman commanders after a series of disasters, began his career by severe executions upon the soldiers of the defeated armies, and having thus taught them to dread him more than the enemy, he first assaulted the division of the Gauls and Germans, and put the greatest part of them to the sword. He then engaged with the main army under Spartacus, and having won a second victory, obliged him to retreat to the southern extremity of Italy. It was the wish of the gladiators to effect their passage into Sicily, in the hope of reviving the insurrections of the slaves, which had raged with such violence in that island not many years before. To accomplish their purpose, they entered into a treaty with some of the Cilician pirates, who chanced to be cruising in the neighbourhood; but the pirates are said to have first secured the money for their transport,<sup>43</sup> and then to have sailed away without fulfilling their part of the engagement. Spartacus then endeavoured to construct rafts on the Italian shore,<sup>44</sup> but the active pursuit of Crassus rendered this impracticable, and he was soon blockaded in a small peninsula near Rhegium, in which he had taken refuge. He effected his escape, however, by passing unobserved, in a dark and stormy night, through the enemy's lines, and with the troops that still remained to him, he directed his march towards the mountains of Petilia in Lucania.<sup>45</sup> Here the tidings of the return of Pompey from Spain, made both Crassus and Spartacus anxious to risk a battle before that dreaded general could take a part in the contest. Accordingly a desperate action ensued, in which Spartacus was defeated and slain, and his army dispersed or destroyed: but Pompey laid a claim to a share in the victory, because he fell in with some parties of fugitives who had escaped from the battle, and cut them to pieces. A considerable number of prisoners were

<sup>42</sup> Livy, Epitom. XCVII. Appian, de Bell. Civil. I. 118.

<sup>43</sup> Plutarch, in Crasso, 10.

<sup>44</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, V. 2.

<sup>45</sup> Plutarch, in Crasso, 11. Appian, I. 120.

taken, who were crucified along the road from Rome to Capua, and their bodies extended at intervals along the whole of the distance.

The war with the pirates was not concluded till four years afterwards; and some events occurred in the intervening period, which will require our notice. Pompey, although we have so often had occasion to mention his name, had as yet held no public magistracy, and was therefore precluded, by one of Sylla's laws, from offering himself as a candidate for the consulship. But the extraordinary circumstances attending his career, and the services he had rendered to the aristocratical party on so many occasions, disposed the senate to regard him with unusual favour; while, on the other hand, he had always possessed the affection of the people, who seem to have excepted him from the general aversion which they entertained towards the partisans of Sylla. At this time his return from Spain was looked forward to by the popular party with an anxious hope that he would become their leader, and enable them to repeal some of those laws which, as they thought, had so greatly encroached upon their liberties. Their chief wish was for the complete restoration of the tribunitian power; not only for its own sake, but as preparatory to effecting a reform in the constitution of the courts of justice.<sup>46</sup> The natural feelings of the people at large were shocked by the long series of crimes which their officers were continually committing in the provinces with impunity; and so long as the judges were taken only from among the men who had enjoyed or were expecting to succeed to the commands in which these excesses were perpetrated, it was not likely that the evil would be effectually remedied. Looking then upon Pompey as on a young man of popular qualities, who would be glad to acquire a claim to the lasting gratitude of the majority of his countrymen, the people welcomed his appearance with joy; and a decree of the senate being passed,<sup>47</sup> allowing him to be a candidate for the consulship, although he had not held the previous offices of quæstor and prætor, he was elected consul, together with M. Licinius Crassus, who had distinguished himself by his recent victory over the gladiators. Pompey did not disappoint the hopes which were formed of him. After his election,<sup>48</sup> when he made his first speech to the people before entering on his office, he promised to restore the tribunitian power, and to endeavour to remedy the grievances of the provinces, and the corrupt state of the courts of justice. His first declaration was received with murmurs of delight; but when he spoke of reforming the courts of justice, he was interrupted by a loud and general shout of ap-

<sup>46</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, actio. I. 15.

<sup>47</sup> Cicero, pro Lege Maniliâ, 21.

<sup>48</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, actio. I. 15.

Consulship of Pompey  
and Crassus.  
U. C. 683.



plause. Accordingly his consulship is memorable for the repeal of Sylla's laws respecting the tribuneship,<sup>49</sup> and the restoration of that office to its original privileges; and also for the law of L. Aurelius Cotta, one of the prætors, which was passed with the sanction of Pompey, and which provided that the judges should hereafter be chosen partly from among the senators, partly from the equestrian order, and partly from the *tribuni ærarii*.<sup>50</sup> These last, as far as appears, were plebeians, possessed of a certain property,<sup>51</sup> and on that account were appointed to act as agents for the payment of the legions, it being their office to receive the money for that purpose from the quæstors of the city, and to negotiate the business of transmitting it to the provincial quæstors, that it might by them be issued to the troops. The object of the law in adding this additional class to those of the senate and the knights, was to establish the courts of justice on a less exclusive system than before, while it endeavoured to obviate the evil of corruption amongst the judges, by providing that they should only be chosen from among men of competent fortune. At the conclusion of the year, which had been marked by such welcome acts, Pompey increased his popularity still more, by declaring that he would not accept the government of any province;<sup>52</sup> and accordingly, when his consulship was expired, he continued to reside at Rome as a private individual.

The extreme disorders of the times had filled men, according to the usual course of opinions, with the desire of seeing the arm of authority strengthened; and thus the censorial power,<sup>53</sup> which was, on many accounts, justly obnoxious, and which had been discontinued since the beginning of the late civil wars, was now revived agreeably to the general wish of the people. It was exercised with great severity by the censors, Cn. Lentulus and L. Gellius, who removed sixty-four persons from the lists of the senate;<sup>54</sup> and probably gratified the public feeling by stigmatizing so large a portion of the nobility. They are charged, indeed, with having listened too lightly to popular reports,<sup>55</sup> and with having affixed their censure on some characters without any sufficient knowledge of their demerits. Instances, too, occur of their disagreement with one another,<sup>56</sup> and of one of them disapproving and acting in opposition to the sentence of his colleague. But, on the whole, it is probable that the revival of the censorship was beneficial; and faulty as

The censorship revived after some years' discontinuance of it.

<sup>49</sup> Cicero, de Legibus, III. 11. Livy, Epitome, XCVII.

<sup>50</sup> Asconius, in Ciceronis pro Cornelio Oration. I. Cicero, ad Quintum Fratrem, II. epist. VI. Cicero, Philippica, i. 8.

<sup>51</sup> Facciolati Lexicon, in voce "Tribunus."

<sup>52</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 31.

<sup>53</sup> Cicero, in Q. Cæciliam, 3.

<sup>54</sup> Livy, Epitome, XCVIII.

<sup>55</sup> Cicero, pro Cluentio, 47.

<sup>56</sup> Cicero, pro Cluentio, 47.

were the old institutions of the commonwealth, they were far better than the general lawlessness, and tyranny, and corruption, which had of late superseded them.

The evils of the piratical war still continued; nor did the consuls of the two following years do any thing effectual to remove them. We have seen that the

The war with the pirates.  
U.C. 686.

experiment had been already tried of appointing one man, with supreme command, to act in every quarter of the Mediterranean; but the misconduct of the individual selected, M. Antonius, had disappointed the hopes which had been entertained of its success. There was, however, another person in the commonwealth, whose personal character was likely to add weight to whatever authority was intrusted to him, whose high military talents fitted him to combat with the enemies of the state, while his integrity and humanity would protect and conciliate its subjects and allies.

Accordingly, in the consulship of C. Piso and

U.C. 686.  
Law of A. Gabinus,  
granting an extraordinary commission to Pompey.

Manius Acilius Glabrio, Aulus Gabinus,<sup>57</sup> one of the tribunes, proposed to the people that the management of the war with the pirates should be committed to a single person for the term of three years; and that the power of the officer thus chosen should extend over every part of the empire, with authority to raise such supplies of men and money as he should think proper, and that he should have under him a certain number of lieutenants of senatorian rank, nominated by the senate. Gabinus was known to be a partisan of Pompey, and his character is said to have been bad; his own motives, therefore, in proposing this measure may well be suspected; but the measure itself, if stripped of some of its clauses, seems not to have been justly blameable. The people took it up with eagerness, and immediately fixed upon Pompey as the individual to be appointed to this extraordinary command. But the high aristocratical party now began to pause in lavishing upon him unusual honours. His late conduct, during his consulship, had shown that he was not insensible to the welfare of the people at large, nor indifferent to the charms of popularity. He could not, therefore, be considered as an undoubted supporter of the nobility on all occasions; and his personal renown seemed to raise him above their level. The motion of Gabinus was therefore generally opposed in the senate, and especially by Q. Catulus and Q. Hortensius;<sup>58</sup> and the negative of two of the tribunes, L. Trebellius and L. Roscius, was secured, according to the old practice of the aristocracy, to stop the progress of the law. Both parties, as usual, had at the very outset of the dispute resorted to violence: the person of Gabinus, we are told, was threatened in the senate when

<sup>57</sup> Cicero, *pro Lege Maniliâ*, 18. Dion Cassius, XXXVI. 10, edit. Leunclavii.

<sup>58</sup> Cicero, *pro Lege Maniliâ*, 18. Dion Cassius, 31. Velleius Paterculus, II. 11.

he first announced there his intended law; and the mob, in return, beset the senate-house, and having laid hold on C. Piso the consul, were with difficulty persuaded by Gabinus to let him go without injury. But a more mischievous step was taken by the proposer of the measure, when he proceeded to imitate the conduct of Tiberius Gracchus;<sup>59</sup> and finding Trebellius obstinate in his opposition, submitted to the assembly the question of his degradation from his office. Trebellius, however, was less resolute than Octavius; and before the eighteenth tribe was called on to vote, he withdrew his negative upon the law. Yet the people listened with respect to Q. Catulus, when he, having been expressly called upon by Gabinus to deliver his sentiments, endeavoured, in manly and temperate language, to prove to them the mischiefs of the intended measure. That he should have prevailed, indeed, was not to be expected, but the aristocracy disappointed any personal views which Gabinus might have had in procuring so extensive a command for Pompey; for although Pompey himself made application in his behalf, the senate refused to insert the name of Gabinus amongst those of the fifteen lieutenants who were to act under his orders.<sup>60</sup>

It was late in the year when the law of Gabinus was carried;<sup>61</sup> but Pompey employed the winter most diligently in making immense preparations for the war. He divided the care of the different parts of the Mediterranean among his several lieutenants, resolving himself to superintend their proceedings in every quarter, and to bestow his peculiar attention wherever it should be most needed. Before the winter was well ended, he put to sea, and deeming it important to open, as soon as possible, the communication between the capital and those countries from which it was usually supplied with corn, he sailed first to Sicily, thence crossed over to Africa, and having carefully scoured the coast there, he returned to Sardinia, stationing a sufficient fleet off the island, and strong guards on different points along the shore, as he had done in the two provinces which he had previously visited. These operations were completed, according to Plutarch,<sup>62</sup> in less than six weeks; and he then returned to Italy, where he remained for a short time, disposing his forces for the protection of both coasts of that peninsula, and sending squadrons and land forces to secure the provinces of Spain, Gaul, and Illyricum. The effect of all these measures was to hunt out the pirates from all their haunts in the western quarters of the Mediterranean, and to drive them gradually back to the seat of their main power in Cilicia. Thither, accordingly,

<sup>59</sup> Cicero, pro Cornelio, et Asconii Commentarius.

<sup>60</sup> Cicero, pro Lege Maniliâ, 19.

<sup>61</sup> Cicero, pro Lege Maniliâ, 12.

<sup>62</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 26.



Pompey sailed in pursuit of them;<sup>63</sup> and expecting to meet with a long and obstinate resistance in the strongholds on that coast, he provided himself with every thing necessary for a succession of sieges. But the fame of his personal character went before him; and the vigour of his military operations, combined with the humanity which he had shown to those of the pirates who first fell into his hands, at once deterred the enemy from continuing to oppose him, and encouraged them to trust themselves to his mercy. On his arrival off the coasts of Cilicia, fortresses and ships were successively surrendered to him without a blow. Nor did he deceive the confidence thus reposed in him; but after receiving the submissions of the pirates, after delivering the prisoners whom he found in their hands, and becoming master of all their resources, he took measures for reclaiming the inhabitants of those countries from that rude and wretched state of life which tempted them to robbery. The town of Soli, with some others in the neighbourhood,<sup>64</sup> had been lately deprived of their citizens by Tigranes, king of Armenia, who had transplanted them into Upper Asia, to people his new capital Tigranocerta. Into the towns thus deserted, Pompey brought some of the pirates who had surrendered, and settled them in a situation where they might naturally be led to taste and to value the blessings of peace and civilization; while he removed others into some of the districts in the interior,<sup>65</sup> which, perhaps, their own incursions, on former occasions, had reduced to desolation, and placed them where the constant sight of the sea might not tempt them to resume their former occupation of piracy. By this admirable conduct Pompey obtained a glory very different from that usually gained by Roman generals; and in seven weeks from the time of his leaving Italy for the East,<sup>66</sup> he had cleared every corner of the sea from the enemy, and had provided for the stability of his victory by those measures of wisdom and goodness which alone, in public as well as in private conduct, can permanently insure a happy result.

Whilst he was thus employed in Cilicia, he received a deputation from the people of Crete, who were at this time attacked by Q. Metellus, a Roman proconsul, and who, refusing to submit to him, were willing to trust themselves to the mercy of Pompey. It appears that M. Antonius,<sup>67</sup> amongst various other acts of injustice which had signalized his command, had commenced hostilities against the Cretans without any just provocation, from the mere ambition to conquer that famous island, which had thus long preserved its independence.

<sup>63</sup> Cicero, pro Lege Maniliâ, 12. Florus, III. 6. Appian, de Bello Mithridatico, 96.

<sup>65</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 32.

<sup>66</sup> Cicero, pro Lege Maniliâ, 12.

<sup>67</sup> Florus, III. 7. Asconius. in Ciceron. Divinat. in Cæcilium, 17.

18. Appian, 96.

War of Crete. Conquest of that island by Q. Metellus.

He failed, however, in his attempt, and had himself died whilst engaged in it. But the Romans, little solicitous about the origin of their wars, finding that one of their officers had engaged them in a quarrel with the Cretans, resolved to continue it; and Q. Metellus, who had been consul in the year 684, was sent, after his consulship, into Crete, as his province. He carried on his operations very successfully, and was looking forward to the speedy reduction of the whole island, when the Cretans, hearing of the extraordinary powers committed to Pompey, and of his merciful treatment to those whom he had conquered, sent a deputation to him in Pamphylia,<sup>68</sup> requesting him to receive their submission. Crete, with every other island in the Mediterranean, was included within the limits of Pompey's authority; he sent, therefore, to Metellus, desiring him to abstain from further hostilities, and at the same time despatched Octavius, an officer of his own, to receive the offered surrender. Metellus treated the message with contempt;<sup>69</sup> and when Octavius threw himself into the town of Lappa, trusting that his character as a Roman officer would protect the inhabitants, Metellus besieged and took the place, and put the Cilicians, who formed the garrison, to death. Octavius then employed a part of the force under Pompey's command, which L. Sisenna, one of his lieutenants, had brought over from Greece, in defending some of the remaining cities in Crete against Metellus; but being too weak to act with effect in their behalf, he was obliged at last to quit the island, and Metellus then soon completed the conquest of every part of it. His conduct was marked with the usual cruelty of the Romans, embittered, in this instance, by personal irritation at the preference which the Cretans had shown for Pompey. After the ordinary succession of executions and exactions,<sup>70</sup> Crete was reduced to the form of a Roman province, and Metellus arranged the affairs of the island as he thought proper. But the dispute which arose from his disobedience to Pompey's authority, was for some time an obstacle to his enjoying the honour of a triumph, till some years afterwards the senate, being more and more alienated from Pompey, thought proper to grant it.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Cicero. *pro Lege Maniliâ*, 12.

<sup>69</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVI. 8.

<sup>70</sup> Florus, III. 7. Livy, *Epitome*, C.

<sup>71</sup> The conduct of Pompey in this transaction is represented in a very different light by some modern writers, who have echoed the sentiments of Plutarch. They impute Pompey's behaviour to a mean desire of robbing Metellus of the glory of his conquest; and Plutarch dwells upon the extravagance of his actually supporting pirates against the power that was employed in punishing them. It is probable that

his vanity was flattered by the preference which the Cretans showed for him; but it is also likely that he, who was acting in Cilicia on such wise and merciful views, was eager to stop the cruelties of Metellus, and to give the Cretans, a people unjustly attacked by the Romans in the outset, the benefit of his own humane policy. Be this as it may, as Pompey's commission certainly extended to Crete, Metellus was guilty of an act of rebellion in resisting his authority, and became himself the robber and the outlaw, in persisting to attack

In this part of the history of the internal state of Rome, we must again remind the reader of the necessary imperfection of our account. The varying objects pursued by parties and by individuals at different times, can only be explained by so full a knowledge of the circumstances and characters as should either remove or account for that which apparently was inconsistent; and the same knowledge could alone enable us to judge correctly of the merits of several measures, which otherwise we might approve or condemn presumptuously and erroneously. Such a knowledge, however, cannot now be obtained, and the conjectures by which we have endeavoured to supply it we wish always to propose with a full consciousness of their uncertainty; for it may happen that some detached passage of an ancient author may have escaped our researches, which, had we known it, would have obliged us to alter, or to qualify, the theory which we had ventured to offer. With this caution we proceed to trace the disorders from which, henceforward, scarcely a year, during the existence of the commonwealth, was exempt.

Amongst the evils by which the state was beset, that of obtaining public offices by undue means, was at this time severely felt.<sup>72</sup> Like many other grievances, it was loudly complained of by the people, and some measure was called for that might remove or lessen it. C. Cornelius, who was one of the tribunes for the year 686, resolved to take up the subject, and proposed to bring in a law which should punish all bribery or undue influence in elections in the severest manner. The senate wishing the measure to proceed from themselves rather than from one of the tribunes, directed C. Calpurnius Piso, who was then consul, to prepare a law to the same effect with that of Cornelius, except that its penalties were somewhat less severe. Cornelius, on his side, regarded this interference of the senate with jealousy and suspicion, and the people, in general, violently opposed the law of Piso;<sup>73</sup> as if its only object were to battle and disappoint their wish for an effective check to the evil complained of. Some serious tumults appear to have arisen; and the consul, provoked at the opposition with which he met, called upon every citizen, who was a well-wisher to his country, to assist in procuring the enactment of the law. This was deemed equivalent to summoning them to support the consular authority by force, as was usual in cases of extreme danger; but even this appeal failing of its effect, and the election for the ensu-

Tribuneship of C. Cornelius.  
U. C. 686.

places protected by a superior officer of his government. It may be a question whether it was owing to the mildness of Pompey's temper, or to the strength of the aristocratical faction, that Metellus was never brought to trial and punished as he de-

served for his disobedience. Plutarch, in Pompeio, 29.

<sup>72</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVI. 18, edit. Leunclav.

<sup>73</sup> Cicero, pro Cornelio, I. Fragm.



ing year drawing on,<sup>74</sup> and being preceded by the usual scenes of violence and corruption during the canvass, the senate, by their own sole authority, decreed that the law should be enacted, and voted a guard to the consuls for the maintenance of the public peace. It had happened that Cornelius had been already disgusted with the conduct of the senate on another occasion during his tribuneship. The provinces and allies of the commonwealth were in the habit of often sending deputies to Rome,<sup>75</sup> sometimes to compliment the officers who had exercised the government amongst them, sometimes to complain of their tyranny, and sometimes to make interest among their friends at Rome, to procure some measure which they deemed expedient for their country. It often happened that the deputies were detained at Rome for a considerable period; and in the want of those resources which modern commerce has devised to facilitate the obtaining money in foreign countries, they were obliged to borrow the sums they wanted of wealthy individuals, and could only procure them by engaging to pay an exorbitant interest. Many of the provincial cities were thus burthened with a debt; and their creditors were not unfrequently employed under the proconsul or prætor of the province,<sup>76</sup> and were then ready to abet him in all his proceedings, in order to purchase the aid of his authority in recovering, by a summary process, the money that was due to them. The evils and the scandal of this system were equally great, and C. Cornelius had moved the senate to repress them, by forbidding any Roman citizen to lend money to the deputies of foreign states or countries. But the senate did not second his wishes; and this had already given him a handle for inveighing against that body in the assemblies of the people. When, therefore, they had again thwarted his projects of reform,<sup>77</sup> by substituting a weaker measure in the place of his proposed law against bribery, he determined to attack one of the privileges which they had gradually usurped in later times, and which had degenerated into an abuse of a flagrant nature. This was no other than a power of dispensing with the laws in particular cases: such, for example, as that of Pompey, who had been allowed, by a decree of the senate, to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship, before he had been prætor or quæstor, in direct violation of the existing laws. In former times, these dispensations, after they had passed the senate, had, in theory at least, if not in practice, required the sanction of the people to give them validity; but by degrees this sanction became so merely a form, that it was neglected altogether; and the usual expression in the decrees of the senate, "that the matter should be submit-

He proposes a law to regulate the dispensing power of the senate.

of a flagrant nature. This was no other than a power of dispensing with the laws in particular cases: such, for example, as that of Pompey, who had been allowed, by a decree of the senate, to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship, before he had been prætor or quæstor, in direct violation of the existing laws. In former times, these dispensations, after they had passed the senate, had, in theory at least, if not in practice, required the sanction of the people to give them validity; but by degrees this sanction became so merely a form, that it was neglected altogether; and the usual expression in the decrees of the senate, "that the matter should be submit-

<sup>74</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVI. 19.

<sup>76</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, I. 29.

<sup>75</sup> Asconius, Argumentum in Ciceron. pro Cornelio, I.

<sup>77</sup> Asconius, Argumentum in Ciceron. pro Cornelio, I.

ted to the approval of the people," was at last omitted as superfluous. This, perhaps, might have been a change well suited to the altered circumstances of the commonwealth; but it was accompanied by another which was nothing but an abuse. These dispensations were often granted by some of those members who took an active part in public business, when none but themselves were present in the senate-house; and thus the privilege was engrossed, in fact, by a few individuals of the highest rank and consideration, who availed themselves of it as of a valuable store of patronage. To correct this system, C. Cornelius proposed to revive and enforce the old principle of the constitution, that no one should be exempted from the observance of any law, except by the authority of the people. The aristocratical party, resisting this alteration, procured the negative of one of the tribunes, P. Servilius Globulus, to stop the progress of the proposed law. When, therefore, the day arrived on which the question was to come before the people, and the crier began to repeat aloud the terms of the law, with a clerk standing behind to prompt him, Globulus forbade both the clerk and the crier to proceed. It is negativ'd, but passed in an amended shape. Cornelius then took the law from the hands of the clerk and read it himself; not intending, as his friends declared, to propose it to the people in defiance of his colleague's negative, but merely to satisfy himself what the provisions were which he was not allowed to submit to their decision.<sup>78</sup> However, the consul, C. Piso, who witnessed the fact, interpreted it in a different manner, and loudly exclaimed that Cornelius was destroying the very essence of the tribunitian power. The multitude received this speech with violent expressions of displeasure; and when Piso sent his lictors to arrest some of those whom he observed as most outrageous, the lictors were resisted, their fasces were broken, and stones were thrown by some persons at the extremity of the crowd against the consul himself. But Cornelius, far from abetting these disorders, immediately broke up the assembly, and relinquished his law; and in order to show his willingness to conciliate his opponents, he brought it forward again without its obnoxious clauses, proposing merely that no dispensation from the laws should be considered as valid, unless two hundred members had been present in the senate when it was granted; and that although the sanction of the people was necessary as a point of form, yet that it should not be lawful for any tribune to negative a

<sup>78</sup> Cicero, in Vatinius, 2. *Defendebatur non recitandi causâ legisse sed recognoscendi.* It seems that persons were in the habit of reading aloud, even when reading by themselves alone, and thus the action of Cornelius might have had no other motive than that which his friends represented. In the Acts of the Apostles,

when the Ethiopian eunuch was reading the Scriptures to himself, as he travelled in his chariot, he evidently pronounced the words aloud; for it is said, that "Philip heard him reading;" whereas now, the natural expression would be, that a man reading alone in a carriage was *seen* reading.

dispensation which had regularly passed the senate.<sup>79</sup> In this amended state the law was too reasonable to be openly opposed ; but the leading senators were greatly offended that their particular influence should be at all diminished. Another salutary measure was brought forward and carried by Cornelius, which appears to have been entirely free from any factious design or tendency. It seems that the prætors had a large discretionary power in the administration of justice, and that it was usual for every prætor,<sup>80</sup> when he entered upon his office, to publish a proclamation, declaring, generally, the principles on which his decisions would be founded during the year. But from these principles the prætors continually deviated, alleging, we may suppose, that the equity of particular cases required them to depart from their general rule. Whatever may be the advantages or disadvantages of leaving much to the discretion of judges in well-ordered governments, and in a tolerably pure state of public morals, we may well conceive that with such officers as the Roman prætors are described to have been at this period, whatever discretionary power they possessed, was likely to be abused for their own purposes. Accordingly, Cornelius was listened to with general ap-

Law to abridge the discretionary power of the prætors.

probation, when he proposed a law obliging the prætors to conform in all cases to the principles

laid down in their own proclamations : and this measure also was carried without any open resistance. It is said that he brought forward several other laws during his tribuneship, which were negatived by some of his colleagues ; but the particulars are not

Cornelius is brought to trial.  
U.C. 687.

mentioned. The resentment, however, which his conduct had excited, broke out as soon as his year

of office was expired. He was accused of what, perhaps, may best be expressed in English by the general term of "high crimes

The trial broken off by a riot.

and misdemeanours ;<sup>81</sup> but on the day appointed

for the trial, P. Cassius, the prætor, who was to act as judge, did not appear ; and a mob assembling at the instigation, as it is said, of Manilius, one of the tribunes, assaulted the accusers, threatening them with death, if they did not abandon their accusation, and, finally, obliged them to fly for their lives. Cornelius appears to have had no share in the riot ; but his trial

He is tried again and acquitted.  
U. C. 688.

was again resumed in the year following, and he

was arraigned chiefly for having read aloud his law to the people, after another tribune had interposed his negative against it. On this point, Q. Catulus, Q. Hortensius, Q. Metellus Pius, and L. Lucullus, all came forward to give their evidence

<sup>79</sup> Ne quis in senatu legibus solveretur, nisi eo adfuissent, neve quis, quum solutus esset, intercederet, quum de eâ re ad populum ferretur. Asconius, Argumentum in Ciceron. pro Cornelio, I.

<sup>80</sup> Asconius, ubi supra. Conf. Dion Cass. XXXVI. 19.

<sup>81</sup> "De Majestate."



with a strong leaning against him; while, on the other hand, Cicero undertook his defence, and is said to have conducted it with the greatest ability in two speeches, of which, unfortunately, only a few fragments remain to us. His eloquence was received with bursts of applause from the assembled people,<sup>82</sup> and Cornelius, as far as we can learn, was acquitted.<sup>83</sup>

We have dwelt the longer upon the tribuneship and laws of Cornelius, because he appears to have been one of the few men of his time who advocated firmly and temperately the real interests of the people; and because the opposition which he met with from the aristocracy, shows how much they were inclined to resist not only the seditious, but even the fairest and most moderate supporters of reform, as if every thing were mischievous which did not tend to maintain their exclusive ascendancy. At a crisis such as that in which Rome was now placed, there were few popular leaders who were disposed to imitate the temper and judgment of Cornelius, and the treatment which he met with was likely still more to diminish the number. Men of real sense and patriotism were deterred from the task of redressing grievances, when they found that they could only succeed at the price of provoking a strong resistance on the part of the nobility, and, perhaps, dangerously exciting the passions of the multitude. But profligate adventurers, to whom sedition was in itself an end, instead of being regarded with aversion even as the means of obtaining some real good, were rejoiced to find the senate so selfish and short-sighted. They could then say, with more plausibility, that the aristocracy were habitually the enemies and oppressors of the poor, and that nothing could effectually benefit the commonwealth but a total revolution in the state of society.

In the year 687, C. Manilius, one of the tribunes,<sup>84</sup> proposed a renewal of one of the laws which had been passed during the triumph of the popular party under Carbo, and which had subsequently, we may suppose, been annulled by Sylla. By this law the freedmen had been enrolled promiscuously in all the tribes, instead of being confined, as before, to the four city tribes only. Manilius procured its revival, by proposing it suddenly at a late hour of the day, when the majority of respectable citizens had left the forum;<sup>85</sup> but it was instantly annulled by the senate, as having been illegally passed, and Manilius himself was induced to abandon any further mention of it.<sup>86</sup> But finding that he was still threatened with the resentment of the aristocracy, he resolved to secure himself by courting more

Tribuneship of C.  
Manilius.

<sup>82</sup> Quintilian, VIII. 3

<sup>83</sup> Quintilian, VI. 5—"ut Cornelium ipso confessionis fiducia eriperit."

<sup>84</sup> Asconius, in Cicero. Orat. pro Milone, 8; and Cicero, Orat. pro Cornelio, I.

<sup>85</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVI. 20, edit. Leunclav.

<sup>86</sup> Cicero, pro Cornelio, I. Fragm.

assiduously the favour of the people, and by gaining the protection of an individual, whose friends it might not be politic for the senate to attack. This is said to have been the origin of the famous Manilian law, by which it was proposed to commit the sole management of the war with Mithridates and Tigranes to Pompey, and to continue to him a large portion of the extraordinary powers with which he was already invested to act against the pirates. The aristocratical party, as may be supposed, warmly opposed the law, but it was supported by Cæsar and by Cicero, and finally carried.<sup>87</sup> It is probable that the mere military part of the command might have been safely intrusted to other hands; but with the peculiar temptations which the East offered to plunder and extortion, no officer could have been so well chosen as Pompey to retrieve the lost character of Roman magistrates, to conciliate the affections of the people of the provinces, and to administer his extensive command with justice, humanity, and wisdom. Nor would the measure, in strictness, have been dangerous, even as a precedent; for as Pompey was appointed to wield such unusual powers, on account of his tried moderation and integrity, there was little probability that officers would often be found with similar qualities to entitle them to a similar honour.

Towards the close of the year, P. Cornelius Sylla,<sup>88</sup> a relation of the late dictator, and P. Autronius, were elected consuls for the year following; but being shortly after accused of bribery, and being found guilty, the election was declared null and void, and L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus were chosen in their room. The famous L. Sergius Catilina had intended to offer himself as a candidate, but he was also at this time under accusation for misconduct in his late province of Africa,<sup>89</sup> and the senate resolved that under such circumstances he could not be elected. Irritated at his disappointment, he entered into a conspiracy with P. Autronius and Cn. Piso, a young man of noble birth, but needy and profligate: and it was resolved that the two consuls elect, Cotta and Manlius, should be murdered in the capitol on the first of January, when they would first enter upon their office; that Catiline and Autronius should then seize upon the consulship, and Piso should be sent with an army to secure the important province of Spain. The design was suspected, and its execution was, therefore, postponed to the fifth of February, when it was intended to assassinate not the consuls only, but a great number of the senators when assembled in the senate-house. Catiline, however, gave the signal for the massacre before the armed men, whom they had hired to execute

First conspiracy of Catiline, Autronius, and Piso.

<sup>87</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVI. 20.

<sup>88</sup> Sallust, Catilina, 18. Cicero, pro P. Syllâ, 17. 32.

<sup>89</sup> Q. Cicero, de Petitione Consulatus, 3. Cicero, Fragm. Orationis in Togâ Candidâ. Sallust, Catilina, 18.

it, were collected in sufficient force; and after this second disappointment the attempt was relinquished. But although this conspiracy is mentioned by Cicero and Sallust as a matter perfectly notorious, yet the authors of it were suffered to remain unquestioned, and Catiline ventured, two years afterwards, to offer himself again as a candidate for the highest office in the commonwealth.

The year which had begun with such alarming circumstances was marked in its progress with little that is re-  
U.C. 688.

markable. Catiline's trial for misconduct in his province came on, but he was acquitted: an escape which he is said to have owed to the corruption of his judges and of his accuser, P. Clodius,<sup>90</sup> who suffered himself to be bribed by Catiline to weaken purposely the force of his own accusation. At this time also M. Crassus and Q. Catulus were acting  
Censorship of M. Crassus and Q. Catulus.

as censors; but they were warmly at variance with each other on an important question relating to the inhabitants of Cisalpine Gaul to the north of the Po.<sup>91</sup> Crassus wished to extend the privileges of Roman citizenship to them as to all the other people within the Alps; but Catulus, according to the usual policy of the aristocratical party, was adverse to the measure, and both persisting in their respective opinions, resigned the censorship. It was thought by many that the streets of Rome were thronged

too much already, without swelling the number of  
The Papian law.  
citizens still more; and C. Papius,<sup>92</sup> one of the tribunes, proposed and carried a law, by which all foreigners were ordered to depart from Rome. This measure occasioned, probably, great inconvenience and distress to individuals, without any important benefits to the public peace. While the number of needy and profligate citizens was so great, and whilst such multitudes of slaves and gladiators were kept in the city, ready at all times to serve the purposes of riot and violence, it was of little avail to drive away the small proportion of free foreigners who might possibly have strengthened the cause of any sedition.

In the year following, L. Julius Cæsar and C. Marcius Figulus were chosen consuls. Catiline now was preparing to renew his canvass for the consulship, and to combine it with the plan of a second conspiracy.  
Beginnings of the second conspiracy of Catiline. U.C. 689.

This man must not be classed among the ordinary leaders of the popular party who opposed the authority of the senate; nor with such men as the Gracchi, who, although their meditated changes threatened to affect the tenure of property, yet proposed no more than that which an unrepealed law of the republic had already sanctioned, and who, with all their rashness and violence, would have shrunk from the thought of shedding the blood of the no-

<sup>90</sup> Cicero, de Haruspicum Responsis, 20.  
Fragm. Orat. in Togâ Candidâ.

<sup>92</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 33. Cicero, de Officiis, III. 11.

<sup>91</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 33.



blest of their countrymen. But Catiline, from his early youth, had been stained with crimes : in the proscription of Sylla he had distinguished himself by peculiar cruelty and rapacity,<sup>93</sup> and since that period the free indulgence of his profligate desires had reduced him to indigence, which he had again repaired by his extortions in his province, but which was returning upon him afresh from the usual tenour of his life in Rome. He was of a patrician family, and found many others amongst the nobility who resembled him in profligacy and neediness, and who were willing to share with him all his projects of revolution :<sup>94</sup> to these were added a multitude of worthless and desperate men from the lower classes of society. Whoever disliked a life of labour, whoever wished to be relieved from the restraints of law, whoever were involved in debts which they could only hope to wipe off by the murder of their creditors ; the envious, the rapacious, and the revengeful, who form so large a portion of mankind, all were ready to embrace a scheme which promised them plunder, and license, and bloodshed. Political circumstances added others to the number of the conspirators. The inhabitants of Tuscany,<sup>95</sup> who had been deprived of their lands by Sylla's confiscations, were eager to recover their property ; many of the soldiers who had received these lands as settlements had since become involved by their extravagance or ignorance of farming, and were anxious for a second civil war that they might receive fresh rewards ; whilst the children of those who had been proscribed, being excluded by Sylla's laws from all the honours of the commonwealth during their lives, were anxious to raise themselves from this state of degradation. It is mentioned, too, that a great many women of birth and talents,<sup>96</sup> but of infamous character, who, in the decay of their youthful beauty had no longer the means of indulging their extravagant habits, and had thus contracted considerable debts, were ready to use all their arts and influence in support of the conspiracy, and to assist it more directly by the use of poison or the dagger against their own husbands, whose rank or character might render them valuable friends to the constitution of their country.

The chief grievance on which Catiline dwelt when endeavouring to excite his associates to overthrow the existing government, was the monopoly of honours and riches amongst a few great families,<sup>97</sup> by which the bulk of the people were kept in a degraded and impoverished condition. This complaint was utterly groundless in his own mouth, or in the mouths of all the patrician conspirators of his party ; they certainly were not excluded by any aristocratical jealousy from office ; nor is it possible to

<sup>93</sup> Q. Cicero, de *Petitione Consulat.*

2, 3.

<sup>94</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 17.

<sup>95</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 28.

<sup>96</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 24.

<sup>97</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 20.

trace, in the lists of consuls and prætors about this period, any signs of a predominant influence exercised either by a few individuals, or by a few particular families of the aristocracy. But it is true that the nobility, as a body, were unwilling to see the highest posts in the commonwealth occupied by men of inferior birth and fortune, and wished to make the constitution too nearly resemble an oligarchy. The same C. Piso, who was consul when C. Cornelius was tribune, and who had been so strongly opposed to him, is said to have declared to the assembled people,<sup>98</sup> when, in his quality of consul, he was presiding at the election of consuls for the ensuing year, that if M. Palicanus, a man of humble origin and a popular tribune, should be chosen by the votes of the comitia, he never would return him as duly elected. This no doubt was an extreme case; yet the lists of consuls sufficiently prove that no one could easily attain that dignity, unless he were of noble blood and distinguished connexions; and at the time of Catiline's conspiracy, Cicero's pretensions to the consulship, for which he was now a candidate, were much discouraged by the high aristocratical party.<sup>99</sup> His character, however, Election of M. Cicero to the consulship. was so pure, his eloquence so popular, and his political principles so much inclined to support the senate, that these merits atoned for his want of family; and as Catiline's projects excited considerable alarm, the nobility perceived the necessity of having a consul able and willing to check them, and thus M. Cicero and C. Antonius were elected to fill the consulship for the following year.

Thus disappointed in his hopes of obtaining a place of lawful power, Catiline turned more zealously to his schemes of revolution; and whilst he was increasing the number of his partisans at Rome, he provided depôts of arms in different parts of Italy, and having found means to borrow money on his own credit and that of his friends, he transmitted it to Fæsulæ in Tuscany, to the care of one C. Manlius, who was to commence the intended insurrection in the country. At the same time he contrived repeated attempts against the life of Cicero; and in the midst of these designs he actually proposed to offer himself once more, at the ensuing elections, as a candidate for the consulship. His plans, however, had been constantly communicated to different persons, and from a very early period of the conspiracy had been denounced to the consul Cicero. One of his asso- The designs of Catiline communicated by Q. Curius to Cicero. ciates, Q. Curius,<sup>100</sup> had long been engaged in a criminal connexion with a woman of the name of Fulvia, who resembled, in the general profligacy and extravagance of her manner of living, those females whom we have already mentioned

<sup>98</sup> Valerius Maximus, III. 8.

<sup>99</sup> Sallust, Catilina, 23.

<sup>100</sup> Sallust, Catilina, 23.

among the accomplices of Catiline ; but who, from some feelings of humanity or private connexions, or some regard for the constitution of her country, was a stranger to all the plans of the conspirators. Curius was a man of good family, but indigent ; and having no means left of gratifying Fulvia's habits of expense, he found himself a less welcome visiter to her. But so soon as he had become acquainted with the views of Catiline, and had heard the splendid allurements which he held out to his partisans, he endeavoured to regain her favour by assuring her that in a short time he should be enabled to testify, in the amplest manner, the affection which he bore her. Some doubts expressed by Fulvia as to his sincerity, led him in his own defence to disclose the means to which he was looking for his enrichment ; and Fulvia, struck with horror at this communication, lost no time in making several persons acquainted with it. Afterwards, when Cicero became consul, he gained her over entirely to the interests of the commonwealth, and empowered her to make Curius such promises as tempted him to give regular information of all that passed at every meeting of the conspirators. Through this channel he also gained timely notice of the designs formed against his own life ; and took care to keep a strong body of his friends and dependents near his person, that they might defend him either from assassination or from open violence.

Such, however, were the imperfections of the Roman laws, that, with the fullest knowledge of the existence and constant progress of a treasonable conspiracy, the consul was obliged to wait for some overt act of rebellion before he could venture to act officially against the guilty. In the mean time the people in general were ignorant of the dangers which threatened the state ; and whilst Catiline was carrying on his projects of revolution in secret, several other matters of far less importance successively engaged the attention of the public. P. Servilius Rullus, one of the tribunes,<sup>101</sup> proposed to gratify the lower orders by a new agrarian law, framed on a scale far more extensive than any that had preceded it, and conferring powers unusually great on the commissioners by whom it was to be carried into effect. The general object of the law was to provide the poorer citizens with settlements of land in Italy ; and for this purpose a commission of ten persons was to be appointed, who should be enabled to sell national property of every description in every part of the empire, and, with the money arising from the sale, should purchase lands in Italy, and settle upon them colonies of Roman citizens. With something more than the usual arbitrary jurisdiction intrusted to commissions of this nature, the commissioners were constituted sole

Events of the early part of Cicero's consulship.

The agrarian law of P. Rullus.

<sup>101</sup> Cicero, *Orationes de Lege Agrariâ*.



judges of what was national property, and were authorized to fix the place of sale wherever they should think proper, a door being thus opened on the one hand to the greatest oppression, and on the other to the most shameful corruption. The commission, moreover, was to exist for five years, and during its existence none of its members could be subjected to trial for misconduct;<sup>102</sup> and two hundred of the equestrian order were to be chosen yearly as a sort of guard of honour, that the commissioners might travel every where with kingly state, and with more than kingly power; for it seems they were empowered every where to enforce their authority by punishments inflicted at their own discretion, while there was no other power which could protect from their jurisdiction, or reverse their sentences. It was proposed further that these sovereign magistrates should be chosen by a majority out of seventeen tribes only;<sup>103</sup> that the tribes who were to elect should be chosen by lot, and the comitia should be held by the framer of the law, that is, by Rullus himself; so that, according to the well-known influence exercised over the result of an election at Rome by the officer who presided at it and received the votes, Rullus might calculate fairly on being placed himself on the commission. This agrarian law is not the only instance in history in which a popular party has incurred general odium by attempting, under the colour of an extraordinary commission, to confer immoderate powers upon its own leaders. Cicero instantly perceived the advantage which was afforded him; and whilst he professed to approve the principle of agrarian laws, he attacked this particular measure as a mere device to invest ten persons with absolute sovereignty over the whole empire; and as Rullus had not acquired such an ascendancy over the people as to make them deaf to all insinuations against the purity of his views, the eloquence of Cicero was listened to with delight; one of the other tribunes promised to negative the law<sup>104</sup> if it should be submitted to the votes of the people; and Rullus, thus finding the popular feeling turned against him, abandoned his measure without further trial.

The aristocratical party were contented with having exposed the folly of their adversaries' scheme, and with having completely defeated their attempt. It is ever the case in party warfare that the public good is sacrificed, while the contending factions appeal almost exclusively to the most contemptible of all arguments, those which derive their force from the weakness or contradictions of an opponent. The proposed law of Rullus was extravagant and absurd; but was there no other practicable plan for the relief of the poor, which Cicero, the professed friend of the principle of agrarian laws, might have most seasonably devised, to remove

<sup>102</sup> Cicero, *Orationes de Lege Agrariâ*, II. 12, 13.

<sup>103</sup> Cicero, *de Lege Agrariâ*, II. 7, 8.

<sup>104</sup> Cicero, *pro Sullâ*, 23.

some portion of the really existing sufferings of the lower orders, and to conciliate their affections to the nobility at a period so fraught with danger to the commonwealth? When the temptations of the capital, and the distressed state of the country had drawn to Rome so large a portion of the free population of Italy; when Samnium and some of the neighbouring districts were almost a wilderness, and Etruria was overrun with banditti; above all, when a conspiracy was known to exist which struck at the very foundation of the present order of things, sound policy surely demanded that the chief magistrates of the state should themselves propose some expedient, which, by relieving the indigent, and restoring Italy in general to a more healthful condition, might deprive the enemies of society of their principal resources. A severe but necessary tax, levied upon all establishments of slaves above a certain number, might have gradually resupplied the country with a population of free labourers; or, as the agrarian laws were the ordinary method of providing for the poor at Rome, the product of such a tax might have been employed in the purchase or rent of lands to be distributed among the poorer citizens; and such a step, abhorrent as it may be to our notions, might perhaps have alleviated the public distresses, and certainly would have enabled the nobility to resist the attacks of seditious adventurers with a greater consciousness of innocence, and a better claim to the support of the people at large.

Proposal for the repeal of the law of Sylla respecting the children of the proscribed.

After the defeat of the proposed agrarian law, an attempt was made by some of the popular party to procure the restoration of the children of those whom Sylla had proscribed to the common rights and dignities of citizens, by rendering them eligible to public offices. On this occasion Cicero again displayed his eloquence with success in opposing the law. He alleged that the existing order of things was so much built upon the laws of Sylla,<sup>105</sup> that the sons of those who had suffered under his government could not, without danger, be relieved from the disabilities under which they laboured. Of the justice of this argument we have no adequate means of judging; it admitted, at least, that the exclusion of so many innocent individuals was an evil; but whether their influence, could they have exerted it, would have tended to reform or to revolutionize the actual order of things, we cannot easily determine. From the general profligacy of the times, however, we may conjecture that a depressed party, invested suddenly with power, was not likely to exercise it with moderation, or with any regard to the public welfare.

The next proceeding of the popular party was more clearly

<sup>105</sup> Quintilian, XI. 1, § 85.

deserving of censure. It has been already noticed, that C. Cæsar had, on one or two occasions, expressed with some ostentation his affection for the party of Marius, and he now attempted to vindicate the memory of L. Saturninus, who, having been for a long time the associate of Marius, was afterwards opposed by him as the reluctant instrument of the senate, and having been taken in actual rebellion, had been murdered by the armed citizens, who broke into his place of confinement. Cæsar,<sup>106</sup> it is said, instigated T. Altius Labienus, at this time one of the tribunes, and afterwards distinguished in Gaul as one of Cæsar's lieutenants, and in the civil war as a partisan of Pompey, to accuse C. Rabirius, an aged senator, as the perpetrator of this murder. The cause was first tried before L. Cæsar and C. Cæsar,<sup>107</sup> who were appointed by lot to act as special commissioners in this case, by virtue of the prætor's order; and the accused was arraigned according to the old law of murder, by which, if he had been found guilty, he would have been condemned to be hanged. But this mode of proceeding was stopped by Rabirius appealing to the people, or by the interference of Cicero as consul,<sup>108</sup> as his speech seems to imply, and his procuring the removal of the cause before another tribunal. The people, however, it is said, were likely to condemn the accused, when Q. Metellus Celer,<sup>109</sup> one of the prætors, obliged the meeting to break up by tearing down the ensign, which was always flying on the Janiculum whilst the people were assembled, and without which, according to ancient custom, they could not lawfully continue their deliberations. In this manner Rabirius escaped, for Labienus or his instigators did not think proper to bring forward the business again, whether despairing of again finding the people equally disposed to condemn the accused, or whether the progress of the conspiracy of Catiline began now to turn men's attention more entirely to a different subject.

The comitia for the election of consuls were on the point of being held, when Cicero acquainted the senate with some of the facts of which he was in possession relative to the conspiracy, and persuaded them to order the postponement of the elections, that the state of affairs might previously undergo a full discussion.<sup>110</sup> On the following day, when the senators were assembled, Cicero taxed Catiline openly with the criminal designs imputed to him, and called on him to justify himself. But when he had said in reply, that there were two parties in the commonwealth, the one weak both in its head and its body, the other strong in body but headless, and that he was resolved to supply it with a head, the senate expressed their indignation by a general murmur, and the

<sup>106</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 12.

<sup>107</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 42.

<sup>108</sup> Cicero, pro Rabirio, 4, 5.

<sup>109</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 42.

<sup>110</sup> Cicero, pro L. Murænâ, 25.



decree, usual in all dangerous emergencies,<sup>111</sup> was passed, "That the consuls should provide for the safety of the republic." Cicero, however, did not avail himself as yet of the ample powers thus committed to him; he contented himself with defending his own person on the day of the election, by going down to the Campus Martius attended by a strong escort,<sup>112</sup> and having seen Catiline once more rejected, and D. Junius Silanus and L. Muræna chosen consuls, he continued to learn all Catiline's plans from the information of Curius, and to take the proper precautions to obviate every attempt that might be made of a nature directly hostile.

In the mean time, C. Manlius, according to the instructions of Catiline, had taken up arms in Etruria,<sup>113</sup> and two others of the conspirators had been despatched to excite insurrections in Picenum and Apulia. To oppose these movements, two of the prætors and two proconsuls, who had lately returned from their provinces, and who, having claimed the honour of a triumph, were both waiting, with their armies not yet disbanded, in the neighbourhood of Rome, were sent into the different quarters where the danger was most threatening, while guards were stationed in different parts of Rome itself, and the public mind was studiously alarmed with reports of the atrocious designs of the conspirators. Catiline finding himself the object of universal suspicion, offered successively to commit himself to the custody of several individuals of distinction, and amongst others even to that of the consul;<sup>114</sup> but no one would undertake such a charge, Cicero being anxious to oblige him to leave Rome, and the others being probably unwilling to incur so great a responsibility, and supposing, perhaps, that Catiline's accomplices in the city were numerous enough to effect his rescue, and that they who held him in custody would be the first marked out for destruction. It appears that Cicero having full information of the extent of the conspiracy, and knowing that there were many persons engaged in it whom he could not venture to punish without driving them first into some act of open treason, was desirous that it should not merely be checked for a time, and allowed again to prosecute its plans in secret, so as to keep the country in perpetual alarm, but that it should be brought at once to its execution; for he trusted to the precautions which he had taken to insure the commonwealth from any danger which the explosion might occasion; and after it had taken place he knew that the consular authority might be freely used to deliver society effectually from those who had so long been plotting against it.

The measures of Catiline were greatly embarrassed by this policy; his accomplices in Rome were restrained and awed by the

<sup>111</sup> Cicero, in *Catilinam*, I. 2.

<sup>112</sup> Cicero, pro *Murænâ*, 26.

<sup>113</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 27. 30.

<sup>114</sup> Cicero, in *Catilinam*, I. 8.

vigilance of the government, and could not be roused to action ; so that he resolved to put himself at the head of the forces already in arms in Etruria, and try his fortune in the field. He called together his principal associates,<sup>115</sup> late at night, at the house of M. Porcius Læcæ : he complained of their inactivity ; proposed to them in greater detail his plans for the general insurrection in the country, and declared his own intention of joining the army of C. Manlius without delay, if Cicero could by any means be removed before his departure. Upon this two Roman knights,<sup>116</sup> C. Cornelius and L. Vargunteius, engaged to go early the next morning to the consul's house, to procure an interview with him, and to assassinate him in his own chamber. But Curius did not fail to give information as usual of what had been undertaken ; and when the intended assassins arrived at Cicero's doors they were refused admittance. Notwithstanding this disappointment, there were other parts of the conspirators' plans which might be avoided with greater difficulty, and Cicero assembled the senate on the following day, the eighth of November, in the Temple of Jupiter Stator, on the ascent of the Palatine hill, a place of unusual security from its situation and the nature of its buildings. It was on this occasion that Catiline ventured to appear in the senate to defend himself against the imputations under which he laboured, and was attacked by Cicero in a vehement invective, in which he was told instantly to leave Rome, where all his treasons were now fully known, and would be no longer tolerated. His attempted excuses were drowned by a general cry of indignation ; he at once left the senate, and on the very same night quitted the city,<sup>117</sup> and hastened to join his associate Manlius in Tuscany. But on his way thither he wrote letters to several persons of high rank at Rome, still asserting his innocence, and saying that, oppressed as he was by the violence of his enemies, he was going to retire to Marseilles, and there live in banishment, rather than involve his country, on his account, in civil disorders. In the want of those regular channels of information by which events are so speedily and so surely known in our days from one end of a country to the other, this statement might continuè to be believed by a large portion of the people, long after Catiline was really at the head of an insurgent army, and might furnish his partisans with grounds for attacking the administration of Cicero, and possibly might establish a common point on which the leaders of the regular popular party would not refuse to co-operate with them.

Cicero denounces Catiline in the senate, and forces him to leave Rome and join his army in Etruria.

After leaving Rome, he waited for a short time in the neighbourhood of Arretium,<sup>118</sup> in order to organize the insurrection in

<sup>115</sup> Cicero, in *Catilinam*, I. 4. Sallust, *Catilina*, 27.

<sup>117</sup> Cicero, II. 1. Sallust, *Catilina*, 32.

<sup>118</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 36. 44. 56.

<sup>116</sup> Cicero, in *Catilinam*, I. 4.

that quarter, and then proceeded to the camp of Manlius near Fæsulæ, attended by his lictors, as if he were a lawful magistrate of the commonwealth. The better to maintain this character, he would not receive any of the slaves who offered to enlist in his army; although his agents in Apulia and Picenum were at this very time endeavouring to rekindle the war of Spartacus, by exciting the slaves every where to assert their freedom and rise in arms. But still his forces were so considerable, that the senate, after declaring him and Manlius public enemies, directed the consuls to levy soldiers, and, intrusting Cicero with the care of the city, commissioned his colleague, C. Antonius, to oppose Catiline in the field. The situation of Antonius on this occasion, greatly resembled that of Marius, when he was ordered by the senate to act against his old associate, L. Saturninus. We have already mentioned that Antonius had been accused and condemned, some years before, for corruption and oppression in Greece, and that he had been expelled from the senate by the censors, L. Gellius and Cn. Lentulus, in the year of Rome 683. From that time the profligacy of his life had connected him with Catiline, and other persons of similar character; and in the elections of the preceding year, Catiline had coalesced with him against the pretensions of Cicero; and his success was regarded by Catiline as a most favourable circumstance, even in the midst of his own disappointment.<sup>119</sup> Worthless as Antonius personally was, it was of importance to conciliate him to the cause of the existing constitution, whilst he held the office of consul; lest, if he openly quarrelled with his colleague, he might lend the sanction of the consular name, as Ciinna had done before him, to the projects of the enemies of the government. Cicero, therefore, when the consuls, as usual, were to receive by lot the care of some province for the year following their consulship, gave up to Antonius the government of Macedonia,<sup>120</sup> which had fallen to him, and was contented to receive in exchange the less desirable province of Gaul; and by this attention, and by avoiding every thing that could give him offence, he induced Antonius to rest contented with the existing state of affairs, and kept him so distant from the conspiracy, that he could with the less scruple obey the senate in acting against it. The departure of Catiline had still left, however, a dangerous band of conspirators within the walls of Rome,<sup>121</sup> who were, agreeably to his instructions, to set fire to the city in several places on a particular day, and to murder the principal magistrates and supporters of the government during the confusion; while Catiline was to be ready with his army, in the neigh-

<sup>119</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 21. 26. Asconii  
Argumentum in Ciceron. Orat. Fragm.  
in *Togâ Candidâ*.

<sup>120</sup> Cicero, in *L. Pisonem*, 2. Plutarch,  
in *Cicerone*, 12.

<sup>121</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 39. 43.



bourhood, to cut off all who should escape the massacre and attempt to fly from Rome, and thus should put the finishing stroke to the revolution. Of the conspirators left behind in the capital, the principal were P. Lentulus Sura, who had been consul in the year 682, and had been expelled from the senate, like C. Antonius, by the censors, in the year following, C. Cethegus, a man also of noble family, but of infamous life, L. Cassius Longinus, P. Autronius, L. Statilius, and P. Gabinius. Many other persons were connected with these: and it is said that a very large proportion of the young nobility favoured their views, and were ready to assist them by murdering their own parents, when the time fixed for the massacre should arrive. In the meantime, attempts were made to throw upon Cicero the odium of the war which had just broken out; and the signal for the execution of the plot was to be given by one of their party, L. Bestia, who was then tribune of the people, and who was to inveigh against the tyranny of the consul in a speech to be delivered in the forum. But the whole conspiracy was timely and completely discovered in a very remarkable manner. There happened to be at Rome some deputies from the Allobroges, a people of Transalpine Gaul,<sup>122</sup> who had been some years before added to the Roman dominions, and who had suffered as usual from the oppression of the provincial magistrates. About six or seven years before this period, they had especially complained of the exactions of Marius Fontenius, and he had been brought to trial on their accusation; and although he was warmly defended by Cicero, yet it was admitted that his government had been rigid, and that the Allobroges were now in a state of great distress, and had incurred a heavy public debt. Their deputies were sent to Rome, in the hopes of obtaining some relief from the senate; but finding that they had little to expect from this body, they were, after a time, reduced to despair, when one of the conspirators, who had formerly traded in Gaul, and was personally known to most of the chiefs of the country, addressed them in the forum, and, learning the hopeless state of their affairs, proposed to them, by degrees, that they should join in the conspiracy, telling them its views, and the names of some of the principal members, and promising, if they could excite their countrymen to take up arms against the republic, that they should be perfectly freed from all their difficulties. The offer was tempting; but, on the other hand, the knowledge of so important a secret might enable them to purchase, without any hazard, an ample reward from the government; and they accordingly disclosed the whole transaction to Q. Fabius Sanga, to whom their countrymen usually applied to further their interests when they had any business at Rome, and who lost no time in laying the information

Attempt to corrupt  
the ambassadors of  
the Allobroges.

<sup>122</sup> Cicero, in *Catilinam*, III. 2. Sallust, 40.

before Cicero. The consul directed the Allobroges to keep up their correspondence with the conspirators, and to feign compliance with their wishes, that they might be able, at the proper time, to furnish him with some written proofs of the reality of the plot; for which purpose, they were instructed to demand that the terms of their agreement should be given them in writing, with the signatures of the principal conspirators, in order that their countrymen in Gaul might know on whom they were to depend. Not only was this request complied with, but the deputies were further desired by Lentulus to visit the camp of Catiline on their way home, and there to confirm with him the alliance which they had contracted with his associates; and T. Volturtius, a citizen of Croton, who was to accompany them, was charged by Lentulus with a letter, without any signature, which he was to deliver to Catiline. All these things being duly reported to Cicero, he ordered two of the prætors to keep guard on the opposite sides of the Milvian bridge on the night fixed for the departure of the deputies.<sup>123</sup>

Arrest of the ambassadors and of the chief conspirators. The train of the Allobroges, accompanied by Volturtius, arrived at the bridge about two or three hours after midnight, on the morning of the third of December: they were instantly stopped by the guards, and, on the appearance of the prætors, surrendered themselves; all their papers were secured, and themselves, together with Volturtius, were taken to Cicero's house a little before sunrise. Messages were immediately despatched to Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and Gabinius, to require their attendance; and they all without any suspicion obeyed the summons. The senate was ordered to meet in the temple of Concord; and there Volturtius, the Allobroges, and the arrested conspirators were successively brought forward. The first was encouraged to declare freely all that he knew; and upon his direct evidence, together with that of the Allobroges, confirmed by their own seals and handwriting, the conspirators either confessed their crime, or did not any longer venture to deny it. They were then committed to custody, Lentulus having first resigned the office of prætor with which he was invested.

Scarcely was the meeting of the senate dissolved, when Cicero assembled the people in the forum, and there related to them, in detail, the objects of the conspiracy, and the manner in which it had been fully detected. With whatever disappointment Feeling of the populace on the discovery of the plot. the mere profligate rabble might have heard this statement, yet the majority of the people, even of those who on ordinary occasions opposed the aristocratical interest, regarded the wickedness of the plot with horror, and felt thankful to Cicero, whose ability had discovered and destroyed it. Every one was incensed at the project of setting fire to the city,<sup>124</sup> which would

<sup>123</sup> Cicero, in *Catilinam*, III. 2.

<sup>124</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 48.

have been as ruinous to the poor as to the rich ; and, for a moment, all, but the most unprincipled of the community, sympathized with each other in the preservation of the commonwealth. A slight attempt was made by some of the dependents of Lentulus to effect his rescue, and to call on the slaves to join them, and to hire the most notorious leaders of the lower people to excite a disturbance amongst them. But Cicero's vigilance baffled these designs ; and the fate of the conspirators depended on the decision of the senate, which assembled on the fifth of December, to determine on their punishment.

D. Junius Silanus, who was at this time consul elect, gave it as his opinion that the conspirators should be put to death ; but C. Cæsar, not pretending to extenuate their guilt, but insisting only that death was by the constitution of Rome an illegal punishment, proposed that their property should be confiscated, and that they should be condemned to perpetual imprisonment in some of the free towns of Italy. His speech is said to have produced a considerable impression ; but Q. Catulus, L. Lucullus, C. Piso, and Cicero himself,<sup>125</sup> with most of the senators of consular dignity, still supported the opinion of Silanus. It was reserved, however, for M. Porcius Cato to move the resolution which was finally carried ; and in which he combined the highest panegyrics on the conduct of the consul, with a vote that the conspirators should be put to death, according to the ancient customs of the republic, as having been guilty of manifest treason. In compliance with this decree of the senate, Cicero ordered Lentulus and his accomplices to be carried, on the very same evening, to a secret under-ground cell in the public prison, where they were successively strangled.

On no occasion were the faults of the Roman constitution more mischievously displayed than in these proceedings. So ill framed were the laws, that the worst criminals could not legally receive that punishment which our natural sense of justice, no less than the maxims of state policy, declares to be the only adequate chastisement of the worst kinds of wickedness. Thus, although justice and the public safety alike demanded the execution of the conspirators, yet these claims could only be satisfied by an assumption on the part of the senate of a power to dispense with the laws, and by another appeal to abstract principles in order to justify a departure from the ordinances of the existing constitution. The advantage thus offered to a popular leader was not lost upon Cæsar : he had now obtained a point on which the sincere but ill-judging friends of liberty might be induced to sympathize with the vilest supporters of sedition, and which might effectually terminate that short-lived

Debate on the punishment of the conspirators.

Reflections on their execution.

<sup>125</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum Epistolar. XII. epist. XXI.



harmony between honest men of all parties, which had been produced by the first discovery of the conspiracy. It mattered nothing that no traces of a sanguinary or tyrannical spirit were to be found in Cicero's proceedings; that after the execution of five persons, all guilty of the most heinous crime on the clearest evidence, the justice of the government was satisfied; and that its triumph was not stained, as in the case of the Gracchi, by any after acts of unwarrantable and disgraceful cruelty. Cæsar's ambition required that he should excite the resentment of the people against the senate; and here, as on every other occasion, he sacrificed to it the welfare of his country.

The fate of Catiline himself<sup>126</sup> soon followed the punishment of his associates.<sup>127</sup> His force had at one period amounted nearly to twelve thousand men, but of these not more than a fourth part were regularly armed, so that he did not choose to venture a battle; but having occupied the line of the Apennines, he manœuvred his troops with considerable ability; sometimes threatening to march towards Rome, and at other times to retreat into Gaul, and never allowing the enemy to bring him to action. But the news of the detection of his accomplices in the city soon caused a considerable desertion amongst his followers, and despairing of success from any offensive operations, he fell back upon the neighbourhood of Pistorium by forced marches, through moun-

<sup>126</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, 56, et seq.

<sup>127</sup> The conspiracy of Catiline, as described by Sallust and Cicero, is considered by some persons to contain many improbabilities. It is incredible, say they, that a man like Catiline, unconnected with the regular popular party, should have seriously hoped to effect a revolution; nor can it be believed that any of the nobility should have submitted themselves to the guidance of such a leader. Even if he had succeeded in setting fire to the city and destroying the principal senators, the prætor of the nearest province would presently have marched against him, and would have crushed him with little difficulty. But they who argue thus, forget that Catiline was a patrician of noble family; that he had been prætor; and that he was considered by Cicero as his most dangerous competitor for the consulship, when he was a candidate for that office. He had been known in Sylla's proscriptions as a man who scrupled at nothing; and there was a large party in Rome to whom such a character was the greatest recommendation, and who would gladly follow any one who possessed it. That this party was inconsiderable in point of political power is true; and they accordingly hoped to effect

their designs by fire and assassination, rather than by open force. But if Catiline could have once made himself master of the city, no one can doubt but that he would have found a majority in the comitia ready, either from fear or sympathy in his projects, to elect him consul or dictator; and when thus invested with the title of a legal magistrate, and in possession of the seat of government, he would probably have persuaded a very great part of the community to remain neutral, while his own active supporters, the profligate young nobility, the needy plebeians, the discontented Italian allies, and the restless veterans of Sylla's armies, would have enabled him to defy the efforts of any neighbouring prætor who might have been disposed to attack him. He might have held the government as easily as Cinna and Carbo had done; and although Pompey might have imitated successfully the conduct of Sylla, in returning from Asia to revenge the cause of the aristocracy, yet the chance of resisting him was not so hopeless as to dismay a set of desperate conspirators, who, in their calculations, would have been well contented if the probability of their failure was only a little greater than that of their success.

tain roads, hoping that thence he might effect his escape into Gaul without being discovered. But finding that his retreat was cut off by the army of the prætor, Q. Metellus Celer, who suspecting his designs had hastened to place himself on his proposed line of march, Catiline altered his plans, and prepared to fight with the consul C. Antonius, who, with a considerable force, had been following him during his retreat. It happened that Antonius either was, or pretended to be, indisposed, so that the command devolved on M. Petreius his lieutenant, an experienced soldier, assisted by P. Sextius,<sup>128</sup> one of the quæstors, who was warmly attached to Cicero, and was heartily desirous of destroying the remains of the conspiracy. Accordingly the army of the republic did its duty, and the rebels, after a desperate resistance, were totally defeated. C. Manlius, Catiline's lieutenant, was killed before the battle was decided, and Catiline himself, when he saw that the rout of his followers was complete, is said to have rushed into the ranks of the enemy, and there to have been slain. Nothing has been recorded of him to lessen the abhorrence which the general wickedness of his life, and the peculiar atrocity of his designs against his country, have justly deserved, and have ever abundantly met with.

Defeat and death of Catiline.

From this time forwards the correspondence of Cicero with his different friends, furnishes us with so many materials for our history, that it becomes necessary, unless we would greatly exceed our limits, to notice only such as are of the greatest importance. When C. Cæsar endeavoured to save the accomplices of Catiline from their deserved fate, he was already prætor elect for the following year; and M. Cato, who so successfully opposed him, was in like manner about to enter on the office of tribune of the people. Of the family and early life of the former we have already spoken; and as we have now mentioned the name of his great opponent, we may take this opportunity of giving a slight sketch of his extraction also, and of the beginnings of his public career. M. Porcius Cato was the great grandson of Cato the censor, and the son of M. Cato and Livia, the sister of M. Livius Drusus, and the divorced wife of Q. Servilius Cæpio, who perished in the war with the Italian allies. His father died when he was a child, and he was brought up in the house of his uncle M. Drusus,<sup>129</sup> where he is said to have given very early proofs of that resolute and even stubborn character which marked him through life. After the assassination of Drusus, he appears to have passed his time under the care of a tutor named Sarpædon; and his half brother Q. Cæpio, after having lost his father, seems to have been placed in the same hands. The lively affection which Cato entertained for his brother was a

Cæsar prætor, Cato tribune. Account of the early life of Cato. U. C. 691.

<sup>128</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 5.

<sup>129</sup> Plutarch. in Catone, 1, &c.

striking contrast to the general coldness of his nature, and even after his constitutional apathy had been confirmed by the precepts of the Stoic philosophy, he gave vent to the most violent expressions of grief at the death of Cæpio, and celebrated his funeral with a sumptuousness which was most opposite to his usual habits. But with this single sacrifice to the common feelings of humanity, he was in other respects, even in his early youth, so stern and reserved, that he is said rarely to have been seen to laugh, and so determined not to follow the vicious or absurd fashions of his age, that he ran into the opposite extreme of an indecent singularity, choosing in his dress the colour that was most unusual, and walking about with his personal appearance so neglected as to be utterly unworthy of his rank in the commonwealth.<sup>130</sup> Yet he was not without feelings of anger, which he displayed towards Q. Cæcilius Metellus Scipio,<sup>131</sup> who had married the lady to whom he himself was engaged, and whom he attacked in consequence in a violently satirical poem, after he was persuaded by his friends to abandon his intention of obtaining redress in a court of law. He was carefully just in his conduct; and it is mentioned of him, that when he was travelling through Asia as a private individual,<sup>132</sup> he contented himself often with the entertainment of common inns, instead of taxing the hospitality of the principal inhabitants, which, it seems, was the usual practice of the Roman nobility in their journeys through the provinces. When the inns could not accommodate him, he applied to the magistrates to receive him, but as he used no imperious or threatening language, he frequently was treated with neglect. This is an odious picture of the ordinary tyranny of the Roman government, and the debasement of character which such a system produced among those who suffered from it; nay, even Cato himself is said to have been much offended when he was not treated with attention, and to have warned the magistrates that other Romans would not imitate his forbearance, but would exact by force a better reception. It is a wretched state of society when good men are proud of themselves merely for abstaining from acts of positive injustice.

In preparing himself to enter upon his political career at Rome, Cato had resolved to support the ancient constitution of his country, and to resist what he regarded as the growing corruptions of the age in which he lived. From the pursuit of this object he was never diverted by any considerations of friendship, interest, or fear; but he did not follow it always with a cool and enlightened judgment; and his personal animosities and prejudices sometimes influenced him, insensibly perhaps to himself, in

<sup>130</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, 6.

<sup>131</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, 7.

<sup>132</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, 12.



opposing with excessive vehemence those whom he deemed the enemies of the commonwealth. The debate concerning the accomplices of Catiline was well calculated to display the predominant features of Cato's character: his civil courage and contempt of popularity in braving the odium which was likely, owing to Cæsar's speech, to fall upon those who voted for the death of the criminals; his zealous support of the old authority of the senate, and his abhorrence of those who sought to overturn it. But a very short time before he had given a proof of his zeal, the wisdom of which was more questionable, in joining to prosecute L. Muræna, one of the consuls elect, for bribery during his election, a charge which he could not substantiate, and which was likely to divide unseasonably the friends of the constitution at a moment when their close union was so necessary. On the whole, however, the senate looked forward to his services with sanguine hope during the ensuing year; and the support of one firm tribune was particularly needed, as Q. Metellus Nepos, a friend of Pompey and a warm enemy of the aristocracy, who was one of Cato's colleagues in the tribuneship, was expected to employ his year of office in promoting measures most unwelcome to the party of the senate.

The first measure which was adopted, on Cato's recommendation, displayed a more politic and conciliating temper than he usually appeared to possess. Already the poorest classes of the people began to murmur at the execution of Catiline's accomplices, and to complain that the senate was Proceedings of Q. Metellus Nepos against the aristocracy. prompt enough in repressing seditions, but never bestowed a thought on relieving the sufferings of the poorer citizens. Q. Metellus was disposed to support these discontents by charging Cicero with the illegal murder of Roman citizens without trial; and C. Cæsar, the idol of the populace, was ready to unite his intrigues and his eloquence to further the same purposes. Cato, therefore, advised the senate to pass a corn law,<sup>133</sup> by which the sum of 1250 talents was to be annually employed in purchasing corn for the maintenance of the poor; and the thankfulness with which this bounty was received ought to have encouraged the senate to devote their attention seriously to the discovery of some plan for the permanent improvement of the condition of the lower classes of the community. As for the attacks made by Metellus upon Cicero's consulship, they had no other immediate effect than to draw from the senate some strong resolutions,<sup>134</sup> by which every person who should presume to question the justice of the late executions was declared an enemy to his country. Metellus after this did not venture to proceed any further; but he proposed a law for the

<sup>133</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, 26; in Cæ-  
sare, 8.

<sup>134</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 49. edit.  
Leunclav.

recall of Pompey with his army, to remedy the existing grievances of the state; and when this measure was frustrated by the opposition of Cato, he left Rome, and withdrew to Pompey's army,<sup>135</sup> as if apprehending personal danger from the violence of his opponents. At the same time C. Cæsar was suspended by a decree of the senate from the discharge of his office as prætor;<sup>136</sup> but on his submitting to their authority, and refusing the proffered aid of the populace to reinstate him by force, he was soon afterwards restored by another decree, and received many compliments in the senate on his dutiful behaviour. The year then appears to have passed on in tolerable tranquillity, except that apprehensions were entertained by many lest Pompey, exasperated at the pretended affronts offered to Metellus, should be tempted to follow the example of Sylla, and cross over with his army into Italy to interfere by force with the government. But Pompey was greatly wronged by these suspicions. He was ambitious, indeed, of exercising a commanding influence in the commonwealth, and was gratified by seeing one of his lieutenants, M. Calpurnius Piso, elected consul, when he sent him home from the army to be a candidate for that dignity, and had avowedly exerted all his interest in his favour. This, however, was the utmost extent of his wishes; and far from entertaining any treasonable or revengeful designs, he no sooner landed in Italy in the winter of this year,<sup>137</sup> than he disbanded his army and repaired to

Return of Pompey to Rome.

Rome, attended only by a few of his friends. As he was not allowed to enter the city whilst laying claim to a triumph, the people, in compliment to him, were assembled without the walls, and he there addressed them for the first time after an absence of six years. All parties were waiting with anxiety to hear his sentiments on the state of the republic, and all, according to Cicero, were alike disappointed.<sup>138</sup> But it may well be doubted whether it were really a just subject of blame in Pompey, that his speech did not espouse sufficiently the interests of any particular party to satisfy their expectations, or excite their applause.

A short time before the end of the year 691, an affair had taken place which, at the moment of Pompey's arrival, was attracting particularly the public attention. P. Clodius Pulcher, a young man of the highest nobility, whose father and grandfather had both been consuls, was detected in disguise in the house of C. Cæsar,<sup>139</sup> during the celebration of certain mysteries, which were annually performed at the houses of some of the higher magistrates, and

P. Clodius is detected in Cæsar's house during the celebration of the mysteries of the Bona Dea.

<sup>135</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 49. Plutarch, in Catone, 29.

<sup>136</sup> Suetonius, in Julio Cæsare, 16.

<sup>137</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, I. epist. XIV. Velleius Paterculus, II. 40.

<sup>138</sup> Ad Atticum, I. epist. XIV.

<sup>139</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, I. epist. XII.

from which every person of the male sex was most carefully excluded. Clodius was a man of infamous life, and the cause commonly alleged for this act of profanation, was an adulterous intrigue in which he was said to be engaged with Cæsar's wife.<sup>140</sup> The matter, however, was taken up very earnestly, and being mentioned in the senate by Q. Conificius, was submitted to the pontifices, and by them pronounced to be an act of sacrilegious wickedness.<sup>141</sup> Upon this decision a motion was founded in the senate to bring Clodius to trial, and this gave occasion to some warm debates. The offender, from various causes, was provided with powerful supporters: his family interest, probably, was extensive, and he had violently opposed Lucullus, and had encouraged the discontent of his soldiers against him,<sup>142</sup> whilst acting as that general's lieutenant in the war with Mithridates, by which conduct he had recommended himself both to the populace and to the partisans of Pompey, to whom Lucullus was equally odious. Besides, there was probably a large portion of the young nobility and of the profligate citizens of all ranks, who naturally sympathized with Clodius from similarity of character, and who would regard him as an injured man, when threatened with a prosecution for an act of irreligion. Accordingly, when it was proposed to the people that Clodius should be brought to trial, and that the prætor should himself select a certain number of judges to decide the cause with him,<sup>143</sup> M. Piso, the consul, opposed the measure, and the popular party were so clamorous against it, that it was deemed advisable to withdraw it. Q. Fufius,<sup>144</sup> one of the tribunes, then moved that Clodius should still be tried, but that the judges, instead of being named by the prætor, should be chosen as usual by lot from the different orders in whose hands the judicial power was then placed. This proposal was approved by the people, and the trial from thenceforward, according to Cicero, became a mere mockery. The judges, thus indiscriminately chosen, were men not inaccessible either to fear or to corruption. The rabble (by which term must be understood not the poorest, but the most profligate of the people, consisting in a great degree of the young nobility) was clamorous for the acquittal of Clodius, and money was distributed so liberally by his friends, that sentence was pronounced in his favour by a majority of six votes out of fifty-six.

The trial of Clodius came on in the spring of the year 692, and C. Cæsar about the same time set out for Spain, which was allotted to him as his province on the expiration of his prætorship. He had divorced his wife on account of the suspicion which her character had incurred

He is tried and acquitted.  
U. C. 692.

Cæsar receives Spain as his province. His conduct during his command there.  
U. C. 692-3.

<sup>140</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 9. Velleius Paterculus, II. 45.

<sup>141</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, I. epist. XIII.

<sup>142</sup> Plutarch, in Lucullo, 34.

<sup>143</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, I. epist. XIV.

<sup>144</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, I. epist. XVI.



from the circumstances of the late profanation of the mysteries ; but ever careful not to compromise his popularity, he had taken no part against Clodius,<sup>145</sup> and professed not to believe that he was guilty. His debts were so enormous,<sup>146</sup> that he could not leave Rome till some of his friends, amongst whom M. Crassus is particularly mentioned, became his sureties with his creditors for very considerable sums. When he was thus enabled to enter upon the government of his province, he displayed the same ability, and the same unscrupulous waste of human lives for the purposes of his ambition, which distinguished his subsequent career. In order to retrieve his fortune, to gain a military reputation, and to entitle himself to the honour of a triumph, he attacked some of the native tribes on the most frivolous pretences,<sup>147</sup> and thus enriched himself and his army, and gained the credit of a successful general, by the plunder and massacre of these poor barbarians. Probably, also, the spoils which he collected on this occasion enabled him to solicit and procure from the senate an abatement of the taxes paid by the province of Spain,<sup>148</sup> a favour which of course gained him numerous friends amongst the wealthy inhabitants of the sea-ports of that country. But while thus employed, his eyes were constantly fixed on the state of things at Rome. The prospect appeared favourable to his ambition ; and, accordingly, after an absence of about twelve months, he returned home to claim a triumph for his victories, and to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship.

The remainder of the year 692 had passed away unmarked

State of affairs in  
Rome during his ab-  
sence.  
U. C. 693.

by any thing of considerable importance ; and L. Afranius and Q. Metellus Celer were chosen consuls for the year following. Metellus, although the

brother of the late tribune, Metellus Nepos, had yet shown his attachment on several occasions to the aristocratical party : he had, during his prætorship, been the means of saving C. Rabinus, when tried for the murder of Saturninus ; and when, after his prætorship, he was appointed to the province of Gaul, he had behaved with great zeal in supporting the government, and in opposing Catiline in the field. Afranius owed his elevation entirely to the interest of Pompey, who, according to Cicero,<sup>149</sup> spent a large sum of money in securing votes in his favour. He is described as a man totally destitute of political influence,<sup>150</sup> and so insignificant as to have been of little or no service in forwarding the views of his patron. It appears that Pompey at this time severely felt the jealousy with which he was regarded by the aristocracy. His successive appointments to the command against the pirates and against Mithridates had

<sup>145</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 10.

<sup>146</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 11. Suetonius,

18.

<sup>147</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 53.

<sup>148</sup> Hirtius, de Bello Hispaniensi, 42.

<sup>149</sup> Ad Atticum, I. epist. XVI. § 7.

<sup>150</sup> Cicero, ubi supra. Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 51, 52.

been carried in spite of the opposition of the nobles; and in those commands he had given the greatest offence, first to Q. Metellus, when he interfered to save the Cretans from his cruelties, and afterwards to L. Lucullus, when he deprived him of the honour of finishing a war which he had so long been engaged in conducting. But Both Metellus and Lucullus were men of great influence in the senate; and now that Pompey was returned from Asia, they exerted themselves to prevent the ratification of his various acts,<sup>151</sup> it being requisite that all measures adopted by a general in settling the state of the conquered provinces after a war, should receive the sanction of the senate's authority. Mortified at this treatment, and thinking it an affront that his measures should be separately canvassed, and confirmed or annulled according to the pleasure of others, he connected himself with the party in opposition to the senate, not intending, if we may judge from his general character, to follow the steps of Marius or Cinna, but rather fancying that he might avail himself of the support of the popular party, just so far as to force the aristocracy to cease from opposing him, and that, by a dexterous management of the two contending interests in the state, he might be acknowledged by the general deference of all to be the first person in the commonwealth, without raising himself by violence to a situation of actual supremacy. Amongst other things, he was particularly desirous to procure settlements of lands for the soldiers who had served under him; a reward which, if we may trust Plutarch's report,<sup>152</sup> he had on former occasions procured for those who had followed him in his early campaigns, and a measure which was sure to confer on a general the highest popularity. Accordingly, L. Flavius, one of the tribunes, as early as the month of January, brought forward an agrarian law,<sup>153</sup> it having been judged expedient to extend the proposed grant of lands to the poorer citizens in general, as well as to the soldiers of Pompey, in order to make the resolution more acceptable to the people at large. It was intended that the lands to be thus distributed should be purchased by the revenue arising from Pompey's new conquests, which accordingly for the next five years was to be appropriated to this object.<sup>154</sup> This law, like every other of the same nature, was warmly opposed by the aristocracy, headed by the consul Metellus; and on the other hand it was supported by Pompey, as might be imagined, with all his interest. Cicero declared himself favourable to the principle of it, but proposed various modifications to prevent it from injuring the rights of individuals; and these alterations, he tells us, were favourably listened to by the people. The alarm

Agrarian law of L. Flavius.

<sup>151</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 40. Florus, IV. 2.

<sup>152</sup> In Lucullo, 34.

<sup>153</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, I. epist. XVIII. Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 52.

<sup>154</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, I. epist. XIX.

of a war in Transalpine Gaul, which threatened the state about the beginning of March, drew off the public attention from the law; but when the prospect of affairs cleared up abroad, the internal disputes were renewed; and it appears, that they continued through a great part of the year, and that the resistance of the aristocracy was so determined, that although L. Flavius on one occasion ordered the consul, Q. Metellus, to be sent to prison for obstructing the progress of the law,<sup>155</sup> yet he was finally unable to gain his object; and Pompey could neither obtain settlements for his soldiers, nor prevail upon the senate to pass the desired confirmation of his acts in Asia.

In this state of affairs Cæsar returned from Spain about the middle of June, wishing at once to obtain a triumph, and to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship. But as the time of the elections was drawing near, and no officer was allowed to enter the city whilst waiting the permission of the senate to triumph, he petitioned that he might be admitted as a candidate in his absence.<sup>156</sup> This, however, being opposed in the senate, and particularly by Cato, Cæsar gave up all thoughts of his triumph, and entering the city immediately commenced his canvass. He had already effected

Cæsar returns from Spain.

The first triumvirate.

that famous coalition between Pompey, Crassus, and himself, which has been distinguished by the name of the triumvirate, or "Commission of Three," an appellation borrowed from the usual number of persons employed by the senate as commissioners for executing any particular service, and bestowed in mockery upon the three individuals, who were purposing to dispose of the whole government of the commonwealth with no authority but their own ambition. The secret conditions of this union cannot of course be otherwise known than from the subsequent conduct of the parties who formed it; but we may conjecture that Cæsar was anxious to secure a military command on an extensive scale, which he might enjoy during several years, that he, too, as Pompey had done, might possess a veteran army attached to his person; and that he might employ it, as Pompey had *not* done, in procuring for himself whatever he might choose to demand. Pompey, on his part, offended with the aristocracy, seeing that he might obtain, through Cæsar's support, that ratification of his acts in Asia, and those settlements for his soldiers, which had been so long denied him; and too vain to imagine that his own exploits, or his consideration among the people, could ever be rivalled; contemplating, besides, the immediate prospect of enjoying an undivided supremacy at Rome for some years, during the absence of Cæsar, and too willing to calculate that the

<sup>155</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVII. 52. Cicero, ad Atticum, II. epist. I.

<sup>156</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 18. Plutarch, in Cæsare, 13.



danger, which is at a distance, may be timely dispelled by some unforeseen contingencies ; Pompey, for all these reasons, listened to the advances of Cæsar with readiness and without suspicion. Crassus was, like Cæsar, ambitious of obtaining a military command ; and, perhaps, flattered himself that, while the personal character of his two associates might direct their jealousy chiefly against one another, he might be able, by his immense wealth, to secure himself in the enjoyment of his greatness hereafter, even without their co-operation. But with whatever views these confederates were actuated, their coalition was as dangerous to the state as the exorbitance of the prizes which they secured to themselves, and the violence used in order to obtain them, were actually destructive of the existing constitution of their country.

Supported by such powerful assistants in addition to his own popularity, Cæsar was elected consul without difficulty ; the aristocratical party succeeding, however, in giving him as a colleague M. Calpurnius Bibulus, on whose attachment to their cause they could fully depend. But it seems that the contending interests in the republic were very unequally matched. On the aristocratical side there was neither unanimity nor vigour. Q. Catulus was lately dead, and his high character and long habits of acting as the head of a party, rendered his loss particularly severe. Those who had succeeded to his station, L. Lucullus, Q. Hortensius, and others of less renown with posterity, were mostly engrossed, if we may believe Cicero,<sup>157</sup> with their own private luxuries, and allowed their public duties to lie neglected. M. Cicero was in many respects so situated, as to regard the dissensions of his countrymen with unusual impartiality. His birth placed a barrier between him and the high nobility, which they were never able entirely to forget ; while, on the other hand, the principles on which he had always acted, and which he had more particularly enforced in his consulship, rendered him an object of aversion to the violent popular party, and removed him from any participation in the ambitious schemes of the triumvirate. But, according to his own statement,<sup>158</sup> the impolicy of his friends, in holding a tone of unseasonable severity, had so alienated from the cause of the republic many of those whom it had been his endeavour in his public conduct to conciliate, that he considered the state of affairs utterly unpromising, and during the eventful year which was now about to commence, he absented himself almost entirely from the business of the commonwealth. The most active defender of the aristocratical cause was M. Cato, who, although he filled no magistracy, nor enjoyed any political rank, yet, by his birth, his unshaken integrity, and his great cou-

Consulship of Cæsar  
and Bibulus.  
U. C. 694.

<sup>157</sup> Ad Atticum, II. epist. I.

<sup>158</sup> Ad Atticum, II. epist. I. ; I. epist. XVII. XVIII.

rage, had rendered himself a person of considerable importance. Towards Cæsar he entertained a fixed animosity, which he retained to the very end of his life; and the notoriety of this feeling deprived his opposition, perhaps, of some of the weight to which it otherwise would have been entitled. But had Cato's influence been much greater than it was, it could have availed little against the united power of Pompey, Cæsar, and Crassus, supported as it was at present by the whole strength of the popular party, and arming itself unscrupulously with all those violent means which had been practised in former times by L. Saturninus, P. Sulpicius, Marius, or Sylla.

We have said that Pompey had been unable to carry the agrarian law of L. Flavius during the preceding year. The first fruits of his coalition with Cæsar were seen in the agrarian law proposed by the new consul early in the year, and by which it was proposed to grant settlements to 20,000 citizens in Campania,<sup>159</sup> one of the richest districts in Italy, which had been let out under the Roman government since the second Punic war, and which no former author of an agrarian law, except the tribune Rullus, during the consulship of Cicero, had ever ventured to give up to distribution among the people. The division of these lands among the settlers was to be committed to twenty commissioners, who were to be invested with full powers to manage it as they thought proper. It appears from Dion Cassius,<sup>160</sup> that Cæsar had at first designed to do little more than bring forward anew the law of Flavius; and that he submitted it to the senate, endeavouring to procure their concurrence in it. But finding that body obstinate in opposing it, on no other grounds, it is said, but because it was an innovation, he resolved to propose it to the people in a more popular form, and to carry it by their authority alone. Bibulus, his colleague, with three of the tribunes, did all in their power to oppose it; and despairing of success by any other means, they endeavoured to break up the assembly from time to time, by reporting that thunder had been heard,<sup>161</sup> an occurrence which, according to the law of Rome, should have immediately suspended the business of the forum. But P. Vatinius, a tribune, entirely devoted to Cæsar, had declared on entering upon his office,<sup>162</sup> that he would regard none of those obstructions which the augurs might throw in the way of his measures, by reporting their observations on the state of the heavens; and as he now was busily engaged in supporting the agrarian law, he provided an armed rabble to abet him in his proceedings, and thus defying the opposition of his colleagues, and ordering Bibulus on one occasion to be sent to prison, and at

<sup>159</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 44. Cicero, ad Atticum, II. epist. VII.

<sup>160</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVIII. 59.

<sup>161</sup> Cicero, in Vatinius, 7. Dion Cassius, XXXVIII. 61.

<sup>162</sup> Cicero, in Vatinius, 6.

another time driving him out of the forum by violence, he procured by these means the enactment of the law.

It was after several similar riots, in which Bibulus found his life endangered, that he confined himself entirely to his own house,<sup>163</sup> and contented himself with issuing strong protests and invectives against the measures of his colleague. Cæsar thus finding himself relieved from all opposition, proceeded to fulfil the conditions of his union with Pompey, by procuring from the people a law ratifying all his acts;<sup>164</sup> and he seized the opportunity of gratifying the equestrian order by another law, Other laws of Cæsar. for the relief of the farmers of the revenue, who having, in their eagerness to obtain the contract,<sup>165</sup> offered too large a sum for the rent of the taxes in the newly conquered provinces, had afterwards petitioned the senate that this agreement might be relaxed a little in their favour. Their petition had been first presented towards the end of the year 692, and had been constantly rejected; Cato on all occasions speaking against it with great vehemence. It was now granted by the people through the influence of Cæsar; and thus the affections of a powerful body of men were alienated from the aristocracy, at a time when their assistance was most needful.

These, however, were all of them measures with regard to which good and wise men might fairly differ, however much they condemned the violent means by which they were carried. It now remained that the triumvirs should provide more directly for their own aggrandizement. Accordingly, P. Vatinius moved before the people, that the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and The province of Gaul given to Cæsar. Illyricum should be given to Cæsar for five years, with an army of three legions,<sup>166</sup> although the disposal of such commands was vested by the law, as it then stood, in the senate alone. The people, as may be supposed, readily agreed to the grant; and the senate, wishing, perhaps, to increase the weight of Cæsar's employments abroad, and to remove him further from the city, added to his government the province of Transalpine Gaul, and voted him another legion. Meantime Pompey had connected himself more closely with Cæsar,<sup>167</sup> by marrying his daughter Julia; and Cæsar, on his part, married Calpurnia, the daughter of L. Piso, intending that his father-in-law, Piso, and A. Gabinius, an old partisan of Pompey, should succeed in the following year to the consulship. At the same time, the adoption of P. Clodius into a plebeian family had been effected through the influence of Pompey and Cæsar,<sup>168</sup> in order that he might be able

<sup>163</sup> Cicero, in Vatinius, 9; ad Atticum, II. epist. XIX. XX. XXI.

<sup>164</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVIII. 62.

<sup>165</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, I. epist. XVII. XVIII.; pro Plancio, 14.

<sup>166</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 22. Cicero, in Vatinius, 15.

<sup>167</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 14.

<sup>168</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, II. epist. XII.; pro Domo, 16. Suetonius, in Cæsare, 20.



to be elected tribune of the people. It is probable that he was considered generally as a useful instrument to keep the aristocratical party in a state of depression and alarm : and Cæsar, it is said, offended by the manner in which Cicero spoke of the triumvirate, was disposed to co-operate with Clodius in those measures which were more particularly aimed against him personally. But the transactions which led to Cicero's exile belong more properly to the subsequent year ; and the story of Cæsar's consulship may be closed by observing, that after seeing Piso and Gabinius elected consuls according to the wish of the triumvirate, and leaving Clodius in possession of the tribuneship, and bent on effecting the destruction of Cicero, he set out from Rome early in the spring of the year 695, to commence his long career of conquests in Gaul.<sup>169</sup>

At this point our narrative of the internal affairs of the commonwealth may be allowed to pause, while the reader's attention is directed to a farther detail of the events which had previously occurred in Spain, to the operations of Cæsar in Gaul, and to those of Crassus in Parthia. The latter expedition, indeed, did not take place till a period somewhat later than that which we have now reached ; but as it is quite distinct from the course of events at Rome, it may be a little anticipated, in order that the thread of our story may not be interrupted, as we proceed from the exile of Cicero to the actual beginning of the civil war.

<sup>169</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Gallico, I. 6, 7.

## CHAPTER VIII.

CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR.—A SKETCH OF THE ROMAN HISTORY FROM  
THE APPOINTMENT OF CÆSAR TO THE COMMAND IN GAUL TO  
HIS DEATH.—FROM U.C. 695 TO 710, A.C. 59 TO 44.

THE proceedings of the triumvirate, and the supreme influence which its members had exercised during the consulship of Cæsar were sufficient proof that the effects of Sylla's victory were already lost, and that the aristocracy was unable to resist the enemies by whom it was again assailed. That coalition between the popular party and individuals of great personal distinction, which had before taken place when Marius united himself with Sulpicius, had now been repeated; and as there was now no Sylla to assert by arms the authority of the senate, it had been repeated with more entire success. The part of Sulpicius had been hitherto performed by Vatinius; it was now to devolve on P. Clodius, who having entered on his tribuneship in the month of December 694, and being supported not only by the influence of the triumvirs, but by the consuls elect, Piso and Gabinius, who would use all the authority of their office in his favour, and by the terror of Cæsar's military force, was likely to pursue his career with little impediment.<sup>1</sup> His chief object was to effect the ruin of Cicero, as by so doing he would at once gratify a personal enmity of his own, and would deprive the senate of the most eloquent and, with all his faults, the most popular, and one of the most upright of their defenders.

During the earlier months of Cæsar's consulship, Cicero had absented himself from Rome,<sup>2</sup> but he had returned thither in June, soon after the passing of the law of Vatinius, which conferred on Cæsar the command in Gaul, and the unusual power of nominating his own lieutenants. He already apprehended the effects of the enmity of Clodius, and was at first inclined to accept the offer made him by Cæsar, that he would accompany him as his lieutenant into Gaul.<sup>3</sup> But encouraged by the apparent popularity

From U.C. 695 to 710.  
A.C. 59 to 44.

Coalition between the  
triumvirate and the  
popular party.

Tribuneship of P. Clodius, and his designs  
against Cicero.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 17.

<sup>2</sup> Epist. ad Atticum, II. epist. IV.—

XVII.

<sup>3</sup> Epist. ad Atticum, II. epist. XVIII.

which he enjoyed, and receiving from Pompey the strongest assurances that Clodius would not think of attacking him, and that if he should do so he would sacrifice his own life rather than that Cicero should be injured, he was persuaded to remain in Rome and abide the issue.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly Clodius, as we have already mentioned, entered on his tribuneship in December, and immediately professed his intention of visiting upon Cicero's head the execution of Lentulus, Cethegus, and the other accomplices of Catiline. He was sure of the support of the consuls Piso and Gabinius; and he boasted also that he was acting with the entire concurrence of the triumvirate. Mobs, consisting of slaves and the lowest of the people,<sup>5</sup> were openly armed and organized to overawe every attempt of Cicero's friends to defend him by legal means; and when the senate and the equestrian order, and, as Cicero asserts,<sup>6</sup> the great majority of respectable citizens, put on mourning, and assumed the dress of suppliants, to testify their grief and the deep interest which they felt in his cause, the consuls ordered the senate to resume their usual habit; and Gabinius in particular, in a speech addressed to the multitude, told them that the senate was nothing in the commonwealth, and that the equestrian order should soon be made to suffer for the part they had taken in abetting Cicero's proceedings during the late conspiracy. It is added that, by his own sole authority, Gabinius commanded L. Lamia, a citizen who had been zealous in Cicero's defence, to leave Rome, and not to come within two hundred Roman miles of the city;<sup>7</sup> an exercise of power which is mentioned, indeed, as illegal and tyrannical, but which still shows to what an extent the consuls could carry their orders, and enforce obedience.

The professed measure on the part of Clodius, which filled Cicero with such lively alarm, was a law proposed by him for the punishment of all persons guilty of putting a Roman citizen to death without trial.<sup>8</sup> It is said that when this law was brought before the assembly of the people (who were summoned by Clodius to meet without the city, because Cæsar could not otherwise, as commander of an army, be present at the discussion), Cæsar spoke in favour of its principle, but wished that it should not affect any past transactions. This exception, however, would have so defeated Clodius's main object, that it was not admitted, and the law passed in its original form, which denounced punishment against any past as well as against any future violation of its provisions. But still, although Cicero might have been brought to trial under this act, yet the natural prejudice against *ex post facto* laws, together with the strong considerations that might have been urged in his defence, and the popularity and interest which

<sup>4</sup> Epist. ad Atticum, epist. XX.

<sup>5</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 15; in Pisonem, 5.

<sup>6</sup> Pro Sextio, 12.

<sup>7</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 12, 13.

<sup>8</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVIII. 67, edit. Leunclav.



he possessed, might have rendered his condemnation a matter of great uncertainty. His own conduct, therefore, as he himself afterwards confessed, was the main occasion of his ruin ;<sup>9</sup> for by soliciting protection, by assuming the dress of a suppliant, and appealing to the compassion of the people, he in a manner anticipated his own accusation, and rendered the motion of bringing him to trial for the measures adopted in his consulship less startling and extravagant to others, by seeming himself fully to expect it. While he was going round the city with his friends, all wearing the same air of dejection and entreaty, he was frequently met and insulted by parties of the armed rabble which acted under Clodius's orders,<sup>10</sup> and he thus compromised his own dignity without any advantage to his interests. He particularly laboured to obtain the support of Pompey, from whom indeed, both on public and private grounds, he had a right to look for it. But Pompey had entangled himself so deeply in the plans of the enemies of the aristocracy, that he could not act freely on either side. With the usual fate of those men whose principles are not firm enough to keep them steadily in the path of duty, but are yet sufficiently powerful to check them in their deviations from it, and to hinder them from ever attaining the rewards of wickedness, Pompey already, it is probable, repented of his share in the proceedings of the triumvirate, and found that the confirmation of his acts in Asia had been too dearly purchased by the loss of the good opinion of the better part of his countrymen, and the degradation to which he was reduced of being a tame spectator of the ruin of his friend, and of the outrages of a man like Clodius. Thus beset with shame and difficulties, he avoided a personal interview with Cicero, who came himself to his Alban villa to solicit his assistance ; and when L. Lentulus, L. Torquatus, M. Lucullus, Q. Fabius Sanga,<sup>11</sup> and many other persons, applied to him to the same effect, he referred them to the consuls, saying that he, as a private individual, did not like to enter into a contest with a tribune who had an armed force at his disposal ; but if the consuls should act in defence of the commonwealth, with the authority of the senate, he would take up arms to join them. We have seen Marius, in his sixth consulship, obliged by the senate to act against his own associate Saturninus ; and Pompey, it is probable, would gladly have obeyed a similar call to return to his own natural situation as defender of the commonwealth. But the call was not given ; the consuls, it is said, had bound themselves, for their own private interests, to abet all the proceedings of Clodius ;<sup>12</sup> and thus Pompey remained inactive in his villa, and Cicero, despairing of

Behaviour of Pompey  
towards Cicero.

<sup>9</sup> Epist. ad Atticum, III. epist. XV.  
Plut arch, in Cicerone, 30.

<sup>11</sup> Cicero. in Pisonem, 31.

<sup>12</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 10.

Cicero withdraws from Rome, and a decree of banishment passes against him.

any effectual support, and unwilling, as he tells us,<sup>13</sup> to be the occasion of bloodshed, withdrew by night from Rome, and went into voluntary exile. His departure relieved his enemies from every difficulty; and the punishment which a judicial sentence would hardly have pronounced, was easily inflicted by a legislative attainder. Clodius proposed a law forbidding him, in the usual language, the use of fire and water within four hundred miles of Italy,<sup>14</sup> denouncing penalties against any person who should harbour him within those limits; and forbidding any one to move for his recall either in the senate or before the people. This was carried immediately, and not, if we may believe Cicero,<sup>15</sup> by the votes of the Roman people, but in an almost empty forum, by the voices of that rabble which was the mere instrument of Clodius's violence. In addition to this, the property of Cicero was ordered to be confiscated; his house on the Palatine hill was burnt to the ground, its site was consecrated to religious purposes, and a statue of Liberty was erected on the place whereon it had stood.<sup>16</sup>

It has been often remarked, that it is the natural tendency of violent measures to produce a reaction; and this effect seems to have followed from the banishment of Cicero. Scarcely had he left Italy, before the senate began to exert itself to procure his recall.

Pompey also was at last roused by an affront offered to him by Clodius, of a nature peculiarly irritating. Tigranes, the son of the king of Armenia, was amongst the prisoners brought to Rome by Pompey on his return from Asia, and having remained ever since in captivity, was at this time under the custody of L. Flavius, one of Pompey's old adherents, and now one of the prætors. Clodius was bribed, as it is said, to take Tigranes out of the hands of Flavius, and to cause him to be set at liberty.<sup>17</sup> This happened in May, little more than a month after Cicero's retreat from Rome; and Pompey from this time began to appear in the senate, and to complain of the late proceedings of Clodius. On the first of June the senate passed a resolution in favour of Cicero's recall, without a single dissentient voice;<sup>18</sup> but Sextus Ælius, one of the tribunes, interposed his negative, and for the present prevented it from being attended with any effect. Clodius, meanwhile, was not wanting either in art or audacity in his endeavours to rid himself of those persons whose opposition he most dreaded. About the beginning of August, one of his slaves dropt a dagger

<sup>13</sup> Pro Sextio, 20, et seq.

<sup>14</sup> Cicero, pro Domo, 19; ad Atticum, III. epist. IV. XII. XV.

<sup>15</sup> Pro Sextio, 24.

<sup>16</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 24. Dion Cassius, XXXVIII. 70.

<sup>17</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXVIII. 78. Cicero ad Atticum, III. epist. VIII.

<sup>18</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 31.

near the senate house,<sup>19</sup> and on being seized, and examined before the consul Gabinus, it was said that he had received orders from his master to assassinate Pompey, who was at that time in the senate. Whether this plot was real or fictitious, Pompey took alarm at it, and during the remainder of Clodius's tribuneship he confined himself to his house,<sup>20</sup> the armed rabble which acted under Clodius rendering it unsafe for him, it is said, to appear in public. The other individual whom Claudius most feared was M. Cato, and him he contrived to remove from Rome, by forcing him to accept a public commission which would employ him abroad for a considerable time.<sup>21</sup> Its nature will deserve our notice, as exemplifying the wide extent of the evils which the power of Rome at this period enabled a profligate demagogue to inflict.

M. Cato is sent to Cyprus.

The island of Cyprus was early filled with Greek colonies, and was first conquered by Amasis, king of Egypt, about five hundred and forty or fifty years before the Christian era.<sup>22</sup> When Egypt was overrun by Cambyses, the Cyprians submitted to the Persian dominion, and remained attached to that empire, although sometimes enjoying a practical independence, till its final overthrow by the arms of Alexander. In the division of his conquests which followed upon his untimely death, Cyprus was again united to the new Egyptian monarchy established by Ptolemy the son of Lagus;<sup>23</sup> and although its possession was often disputed by the kings of Syria, yet it still continued among the dependencies of the crown of Egypt, and appears to have formed what would in modern language be called an appanage, being bestowed as a separate principality on some member of the royal family. At the time of which we are now speaking, it was ruled in this manner by a brother of the reigning king of Egypt, who himself also bore the name of Ptolemy. It is said that Clodius, when a young man, having fallen into the power of the Cilician pirates, during the period of their greatness, applied to the king of Cyprus for money to pay his ransom,<sup>24</sup> and that Ptolemy sent so small a sum that the pirates refused to accept it, and afterwards, from what motives we know not, released their prisoner gratuitously. Clodius, it is added, had long resented the behaviour of Ptolemy on this occasion, and now gladly availed himself of his present power to propose a law, declaring the island of Cyprus forfeited to the Roman republic. The only possible colour for such an act was a pretended will of the late king of Egypt, by which he was said to have assigned his dominions to the Roman people. But the reality of this instrument was so questionable, that the senate had never chosen

Sketch of the revolutions of that island.

<sup>19</sup> Asconius, in Oration. pro Milone.

<sup>20</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 32.

<sup>21</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 28.

<sup>22</sup> Herodotus, Euterpe. cap. ultim.

<sup>23</sup> Strabo, XIV. 782, edit. Xyland.

<sup>24</sup> Strabo, ubi supra.



to act upon it, and the present king of Egypt had lately been acknowledged as a lawful sovereign, so that his brother, the ruler of Cyprus, holding his crown by the same title, was in equity equally included in this acknowledgment. It was sufficient, however, that the island was a tempting prize, and that the power of the Romans enabled them to seize it with impunity. Its fertility, indeed, and abundant resources of every kind, were highly celebrated, and it was the boast of the inhabitants that they could build and send to sea a ship of the largest size, without applying to foreign countries for the supply of a single article required in her construction and equipment.<sup>25</sup> The law for the forfeiture being passed, Clodius proposed by a separate law to intrust M. Cato with the execution of it, and he was accordingly despatched with prætorian authority to carry into effect a measure which he is said to have abhorred for its injustice. He was, besides, ordered to procure the restoration of certain individuals who had been exiled by the government of Byzantium;<sup>26</sup> and these two employments were expected to detain him for a considerable time at a distance from Rome.

They were, however, both executed without any difficulty. Ptolemy, hearing of the sentence of deposition issued against him, swallowed poison in despair;<sup>27</sup> and Cato being informed of his death, sent the famous M. Brutus, his nephew, immediately to Cyprus, to secure the king's property, while he himself first went to Byzantium to discharge his commission there. As soon as this was effected he rejoined his nephew in Cyprus, and superintended the sale of the confiscated treasures with an excessive and almost ridiculous minuteness, allowing nothing to be sold except in his own presence, and doing his utmost to procure a good price for every article.<sup>28</sup> Whilst he was thus engaged, Munatius Plancus, one of his most devoted friends, arrived in Cyprus to join him; but happening to call on Cato when he was transacting business with his principal officer, he was refused admittance. He complained of this afterwards to Cato, and received from him a very rough answer, being told that Canidius, the officer with whom Cato had been engaged, was the person most deserving of confidence from his experience and integrity, and that Cato therefore preferred his company. Not content with having said this to Munatius himself, Cato, with characteristic indelicacy, repeated it afterwards to Canidius, and Munatius then, feeling himself offended, absented himself from Cato's table, and did not go to him when sent for to assist him in the despatch of business. This behaviour shocked Cato's notions of

<sup>25</sup> Ammianus Marcellinus, XIV. 21, edit. Vales.

<sup>26</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 26. Plutarch, in Catone, 34.

<sup>27</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, 36. Ammianus Marcellinus, ubi supra.

<sup>28</sup> Plutarch, 37.

discipline, and he threatened to fine him for his disobedience; but Munatius immediately quitted the island, and remained for some time in a state of alienation from his former friend. Afterwards, however, they both were invited to an entertainment at the same house, and Cato arriving after the guests had taken their places at the table, asked his host to which couch he ought to go; when being told to choose any place that he liked, he said that he would then fix himself near Munatius, and accordingly he lay on the sofa next to him for the whole evening, but made no further advances towards a reconciliation. But at the request of his wife Marcia, he afterwards wrote to Munatius, requesting him to call at his house as on business, and Munatius coming, and being detained by Marcia till all other visitors were gone, Cato then went in to him, threw his arms around him, and embraced him with great cordiality. This story exhibits very fairly Cato's characteristic good and bad qualities;<sup>29</sup> and as Plutarch professes to copy it from the account of Munatius himself, it rests on sufficient authority to deserve our belief, and may therefore be readily admitted; for the well attested personal anecdotes of eminent individuals are so rare in Roman history, that we may well be pardoned for noticing those which do present themselves to our curiosity.

Meanwhile the consular elections at Rome came on, and P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, and Q. Cæcilius Metellus Nepos, were elected to succeed Piso and Gabinius. Lentulus had been ædile during Cicero's consulship, and his dispositions were known to be such, that Cicero conceived his appointment to be a favourable omen for himself. Metellus, during his tribuneship, had affronted Cicero personally, and had acted uniformly against the aristocracy; but he was so much under the influence of Pompey, that nothing was to be feared from him under the present circumstances. Accordingly, on the very day on which the new consuls came into office, P. Lentulus brought the case of Cicero before the senate, and found that body almost unanimously disposed in his favour.<sup>30</sup> It was proposed that a law should be submitted to the people repealing his sentence of banishment; but the assembly held for this purpose was interrupted by the armed partisans of Clodius;<sup>31</sup> Q. Cicero was assaulted and obliged to fly for his life, the tribunes friendly to

New proceedings at  
Rome in behalf of  
Cicero.  
U.C. 695.

<sup>29</sup> Some points in this story must remind the reader of Dr. Johnson, who is said by Boswell to have often made indirect advances towards a reconciliation, when he had offended his friends by some rudeness; expecting that they would accept such tokens of his good will towards them, in the place of any more open apology. In fact, the natural dispositions of Cato and Johnson appear to have borne a considerable

resemblance to one another; and, had Cato been a Christian, the likeness would have been more perfect. His character would have been far better than it was, had he been taught to struggle against his pride and coarseness of mind, instead of thinking it to his credit to indulge them.

<sup>30</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 34.

<sup>31</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 35.

Cicero's cause were driven from the forum, and great numbers of citizens were murdered in the riot. On a subsequent occasion, P. Sextius, another tribune, zealously devoted to Cicero, was wounded and left for dead in the temple of Castor;<sup>32</sup> and these atrocious acts were perpetrated without receiving any check from the authority of the government. But T. Annius Milo, who was also among the tribunes of this year, and who was of a temper well fitted to render him a proper antagonist to Clodius in such times of disorder, seeing the laws utterly powerless to preserve the peace of the city, resolved to meet the rioters on their own ground; and while on the one hand he threatened Clodius with a legal prosecution for his acts of violence,<sup>33</sup> he prepared, in the mean time, to restrain his outrages by force; and, having procured a body of gladiators and armed retainers, he enabled the aristocratical party to speak and act with more freedom. Then

He is recalled from exile, and returns in a triumphant manner to Rome.

it was that the senate and people, with wonderful unanimity, passed the law for Cicero's recall; and on the fifth of August he returned once more to Italy,<sup>34</sup> and was received at Brundisium with a kindness which was a foretaste of the universal feeling soon after manifested towards him in every quarter. After a short stay at Brundisium, he set out on his way to the capital. Deputies from the several towns met him on the road with their congratulations; and when he approached Rome, there was not a single individual of any note, except his avowed enemies, who did not come forth to welcome him. As he entered by the Capene gate, the steps of the temples were thronged with multitudes of the poorest of the people, who expressed their joy by the loudest cheers; and as he passed through the streets to the capitol, he was every where greeted with the same acclamations, and surrounded by a similar concourse. This was, indeed, a triumphal procession far more honourable than those of victorious generals; and on this occasion it was proved, that Cicero was not only regarded by a party, but possessed, in an unusual degree, the respect and affection of the people at large. He reaped on this day the just reward of that upright and impartial course which he had pursued since the commencement of his political life; supporting the moderate ascendancy of the aristocratical party, yet not ashamed to advocate the rights and promote the benefit of the lower classes; the queller of a profligate insurrection, but unseduced to abuse his victory, or to gratify a spirit of animosity or ambition, by shedding any blood that was not demanded by justice and the safety of the commonwealth.

One of the first things which he did after his return, was to

<sup>32</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 37.

<sup>33</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 40, et seq.

<sup>34</sup> Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, IV. epist. I.



propose a law for investing Pompey with another extraordinary commission. There had been for some time a scarcity of corn at Rome,<sup>35</sup> which, as was natural, disposed the multitude to tumult; and at the time of Cicero's return, a mob assembled round the senate-house, and calling aloud that Pompey should be intrusted with the control of the markets, they required Cicero by name to propose a vote to that effect. Accordingly, the senate, on his suggestion, resolved that Pompey should be appointed with full powers to manage every thing relating to the supply of the corn markets in every part of the empire for five years; and a law to the same purpose was submitted to the assembly of the people. C. Messius, however, one of the tribunes, proposed another law, in which Pompey's authority was extended still more, inasmuch as it conferred on him the control of the entire revenue of the commonwealth, gave him the command of a fleet and army, and bestowed on him a power in all the provinces paramount to that of the officers by whom they were immediately governed. It does not appear whether these additions to the original proposition were approved by the people or not; but it seems most probable that they were rejected. Still the power actually committed to Pompey was exceedingly great; and the readiness with which the people conferred such great charges on individual citizens, was a sure symptom of that helplessness in themselves, and that habit of dependence for every thing upon their government, which show that a nation is fit only for despotism.

Pompey is appointed controller of the markets throughout the empire.

The remainder of the year 696 was marked by nothing that deserves particular notice. The senate, on the report of the pontifices,<sup>36</sup> before whom the question had been previously argued, resolved that the consecration of the site of Cicero's house was not valid; and that the ground should be given back to him, and a sum presented to him out of the treasury to enable him to restore the building. Smaller sums were also voted to him to repair the damage which his country houses had sustained. But the workmen who were employed in rebuilding his house in Rome, were dispersed on the third of November by the armed rabble under the command of Clodius; the house of his brother Quintus was deliberately set on fire by the same assailants; and a few days afterwards, a house belonging to Milo was attacked in the same manner. On this last occasion, however, Q. Flaccus sallied out from another of Milo's houses at the head of an armed party, and attacking Clodius, killed a number of his most notorious followers, and obliged him to save his own life by flight. At the same time, also, Clo-

Riots in the streets of Rome. T. Milo supports the cause of the aristocracy.

<sup>35</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IV. epist. I.

<sup>36</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IV. epist. II. and III.

dus, as we have before mentioned, was threatened with a prosecution by Milo; but, by the assistance of his brother-in-law, Q. Metellus, the consul, and of his brother, Appius Claudius, one of the prætors, he succeeded in postponing his trial till after the comitia had been held for the election of ædiles.<sup>37</sup> He was a candidate for that office; calculating that, if he should gain it, he should be able to shelter himself under its protection from the impeachment of his adversaries for another year; and being, in fact, elected, he immediately commenced in his turn a prosecution against Milo, whom he charged with disturbing the public peace.<sup>38</sup> P. Sextius, who, when tribune, had been nearly murdered by the followers of Clodius, was now also himself brought to trial for the same offence; but he was defended by Cicero in one of his most eloquent orations, and was acquitted. The trial of Milo was adjourned from time to time, till it was either abandoned altogether, or may be supposed to have ended in the acquittal of the accused.

The consuls for the year 697 were Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Affair of Ptolemy Auletes, king of Egypt. Marcellinus, and L. Marcius Philippus; the former warmly disposed in favour of the aristocratical party; the latter a respectable and moderate man, who is known as the father-in-law of Augustus Cæsar, having married Atia, his mother, after the death of her first husband, C. Octavius. About this time the partisans of Pompey endeavoured to procure for him another extraordinary command. Ptolemy, king of Egypt,<sup>39</sup> having been expelled from his throne by his subjects, had come to Rome during the preceding year, in the hope of recovering his kingdom through the assistance of the Roman government. It is said that he gained many partisans by bribery; and be this as it may, the senate passed a vote that he should be restored, and the consul, P. Lentulus Spinther, to whose lot Cilicia had fallen in the distribution of provinces, was appointed to carry the vote into execution. But in the mean time, a deputation of a hundred citizens of Alexandria had been despatched from Egypt to counteract, if possible, the effect of Ptolemy's bribes and intrigues; and the king, imitating the conduct of Jugurtha on a like occasion, had caused the greater part of them to be assassinated, some on their way to Rome, and others in the city itself. Still it appears that the influence which he had gained by his money, or by the hope that his restoration would afford to many an opportunity of obtaining military commands and emoluments, was likely not only to save him from punishment, but even to secure his return to his kingdom; when it began to be whispered that a prophecy had been found in the Sibylline books, warning the Romans "not to

<sup>37</sup> Epist. ad Atticum, IV. epist. III.

<sup>39</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXIX. 97.

<sup>38</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 44. 69.

restore a king of Egypt to his throne with the aid of numbers, but that in any other way they might effect it." On the first rumour of this injunction of the sibyl, C. Cato, one of the tribunes, summoned the keepers of the mystic books before the assembly of the people, and obliged them to repeat the oracle exactly. It may be hoped that he availed himself of this expedient to baffle the intrigues of Ptolemy and his supporters from an honest indignation at their crimes, and that it was taken up by a large party in the senate with the same feelings. But, however this may be, the subject was debated with considerable warmth.<sup>40</sup> Pompey's friends proposed that he should be commissioned to restore the king; since his name and authority, now that the support of an army was forbidden, were more likely to succeed than those of any other person. Cicero and Hortensius insisted that P. Lentulus should not be deprived of an office which the senate had already committed to him; but C. Cato, finding that Pompey's claims were regarded with peculiar jealousy, and that the appointment would probably remain with Lentulus, brought in a law to take away that officer's command.<sup>41</sup> In this he does not appear to have succeeded; but his determined opposition, and the mutual jealousies of the partisans of Pompey and Lentulus, disappointed, for the present, the hopes of Ptolemy; who, despairing of his return, retired to Ephesus, and there, to avoid the vengeance to which he might be exposed from the relations of those whom he had murdered, he lived in a sort of sanctuary, under the protection of the sacred precincts of the temple of Diana.<sup>42</sup>

While these transactions were occurring, Cæsar, as usual, was passing the winter at Lucca, on the very southern extremity of his province, and regarding, with no indifferent eye, the state of affairs at Rome. He had just concluded his second campaign, which he had signalized by his famous victory over the Nervii; and for this, together with his other successes, he soon after received from the senate an unprecedented honour, in the appointment of a solemnity of thanksgiving, which was to continue for fifteen days.<sup>43</sup> But the aristocratical party, retaining a lively resentment against him for the seditious tenour of his consulship, and viewing his present extensive military command with a very reasonable jealousy, were resolved to avail themselves of the known sentiments of one of the consuls, and of the moderation of the other, to commence an attack upon him and his measures. Scarcely had the present consuls been elected, when P. Rutilius Lupus,<sup>44</sup> one of the tribunes, brought forward in the

Cæsar at Lucca.

The aristocratical party threaten to attack the laws passed in his consulship.

<sup>40</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, I. epist. I. et seq.

<sup>41</sup> Cicero, ad Q. Fratrem, II. epist. III.

<sup>42</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXIX. 99.

<sup>43</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Gallico, ii. 35. Cicero, de Provinciis Consularibus, 10, 11.

<sup>44</sup> Cicero, ad Quintum Fratrem, II. epist. I.



senate the question of Cæsar's agrarian law, by which the lands of Campania were assigned for division among the poorer citizens. This had been always an obnoxious measure to a large portion of the people, as it cut off one of the most valuable sources of the public revenue; for the whole of Campania having been forfeited to the Roman people after the revolt of Capua in the second Punic war, had been since let out to individuals, and the rent arising from these estates afforded a considerable and constant income to the treasury. Thus, when P. Rullus, in the agrarian law which he brought forward during Cicero's consulship, had proposed to include Campania among the districts that were to be divided, Cicero attacked this as one of the most pernicious parts of the whole scheme. No wonder, therefore, that Cæsar's law was regarded by many as a measure which ought to be rescinded as soon as possible; but as Pompey was not present when P. Lupus first laid the subject before the senate, it was judged right to postpone the discussion of a question, in which the triumvirate was so nearly concerned, till he could attend to take a part in it. On the fifth of April,<sup>45</sup> however, after a vote had passed to grant Pompey the sum of forty millions of Roman money (322,916*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*), for the discharge of his duties as controller of the markets, the agrarian law was again mentioned; the large grant which had been just made out of the treasury, made its poverty more deeply felt, and rendered the recovery of the Campanian rents more desirable; and accordingly, after a stormy debate it was voted, on the motion of Cicero, that the question of the lands of Campania should be formally discussed in a full senate, on the fifteenth of May. But the fifteenth of May arrived, and the lands of Campania were suffered, without dispute, to remain subject to the provisions of Cæsar's law; while, instead of commencing any attack on Cæsar's measures, Cicero about this time delivered a speech in the senate full of the highest praises on his conduct in Gaul,<sup>46</sup> and recommending that his province should still be continued to him, when some members had proposed that a new officer should be sent out to succeed him, according to the usual practice and law of the commonwealth. It appears that Cicero, ever since his return from exile, had been disgusted with the high aristocratical party, and finding that they regarded him with jealousy, according to his own account,<sup>47</sup> he was naturally disposed to seek the friendship, or at least to deprecate the enmity, of their opponents. Accordingly, on the trial of P. Sextius, when he attacked P. Vatinius, one of Cæsar's instruments during his consulship, with the utmost vehemence, he was careful to speak of Cæsar himself in terms of respect.<sup>48</sup> Still he

Cicero is persuaded to desert the aristocratical party.

<sup>45</sup> Cicero, ad Quintum Fratrem, II. epist. V.; ad Famil. I. epist. IX.

<sup>46</sup> De Provinciis Consularibus.

<sup>47</sup> Ad Familiares, I. epist. IX. Ad Atticum, IV. epist. V.

<sup>48</sup> Cicero, in Vatinius, 6, 7.

seemed disposed to adhere to the cause which he had formerly upheld : he openly extolled the conduct of M. Bibulus,<sup>49</sup> Cæsar's late colleague : he supported the interests of P. Lentulus in opposition to the friends of Pompey, in the question of the king of Egypt's restoration ; and above all, his motion on the fifth of April seemed to be the pledge of his determined enmity to the party of the triumvirate. It was received as such by the high aristocratical party, who displayed an evident joy at the prospect of an irreconcilable quarrel between him, and Pompey, and Cæsar. Cicero took alarm at this, and having probably received some personal grounds of offence from the aristocratical leaders, he despatched, within five days,<sup>50</sup> a small work of his own composition to Cæsar, couched in language designedly complimentary, on purpose, as he himself confesses, to bind him to his reconciliation with Cæsar, and to cut off the possibility of his reuniting himself with the aristocracy. Still his conduct in the senate, on the fifth of April, had so offended and alarmed Pompey, that leaving Rome immediately, as if to superintend the business of his office as controller of the markets, he paid a visit to Cæsar at Lucca,<sup>51</sup> and there consulted with him upon the steps to be taken with regard to Cicero's opposition to their measures. From Lucca Pompey crossed over to Sardinia, and had an interview with Q. Cicero, who held a public situation in that island.<sup>52</sup> He dwelt much on the services which he had rendered to Marcus Cicero, and reminded Quintus that he had answered to him for his brother's attachment to the interests of the triumvirate, when soliciting their concurrence in his proposed recall from banishment. Quintus, it is probable, lost no time in reporting this conversation to his brother ; and it seems to have produced on him the desired effect, for he dropped, as we have seen, the prosecution of the Campanian question, and during the greater part of the remainder of the year he absented himself from political business altogether.

It was in the early part of this year that M. Cato returned to Rome from Cyprus, bringing with him a considerable treasure which had belonged to the late sovereign of the island. As his vessel advanced up the Tiber,<sup>53</sup> the senate, headed by the two consuls, and followed by an immense crowd of private citizens, came out of the city, and descended along the banks of the river to welcome him ; but he proceeded without noticing this compliment, till he reached the spot where the treasure was to be landed. Still further to testify their regard for him, the senate proposed to confer on him the office of prætor

Return of M. Cato to Rome.

<sup>49</sup> Ad Familiares, I. epist. IX.

<sup>50</sup> Ad Atticum, IV. epist. V.

<sup>51</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, I. epist. IX.

<sup>52</sup> He was one of Pompey's lieutenants, in the service of superintending the mar-

kets throughout the empire. Cicero, pro Scauro, Fragm. Orat. ab Angelo Maio editarum.

<sup>53</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 45. Plutarch, in Catone, 39.

for the following year,<sup>54</sup> by voting that he should be appointed prætor at the next comitia, "extra ordinem," that is, by virtue of the senate's resolution, independently of the votes of the centuries. But Cato disapproving of such an unusual measure, and conscious also that, if it were contested by the popular party, it would greatly prejudice his prospects of success when he became a candidate in the ordinary manner, declined the compliment thus offered to him. It is said, also, that he complained of the conduct of Cicero<sup>55</sup> in wishing to declare the tribuneship of Clodius illegal, and all the acts passed in it to be consequently invalid, and that he openly espoused the cause of Claudius on this question. In doing this he was defending, in fact, the validity of his own proceedings in Cyprus, which, as his commission was bestowed on him by a law of Clodius, would themselves have lost their authority, if that commission were not legally conferred. But the aristocratical party in general were disposed to coalesce with Clodius at the present moment, because he was now at enmity with Pompey; and this was one of the reasons which alienated Cicero from them, and inclined him, as we have seen, to relinquish his opposition to the triumvirate.

L. Domitius Ænobarbus, by birth and by preference alike attached to the aristocracy, was preparing to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship, with the avowed intention of procuring the recall of Cæsar from his province.<sup>56</sup> It was not to be doubted that he would receive the zealous support of the senate; and if the comitia were held by the present consul Marcellinus, his election was most likely to follow. To prevent it, Pompey and Crassus resolved to come forward themselves as his opponents; and that the comitia might not be held by any unfriendly person, C. Cato,<sup>57</sup> one of the tribunes, was prevailed on to stop the elections by his negative, till the year expired and the present consuls went out of office. Whether he had been gained over by Pompey since his opposition to the restoration of king Ptolemy, or whether he only served the triumvirate from his aversion to the aristocratical party, we cannot clearly decide; but it seems that, in forbidding the comitia, he professed only to retaliate upon the consul Marcellinus, who, by appointing frequent holidays, had obstructed the assembling of the people on public business, and had deprived him of all opportunities of carrying some laws of which he was the proposer. After all, the consular elections were disgraced by scenes of open violence: Domitius,<sup>58</sup> who persisted in trying the event, was prevented by force from reaching the forum; M. Cato,

Pompey and Crassus candidates for the consulship.

They procure their success by violence.

<sup>54</sup> Valerius Maxrmus, IV. 1.

<sup>55</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, 40. Dion Cassius, XXXIX. 100, edit. Leunclav.

<sup>56</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 24.

<sup>57</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXIX. 103. Cicero, ad Q. Fratrem, II. epist. VI.

<sup>58</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXIX. 105. Plutarch, in Catone, 41.



who attended him with his usual courage, was wounded, and one of his servants killed; and in this manner Pompey and Crassus obtained their second consulship, fifteen years after they had been for the first time elected together to the same office.

But although Domitius was thus excluded from the consulship, M. Cato still hoped that he should himself obtain a place among the prætors, even though he had declined the irregular interference of the senate in his behalf. His character was so respected, that if no unfair arts were practised by his opponents, he was likely to be successful; but the elections were deferred, it appears, till the month of May;<sup>59</sup> and then the consuls rejected a proposal made by some of the senators, that sixty days should elapse between the nomination of the prætors and their entering upon their office, in order to allow time for inquiry into any corrupt practices to which they might have been indebted for their success. Bribery, indeed, is said to have been used most unscrupulously by the triumvirate;<sup>60</sup> yet still, on the day of the comitia, Cato obtained the votes of the first tribe, a circumstance which so alarmed his opponents, that Pompey himself came forward and declared that he had heard thunder; thus procuring the adjournment of the assembly, at the expense, it is said, of an open falsehood. In the interval thus gained, the party of the consuls renewed their efforts to procure votes, and when the election again came on, Cato was rejected. The other elections were equally unfavourable to the aristocracy, and only two of their partisans, C. Ateius Capito, and P. Aquillius Gallus,<sup>61</sup> could find a place on the list of tribunes.

The most memorable event of this year was the law proposed by C. Trebonius, now tribune of the people, and a partisan of the triumvirate, and afterwards more notorious as one of the assassins of Cæsar. Its object was to confer a military command for a term of years on each of the consuls: thus, the province of Spain was assigned to Pompey,<sup>62</sup> and that of Syria to Crassus, to be held for five years, with a discretionary power of raising troops, and of making peace and war. After a most resolute opposition on the part of the two aristocratical tribunes, and of M. Cato, the law was carried by absolute violence; and immediately afterwards Pompey himself proposed and carried another,<sup>63</sup> prolonging Cæsar's command in Gaul for five, or, according to Dion Cassius, for three years beyond the term originally assigned to it, and adding Germany also, as it is said, to his province. Crassus, who was eager to grasp the glory which he anticipated from an attack on the

U. C. 698.

M. Cato sues for the prætorship and is rejected.

The Trebonian law.

Crassus sets out from Rome on his way to Syria.

<sup>59</sup> Cicero, ad Q. Fratrem, II. epist. IX.

<sup>62</sup> Livy, Epitome, CV.

<sup>60</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 52; in Catone, 42.

<sup>63</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXIX. 106. Plutarch, in Catone, 43; in Pompeio, 52.

<sup>61</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXIX. 105.

Parthians, left Rome in the month of November,<sup>64</sup> on his way to Syria; but his departure was attended with circumstances which were regarded at the time as ominous of evil, and which were remembered more carefully after the disastrous issue of his expedition. The tribunes, Ateius and Aquillius,<sup>65</sup> at first attempted to prevent him from going, and Ateius threatened him with imprisonment, but was restrained by the negative of his colleagues: however, when Crassus was leaving the city, as we have before related, he denounced the wrath of the gods against his enterprise, and lighting a fire at the gate through which Crassus was to pass, he went through certain ceremonies of imprecation, devoting, with the most fearful curses, both the general and his army to destruction. It is said, too, that the projected war with the Parthians was so unpopular, especially when combined with the manner in which Crassus had gained his province, that he was attended by nothing of that train of citizens who were used to crowd round an officer when departing from Rome to undertake an arduous contest against a foreign enemy: but that he besought Pompey to accompany him out of the city, in the hope that his presence might save him at least from any open expressions of ill-will on the part of the multitude. Meanwhile Pompey himself intrusted the command of his province to his lieutenants, and continued to reside in Rome, pretending that his post of controller of the markets did not allow him to be absent from the capital;<sup>66</sup> but enjoying probably the thought, that whilst he, like Cæsar and Crassus, had a province and an army at his disposal, he was living at the same time at the seat of government, and exercising an influence there which was little short of sovereignty.

In this situation Pompey was at the utmost height of his ambition; and accordingly from this time forward he abetted no acts of violence, and encouraged no parties against the aristocracy, but seemed inclined to regard the senate as a prince would view the nobility of his kingdom, that is, as the most natural supports and ornaments of his own greatness. Thus the elections for the ensuing year appear to have passed without disturbance; and L. Domitius, who had been the unsuccessful opponent of Pompey and Crassus, was now able to gain his object, and was chosen consul, together with Appius Claudius Pulcher, the brother of P. Clodius, and partisan of Cæsar. M. Cato also was allowed to avail himself of the esteem which the people entertained for him, and was elected prætor without difficulty. Cicero's reconciliation with Cæsar was about this time confirmed by the appointment of his brother Quintus to be one of Cæsar's lieutenants in Gaul; and P. Clodius had

<sup>64</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IV. epist. XIII.

<sup>66</sup> Dion Cassius. XXXIX. 109.

<sup>65</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 46. Plutarch, in Crasso, 16.

now somewhat declined in notoriety, and had lost much of his power, and perhaps of his inclination, to excite disturbances. The commonwealth seemed, in short, destined to enjoy a breathing time from the perpetual tumults by which it had been assailed; but its peace rested on such slender foundations, that no intelligent observer could venture to calculate on its perpetuity.

We have already seen that Ptolemy, king of Egypt, had left Rome in the year 697, and had retired to Ephesus, hopeless of effecting his restoration to his throne by the assistance of the Romans, although he had committed so many crimes to purchase it. But in the beginning of the year following he found an unexpected friend in A. Gabinius, who still held the province of Syria, to which he had succeeded on the expiration of his consulship. Gabinius instigated, as some say, by private letters from Pompey,<sup>67</sup> and at any rate trusting to his protection to save him from punishment, if he were afterwards questioned for his conduct, did not hesitate to espouse the king's cause; and, in defiance of the provisions of two recent laws of Sylla and Cæsar, marched with his army out of his province,<sup>68</sup> invaded Egypt, and having defeated the Egyptians and taken Alexandria, reinstated Ptolemy in his former power. Meantime, the Syrians, during the absence of his army,<sup>69</sup> suffered severely from the incursions of some hordes of plunderers, by whom, as by the common scourge of that part of Asia, the wilder parts of their country were occupied. They carried their complaints to Rome, and they met with the more favourable reception, because, from the distressed state of the province, which had been ill protected even when Gabinius was present, the taxes could not be collected, and the farmers of the revenue were unable to discharge their debt to the government. But the interest of Pompey and Crassus sufficiently defended Gabinius during their consulship; and Crassus, who was going to supersede him in his province, felt himself possibly the more bound to secure him from molestation on his return to Rome. Now, however, the interest of the triumvirate was less predominant; and Gabinius, when he at last arrived in Italy, and entered the capital by night, on the twenty-eighth of September,<sup>70</sup> found himself at once beset with prosecutions. On his first trial, for a violation of the Cornelian law, in leading an army out of his province, he was acquitted,<sup>71</sup> partly, according to Cicero, from the want of talent in his accuser, and partly from the corruption of his judges. He was tried a second time, however, on a charge of receiving bribes from king Ptolemy; and to the surprise of every one, Cicero, who had

Ptolemy, king of Egypt, is restored to his throne by A. Gabinius.

Trials of A. Gabinius, on several charges.

<sup>67</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXIX. 115.

<sup>68</sup> Cicero, in Pisonem, 21.

<sup>69</sup> Dion Cassius, XXXIX. 118.

<sup>70</sup> Cicero, ad Q. Fratrem, III. epist. I.

<sup>71</sup> Cicero, ad Q. Fratrem, III. epist. IV.



He is defended by Cicero, but condemned and goes into exile. ever been his most vehement enemy, now appeared as his advocate.<sup>72</sup> This change had been brought about by the earnest solicitations of Pompey,<sup>73</sup> to whom Cicero was unwilling to refuse any thing; but the real placability of Cicero's disposition disposed him to lay aside his animosities; and the consciousness of this feeling would make him less suspect the purity of his own motives, when he suffered himself to be won over by Cæsar to forget his enmity to Vatinius, and when he now was persuaded by Pompey to defend Gabinius. His reconciliation, however, was of no benefit to the accused, who was condemned, and went into exile.

The competition for the consulship began as usual about mid-summer, and was carried on with great vehemence.

Violent competition for the consulship.

There were four candidates,<sup>74</sup> Cn. Domitius Calvinus, who had been tribune in the consulship of Cæsar and Bibulus, and had distinguished himself by his steady support of the aristocracy; M. Valerius Messala, who was also attached to the same interest; C. Memmius, who had been formerly Pompey's quæstor in Spain, and who now rested his hopes, in a great measure, on the influence of Cæsar's friends in his behalf; and M. Æmilius Scaurus, the son of that Scaurus who was, during so many years, first on the rolls of the senate, and the son-in-law of L. Sylla, who had married his mother, Metella. He was at this very time brought to trial before M. Cato, as prætor,<sup>75</sup> on a charge of corruption in the administration of his late province of Sardinia; but was defended by Cicero and Hortensius, and acquitted. All these candidates were guilty of bribery to such an amount as to produce a great effect on the money market; for they borrowed such large sums to carry on their canvass,<sup>76</sup> that the rate of interest rose in one day from four to eight per cent. The senate, to repress these proceedings,<sup>77</sup> wished to institute an inquiry into the conduct of the candidates previously to the election; and this being prevented by one of the tribunes, Q. Scævola, another tribune in the interest of the senate, forbade the comitia to be held until this obstruction should be removed. In the mean time, C. Memmius, by the ad-

Infamous agreement between the consuls and two of the candidates.

vice of Pompey,<sup>78</sup> disclosed a singular scene of infamy in which he himself was a principal actor. He produced and read in the senate an agreement which had been entered into by himself and Cn. Domitius Calvinus with the present consuls; in which it was stipulated, that, if they were elected consuls, they would produce three augurs and two senators of consular dignity, who should depose to the validity of a forged act of the comitia curiata, and a forged decree of the senate; that

<sup>72</sup> Valerius Maximus, IV. 2.

<sup>73</sup> Cicero, pro Rabirio Postumo, 8. 12.

<sup>74</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IV. epist. XV.  
ad Q. Fratrem, II. epist. XV.

<sup>75</sup> Cicero, Orat. pro Scauro.

<sup>76</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IV. epist. XV.

<sup>77</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IV. epist. XVI.

<sup>78</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IV. epist. XVIII.

these false instruments were to confer the command of certain provinces on the consuls of the present year, in return for the support which they were to give to Memmius and Domitius in their present contest ; and if the proper witnesses could not be procured to prove what was required, the two candidates agreed to forfeit to the consuls a certain sum of money. We may suppose that Memmius was prevailed upon by the party of the triumvirate to make this disclosure, in order to ruin the character of L. Domitius, one of the present consuls, who, as the friend of Cato, and as the opponent of Pompey and Crassus in the preceding year, was peculiarly obnoxious to them. He trusted besides, that, in consequence of this transaction, the elections would be postponed till after the expiration of the present year ; and Pompey's friends then thought it probable that he might be named dictator, in which case Memmius, as a partisan of the triumvirate, had every prospect of succeeding to the consulship. In fact, the year was suffered to pass away without any election taking place ; L. Domitius and Appius Claudius went out of office ; and the beginning of the seven hundredth year of Rome found the commonwealth in a state of anarchy, without any promise of a speedy return to any thing more regular.

Amongst the events of the year 699 should be mentioned, however, the death of Julia, the daughter of Cæsar, and wife of Pompey. She died immediately after having given birth to a daughter,<sup>79</sup> and the child survived her only a few days. Her amiable character and constant affection to her husband had gained her the general regard of the people ; and this they testified by insisting on celebrating her funeral in the Campus Martius, a compliment scarcely ever paid to any woman before. It is said that Pompey had always loved her tenderly, and the purity and happiness of his domestic life is one of the most delightful points in his character. Now the tie that had bound him so closely to Cæsar was broken, and no private considerations any longer existed to allay the jealousies and animosities which political disputes might enkindle between them.

Death of Julia, the wife of Pompey, and daughter of Cæsar.

The commonwealth remained without consuls for some months,<sup>80</sup> the elections being continually obstructed, as it appears, by some of the tribunes who were in the interest of Pompey, and who wished to drive the aristocracy into the necessity of appointing him dictator. Pompey, however, always professed his unwillingness to accept such a trust ; and whether he was sincere or not, he was obliged, at last, to act agreeably to his professions ; and, uniting his influence to that of the senate, the comitia were at last suffered to be held, and Cn.

Interregnum for several months.

<sup>79</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 53.

<sup>80</sup> Cicero, ad Famil. VII. epist. XI. ad Q. Fratrem, III. epist. VIII.

Consulship of Cn. Domitius and M. Mesalla. U. C. 700. Milo, Scipio, and Hypsæus candidates for the consulship.

Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala were elected consuls. But the same difficulties threatened to arise, with regard to the appointment of their successors. T. Annius Milo,<sup>81</sup> who had borne so

great a part in effecting Cicero's recall from banishment, P. Plautius Hypsæus, a partisan of Pompey, and who had served as his quæstor in the war with Mithridates, and Q. Metellus Scipio, who, being by birth a member of the family of the Scipios, had been adopted into that of the Metelli by Q. Metellus Pius, and who had been accused of bribery seven years before,<sup>82</sup> were now candidates for the consulship; and at the same time, P. Clodius was

Clodius a candidate for the prætorship.

aiming at being elected prætor. The old enmity that had subsisted between Clodius and Milo now

broke out afresh with increased violence; and they opposed one another, as before, with parties of armed men, who frequently met and fought in the streets, while all the candidates were equally guilty of the most scandalous corruption. Milo had the support of the aristocratical party, and had won, moreover, a large share of popular favour, by the extreme magnificence of the games which he had lately exhibited for the entertainment of the multitude. He was thus not unlikely to gain his election, if the comitia were peaceably held; and Clodius, to prevent this, occasionally interrupted the assemblies of the people by acts of violence; on one of which occasions the two consuls were assailed with stones and wounded.<sup>83</sup> Three of the tribunes also, Q. Pompeius Rufus, T. Munatius Plancus Bursa, and C. Sallustius Crispus, the historian, were determined enemies of Milo; and their negatives were probably used, as had been done in the preceding year, to stop the election in a manner more agreeable to law. Cn. Domitius and M. Messala thus resigned the consulship at the end of the year, before any persons were named to succeed them; and a period of anarchy was likely again to continue for some months, till one party or the other could gain a more decided ascendancy.

But an event soon occurred which totally changed the face of affairs. On the twentieth of January, Milo set out

Interregnum.

from Rome to go to Lanuvium, a town of which he was the chief magistrate, or dictator, and where, by virtue of his office, he was on the following day to appoint a flamen for the performance of some of the religious ceremonies of the municipality. He travelled in a carriage, accompanied by his wife Fausta, and by one of his friends, and attended by a strong body of his slaves, and also by some of those gladiators whose services he had occasionally employed in his contests with Clodius. It was

<sup>81</sup> Asconius, in Ciceron. Orat. pro Milone.

<sup>83</sup> Cicero, *Fragm. de Ære alieno* Milonis, ab. Angel. Maio edit.

<sup>82</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, II. epist. I.



late in the afternoon, and he had just passed the little town of Bovillæ, ascending the Alban hills, when he fell in with Clodius, who was on his way to Rome, mounted on horseback, and followed by about thirty of his slaves. Clodius, it appears, had been to Aricia on business, and thence had returned to a villa of his own on the Alban hills, where he intended to pass the night; but receiving intelligence of the death of one Cyrus, an architect at Rome, whose property he expected to inherit, he left his villa at a late hour, purposing to travel on with all speed to the capital. He and Milo passed one another without disturbance; but the gladiators, who were among the last of Milo's party, provoked a quarrel with the slaves of Clodius; and Clodius turning back, and interposing in an authoritative manner, Birria, one of the gladiators, ran him through the shoulder with his sword. Upon this the fray became more general. Milo's slaves hastened back in greater numbers to take part in it, while Clodius was carried into an inn at Bovillæ. Meanwhile, Milo himself was informed of what had passed, and, resolving to avail himself of the opportunity which was before him, he ordered his slaves to attack the inn and destroy his enemy. Clodius was dragged out into the road, and there murdered; his slaves shared his fate, or saved their lives by flying to places of concealment; and his body, covered with wounds, was left on the ground in the middle of the highway.<sup>84</sup>

Clodius is murdered  
by Milo at Bovillæ.  
U. C. 701.

After the perpetration of this act, Milo continued his journey towards Lanuvium. The body of Clodius was taken up soon after by a senator who happened to be returning to Rome from the country, and was sent on by him to the capital in his own litter; he himself (suspecting, probably, what was likely to follow) going back to the place which he had just left, in order to be out of the way of all disturbance. It was about an hour after nightfall that the body was brought to the house of Clodius in Rome, and there deposited in the court of the building. A crowd, consisting of the lowest class of the populace and of slaves, presently gathered round it; and Fulvia, the widow of the deceased, inflamed their passions by a display of the wildest sorrow, as she pointed out the wounds with which her husband was covered. By daybreak, on the following morning, the crowd was greatly increased, and the tribunes, T. Munatius and Q. Pompeius, who were attached to the popular party, hastening to the spot, recommended to the people to take up the body in its present state, to bear it into the forum,

The body of Clodius is  
carried to Rome, and  
burnt by the populace  
in the senate-house.

<sup>84</sup> Asconius, in Ciceron. Orat. pro Milone. This account of the death of Clodius is taken from the argument prefixed by Asconius to Cicero's speech in defence of Milo. In the whole of the de-

tail Asconius has shown great diligence, clearness, and impartiality; and his authority, on this occasion, may be followed with entire reliance on its excellence.

and there exhibit it on the rostra. The multitude readily followed their directions; and the two tribunes began to expatiate on the atrocity of the murder, and to inflame the public indignation against its author. As the passions of the populace were excited they were more disposed to listen to the most violent suggestions; and presently they carried the body from the rostra into the senate-house, and there set fire to it on a pile made at the moment out of the benches, tables, and other furniture which they found at hand. The consequence was, as might have been expected, that the senate-house itself was involved in the conflagration, and burnt to the ground; many of the populace, no doubt, delighting in the accident, and pleased to see Clodius, even after his death, becoming the cause of mischief to that assembly, which, during his lifetime, he had regarded with such unceasing enmity.

These and several other disorders committed by the multitude somewhat turned the tide of public opinion, which had at first run strongly against Milo. He now was encouraged to return to Rome, to renew his canvass for the consulship, and to make a large distribution of money among the several tribes. The other candidates continued their intrigues in the same manner,<sup>85</sup> and parties of armed men were employed successively on all sides to prevent the comitia from being peaceably held, insomuch that the senate at last gave the usual solemn charge to the interrex, the tribunes of the people, and Pompey as a proconsul holding a military command, "that they should provide for the safety of the commonwealth," and that Pompey should be commissioned to levy soldiers in every part of Italy to assist him in maintaining the public peace. But as it seemed desirable at once to remove the want of a supreme magistrate, and as the appointment of a dictator was a measure generally obnoxious, it was proposed in the senate by M. Bibulus, with the concurrence of M. Cato, that

Pompey appointed  
sole consul.

Pompey should forthwith be declared consul without any colleague. This seemed a complete overture on the part of the aristocracy towards a reconciliation with Pompey, and he received it as such, and is said to have expressed particularly to Cato, his thanks for the confidence which he had thus reposed in him.<sup>86</sup> He entered on his office immediately without opposition: whether it was admitted that the senate might by its own authority create a consul as well as a dictator on extraordinary occasions, or whether the interrex was enabled to hold the comitia, and the resolution of the senate was confirmed by the votes of the people. No sooner was he declared consul

Laws of Pompey.

than he brought forward two laws with the sanction of the senate;<sup>87</sup> one enacting that an inquiry

<sup>85</sup> Asconius, in Ciceron. orat. pro Milone.

<sup>86</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, 47, 48.

<sup>87</sup> Asconius, ubi supra.

should be instituted into the late acts of violence, and specifying particularly the murder of Clodius, and the burning of the senate-house; the other providing severer penalties for the crime of bribery. In both a material improvement was introduced in the regulation of trials: the witnesses on each side were to be previously examined during three days, and on the following day both the accuser and the accused were to finish their pleadings, two hours being allowed to the former, and three to the latter. It was further enacted, that a judge should be chosen by the people from among the citizens of consular rank, to preside in the proposed inquiry. When these laws were first brought forward, M. Cælius, one of the tribunes, a man of doubtful character and closely connected with Milo, endeavoured to obstruct their progress, but was deterred by a threatening expression of Pompey, "that he would protect the commonwealth, if necessary, by force of arms." Pompey, indeed, appeared personally to apprehend the violence of Milo. A man who had so long been accustomed to employ a band of gladiators in his political contests, and who had lately used their swords with so little scruple against his enemy, might well be suspected of venturing on some desperate measure to escape the judgment of the laws; and Pompey, therefore, surrounded his residence with a strong military guard, and on one occasion assembled the senate in one of the galleries of his own house, that they might be under the safeguard of his soldiers.

Meantime L. Domitius Ænobarbus, who had been consul two years before, was appointed chief judge for the approaching trials; and the other members of the court were nominated by Pompey with such care that Rome had never seen a tribunal composed of citizens more distinguished or of greater integrity. M. Cato is mentioned as having been one of their number. Before these judges Milo was accused by two of the nephews of Clodius; and the examination of witnesses, according to Pompey's new law, commenced on the fourth of April, and continued during that and the two following days. The proceedings were carried on in the forum; and on the first day when M. Marcellus, one of Milo's advocates, was beginning to question one of the witnesses for the prosecution, the rabble, which filled the forum, and which consisted of the partisans of Clodius, raised so alarming a clamour that Marcellus, dreading some personal violence, was received within the place set apart for the judges, and Pompey was applied to for a guard to enable the accused to conduct his defence with freedom. Accordingly, on the following days, the court was protected by the presence of so strong a military force, that the examination of the witnesses was concluded without a second interruption. On the afternoon of the third day, after the court had adjourned till its final sitting,

Trial of Milo.



T. Munatius Plancus addressed the multitude, and advised them to attend on the last day of the trial with a full display of their strength, to testify to the judges their own opinion of Milo's guilt, and not to suffer him to escape the punishment which he deserved. At length, on the morning of the eighth of April, the court again assembled; the shops were shut throughout the city; the forum was crowded by multitudes of the populace, and surrounded by Pompey's soldiers; Pompey himself was present, attended by a select guard; the judges, eighty-one in number, were taken by lot out of the larger list of persons nominated by Pompey, and the commencement of the pleadings was awaited in a silence of the deepest interest by the immense concourse of people that thronged the forum. The accusers were three in number, Appius Claudius, one of Clodius's nephews, M. Antonius, who was afterwards so distinguished, and P. Valerius Nepos; and their speeches, according to Pompey's law, were limited to two hours altogether. Cicero arose to reply in defence of Milo, but it is said that he was so confused by the clamours and outcries of the populace devoted to the party of Clodius, that he did not speak with his usual force and eloquence. Before the sentence of the court was to be pronounced, fifteen judges were challenged by the accusers, and as many by Milo, so that there were left only fifty-one persons who actually decided the cause, and out of these there were found thirteen who voted in favour of the accused, and thirty-eight who condemned

He is condemned, and goes into exile.

him. When the event of the trial was known he went into exile, and fixed his abode at Massilia, or Marseilles, in Gaul; he was also tried after his departure for three other distinct offences; for bribery, for illegal caballing and combinations, and for acts of violence, and was successively found guilty on all. But the triumph of his enemies was limited to the ruin of Milo alone, for when, shortly afterwards, M. Saufeius was accused for having headed the assault on the inn at Bovillæ, he was acquitted, although the charge was notoriously true; and this decision was owing to the universal abhorrence in which the memory of Clodius was held. On the other hand, Sex. Clodius and T. Munatius Plancus<sup>88</sup> were brought to trial as the instigators of that riot in which the senate-house had been burnt; and they, together with several others of the same party, were found guilty. Thus justice seemed to be administered with unusual impartiality; and Pompey's behaviour fully justified the confidence which his countrymen had shown in conferring on him an authority so extensive and so unprecedented.

After he had held the consulship alone for some months, he chose for his colleague L. Scipio. The new consul had been one of the candidates for that office at the beginning of the year, and

<sup>88</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. VII. epist. II.

his daughter Cornelia had lately become the wife of Pompey. Several prosecutions for bribery were going on at this time, under the new law of Pompey; and another measure was either proposed by him, or was now for the first time carried into effect, in order still further to check that immoderate competition for public offices which had of late been so injurious to the commonwealth. It was enacted<sup>89</sup> that no magistrate should be appointed to the government of a province till five years had elapsed from the expiration of his magistracy; but at the same time we are told, that Pompey did not hesitate to procure for himself a continuation of his command in Spain for five additional years. This act of most ill-judged ambition was attended with consequences more disastrous to his country than Pompey could be expected to foresee. His conduct since the beginning of his consulship had greatly reconciled him to the aristocratical party; and the severe laws which he had brought forward to correct the public disorders, combined with the desire which he still manifested to maintain his own supremacy in reputation and dignity, gave no small alarm to all those who hoped to rise in the commonwealth by corruption or tumults, as if Pompey, having himself gained the height which he coveted, was resolved to employ his power in barring up the path against all others. Above all, Cæsar and his immediate partisans regarded the present course of Pompey's administration with the utmost jealousy. Cæsar's own command in Gaul had now lasted for more than six years, and in less than four years more it would naturally expire; he had then the prospect of returning to Rome as a private citizen, while Pompey would still retain the command of an army, and, from his late conduct, was likely to enjoy, at least in a far greater degree than himself, the confidence and support of the aristocracy. Before his connexion then with Pompey was disturbed by a more decided separation of their interests, and while the remembrance of his daughter Julia was still alive in the heart of her husband, notwithstanding his recent marriage with another, he resolved to avail himself of Pompey's influence to secure a point most essential to his future designs. He might represent with some plausibility, that while Pompey was combining the possession of civil and military authority in his own person, he ought not himself to be debarred from pursuing his career of honours at home, because the service of the state was still detaining him in Gaul; and he proposed, accordingly, that he might be allowed to become a candidate for the consulship in his absence, without resigning the command of his army, or leaving the important duties of his province. To this Pompey not only assented, but even himself<sup>90</sup> applied to Cicero

<sup>89</sup> Dion Cassius, XL. 147.

<sup>90</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. I.

Law allowing Cæsar to become a candidate for the consulship in his absence.

to obtain his concurrence in the measure, and accordingly a law, such as Cæsar desired, was brought forward by some of the tribunes, and was passed in spite of the most vehement opposition on the part of Cato.<sup>91</sup> But when Cæsar's friends expressed a desire to obtain a still further extension of the term of his command in Gaul, Pompey was unwilling to support them, and, according to Plutarch,<sup>92</sup> he asserted that he had letters from Cæsar in his possession, in which Cæsar himself professed that he was tired of the labours of a military life, and that he would gladly be relieved by the appointment of a successor.

While, however, Cæsar was thus affecting to be disgusted with his actual situation, he was in reality making it subservient in many ways to the designs which he entertained against the liberties of his country. During the present summer he had, in fact, completed the conquest of Gaul by the defeat of the formidable confederacy organized by Vercingetorix, and by the capture of Alesia. By his successive victories he had amassed a treasure which, if we judge by the effects ascribed to it, must have been enormous. He is said to have spared no expense in gaining over every person whose support at Rome might be valuable. He lent Cicero<sup>93</sup> a large sum of money to enable him to rebuild his houses after his return from banishment; he won the favour of the populace by commencing several public works in the city,<sup>94</sup> by giving splendid exhibitions of gladiators, and by offering entertainments to the multitude in honour of his daughter Julia's memory. To his own army his liberalities were almost unbounded; while his camp presented a place of refuge to the needy, the profligate, the debtors, and even the criminals,<sup>95</sup> who found it convenient to retreat from the capital. When it is remembered that the object of all this profusion was the enslaving of his country, and that the means which enabled him to practise it were derived from the unprovoked pillage of the towns and temples of Gaul, and the sale of those unfortunate barbarians, who, in the course of his unjust wars, became his prisoners, it may be justly doubted whether the life of any individual recorded in history was ever productive of a greater amount of human misery, or has been marked with a deeper stain of wickedness.

Meantime the year drew near its close, and the consular elections were again approaching. The candidates were Servius Sulpicius, a man eminent for his great knowledge as a lawyer, M. Claudius Marcellus, and M. Cato;

Consulship of Ser. Sulpicius and M. Marcellus.

<sup>91</sup> Livy, Epitome, CVII.

<sup>92</sup> In Pompeio, 56.

<sup>93</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, V. epist. V. VI.; 27.

VII. epist. III. VIII. Ad Familiæ, I. epist. IX.

<sup>94</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 26.

<sup>95</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 20. Suetonius,



and as Cato was generally unpopular with the multitude, from his exertions to stop that traffic in votes by which they were benefited, Sulpicius and Marcellus were elected. Marcellus was a partisan of Pompey, and as such was disposed to act against Cæsar; for although the two leaders professed a friendship for each other, yet their respective adherents already conducted themselves as if an open quarrel had taken place between them. From this point it becomes necessary to trace minutely the progress of those disputes which so soon terminated in the civil war; and to these, indeed, our attention for the present will be chiefly confined.

It may be remembered that the party of Marius and Cinna, during the former civil dissensions, derived its main strength from the support of the Italian allies, whose claim to the rights of Roman citizenship had been always opposed by the aristocracy, and favoured by the popular leaders. The event of what is called the Italian war, had procured for the Italians all that they desired; and the victory of Sylla had, as we have seen, deprived them only, in a few instances, of the advantages which they had gained. But the inhabitants of the country between the Po and the Alps had not yet been raised to an equality with the other people of the peninsula; and their cause accordingly was espoused by those who wished to gain popularity, in the same manner as the privileges of the other Italians had been contended for on former occasions. We have already seen that when M. Crassus was censor, in the year 688, he had wished to extend the rights of citizenship to the people beyond the Po, but was prevented by the opposition of his colleague, Q. Catulus; and it is said, that Cæsar<sup>96</sup> had even then exerted himself on the popular side of the question, and had secretly instigated the Transpadani to assert their claims by an open insurrection. The command which he had since enjoyed in the north of Italy, was likely to make him more desirous of ingratiating himself with its inhabitants; and whilst he was disposed on the first favourable opportunity to procure for them in general the freedom of Rome, he had, in the mean time, availed himself of a power conferred on him by the Vatinian law,<sup>97</sup> under which he held his command, and had bestowed on some of the towns north of the Po, the rank and title of Roman colonies; so that any of their inhabitants, who had held any public office in their own city, became, in consequence, *ipso facto* citizens of Rome. Among the towns thus favoured, was Comum, situated at the foot of the Lake Laris, or, as it is now called, the Lake of Como; a place which had first received an accession of inhabitants from Cn. Pompeius, the father of Pompey,<sup>98</sup> and secondly from C. Sci-

Cæsar supports the claims of the people north of the Po to the rights of Roman citizenship.  
U. C. 702.

<sup>96</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 8.

<sup>98</sup> Strabo, V. 236, edit. Xyland.

<sup>97</sup> Suetonius, 28. Appian, de Bell. Civil. II. 26.

pio, who appears to have been exiled under the dictatorship of Sylla,<sup>99</sup> and whose misfortune may possibly have communicated itself in part to the town which he had patronized. Cæsar had added five thousand names to the list of its citizens, amongst whom were five hundred Greeks of distinction, who did not reside at Comum, but enjoyed the privileges of the new establishment, and reflected some honour on its name. One of the citizens of Comum,<sup>100</sup> who had held a magistracy there, happened to go to Rome in the present year, and claimed the rights of a Roman citizen, on the ground of having filled a public office in a Roman colony. The consul, M. Marcellus, one of whose ancestors, by a curious coincidence, had first recovered Comum<sup>101</sup> to the Roman dominion after the second Punic war, desirous to express his animosity against Cæsar, insisted that the man's claim was ill-grounded, and, in mockery of his pretensions, ordered him to be publicly scourged, desiring him, it is said, to go and show his stripes to Cæsar. This act of unmanly cruelty was probably of considerable service to the cause of him whom it was meant to insult; and Cicero, in a letter to Atticus,<sup>102</sup> expressed his opinion, that it would give as great offence to Pompey as to Cæsar; for Pompey, it seems, with his usual true liberality,<sup>103</sup> had taken the case of the people beyond the Po into his consideration, and was disposed to grant them the rights of citizenship as an act of justice, and as one of those honourable means by which a government may most wisely and most effectually defeat the designs of the disaffected.

The conduct of the consul Marcellus in this affair was a bad omen of his temper and judgment in the management of the main dispute between the government and Cæsar. As the war in Gaul drew more evidently towards its close, men seemed on a sudden to be awakened to a sense of their error in having allowed an officer of Cæsar's character to form and discipline a formidable army in the very position that was most dangerous to the safety of the commonwealth; and the wish was generally entertained of removing him by any means whatever from a station so threatening. But while Marcellus was anxious to effect this object at any risk, his colleague, Ser. Sulpicius,<sup>104</sup> endeavoured to moderate the vehemence of the senate by representing the inevitable evils of all civil wars, and by bidding them remember the natural tendency of such contests to increase in havoc and atrocity, each improving on the precedent of that which had gone before it. His moderation, and the unwillingness of Pompey to give Cæsar any just cause of offence, prevented all violent proceedings for the present. It was only resolved by the senate,<sup>105</sup>

<sup>99</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, 3.

<sup>100</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. II. 26. Plutarch, in Cæsare, 29.

<sup>101</sup> Livy, XXXIII. 36.

<sup>102</sup> Ad Atticum, V. epist. XI.

<sup>103</sup> Ad Atticum, V. epist. II.

<sup>104</sup> Cicero, ad Famil. IV. epist. III.

<sup>105</sup> Cicero, ad Famil. VIII. epist. VIII.

that the disposal of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, and of the other provinces, should be discussed early in the following year; that if any person should endeavour to stop the jurisdiction of the senate in this affair, he should be considered as acting against the good of the commonwealth; and that further, the cases of all soldiers in Cæsar's army claiming their discharge, should then be considered and determined by the senate. Several of the tribunes, who had been gained by Cæsar, interposed their negatives upon this resolution; so that it could not have the force of a decree, but was registered in the journals, under the title of the "authority" of the senate.

Meantime, C. Claudius Marcellus, a cousin of the present consul, and L. Æmilius Paullus, were elected consuls for the following year; and C. Scribonius Curio was at the same time elected one of the tribunes.<sup>106</sup>

Consulship of C. Marcellus and L. Paullus. U. C. 703. Tribuneship of C. Curio.

Curio was a man of talents, of eloquence, of a restless thirst for distinction, and impatient of slight or neglect. In the year of Cæsar's consulship, when the power of the triumvirate was at its height, he had courted and obtained popular applause by the boldness with which he had on some occasions attacked their conduct.<sup>107</sup> When candidate for the tribuneship, he professed himself warmly devoted to the party of the senate, being irritated, as it is said,<sup>108</sup> by some appearances of indifference or contempt which were manifested towards him by Cæsar. But, in the very first month of his tribuneship, he was again disgusted with the aristocracy,<sup>109</sup> because he could not obtain the insertion of several additional days in the calendar to lengthen the term of his office; the intercalary month, which was inserted every year to make up the deficiency in the ordinary computation, being made longer or shorter at the discretion of the pontifices, according as the interests or wishes of their friends or their party might require. On this ground, Curio began to espouse the cause of Cæsar; and a man so jealous of affront, so ambitious, and with so little steadiness of character, may be as naturally supposed to have acted from this motive, as from that still baser one which rumour imputed to him,<sup>110</sup> namely, that he was bribed, by Cæsar, with a sum amounting to about 80,000*l.* of our money.

Yet the year 703 passed on to its close without witnessing any thing more decisive than the year which had preceded it. We are told that Curio professed to follow a course of perfect impartiality,<sup>111</sup> and proposed that both Cæsar and Pompey should alike resign their military commands, that so the republic might have nothing to fear from the ambition of either. When he

<sup>106</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. II. epist. VII.

<sup>107</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, II. epist. XVIII.

<sup>108</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. VIII. epist. IV.

<sup>109</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. VIII. epist. VI.

<sup>110</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 48.

<sup>111</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 58. Dion Cassius, XL. 150.



found that the senate was disinclined to this measure, he began to attack Pompey with great freedom,<sup>112</sup> and to charge him with aspiring to the exercise of an absolute power over his country. Pompey's influence in Rome had long been so predominant, that language of this sort was considered a proof of extraordinary boldness; and the multitude, who always delight to hear invectives against the powerful, testified their admiration of Curio by the liveliest acclamations. He threatened, it seems,<sup>113</sup> to negative any decision to which the senate might come respecting Cæsar's recall; and thus the question concerning the provinces was not brought forward on the first of March, as the senate had before resolved, but was suffered to remain undetermined. It was understood to be Pompey's wish that Cæsar should now be recalled on the thirteenth of November, and that he should on no account be permitted to enjoy the consulship till he had resigned the command of his army. Two years before, it will be remembered, Pompey had interested himself in obtaining for Cæsar the very privilege which he now wished to take away; but in that interval Cæsar had shown a disposition to resist the senate's authority, which might give just suspicion of his real designs. Pompey justly considered the successive interference of the tribunes to deprive the senate of their lawful control over the provinces, as equivalent to an actual disobedience on the part of Cæsar,<sup>114</sup> in whose behalf and at whose instigation this interference was exerted; and the general attachment of all profligate and desperate citizens to the cause of Cæsar, and the resort of many persons of that description to his camp, where they were received with the utmost cordiality, seemed to warn the commonwealth of the danger of allowing the head of such a party to unite the command of an army with the highest post in the civil government. It is the opinion of Cicero,<sup>115</sup> that if the senate had consented, according to many former precedents, to apply officially to Curio, and request that he would not interpose his negative on their decrees, he would have yielded to their wishes. But this, though proposed by M. Marcellus,<sup>116</sup> was not adopted; and Curio, still further incensed at this apparent contempt of his power, persisted in his threats of preventing the execution of every thing which the senate might resolve. In this manner nothing was determined; and the final decision of the question, with its important results, a civil war on the one hand, or on the other the removal of all apprehensions or violence from Cæsar, was to be reserved for the following year, when C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius

<sup>112</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. VIII. epist. XI.

Appian, de Bell. Civil. II. 28.

<sup>113</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. VIII. epist. XI.

<sup>114</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. VIII. epist. VIII.

<sup>115</sup> Ad Atticum, VII. epist. VII.

<sup>116</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. VIII. epist.

XIII.

Lentulus were appointed consuls; the last individuals who ever held that office by the unforced votes of the Roman people.

It was about the autumn of the year 702 that Pompey was seized with a dangerous fever,<sup>117</sup> while at his villa in the neighbourhood of Naples. No sooner was his illness known, than public prayers for his safety were offered up throughout Italy; and when he recovered, sacrifices of thanksgiving were equally general: every town celebrated the event by a spontaneous festival; and when he was able to travel to Rome, multitudes of people thronged the road with garlands on their heads and torches in their hands, scattering flowers around him as he passed. These signs of the attachment of his countrymen were received by Pompey with peculiar pleasure, for he had ever been more ambitious of popularity than of power; but it is said that they misled him fatally on the present occasion, by inducing him to estimate from them the real strength of his cause. So confident, indeed, did he feel in the support of the Italians, that he is said to have declared that he could raise armies in Italy by the stamp of his foot.<sup>118</sup> But he was for a long time also lulled into security from a belief that Cæsar would not dare to make war upon his country for his own private quarrel; perhaps, also, from a persuasion that he would be restrained by his personal friendship to himself. This last hope, however, vanished towards the close of the year 703, when Hirtius,<sup>119</sup> one of Cæsar's most confidential officers, arrived at Rome from the army, and departed again without visiting Pompey, or holding any communication with him; and still more, when M. Antonius, who had been Cæsar's quæstor in Gaul, and who had been just elected tribune, to support his interests, delivered a speech full of violent invectives against Pompey,<sup>120</sup> and attacking the whole of his public life from its first commencement. From that time he looked forward to a war as inevitable, and professed that he dreaded such an issue less than the prospect of allowing Cæsar to enjoy any political power at Rome. His own great name, the large army held by his lieutenants in Spain, the attachment of the Italians, and the authority of the senate, seemed to insure him an easy victory over a single rebel general and his army, however great might be the talents of the one and the discipline of the other.

But, in fact, the mass of the people of Italy were not disposed to risk their lives and properties in the maintenance of a contest which seemed little to affect their individual interests. The landed proprietors and the monied men

*Illness of Pompey.*

*Of the supporters and resources of Pompey.*

<sup>117</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 57. Velleius Paterculus, II. 48.

<sup>118</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 57.

<sup>119</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. IV.

<sup>120</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. VIII.

were anxious for peace,<sup>121</sup> and indifferent whether Pompey or Cæsar administered the affairs of the commonwealth; the citizens of the different towns, who had been so earnest in their prayers for Pompey's safety, were not equally ready to endure for his sake the evils of a civil war, and the devastation of their homes and families; while the men of desperate fortunes, the debtor, the profligate, and the robber, were eager in every part of Italy to embrace the cause of Cæsar, as that of revolution, and impunity, and plunder. If from Italy we extend our view to the provinces, we shall find them influenced by particular causes to favour one leader or the other, according as their principal inhabitants had received favours from either, or as either happened to be better known amongst them, or to possess the strongest military force in their immediate neighbourhood. But degraded and oppressed as they had been under the Roman government, it mattered little to them by what party the system under which they suffered was administered; unless there were some among them, who, looking upon Cæsar as the advocate of popular and liberal principles, indulged the hope that he would extend more generally that envied privilege of Roman citizenship, which he had already wished to impart far wider than his aristocratical opponents were willing to allow.

The authority of the senate, and the reputation of upholding the cause of law and good principles, might have conferred a greater strength on Pompey, had it not been for the selfish, and narrow, and profligate views and characters which marked so many of his adherents. His own private morals were remarkably pure and amiable; but his father-in-law Metellus Scipio had, even when consul,<sup>122</sup> been present at an entertainment where such a scene of debauchery was exhibited, as no honest man, and far less a magistrate, should have sanctioned by his presence; and Appius Claudius, with whom he was also become connected by the marriage of his son Cnæus with Appius's daughter, after having committed many acts of oppression and extortion in his province of Cilicia, after having been detected, during his consulship, in the grossest corruption, and having obtained a general character of prodigality and voluptuousness, was now invested with the office of censor,<sup>123</sup> and was exerting his power with the utmost severity. He expelled a number of persons from the senate, and amongst the rest C. Sallustius Crispus, the historian; he also degraded many individuals of the equestrian order; and although we are not told that any of his censures were undeserved, yet they seemed inconsistent with the character of the censor himself, and served to alienate from the cause of the aris-

<sup>121</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VIII. epist. XIII.

<sup>123</sup> Cicero, ad Famil. VIII. epist. XIV. Dion Cassius, XL. 150.

<sup>122</sup> Valerius Maximus, IX. 1.



tocracy those who had become obnoxious to them. L. Lentulus, one of the consuls for the present year, was overwhelmed with debts,<sup>124</sup> and is said to have eagerly anticipated a civil war, as the means of restoring his broken fortunes. To these might be added that large proportion of selfish and narrowminded individuals who are the incumbrance and disgrace of every aristocracy; men who abhor all reform, because they think it may interfere with their comforts and privileges, and who consider their own ascendancy rather as the ultimate object of government than as one of the means by which the general welfare of the state is promoted; men, in short, who burden a noble cause with all the weight of their pride and ignorance, who render its success a doubtful blessing, and lessen the regret with which the good regard its overthrow. This was the party which had persecuted the patriotic tribune C. Cornelius, which had largely shared in the oppression and plunder of the provinces, and which had constantly opposed the extension of the right of Roman citizenship to the allied or subject states of Italy.

On the other hand, the strength of Cæsar's cause was of a nature most likely to insure victory in such a state of society as the Roman empire exhibited. He was Of the supporters and resources of Cæsar. at the head of an army of nine legions,<sup>125</sup> consisting of such veteran soldiers, that one of the legions was considered inferior to the rest in tried courage and experience because it had not served more than eight campaigns. The people of the north of Italy were attached to him as the supporter of their claims for a participation in the freedom of Rome; and Gaul, however ill-affected towards the man who had been at once her spoiler and enslaver, was yet forced to assist his views by the wealth which her plunder put at his disposal, and which enabled him to purchase partisans at Rome, and to bind his soldiers to his interests by the liberality of his donations. Thus amply provided with means to strike the first blow with effect, he trusted on his approach to Rome to find a numerous party ready to co-operate with him. The profligate young nobility,<sup>126</sup> who had conspired with Catiline in his plans of rapine and murder, and who had since abetted the vices and the riots of P. Clodius, were eager to support this new leader, who would accomplish, as they trusted, what their former chiefs had attempted in vain; and the rabble of the capital, constantly at enmity with the existing government, was a certain ally to any one who should head a rebellion. All these were likely to be active assistants in promoting the cause which they espoused; while a large proportion of those who wished well to

<sup>124</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 49. Cæsar, de Bell. Civili, I. 4.

<sup>126</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. V. VII.

<sup>125</sup> Cæsar, de Bell. Gallico, VIII. 46.

the constitution would confine their zeal to words or feelings, and would make no practical exertions in its behalf.

It may not be uninteresting to the reader here to mention the dispositions and the situation of some of the most eminent citizens of the commonwealth, when the civil war was now on the very eve of its commencement. We have spoken of the departure of M. Crassus from Rome in the year 698, to take possession of his province of Syria, and to attempt the conquest of Parthia; and we have shown how, in the year 700, his ambition, unaccompanied by corresponding ability, had been finally checked by his defeat and death in Mesopotamia. The wreck of his army had been led back into Syria with considerable difficulty by C. Cassius,<sup>127</sup> afterwards one of the assassins of Cæsar, and at this time acting as quæstor under Crassus. Cassius covered the province of Syria against the attacks of the Parthians, and maintained his ground till, in the year 702, M. Cicero was appointed to succeed Appius Claudius in the government of Cilicia, and M. Bibulus arrived in Syria to take the command in the room of Cassius. Neither of these officers, however, had much to do in their military capacity, for the Parthians were unequal to make any serious impression on the Roman empire: but Cicero<sup>128</sup> carried with him into his province the virtues of his private life, and preserved both himself and all his subordinate officers pure from every act of oppression or extortion; nor would he even accept from the provincials those sums for the maintenance of his personal establishment, which, as the governors received no salary from the treasury at home, were considered as the ordinary allowances of their office. He resigned his command and returned to Italy about the close of the year 703, but remained at his different villas for some time; and when he moved towards Rome early in January,<sup>129</sup> he did not enter the city, or take any part in the debates of the senate, as he intended to prefer his claim to a triumph, on account of some successes which he had gained over the plundering tribes of the mountain districts of Cilicia; and under these circumstances he was obliged by law to remain without the walls of Rome. M. Cato was constantly attending the senate, and, as might be supposed, gave his warm support to every resolution hostile to Cæsar. L. Lucullus and his brother Marcus had been some time dead; and Q. Hortensius, another of the oldest and most eloquent members of the aristocratical party, had died more recently, in the summer of the year 703.<sup>130</sup> P. Lentulus Spinther, to whose exertions, when consul, Cicero professed himself greatly indebted for his restoration from exile, and L. Domitius, the colleague of Appius Claudius in

<sup>127</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 46.

<sup>128</sup> Ad Atticum, V. and VI. passim.  
Ad Familiar. XV. epist. V.

<sup>129</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. XVI. epist. XI.

<sup>130</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. VIII. epist. XIII.

the consulship, and implicated together with him in the corrupt agreement which they entered into with two of the candidates for the succession to their office, were both in Rome, and disposed to co-operate zealously with Pompey. L. Piso, the father-in-law of Cæsar, who had been consul with A. Gabinius in the year of Cicero's banishment, was now censor, and although wishing to restrain the vehement proceedings of his colleague Appius Claudius,<sup>131</sup> was yet by no means inclined to go all lengths with Cæsar. Of the persons who afterwards acted a principal part in the civil wars, M. Antonius was now just elected one of the tribunes in order to further Cæsar's designs; M. Brutus was in Rome, but although known as the nephew of Cato, and as the son-in-law of Appius Claudius, and considered as a young man of promising talents,<sup>132</sup> he had as yet taken no conspicuous share in public affairs. C. Cassius was one of the tribunes for this year;<sup>133</sup> and C. Octavius, now a boy of about thirteen years of age, was living at Rome under the care of his mother Atia, and of his father-in-law L. Philippus.

On the first of January, 704,<sup>134</sup> when the new consuls, L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus, entered on their office, C. Curio, the late tribune, arrived in Rome from Cæsar's quarters, whither he had lately betaken himself, and presents a letter from Cæsar, addressed to the senate. It was read at the earnest desire of the tribunes, Q. Cassius and M. Antonius; and contained a statement of Cæsar's services to the commonwealth, and professions of his willingness to resign his province and the command of his army, if Pompey would do the same; but otherwise, he said, it was unjust to desire him to expose himself without defence to the attempts of his enemies. This language was in itself rebellious, inasmuch as it dictated the terms on which alone he would obey the senate's orders; the consuls, therefore, refused to take the sense of the senate on the contents of the letter, but called upon the assembly to consider generally the state of the republic. A vehement debate ensues,<sup>135</sup> and one or two members urged that Cæsar's proposals should be accepted; but a great majority resolved, on the motion of Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, that Cæsar should resign the command of his army by a certain day, and that if he refused to comply with this order, his conduct should be regarded as treasonable. The account of these transactions, which goes under Cæsar's name, whether it be really the work of himself or of one of his partisans, naturally represents this decision as being almost extorted from the fears of the senate by the violence of Pompey's friends, and the apprehension of the

Cæsar dictates terms to the senate.

He is ordered by the senate to give up his army.  
U. C. 704. Oct. 22.

<sup>131</sup> Dion Cassius, XL. 150.

<sup>132</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. III. epist. X.

<sup>133</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. XXI.

<sup>134</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civili, II. 32. Dion Cassius, XLI. 152.

<sup>135</sup> Cæsar, de Bell. Civili, I. 2.



military force which he commanded in the neighbourhood of the capital; but it appears from Cicero's more impartial testimony, that although many of the more moderate senators<sup>136</sup> were probably hurried into resolutions more violent than they thought expedient, yet that Cæsar's pretensions were generally regarded with abhorrence; and that they doubted not of the justice, but of the policy of requiring him to give up his army.

The senate's decree is negatived by two of the tribunes.

However, the decree of the senate was negatived by the tribunes Antonius and Cassius;<sup>137</sup> upon which the consuls submitted to the assembly the consideration of this negative; and it was debated in what manner they should counteract it. Nothing was determined on that day; but for some days afterwards the more violent party amongst the aristocracy exerted their utmost endeavours to bring the question of Cæsar's obedience at once to an issue. The senators, as had often been practised on similar occasions, put on mourning,<sup>138</sup> to express their feeling that the interests of the commonwealth were obstructed by the behaviour of the tribunes; and when this step failed to produce any effect, they had recourse to their highest prerogative, and gave their

Charge given to the consuls to provide for the safety of the Commonwealth.

charge to the consuls, prætors, tribunes, and proconsuls, "to provide for the safety of the republic."

This resolution was entered on the journals of the senate on the seventh of January; and no sooner was it passed, and Antonius and Cassius, together with Curio,<sup>139</sup> professing to believe their lives in danger, fled in disguise from Rome, and hastened to escape to Cæsar, who was at that time at Ravenna, waiting for the result of his application to the senate.

The tribunes fly to Cæsar.

It appears from one of Cicero's letters,<sup>140</sup> written a few days before the first of January, that he had calculated

U. C. 705.

on such an event as the flight of the tribunes, and on its affording Cæsar a pretext for commencing his rebellion. When it had actually taken place, the senate were well aware of the consequences to which it would lead, and began to make pre-

The senate prepares for war.

parations for their defence. Italy was divided into several districts,<sup>141</sup> each of which was to be placed under the command of a separate officer; soldiers were ordered to be every where levied: money was voted from the treasury to be placed at Pompey's disposal; and the provinces were assigned to their respective governors, as proconsuls or prætors. Among these appointments, Syria was given to P. Scipio, and the two Gauls, which Cæsar had been just summoned to resign, were be-

<sup>136</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XVI. epist. XI. XII.; ad Atticum, VII. epist. VII. IX.

<sup>137</sup> Cæsar, de Bell. Civili, I. 2, 3.

<sup>138</sup> Dion Cassius, XLI. 153.

<sup>139</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XVI. epist. XI. Plutarch, in Cæsare, 31.

<sup>140</sup> Ad Atticum, VII. epist. IX.

<sup>141</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. XVI. epist. XI. XII. Cæsar, de Bello Civili, I. 6.

stowed on L. Domitius and M. Considius Nonianus. The whole direction of the forces of the commonwealth was conferred on Pompey, whose reputation as a general was still so high, that none contemplated the probability of his meeting with an equal antagonist.

We have said that, when Curio, Antonius, and Cassius fled from Rome, Cæsar was at Ravenna. He had with him at this time no other troops than the thirteenth legion, which had been ordered to winter in Cisalpine Gaul;<sup>142</sup> the remainder of his army, amounting to eight legions, was avowedly quartered beyond the Alps; but, by the celerity with which one of these legions afterwards joined him, it may be conjectured that it had already received orders to march into Italy, and was on the Italian side of the Alps at the moment when Cæsar commenced hostilities. No sooner was he informed of the flight of the tribunes, and of the subsequent resolutions of the senate, then he assembled his soldiers, and expatiated on the violence offered to the tribunitian character, and on the attempts of his enemies to despoil him of his dignity, by forcing him to resign his province before the term of his command was expired. Thus much of his speech is avowed by his own party historian: the promises which he made to his followers, and the prospect of spoil and settlements of lands which he held out as the price of their rebellion, it was not equally to his purpose to record, although such temptations were not likely to be omitted. He found his troops perfectly disposed to follow him; and, accordingly, having sent out some men in small parties, with orders to enter unobserved into Ariminum<sup>143</sup> and secure the town, he himself left his quarters at Ravenna late in the evening, and on the following morning, on his arrival at Ariminum, found that his enterprise had succeeded, and that the place was already in his power. This was the first town of importance without the limits of his province on the road to Rome; and by thus seizing it he declared himself in open rebellion, and that from this time forward he was to follow, without reserve, that path of lawless usurpation on which he had for so many years been preparing himself to enter.

Cæsar commences his rebellion.

He seizes Ariminum.

At Ariminum he met the fugitive tribunes,<sup>144</sup> whom he introduced without delay to his army, in the disguise in which they had fled from Rome, desiring them, at the same time, to relate the violence which they had suffered. Cæsar himself then began to speak, imploring the troops, with the most passionate expressions of grief and indignation, to revenge at once the injuries of their general, and the outrage offered to the tribunes of the people. In

<sup>142</sup> Cæsar, I. 7.

<sup>143</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, II. 35.

<sup>144</sup> Cæsar, I. 8. Suetonius, in Cæsare,

33. Dion Cassius, XLI. 154.

the vehemence of his words and gestures he frequently held up his left hand, and, pointing to the ring which he wore as the well-known badge of patrician or equestrian rank, he declared, that he would sooner part with that ring, than fail to satisfy the amplest wishes of those who were now offering their aid to maintain his dignity. The action being seen at a greater distance than the words could be heard, many of the soldiers imagined that he was promising to advance all his followers to the rank and fortune of the equestrian order; and this impression tended not a little to

Fruitless negotiation  
for peace.

inflame their zeal in his behalf. At Ariminum,<sup>145</sup> also, Cæsar found L. Roscius, one of the prætors, and L. Cæsar, a distant relation of his own, who had both left Rome in the hopes of preventing an open rupture, and had both consented to be the bearers of a private communication from Pompey to Cæsar. Its substance was an exculpation of his own conduct in the part he had lately taken; in which he said, he had been actuated by no unkindly feelings towards Cæsar, but from a sense of his paramount duty to the commonwealth; and he urged Cæsar, in like manner, to wave his personal animosities in consideration of his country, and not to seek to punish his enemies at the price of involving the republic in a civil war. Cæsar professed to be equally desirous of avoiding bloodshed; and requested L. Cæsar and Roscius to carry back his answer to Pompey, in which, after studiously dwelling on his supposed injuries, he proposed that both Pompey and himself should give up their armies; that Pompey should go into Spain; and that all the forces in Italy should be disbanded on both sides, that the senate and people of Rome might deliberate and decide on all public questions with perfect freedom; that he himself should resign his provinces of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul to the officers appointed by the senate to succeed him; and that he should go to Rome to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship. Finally, he requested a personal conference with Pompey, that all things might be fully adjusted, and that both parties might pledge themselves by oath to fulfil the conditions of the treaty.

With these terms, L. Cæsar and L. Roscius set out on their return to Pompey. But Cæsar,<sup>146</sup> not waiting to see the result of the negotiation, despatched M. Antonius, who already had taken a command under him, with five cohorts, to occupy Arretium, and, at the same time, he secured, with other detachments, the towns of Ancona, Fanum, and Pisaurum. These movements excited a general consternation;<sup>147</sup> many of the inhabitants fled from their homes at the approach of Cæsar's troops; while men

<sup>145</sup> Cæsar, I. 8, 9. Cicero, ad Familiares, XVI. epist. XII.

ad Familiar. XVI. epist. XII. Cæsar, I. 11.

<sup>146</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. XI. ;

<sup>147</sup> Appian, II. 35. Cicero, ad Atticum. VII. epist. XI.



of broken fortunes, and those who had been obliged to go into exile for their crimes, welcomed his arrival as the sure forerunner of a total revolution. The alarm reached Rome, and produced there such an effect, that Pompey judged it expedient to abandon the capital, as he had not yet organized a force sufficient to withstand the sudden advance of the rebel army. Accordingly, before the nineteenth of January,<sup>148</sup> he withdrew from Rome towards Capua, accompanied by both the consuls, The senate and consuls withdraw from Rome. the great majority of the inferior magistrates, and most of the members of the senate. The treasury was left closely locked, from the precipitation with which the capital was abandoned, or from a reluctance to carry off treasures, some of which were looked upon as almost too sacred to be invaded, and from the hope that Cæsar would in this point imitate the forbearance of his adversaries. It is said that the sight of every thing most noble in the commonwealth being now obliged to fly from their country, produced a strong effect on the public mind;<sup>149</sup> and that compassion for Pompey, and indignation against Cæsar, were for a time the prevailing feelings of the inhabitants of the country towns of Italy. So general was the abhorrence of Cæsar's rebellion, that his own father-in-law, L. Piso,<sup>150</sup> did not hesitate to accompany the senate in their retreat from Rome; and T. Labienus,<sup>151</sup> who had been one of his most favoured lieutenants in Gaul, left him immediately on the open disclosure of his designs against his country, and joined Pompey and the consuls at Theanum in Campania, on the twenty-fourth of January.

It appears certain that Pompey was taken by surprise through the suddenness with which Cæsar commenced Pompey is unable to meet the enemy. hostilities. Trusting probably to the season of the year, he had imagined that he should have two or three months before him; in the course of which he might organize a sufficient force in Italy to prevent Cæsar from advancing, and might thus detain him in Cisalpine Gaul, till the Spanish army, under Afranius and Petreius, could cross the Pyrenees and the Alps to complete his destruction by assailing him in the rear. But when Cæsar opened the campaign just as the winter was setting in, (for, owing to the defective state of the Roman calendar, the nominal time was nearly two months in advance of the real season of the year,) Pompey's preparations for defence were paralyzed. His actual force consisted chiefly of two legions,<sup>152</sup> which had been withdrawn from Cæsar's army by a decree of the senate in the preceding year, as a reinforcement for the troops of the republic in Syria, but which had been detained in Italy, when it became

<sup>148</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. X. XI. XII. Appian 37.

<sup>149</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. XI.

<sup>150</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. XIII.

<sup>151</sup> Ad Atticum, VII. epist. XII. XIII.

<sup>152</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. XIII. Cæsar, de Bell. Gallico, VIII. 54.

apparent that the commonwealth had more to fear on the side of Gaul than of Parthia. These legions had shared in Cæsar's victories for several years, and when he at last parted from them, one, or both of them, had received from him a liberal donation in money,<sup>153</sup> so that Pompey dared not risk a battle while these troops composed the whole or the greater part of his army.<sup>154</sup> His officers, it is true, were busy in levying soldiers in different parts of Italy, and particularly in Picenum, that district in which his father had acquired such great influence, and from which he had himself raised an army of three legions by his personal exertions, when he first took part in public affairs, and though then a youth, without rank or public authority, marched at the head of 15,000 men to support the cause of L. Sylla. But these levies were carried on to a great disadvantage under the constant alarm of the approach of the enemy.<sup>155</sup> Under such circumstances, men are unwilling to come forward; and those who might have rallied round any regular force which was already organized, had no inclination to take upon themselves all the dangers of an unequal resistance. Moreover, Pompey might have remembered, from the experience of the last civil war, that soldiers were easily induced to desert officers with whom they were little acquainted, and whose names bore no commanding authority; and that it was, therefore, most unsafe to trust generals of no reputation with untried soldiers in the presence of such an enemy as Cæsar, whose liberality was hardly less notorious than his victories.

His plan of operations.

His fixed determination, accordingly, was, to avoid all engagements with the rebels, and to concentrate all the troops that his lieutenants could collect in the south of Italy; after which he would be guided by circumstances, whether still to make a stand in Italy, or to cross over into Greece, and there organize the resources of that part of the empire in which his past exploits had gained for him so many connexions, and such an universal popularity.

Pompey was still with the consuls at Theanum,<sup>156</sup> when L. Cæsar arrived there on the twenty-fifth of January, with Cæsar's proposed conditions of peace. They were immediately discussed in a council composed of the principal senators; and it was agreed to accept them, provided that Cæsar would withdraw his troops from all the towns which he had occupied beyond the limits of his province. L. Cæsar was sent back with this answer; and Cicero seems for a time to have flattered himself that the war would thus be brought to a conclusion. But Cæsar had no intention of resting contented with the permission of standing

<sup>153</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. II. 29. Plutarch, in Cæsare, 29.

<sup>155</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. XIII.

<sup>156</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. XIV.

<sup>154</sup> Epist. Pompeii ad Domitium, apud Ciceron. ad Atticum, VIII. epist. XII.

for the consulship when the sovereignty of Rome seemed within his grasp. He complained that Pompey still continued his levies of soldiers;<sup>157</sup> that his making no mention of a personal conference betrayed an unwillingness to terminate the quarrel; and that he had fixed no particular day for his departure into Spain. He meantime,<sup>158</sup> on his own part, was raising troops, and awaiting the arrival of the other legions of his own army; he had occupied the towns of Iguvium and Auximum,<sup>159</sup> which Pompey's officers had in vain attempted to defend; and Curio,<sup>160</sup> in his private correspondence, ridiculed the mission of L. Cæsar, as a measure from which the invader had never really anticipated any result. Pompey, still pursuing his plan of retreating, was at Luceria in Apulia, in the beginning of February; and on the seventh of that month,<sup>161</sup> encouraged by Cæsar's protracted absence, he sent orders to the consuls at Capua, that they should return with all haste to Rome and carry off the sacred treasures from the treasury, which he now regretted that he had left behind. But the consuls, judging the attempt too hazardous, declined to put it in execution. The disobedience of one of his officers soon afterwards brought upon Pompey a far severer loss. P. Lentulus Spinther and L. Vibullius Rufus<sup>162</sup> had been employed in levying soldiers in Picenum, and although, as Cæsar advanced, many of their men deserted and went over to him, yet Vibullius was able to reach Corfinium with fourteen cohorts, amounting to about eight thousand four hundred men. At Corfinium he found L. Domitius Ænobarbus, with a force of twelve cohorts, and C. Hirrus with five more, which he had collected from the neighbourhood of Camerinum. In this manner an army was assembled of nearly nineteen thousand men; and Vibullius<sup>163</sup> wrote to Pompey to tell him that Domitius would put the whole in motion to join him on the ninth of February. But instead of executing this plan, Domitius began to flatter himself that he was strong enough to arrest Cæsar's progress, or at any rate to threaten his rear with serious annoyance, if he should venture to pass beyond him, and advance in pursuit of Pompey. It appears, too, that private interests were allowed to influence his decision;<sup>164</sup> and that some individuals who possessed property in the neighbourhood, induced him to remain, that he might protect their villas, or enable them to remove their effects with greater security. He even divided his forces, and attempted to hold the towns of Sulmo

L. Domitius attempts to defend Corfinium.

<sup>157</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Civili, I. 11.

ad Atticum, VII. epist. XXIII.; VIII.

<sup>158</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist.

epist. II. XI.

XVIII.

<sup>159</sup> Cæsar, I. 12, 13.

<sup>160</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. XIX.

<sup>163</sup> Epist. Pompeii ad L. Domitium, apud Ciceron. ad Atticum, VIII. epist. XII.

<sup>161</sup> Ad Atticum, VII. epist. XXI.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid. antea citata.

<sup>162</sup> Cæsar, Bell. Civili, I. 15. Cicero,



and Alba; and instead of setting out to join Pompey on the ninth of February, he remained at Corfinium in spite of repeated orders to the contrary, till Cæsar arrived before the town, about the fifteenth or sixteenth,<sup>165</sup> with a force which cannot be exactly computed, as he was every day receiving reinforcements either by desertion from the enemy, or by the success of his levies, or by the arrival of detachments from the legions of his own army which he had left in Gaul. Sulmo was soon surrendered to his lieutenant M. Antonius;<sup>166</sup> and the event of the siege of Corfinium was awaited with the most lively interest in every quarter. There were many persons, and Cicero himself was among the number, who expected that Pompey would march to the relief of Domitius, and considered that it would be most disgraceful if he tamely abandoned him. But Domitius had exposed himself to danger in defiance of the express orders of the commander of the armies of the commonwealth; and he had detained with him the levies from Picenum, on whose fidelity to his person Pompey relied with particular confidence, and whose presence he anxiously looked for to overawe the wavering inclinations of the two legions which he had received from Cæsar. It is possible, indeed, that a more enterprising general might have risked the attempt, and might have thought it wise to run all hazards in the hope of putting himself at the head of the soldiers of Picenum; but Pompey, misled perhaps by the example of Sylla, seems to have attached too little value to the possession of Italy, and to have contemplated without regret the prospect of abandoning it for the present, while he was preparing in Greece sufficient resources to enable him, as he trusted, speedily to recover it. Accordingly, having written to Domitius to warn him that he must look for no relief, he continued his retreat towards Brundisium, and reached that place about the twenty-fifth of February.<sup>167</sup> Domitius, thus left to his own resources, soon found how unequal he was to the task of opposing Cæsar; his soldiers began to perceive his distrust of his own situation, and thought that they were now authorized to consult their own safety.<sup>168</sup> They immediately mutinied against their generals, secured the persons of Domitius and the principal officers who were with him, and sent to inform Cæsar that they were ready to open the gates to him, and to put his chief enemies into his power. Upon this offer he took possession of the town, and ordered Domitius, with the other leaders, to be brought before him, when having reproached some of the number with per-

His troops mutiny,  
and surrender the  
town to Cæsar.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid. apud Ciceron. ad Atticum, VIII. 12.

<sup>166</sup> Cæsar, de Bell. Civil. I. 18. Cicero. ad Atticum, VIII. epist. IV.

<sup>167</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VIII. epist. IX. XI.

<sup>168</sup> Cæsar, de Bell. Civil. I. 19. 23.

sonal ingratitude to himself, from whom they had received many favours, he dismissed them all unhurt, and even allowed Domitius to carry off with him a considerable treasure which he had brought to Corfinium for the payment of his troops. The soldiers he enlisted in his own army; and immediately set out from Corfinium, about the twenty-second of February, to prosecute his march to Brundisium. In this manner Cæsar, like Sylla, owed his first great success to the faithlessness or weakness of his enemy's adherents; and the betrayal of Scipio by his own soldiers in Campania was now imitated by the troops at Corfinium, who surrendered their post and their general, and themselves joined the standard of the conqueror.

It now appeared certain that Pompey intended to abandon Italy; and when this determination became known, it necessarily drove the Italians to throw themselves into the arms of Cæsar, since they were left wholly at his mercy. His moderation at Corfinium was every where eagerly reported; and those who at first dreaded the worst evils from the approach of his army,<sup>169</sup> were now grateful to him in proportion to their former fears, when they saw that he abstained, as yet, from confiscations and proscriptions. There were many senators also, and men of rank and fortune,<sup>170</sup> who, considering the Roman government inseparable from the possession of Rome, did not think themselves bound to follow Pompey into a foreign country, and looked upon his resignation of the seat of government as a virtual acknowledgment that Cæsar might now dispose of the commonwealth with some shadow of lawful authority. P. Lentulus having been freely spared by Cæsar at Corfinium, was unwilling to take any further part in the quarrel; and even Cicero hesitated whether he should follow Pompey into Greece or not, he having been left at Capua with the care of that part of Italy, and having afterwards been prevented from reaching Brundisium by the rapid advance of Cæsar's army into Apulia. Meanwhile the consuls, with all the troops which they had been able to raise, had effected their junction with Pompey; but some of his officers, endeavouring to join him from more distant parts of the country, found that Cæsar had intercepted them. Among these P. Rutilius Lupus, one of the prætors, whilst trying to retreat from Taracina with about eighteen hundred men, fell in with Cæsar's cavalry, upon which his soldiers immediately deserted to the enemy, and he himself, relinquishing the cause of Pompey as desperate, returned to Rome, and there began to perform the ordinary duties of his office in administering justice. Cæsar arrived before Brundisium on the ninth of March, with a force amounting now to six legions, three of which

Cæsar besieges Pompey in Brundisium.

<sup>169</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VIII. epist. XIII.

<sup>170</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VIII. epist. XVI.; IX. epist. I.

the troops which he had levied since he entered Italy. He found that the consuls with the greater part of the army,<sup>171</sup> and with a large number of senators, accompanied by their wives and children, had embarked for the opposite coast of Greece on the fourth of March; and that Pompey, with about twenty cohorts, or twelve thousand men, was apparently resolved to maintain Brundisium against him. He had, a short time before, taken prisoner one of Pompey's officers,<sup>172</sup> whom he had sent back to Pompey, hoping, according to his own professions, that he would use his influence with his general to agree to a reconciliation. But when Pompey sent this officer to Cæsar<sup>173</sup> with proposals of peace, Cæsar, pretending to consider the terms unsatisfactory, prosecuted the siege of Brundisium with the utmost vigour; and on the other hand, Pompey is said to have declined another offer on the part of Cæsar to negotiate,<sup>174</sup> alleging that he could enter into no treaty in the absence of the consuls. At the same time, however, that Cæsar was expressing his wish for peace, his followers, in their private reports,<sup>175</sup> gave a very different representation of his intentions, and declared that he talked of revenging the fates of Carbo and Brutus, and those other members of the party of Marius, whom Pompey had formerly put to death; nay, so eager was he to find grounds of complaint against his antagonist, that he pretended to consider T. Milo as the victim of Pompey's unjust persecution, and thus to espouse the cause of a man whose only claim on his support was a turbulence and factiousness of spirit resembling his own. Meanwhile the siege of Brundisium was pressed with vigour; and Cæsar attempted to carry out two moles from the opposite sides of the harbour's mouth, with the view of blocking up the passage, and thus depriving the enemy of his means of retreat by sea. But before this work was completed, the ships which had transported the consuls<sup>176</sup> and the first division of the army into Greece, returned to Brundisium, and Pompey was finally enabled to embark the remainder of his troops, and to put to sea, on the seventeenth of March, with the loss of only two transports, which ran aground at the contracted entrance of the harbour, and were in this manner taken. The citizens of Brundisium immediately opened their gates to Cæsar; and on the eighteenth he entered the town and made a public address to the inhabitants. Thence he resolved at once to move towards Rome, for he was unable to follow Pompey from the want of shipping; and he was anxious to take possession of the seat of government, and

Pompey crosses the sea to Greece with his army.

<sup>171</sup> Cæsar, I. 25. Cicero, ad Atticum, IX. epist. VI.

<sup>172</sup> Epist. Cæsar's ad Oppium et Balbum, apud Ciceron. ad Atticum, IX. epist. VII.

<sup>173</sup> Epist. Cæsar's ad Oppium et Balbum, apud Ciceron. ad Atticum, IX. epist. XIII.

<sup>174</sup> Cæsar, I. 26.

<sup>175</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IX. epist. XIV.

<sup>176</sup> Cæsar, de Bell. Civil. I. 27. Cicero, ad Atticum, IX. epist. XIV.



then to carry his army into Spain, and destroy, if possible, the formidable force which was under the command of Pompey in that province.

It appears that Pompey,<sup>177</sup> justly regarding Cæsar and his partisans as rebels, had in all his proclamations denounced severe punishments against every one who should abet or countenance them; and by this language he had alarmed and alienated the minds of that large portion of the Italian people who were disposed, above all things, to consult their own private ease and safety. This feeling towards the opposite party, combined with the fame of his antagonist's moderation, had disposed the inhabitants of the different towns to favour Cæsar's interests, and on some occasions to afford him active assistance; but now that Pompey was retired from Italy, the evils occasioned by his rival were more keenly felt, and rendered men in turn dissatisfied with him. Cæsar, although the mere leader of a rebellious army, began to act as if he were the lawful sovereign of Italy. He sent orders to the chief magistrates of all the corporate towns to provide a certain number of ships,<sup>187</sup> and cause them to be sent to Brundisium, there to be in readiness to transport his army into Greece; he quartered his legions in different places, to the great vexation of the inhabitants, who were unused to such a burden in Italy; and he continued to levy soldiers as he had done from the beginning of his rebellion, while his officers conducted themselves in the execution of a task odious in itself, with much superfluous insolence and offensiveness. The character of his partisans was, indeed, such as would have disgraced the most honourable cause. His own personal profligacy was faithfully imitated by his lieutenants Antonius and Curio; and the reputation of the leaders, together with the revolutionary views which they were supposed to entertain, had attracted to their standard a crowd of desperate and atrocious men,<sup>179</sup> whose appearance filled all respectable citizens with terror. Thus attended, Cæsar moved from Brundisium towards Rome, wishing to assemble and address the senate, or rather the small minority of senators who had not left the capital on the first of April.<sup>180</sup> As he was anxious to gain the sanction of every person of credit whom he could at all hope to influence, he wrote to Cicero, earnestly requesting him to meet him at Rome: Cicero, however, having no intention of complying with his wishes, had a personal interview with him on his road, about the twenty-eighth of March, at Formiæ, hoping to persuade him not to press his request any further. But Cæsar told him<sup>181</sup> that his absence from the senate would naturally influence

Cæsar moves towards Rome.

His interview with Cicero.

<sup>177</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IX. epist. X.

<sup>179</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IX. epist.

<sup>178</sup> Cæsar, de Bell. Civil. I. 30. Cicero, ad Atticum, IX. epist. XIX.

XVIII. XIX.

<sup>180</sup> Ad Atticum, IX. epist. XVII.

<sup>181</sup> Ad Atticum, IX. epist. XVIII.

others, and would be looked upon as a condemnation of his conduct. He then urged him to appear in the senate, and endeavour to bring about a negotiation; but when Cicero replied, that if he did so he should recommend the senate to forbid the march of troops into Spain, or their transport into Greece, and should lament the condition to which Pompey had been reduced, Cæsar told him "that he would have nothing of that sort said;" and in conclusion, finding Cicero resolute in his refusal, he observed, "that if he were denied the benefit of Cicero's advice, he must follow such as he could procure, and should have recourse to extreme measures." On these terms they parted, and Cæsar proceeded on his way to Rome.

We have already stated that there were many senators, who after Pompey's departure from Italy, resolved to take no further share in the civil war. Amongst these were L. Volcatius Tullus and Manius Æmilius Lepidus, who had been consuls in the year 687;<sup>182</sup> Ser. Sulpicius, who had been consul in the year 702; and C. Sosius and P. Rutilius Lupus, who were two of the prætors for the present year. But of this number all were by no means agreed as to the propriety of countenancing Cæsar's usurpation. The two prætors, by continuing to act in their judicial character at Rome, seemed to acknowledge that the capital was still the seat of a lawful government; but L. Tullus and Ser. Sulpicius wished to remain in perfect retirement,<sup>183</sup> and declined to attend the meeting of senators which Cæsar called together on his arrival. Another prætor, M. Æmilius Lepidus, afterwards the associate of Octavius and Antonius in the second triumvirate, had remained at Rome when the consuls and the majority of the senate had left it, and was considered to be a decided partisan of Cæsar. M. Cælius Rufus, at this time curule ædile, who had been tribune in the year 701, and had then taken an active part in behalf of Milo, was now also engaged on the side of Cæsar, and appears to have been at this period in Rome.<sup>184</sup> L. Cæcilius Metellus, one of the tribunes, was in Rome also,<sup>185</sup> but with very different intentions, it being his purpose to force Cæsar to display his real contempt for the laws of his country, and to prove how little he himself respected the sacredness of the tribunician character, when it was in the way of his own ambition. Cæsar appears to have reached the capital about the time that he proposed to arrive there, that is, on the first of April, and having assembled as many of the senators as could be prevailed on to obey his summons, he held to them a language in which he scarcely attempted to disguise the lawlessness

Description of the persons who remained in Rome to receive Cæsar.

Cæsar addresses the senate.

<sup>182</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. XII.; VIII. epist. I. IX. XV.; IX. epist. I.

<sup>183</sup> Ad Atticum, X. epist. III.

<sup>184</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, VIII. epist. XVI.

<sup>185</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, X. epist. IV. Cæsar, de Bell. Civili, I. 33.

of his usurpation.<sup>186</sup> He again repeated the story of his pretended injuries in not having been allowed to dictate to the government the terms on which he would obey their orders ; and he inveighed against the cruelty shone to the tribunes Antonius and Q. Cassius, a cruelty which had existed at most only in intention, and probably only in the counterfeited fears of those who were its imaginary objects. On such provocations he thought himself entitled to be guilty of rebellion and usurpation ; and he entreated the senate to assist him in the administration of the republic, telling them plainly, at the same time, that if they were adverse to the task he would not burden them with it, but would govern the commonwealth by himself. Meanwhile he recommended that deputies should be sent to Pompey to endeavour to effect a peace.

This last proposal the senate, according to Cæsar's own account,<sup>187</sup> was not unwilling to embrace ; but no one could be found to accept the office of ambassador, because they were all afraid to put themselves in Pompey's power after the threats which he had denounced against those who did not follow him out of Italy. This is probably a mere calumny of Cæsar's : and a more natural cause of the general reluctance is assigned by Plutarch,<sup>188</sup> and implied by Cicero,<sup>189</sup> that no one thought Cæsar sincere in his offer to negotiate. He attempted to carry several other measures through the concurrence of the senate, but he found even the shadow of that body, which now alone remained, decidedly averse to his interests ; and L. Metellus, the tribune, interposed his negative on several occasions to defeat Cæsar's objects. All the opposition was nearly indifferent to him, for he was little anxious to have his power supported by law ; and, as if he were already the despot of his country, he refused to let his lieutenant, C. Curio, derive his title to his command in Sicily from a decree of the senate, but told him that all commissions should proceed from himself. But when L. Metellus endeavoured, by his negative, to prevent him from breaking open the treasury, and from converting the public money to his own use, he was highly irritated, insomuch that when Metellus,<sup>190</sup> as a last resource, placed himself before the door of the treasury, Cæsar threatened him with immediate death, and was disposed to have made this murder, had Metellus persisted in his resistance, the prelude to a general massacre. Thus, within the space of three months, the man who had attacked his country, under pretence of revenging the insults offered to the tribunitian power, was himself guilty of a most violent outrage upon that power, when exercised in as just a cause as could on any occasion have required its protection. But by

Cæsar robs the treasury, and violates the sacredness of the tribunitian office.

<sup>186</sup> Cæsar, I. 32.

<sup>187</sup> I. 33.

<sup>188</sup> In Cæsare, 35.

<sup>189</sup> Ad Atticum, X. epist. I.

<sup>190</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, X. epist. IV. Plutarch, in Cæsare, 35.



this act of violence Cæsar lost much of his popularity, even with the lowest of the people;<sup>191</sup> and finding that he was doing himself nothing but mischief by his stay in Rome, he set out before the middle of April on his way to Spain, without venturing to deliver a speech to the people as he had before designed. He intrusted the command of the capital itself to M. Lepidus;<sup>192</sup> that of the rest of Italy to M. Antonius; C. Curio, as has been before mentioned, was to occupy Sicily; Q. Valerius Orca, Sardinia; and C. Antonius, Illyricum.

Sicily and Sardinia were won with little difficulty. The first of these provinces had been assigned by the senate to M. Cato on the first commencement of the rebellion; but he, judging himself more fitted for civil than for military employments, had declined to accept the command,<sup>193</sup> so long as there was any prospect of the speedy re-establishment of the government at Rome. When this became desperate, he went over to Sicily, and exerted himself with great vigour in building ships, in refitting such as he found in the island, and in levying soldiers, not only from among the Sicilians, but from the inhabitants of the opposite coast of Italy. These preparations, however, were in a very imperfect state, when he received the tidings of Curio's approach with an army of three legions; the troops being, indeed, actually carried over into Sicily by C. Asinius Pollio, before Curio had joined them to assume the command.<sup>194</sup> Cato appears to have entered into the war with the same feelings that are ascribed to our own Lord Falkland, under circumstances partly similar: he deeply regretted the bloodshed which must attend the victory of either party, and he justly estimated the wickedness of bringing the miseries of war on the peaceable inhabitants of a country without any reasonable prospect of success. Accordingly, finding himself unable to maintain possession of the island,<sup>195</sup> he quitted Syracuse on the twenty-fourth of April, and went to join Pompey and the army of the commonwealth in Greece. Curio thus became master of Sicily without opposition, and Q. Valerius Orca was equally fortunate in Sardinia; for M. Cotta,<sup>196</sup> to whom the senate had intrusted the care of that province, finding the inhabitants strongly disposed to submit to Cæsar, and being driven out of Caralis, one of the chief towns in the island, by the unassisted efforts of the citizens themselves, despaired of resisting Cæsar's officer, and abandoning Sardinia, withdrew into Africa, where the cause of the commonwealth seemed to wear a more promising appearance.

<sup>191</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, X. epist. IV. Ad Familiares, VIII. epist. XVI.

<sup>192</sup> Plutarch, in Antonio, 6. Appian, de Bell. Civili, II. 41.

<sup>193</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. XV. Cæsar, I. 30.

<sup>194</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, 53. Appian, II. 40.

<sup>195</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, X. epist. XVI. Cæsar, I. 30. Plutarch, in Catone, 53.

<sup>196</sup> Cæsar, I. 30. Cicero, ad Atticum, X. epist. XVI.

We must now follow the steps of Cæsar towards Spain. On his arrival in Transalpine Gaul, he found that the citizens of Massilia refused to admit him within their walls,<sup>197</sup> and were making preparations to stand a siege. Massilia, a Greek colony, founded by the Ionians of Phocæa, when Ionia was first conquered by the Persians in the reign of the elder Cyrus, had been for many years the ally of Rome, and had attained to a considerable height of power and prosperity. Its government deemed it inconsistent with their relations with Rome to support a rebel general, whatever might have been the success of his rebellion; and L. Domitius, whom Cæsar had taken prisoner and dismissed at Corfinium, having been since busily employed in collecting a squadron of light vessels and manning them with his slaves and dependents from his estates near Cosa in Etruria, was expected soon in Transalpine Gaul, the command of which had been conferred on him by the senate, as we have before mentioned. According to Cæsar's account, the Massilians, after making professions of perfect neutrality, received Domitius into their city as soon as his squadron arrived, and placed all their resources at his disposal: but it seems more likely that Cæsar had insisted on their acknowledging his authority, and from the moment they had refused to do so had already regarded them as enemies, so that their reception of Domitius was rendered unavoidable. Be this as it may, their hostility to Cæsar soon assumed a decided shape, and he laid siege to their city with three legions. About a month was employed in the construction of a fleet of twelve ships of war by his orders in the neighbouring port of Arelate, and in preparing towers and other works for the attack of the walls, after which he gave the command of the army to C. Trebonius, and of the fleet to Decimus Brutus (both of them afterwards in the number of his assassins), and pursued his own course, according to his original intention, into Spain.

He marches into Spain. The city of Massilia refuses to acknowledge his authority.

Siege of Massilia commenced.

Spain was at this time held by three of Pompey's lieutenants: L. Afranius, who had been consul with Q. Metellus Celer in the year 693; M. Petreius, a veteran officer, who, as lieutenant of the consul C. Antonius, had commanded the forces of the commonwealth in the battle in which L. Catiline was defeated and killed in the year 691; and M. Terentius Varro, a man more distinguished as a writer and philosopher than as a general. Their united force is stated by Cæsar to have amounted to seven legions;<sup>198</sup> two of which, under M. Varro, were occupying the southern part of Spain, while Afranius and Petreius, with the remaining five, and a numerous body of Spanish auxiliaries, had stationed themselves on the north of the Ebro, and had fixed

State of the army of the commonwealth in Spain.

<sup>197</sup> Cæsar, I. 34, et seq.

<sup>198</sup> Cæsar, I. 38.

their head-quarters at Ilerda on the Sicoris. Cæsar had already sent C. Fabius, his lieutenant, with four legions across the Pyrenees, and others were ordered to follow without delay. A considerable auxiliary force of Gauls also accompanied the army, and the Gaulish cavalry in particular is said to have been both numerous and excellent. Meantime, a report was current that Pompey, with all his own army, was on his way to Spain to join his lieutenants; and the apprehension of so formidable an accession to the strength of the enemy, induced Cæsar to attempt to bind most closely the attachment of his own soldiers to himself. For this purpose he borrowed money of the military tribunes and centurions, and with this fund he was enabled to make a donation to the troops; a step by which he not only conciliated the soldiers, but secured the fidelity of the officers, whose only hope of being repaid rested in the victory of their general.

It is not easy to ascertain the precise amount of the numbers of Cæsar's army, when he himself arrived to take the command. They were at least equal to those of the enemy in regular infantry, and Cæsar was expecting additional reinforcements of Gauls, which might place his auxiliary force on a level with that of his opponents. However, Afranius and Petreius were unwilling to risk a general action with the veteran soldiers of Cæsar's legions; and they resolved rather to protract the contest, being abundantly provided with resources, and being in a position which they had themselves chosen as the seat of war. The town of Ilerda was situated on the right bank of the Sicoris, and their army was encamped before it; so that Cæsar had pitched his camp on the same side of the river, preserving also his communications with the left bank by means of two bridges,<sup>199</sup> distant nearly four miles from each other, which had been constructed at points higher up the Sicoris. The country which he could command on the right bank was confined within narrow limits by the river Cinga, which flows into the Sicoris just above its confluence with the Ebro, and whose course was distant from Ilerda something less than thirty miles. This district was soon exhausted; as Afranius had already conveyed the greatest part of the corn which he could find in it into Ilerda, and Cæsar's troops had quickly consumed whatever had not been thus pre-occupied. But, as large convoys of provisions were on their way from Gaul and Italy, as some of the more distant Spanish tribes had also engaged to send supplies, and as Cæsar's own plundering parties made frequent excursions on the left bank of the Sicoris, the support of the army seemed likely to be well secured.<sup>200</sup> It happened, however, that

Cæsar arrives in Spain.

Campaign on the Sicoris.

<sup>199</sup> Cæsar, I. 40.

<sup>200</sup> Cæsar, I. 48.



for some days there fell an unusual quantity of rain, which combined with the melting of the snow on the mountains to produce a great and sudden flood, insomuch that both Cæsar's bridges were blown up in the course of the same day. Nor did the waters soon abate; but continued so high as to baffle all attempts at repairing the bridges, and effectually to cut off all intercourse with the opposite bank of the river. Under these circumstances, Cæsar's foraging parties on the left bank were unable to rejoin the army, and several large convoys of provisions, which had reached the Sicoris, found themselves suddenly intercepted. The army of the commonwealth, meantime, still preserved its communications uninterrupted, by means of the bridge at Ilerda; and in this manner, Afranius, hearing of the detention of Cæsar's convoys, crossed the river with three legions and all his cavalry, and set out by night in the hope of surprising them. According to Cæsar's account,<sup>201</sup> the gallant resistance of some Gaulish horse enabled the greater part of the convoys to effect their escape to the higher grounds; some baggage, however, was taken, and the prospect of the safe arrival of the rest was rendered extremely doubtful. Great distress began to be felt in Cæsar's army; the price of corn rose to an extravagant height; the strength and spirits of the soldiers were affected by the necessary reduction in their allowance of food; whilst the legions of Afranius were abundantly supplied with every thing, and the generals themselves, full of confidence in their final success, transmitted to Rome the most favourable reports of the state of their affairs, and represented, perhaps with some exaggeration, the distress of the enemy.

Distress of Cæsar owing to the destruction of his bridges by a flood.

Under these circumstances, Cæsar ordered his men to make a great number of boats, of a construction which, he tells us, he had learnt in Britain; and which may still be seen in the coracles used by the descendants of the Britons in the rivers and mountain lakes of Wales. A light frame or skeleton of wood was filled up with wicker work, and then covered over on the outside with hides.<sup>202</sup> The boats thus formed were transported in wagons about twenty miles up the river by night, and, being then put into the water, carried over a detachment of troops immediately, who occupied a hill close to the bank. One entire legion was then ferried across in the same manner; and, the work being carried on at once from both banks, a new bridge was completed in two days. The dispersed convoys and the foraging parties, which had been detained on the left bank, now joined the army; and a large proportion of Cæsar's cavalry, crossing the river as soon as the bridge was finished, attacked some of the foragers

His army is carried over the river in light boats.

The army of the commonwealth annoyed by Cæsar's superior cavalry.

<sup>201</sup> Cæsar, I. 51.

<sup>202</sup> Cæsar, I. 54.

of the enemy with great success, defeated their covering party of light troops, and returned to their camp on the right bank, bringing with them a very considerable booty. Indeed, Cæsar's cavalry was so decidedly superior to that of Afranius, that, as soon as he had re-established his communication with the opposite bank of the Sicoris, he was enabled to retaliate on his antagonists the evils which had lately pressed upon himself. He commanded the country so as to prevent them from getting any provisions by foraging; and several of the Spanish tribes now thought it expedient to espouse his cause, and brought him abundant supplies of corn. The distance of his new bridge from his camp was still an inconvenience; to remedy which he proposed to render the Sicoris fordable at a point nearer to his present station, by drawing off a part of its waters into several small cuts, as the floods had, proba-

The generals of the commonwealth's army propose to retire behind the Ebro.

bly, by this time considerably abated. When he had made some progress in this work, the enemy's generals thought it expedient to change entirely their plan of operations. They resolved to retire behind the Ebro;<sup>203</sup> and, relying on the affection of those Celtiberian tribes, which had received signal favours from Pompey in return for their assistance in his contest with Sertorius, they expected to draw from them such reinforcements of cavalry as might enable them to oppose Cæsar on equal terms, and to protract the war with advantage in a friendly country, till the return of winter. On the other hand, delay would be to Cæsar hardly less fatal than defeat. Neither the character nor the resources of his lieutenant, M. Antonius, were calculated to insure his possession of Italy, if Cæsar should be long detained in Spain; and the aristocracy might rally a sufficient force in Rome and in Italy to shake off the military usurpation by which it was enslaved, even without the aid of that formidable fleet and army which the generals of the commonwealth had already assembled in Epirus.

We must suppose that Afranius and Petreius had not calculated on Cæsar's bringing with him into Spain a cavalry so decidedly superior to their own; as otherwise, their choice of Ilerda, as the base of their operations, seems to have been originally unwise. The country, for some miles on every side of that town, is a plain, on which cavalry can act with advantage; and, accordingly, we find that, as soon as Cæsar had remedied the accidental inconvenience produced by the loss of his bridges, the enemy were unable to cope with him, and were driven to abandon the ground on which they had at first proposed to carry on the campaign. Measures were taken by Afranius and Petreius to secure their retreat. A bridge of boats was begun to be thrown across the Ebro, near the point of its confluence with the Sicoris, and at the

distance of something less than twenty miles from their present camp;<sup>204</sup> all the small craft on the river were secured and brought together on this spot; and two legions of their army crossed at once from Ilerda to the left bank of the Sicoris, and there formed a camp. At length, when they were informed that Cæsar's artificial cuts had nearly rendered the river fordable for infantry, they put their whole force in motion, and leaving only a small garrison in Ilerda, they transported all their troops to the opposite bank, and effected their junction with the two legions which, as we have mentioned, they had sent across before. From this point their course was through the plain of Ilerda, descending the left bank of the Sicoris for several miles; after which they would meet with a tract of wild and mountainous country extending as far as the Ebro. If then they could once reach the mountains, their retreat was accomplished, for the passes might be easily secured so as to check the pursuit of an enemy; and whilst they had only to march on in a straight line, Cæsar's infantry was still detained on the right bank of the river; and if he should attempt to go round by his own bridge, the circuit, which he would be thus obliged to perform, would render his chance of overtaking them before they had passed the plain utterly desperate. With these prospects, Afranius and Petreius commenced their march a little before day-break.

They retreat from Ilerda towards the Ebro.

It appears, however, that Cæsar had anticipated their purpose, and had already sent his whole cavalry across the river,<sup>205</sup> to be prepared to harass and impede their progress from the instant that they should quit their camp. This service was performed very effectually; the army of the commonwealth having no horse or light troops of any description that could at all repel the annoyance. Meantime, as soon as it was day, Cæsar's infantry, seeing what was passing on the opposite side of the river, were impatient to join in the pursuit; and their general, availing himself of their ardour, ventured to ford the Sicoris with his whole army, leaving behind only one legion to guard his camp, together with those soldiers from the other legions whose bodily strength or courage seemed unequal to the enterprise. When he had gained the left bank, he pressed his march with such rapidity, that, although he had crossed the river some distance above Ilerda, and some delay had taken place in effecting the passage, he yet came up with the enemy three or four hours before sunset.<sup>206</sup> Afranius halted on a rising ground and offered battle; Cæsar halted too, not to fight, but to give his soldiers some refreshment; and when Afranius again attempted to continue his retreat, he experienced a renewal of the same an-

They are pursued by Cæsar.

<sup>204</sup> Cæsar, I. 61.

<sup>205</sup> Cæsar, I. 63.

<sup>206</sup> Cæsar, I. 64.



noyance as before from Cæsar's irresistible cavalry. Wearied with a long day of marching in retreat, and of fighting at continual disadvantage, the army of the commonwealth halted, and formed their camp for the night, when they were now within five miles of those friendly mountains, to reach which was certain safety.

About midnight Afranius and Petreius prepared in silence to recommence their march;<sup>207</sup> but some of their men having ventured too far to get water, were taken by Cæsar's cavalry, and their intention was thus discovered. Cæsar ordered the alarm to be instantly sounded, and the call to be given to his soldiers to commence the pursuit. The camps were so near to one another, that this note of preparation was clearly heard by the enemy's army, and the generals, dreading the confusion of a night engagement, while encumbered with their baggage on the march, changed their purpose, and kept their troops in their quarters. On the following day parties were sent out on both sides to reconnoitre the nature of the ground over which the retreat was to be continued; and when the report was received, Afranius and Petreius resolved to set out on the following morning, not doubting but that they should be able to gain the mountains, even if it were at the price of some partial losses. Cæsar also formed his plan; and in pursuance of it he put his army in motion at the very earliest dawn of the succeeding day, and leaving his heavy baggage in his camp, set out apparently in the opposite direction from that which led to the mountains, following no road, but making the best of his way across the country. By a fatal and incomprehensible infatuation, Afranius and Petreius lost some irretrievable moments in congratulating themselves on the defeat of their enemy's plans, imagining that, having advanced beyond his resources, he was obliged to abandon the pursuit from want of provisions. They lingered in their camp<sup>208</sup> till they saw the direction of this fancied retreat suddenly changed, and perceived Cæsar's army wheel round to the right, and push forward with the utmost speed to reach the mountains, and intercept their escape. Then perceiving their danger, every man at once ran to arms, and the army resumed its march with redoubled rapidity, striving to disappoint Cæsar's designs, and to gain their place of safety before they were for ever precluded from attaining it.

Their efforts, however, were fruitless.<sup>209</sup> They where harassed by Cæsar's cavalry, and this impediment more than counterbalanced the natural difficulties of ground with which Cæsar himself had to struggle. He reached the mountains first, and there drew out his army on a commanding ridge, in front of his baffled enemy. Afranius halted with his

Their retreat cut off.

<sup>207</sup> Cæsar, I. 66.

<sup>208</sup> Cæsar, I. 69.

<sup>209</sup> Cæsar, I. 70. 72.

troops on a hill which rose in the outskirts of the mountain region, and made one last effort to secure, with his light troops, the highest point in the chain before him, hoping, if the attempt succeeded, to carry his whole army thither, and still to retreat over the high grounds, though by a somewhat different course from that which he had originally designed. But he saw the whole detachment which he had sent on this service cut to pieces before his eyes by Cæsar's cavalry, and his troops, dispirited by repeated disappointments, seemed hardly able to resist an attack, if Cæsar should now try to finish the campaign by a single battle. Cæsar, however, preferred a surer and more bloodless victory; and purposely so altered the disposition of his troops as to allow Afranius to fall back to his camp without fear of interruption. The hill on which the army of the commonwealth was now posted, was untenable from its want of water; and no better prospect presented itself than to return to the camp which they had left in the morning. Accordingly they did so; while Cæsar, having carefully occupied every pass in the mountains which led to the Ebro, again moved towards his enemy, and pitched his camp for the night as near to theirs as possible.

The issue of the campaign was now clearly decided, and the remaining faint struggles made by Afranius and Petreius to protract their fate do not require a very minute detail. They attempted to retreat to Ilerda, where they had left some supplies of corn,<sup>210</sup> but being harassed, as before, by Cæsar's cavalry, their progress was continually impeded, their parties sent out to get water were cut off, and at last, when they remained in their camp as if wearied with the unceasing annoyance to which they were exposed on their march, Cæsar prepared to surround them with a line of circumvallation, and thus force them to surrender at discretion from mere famine. Before matters had come to this extremity, the soldiers on both sides had, on one occasion, begun to communicate with each other; and those of Afranius, availing themselves of the temporary absence of their generals from the camp, proposed to submit to Cæsar, if he would engage to spare the lives of their commanders. So far had this unauthorized negotiation proceeded, that several officers and soldiers from either army passed without fear into the opposite camp; and the Spanish chiefs in particular, whom Afranius kept with him as hostages for the fidelity of their tribes, were eager to commend themselves to the protection of the conqueror. But Afranius and Petreius being informed of the subject in agitation, hastened back to their camp; and Petreius, attended by some troops especially attached to his person, appeared suddenly on the rampart, broke off the conferences between the soldiers,

They endeavour to return to Ilerda, but are obliged to surrender, and are disbanded.

<sup>210</sup> Cæsar, I. 73—84.

drove away Cæsar's men, and seized and put to the sword all of them whom he could find within his own lines. No doubt every superior officer in Cæsar's army might have been executed as a traitor and rebel ; but justice itself, when not supported by adequate power, becomes useless cruelty ; and the conduct of Petreius on this occasion, besides the barbarity of such an indiscriminate slaughter of defenceless men, was merely likely to provoke a victorious enemy to a severe retaliation. When, therefore, the army of the commonwealth was reduced to the last extremity, and the generals, if we may believe Cæsar, threw themselves entirely on his mercy,<sup>211</sup> he reproached them bitterly for their cruelty to his soldiers, and represented this conduct as perfectly agreeable to the general treatment which he had received from the partisans of Pompey ; but he was too politic to follow their example, and agreed to spare them and their troops on the condition of their quitting Spain and disbanding their army. This last stipulation was most welcome to the vanquished soldiers, who thus unexpectedly obtained their release from service at the hands of their enemy. The natives of Spain were dismissed immediately ; the rest of the troops were marched through Gaul to the frontiers of Italy, receiving rations from Cæsar on their way, and when they arrived at the river Var, they also were all disbanded. Afranius and Petreius repaired to Greece, and joined the army of Pompey.

M. Varro still remained in arms in the south of Spain,<sup>212</sup> and on receiving tidings of the issue of the campaign

Surrender of M. Varro, the last general of the commonwealth in Spain.

on the Sicoris, he intended to shut himself up with his army of two legions in the island of Gades, more familiar to our ears under its present appellation of the Isle of Leon. Here he had collected a fleet and considerable magazines of corn, and had also raised a large sum of money, partly by forced contributions from the Roman citizens resident in the province, and partly by seizing the treasures and sacred ornaments from the famous temple of Hercules, in the neighbourhood of the town. Cæsar, with his usual activity, hastened to extinguish these last remains of hostility in Spain,<sup>213</sup> and having sent before him two legions, under the command of Q. Cassius, he followed himself with six hundred horse, issuing at the same time a proclamation, by which the magistrates and chief men of all the towns of the province were required to meet him on a certain day at Corduba. The fame of his victory over Afranius and Petreius had produced so general an impression in his favour, that his proclamation was every where obeyed, and every town took an active part in his cause. The people of Gades declared for Cæsar, and expelled from their city the officer to whom Varro had intrusted the com-

<sup>211</sup> Cæsar, I. 84—87.

<sup>212</sup> Cæsar, II. 17.

<sup>213</sup> Cæsar, II. 19—21.



mand; and one of the two Roman legions that composed Varro's army deserted him openly, and marched away to Hispalis. Upon this Varro offered to surrender his remaining legion, together with the fleet, corn, and money that he had collected for the war. Cæsar received his submission at Corduba, where he found the principal individuals of the province, both Romans and Spaniards, assembled according to his orders. He thanked them for the zeal which they had shown in his cause, and remitted to the Roman citizens among them the contributions which Varro had demanded. He thence proceeded to Gades, where he ordered the treasures taken from the temple of Hercules to be restored; and having left Q. Cassius, with four legions, to command the province, he embarked on board the fleet which Varro had just surrendered to him, and arrived after a short passage at Tarraco. Here he received a number of deputations from the different towns of the north of Spain, and having bestowed some hon- All Spain submits to Cæsar. ours on such states and individuals as had most assisted him in his late campaign, he set out from Tarraco by land, and returned to that part of his army which he had left under C. Trebonius, employed in the siege of Massilia. He returns to Massilia. It is said that the complete conquest of Spain was effected in forty days from the period of his first opening the campaign on the Sicoris.<sup>214</sup>

The citizens of Massilia were by this time reduced to the last extremity,<sup>215</sup> their naval force having been totally defeated by Decimus Brutus, a considerable breach Surrender of Massilia. having been made in their walls, and they themselves suffering the combined evils of scanty sustenance and disease. Accordingly, on Cæsar's arrival before the town, they offered to surrender to him, L. Domitius having already effected his escape by sea; and their submission was so far accepted, that their city was preserved from plunder, and was even allowed to retain its liberty; but they were obliged to surrender all the arms and military engines in their arsenals, to give up all their ships, to pay to Cæsar all the money in their treasury, and at a subsequent period to forfeit most of the dominion which they possessed beyond their own walls. Before the end of the siege, Cæsar re- Cæsar is appointed dictator. ceived intelligence from Rome that he had been appointed dictator by M. Lepidus the prætor, in pursuance of a decree of the people. Nothing could be more illegal than such an appointment, made as it was without the authority of the senate, or the nomination of either of the consuls;<sup>216</sup> but it appears that the absence of the chief magistrates of the commonwealth had somewhat embarrassed Cæsar's party, and that they did not

<sup>214</sup> Cæsar, II. 32.<sup>215</sup> Cæsar, II. 22. Dion Cassius, XLI.<sup>216</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, II. 48.

know how to procure his election as consul for the year following, without this previous measure of conferring on him the dictatorship, that he might be enabled to preside at the comitia. This could not be done by Lepidus,<sup>217</sup> who was only prætor, and far less by any inferior officer: there was no alternative, therefore, but to appoint Cæsar dictator, or to allow the year to expire without proceeding to any election; and then, when the present consuls should have resigned their power, to let the comitia be held, as was usual in such cases by an interrex. But Cæsar now being invested with the title, at least, of a lawful magistrate, set out for Rome, as soon as Massilia had surrendered, in order to exercise his power in the civil government with more effect than during his late visit to the capital on his way from Brundisium to

Mutiny of Cæsar's  
troops at Placentia.

Spain. He was unexpectedly detained, however, at Placentia, by a mutiny which broke out in a part of his army,<sup>218</sup> owing, as it is said, to the disappointment of the soldiers in not being gratified, as they had hoped, with the plunder of Italy. Cæsar's ability displayed itself on this occasion to great advantage. He addressed the mutinous troops in the firmest tone; and as they professed to wish to gain their discharge, he instantly dismissed from his service one entire legion, and punished with death the principal authors of the mutiny; after which, finding the legion most anxious to be again received into favour, he consented to revoke its punishment, and to continue it in his service. In this manner, like Cromwell on a similar occasion, he quelled the most formidable danger that could threaten him, by appearing unmoved by it; and whilst he was trampling on all laws himself, gave a lesson to his followers that they were not to be indulged with an equal license. From Placentia he then proceeded to Rome, and entered on the dictatorship; but not choosing at present to hold this unpopular title longer than was necessary, he held the comitia for the election of consuls, and having procured his own nomination, together with that of P. Servilius Isauricus, he laid down his office of dictator in eleven days after he had begun to exercise it.<sup>219</sup>

State of Italy during  
the first year of the  
civil war.

But within this short space of time there were not a few important subjects which claimed his attention. When he had set out for Spain some months before, he left the command of Italy, as has been already mentioned, to M. Antonius. A rebel general in this manner subjected the first country in the empire to the absolute control of one of the vilest of his rebel officers. Antonius acted on no other authority than Cæsar's commission; but this empowered him to prevent any one from leaving Italy,<sup>220</sup> and to conduct himself as the master of

<sup>217</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IX. epist. IX.

<sup>219</sup> Cæsar, III. 2.

<sup>218</sup> Dion Cassius, XLI. 165. Suetonius, in Cæsar, 69.

<sup>220</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, X. epist. X. XVI. Philippic II. 23.

a conquered province. He travelled about, accompanied at once by his mistress, who was carried in an open litter, by his wife, and by his mother, and attended by a train of men and women of the most abandoned description. He obliged the several towns through which he passed to send out deputations to meet him, and to offer complimentary addresses, in which his mistress, who was by profession an inferior actress, was saluted with the name of *Volumnia*, a name consecrated in the traditions of Rome as having been that of the wife or mother of *Coriolanus*. On other occasions, when the magistrates of some of the most considerable cities were summoned to attend him,<sup>221</sup> he treated them with studied insult, because their towns had incurred *Cæsar's* displeasure from their disinclination to his cause. This behaviour tended greatly to alienate the affections of the people of Italy, and to make them anticipate the evils likely to follow from the final victory of a party whose adherents already so boldly defied and insulted public opinion. Even the dispositions of the army began to waver; and as far as we can learn from some hints in *Cicero's* letters to *Atticus*,<sup>222</sup> there were some of *Cæsar's* officers who were already disgusted with the party which they had chosen, and who secretly fomented the discontent of the soldiers. The centurions of three cohorts, posted at *Pompeii*, came to *Cicero*<sup>223</sup> while he was residing at his villa in that neighbourhood, and offered to place themselves, their soldiers, and the town which they occupied, at his disposal. He was not disposed to commit himself by accepting their offer; but it shows how fair a prospect *Pompey* would have had of regaining Italy, if he had availed himself of *Cæsar's* absence to make a descent upon it. Meanwhile the minds of men in general were kept in a continual ferment. We have seen, on former occasions, that the number of debtors at Rome, unable or unwilling to satisfy their creditors, was usually very considerable; and as the habits of the times became more expensive, it was likely to be perpetually increasing. The present distracted state of Italy contributed to aggravate the difficulties of persons of this description. Money, it appears, had risen greatly in value,<sup>224</sup> partly perhaps from the sums taken out of circulation by the many wealthy individuals who followed *Pompey* into Greece; partly from the great demand for it to maintain such large armies as were now on foot in different parts of the empire; and partly, we may suppose, from the practice of hoarding, which is always common amongst a large proportion of the community, in times of apprehended distress and danger. On the other hand, landed property was as naturally depreciated, for no one liked to purchase that which might soon be wrested from

<sup>221</sup> *Cicero*, ad *Atticum*, X. epist. XIII.<sup>223</sup> *Cicero*, ad *Atticum*, X. epist. XVI.<sup>222</sup> *Cicero*, ad *Atticum*, X. epist. XII.  
XIV. XV. XVI.<sup>224</sup> *Cæsar*, III. 1. *Dion Cassius*, XLI.  
170, 171.



him to furnish settlements for the veteran soldiers of the party which might finally prove victorious. In this manner a debtor could neither readily raise money by the sale of his estates to discharge the principal of his debt, nor could he easily find means to pay the interest, which in itself was a great and now a permanent burden. Many, therefore, were looking forward with hope to a total revolution, by which all debts would at once be cancelled; many derived encouragement from the assurance of Antonius,<sup>225</sup> that all exiles would soon be allowed to return to their country: while others again were anticipating with horror a regular system of proscription and massacre whenever Cæsar should return from Spain. His arrival, invested as he was with the power of dictator, was thus viewed on all sides with eagerness and anxiety; and men watched to see the first measures of his government, by which they might judge whether he intended to imitate Sylla or Catiline; whether he felt himself strong enough to disclaim, as a tyrant, the principles which he had favoured as a demagogue; or whether he still proposed to tread consistently in the steps of his early life, and to uphold the needy, the extravagant, and the licentious, in their several courses of fraud, and dissipation, and profligacy.

But Cæsar knew that no government can sport with the rights of property without sinking into weakness and contempt. He was obliged, therefore, to uphold the cause of the creditor, and to give no countenance to those who called for an entire abolition of all debts; but yet, wishing to relieve the debtor he ordered that certain commissioners should be appointed to estimate the property of an insolvent,<sup>226</sup> and to oblige the creditor to receive it in payment at the price which it would have borne before the war. It is added, by Suetonius,<sup>227</sup> that he caused all sums, previously paid as interest, to be deducted from the principal of the debt; by which regulation, together with the preceding one, the creditor sustained, on the whole, a loss of twenty-five per cent. In his next measure, the dictator was enabled to indulge his inclinations with less restraint. We have already mentioned the improvements introduced in the laws against bribery and other offences during Pompey's last consulship; and that several individuals were tried and banished under the provisions of his acts. Cæsar now procured a decree of the people, reversing all the sentences passed at that time,<sup>228</sup> and allowing all who had been sufferers from them to return to their country; alleging, that an undue influence had been exercised against them by the presence of Pompey's military force in the city during their trials. But to show the real motives by which

<sup>225</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, X. epist. XIII.

<sup>226</sup> Cæsar, III. 1.

<sup>227</sup> In Cæsare, 42.

<sup>228</sup> Cæsar, III. 1.

he was actuated, he excepted Milo from the benefit of this decree,<sup>229</sup> because he was well known to be an enemy to the popular party ; although no one had been condemned at the same period against whom Pompey had testified a stronger feeling of dislike. It should be observed, too, that the language of Cicero, on several occasions, implies a far more general restoration of exiles on this occasion, than Cæsar or his partisans have thought proper to acknowledge ;<sup>230</sup> that Dion Cassius, Appian, and Suetonius agree in asserting, distinctly, the same thing ; and that Suetonius adds further,<sup>231</sup> that all those who had been degraded by the censors, were in like manner restored to their former rank. The object of this last step was probably to gratify those individuals whom Appius Claudius had lately disgraced in his censorship, and who at that very time threw themselves into the arms of Cæsar, in the hope of obtaining, through him, the recovery of their dignity. When he had thus rewarded his followers, and endeavoured to gratify that class of persons who were most disposed to support him, without greatly offending the possessors of property, he resigned the dictatorship, as has been already mentioned, and set out for Brundisium. Here his army had been ordered to assemble ; and the troops which had returned from Gaul and Spain, together with those which he had raised in Italy, formed, on the whole, a force of no fewer than twelve legions.<sup>232</sup> Some of these, however, were hardly more than skeletons, owing to their losses in former campaigns, which had not been yet made up, and to the effects of sickness, produced by the sudden change which many of the men had experienced from the climate of Spain and Gaul, to the influence of an autumn in Apulia ; nor had he ships to enable him at once to transport into Greece so considerable an army. According to his own statement, the seven legions, which he at first proposed to embark, amounted to no more than 20,000 infantry, and 600 cavalry, implying a diminution of their original numbers, for which his accounts of his former campaigns by no means would have prepared us ; and with this force he put to sea on the fourth of January, and on the following day effected his landing in safety on the coast of Epirus.

He leaves Rome and proceeds to Brundisium, from which he crosses over to Greece. U. C. 705.

The advantages which Cæsar had gained in Spain and Italy in the first year of the war, were somewhat checked by the ill success of his officers in Africa and in Illyricum. We have already seen that C. Curio had occupied Sicily without opposition, M. Cato having thought his forces in-

Campaign of Curio in Africa. U. C. 704.

<sup>229</sup> Dion Cassius, XLI. 170. Appian, II. 48.

<sup>230</sup> Ad Atticum, VII. epist. XI. ; X. epist. XIII. XIV.

<sup>231</sup> In Cæsare, 41,

<sup>232</sup> Cæsar, III. 2, 6.

sufficient to defend the island, and having accordingly abandoned it before the arrival of the enemy. Curio's original instructions from Cæsar,<sup>233</sup> directed him to cross over into Africa so soon as he should have secured Sicily; and this first object being already effected, he set sail with two legions, about the middle of the summer, and reached the African coast in safety after a passage of two days and three nights. The Roman province of Africa was at this time held by P. Atius Varus, an officer attached to the cause of Pompey, but little scrupulous, as it appears, of disregarding the forms of the commonwealth. He had been opposed to Cæsar in Italy, at the beginning of the rebellion; and being then deserted by his soldiers, he left Italy, and hastened to Africa,<sup>234</sup> a province which had formerly fallen to his lot to govern in the year that followed his prætorship. His old authority in that country was still favourably remembered; and the late prætor, C. Considius, having returned to Rome,<sup>235</sup> and left the province under the care of his lieutenant, Q. Ligarius, till the appointment and arrival of a successor, P. Varus thought proper to take the chief command upon himself, in order to secure so valuable a portion of the empire from the usurpation of Cæsar. Ligarius was a quiet man, and was glad to be released from a situation of much difficulty and danger, so that he willingly allowed Varus to supersede him. But soon after, L. Tubero<sup>236</sup> arrived off the coast, as the lawful successor of C. Considius, having received Africa as his province, amongst the various appointments made by the authority of the senate just before they were compelled by Cæsar to abandon the capital. It seems, however, that Tubero had no inclination to accept the office, and had only been persuaded to do so by the strong remonstrances of some of his friends, who represented his compliance as a duty which he owed to his country in these times of peril. A man thus reluctantly engaged in the cause, appeared to Varus unfit to be trusted with a post of such importance as the command of Africa; and thus availing himself of the license of civil wars, Varus forcibly excluded the lawful officer of the commonwealth from taking possession of his province, and would not even suffer him to set his foot upon the shore. Tubero, thus repelled, showed the injustice of the suspicions entertained against him, by repairing immediately to the standard of the commonwealth in Macedonia;<sup>237</sup> while the possession of Africa was to be disputed between two parties, both of whom were equally destitute of a legal title to it.

Varus, however, professed to act as an officer of the common-

<sup>233</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Civili, I. 30; II. 23.

<sup>234</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Civili, I. 31, Cicero, pro Ligario, 2.

<sup>235</sup> Cicero, pro Ligario, 2.

<sup>236</sup> Cicero, pro Ligario, 7. Cæsar, I. 31.

<sup>237</sup> Cicero, pro Ligario, 8.



wealth, and a partisan of Pompey ; and as such was strongly supported by Juba, king of Mauritania. That prince was the son of Hiempsal,<sup>238</sup> who, in the civil wars between Marius and Sylla, had supported the party of the aristocracy, and had been rewarded for his services with the kingdom of Mauritania, when Pompey overthrew the united forces of Domitius and Hiarbas, and established the authority of Sylla in Africa. Juba, therefore, was disposed, naturally, to assist Pompey as the benefactor of his family ; and his assistance was given with double readiness, when he found that the army against which it was required was commanded by Curio ; for it seems that Curio,<sup>239</sup> during his tribuneship, had proposed a law to declare the kingdom of Mauritania forfeited to the Roman people. The succour which Juba afforded was prompt and decisive.<sup>240</sup> Curio obtained at first some advantages over the Roman forces under Varus ; but being too much elated by his success, he neglected the necessary precautions ; and attacking the army which Juba brought up to the relief of Varus, without duly acquainting himself with its strength, he and the entire force under his command were cut to pieces. By this victory the province of Africa remained under the authority of the commonwealth, and became afterwards the favourite refuge of the constitutional party, when the defeat of Pharsalia had ruined their cause in Greece and Asia.

Juba, king of Mauritania, assists the party of the commonwealth in Africa.

Defeat and death of Curio.

With regard to the operations in Illyricum, our information is exceedingly defective. It appears that Cæsar, before his departure for Spain,<sup>241</sup> had left C. Antonius, the brother of Marcus, with a certain naval and military force in Illyricum, which country was comprised, together with the Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, within the limits of his original province. Its occupation at the present moment was of considerable importance to Cæsar's interests, because it might otherwise, during his absence in Spain, have afforded to Pompey a passage to the north of Italy, and thus have enabled him to cut off the resources which Cæsar drew in abundance from the attachment of the people of that country. Reports, indeed, were prevalent at Rome as early as the month of April, that Pompey was actually making this attempt ;<sup>242</sup> but his plans were of another kind, and his armaments were not yet in such a state of forwardness as to encourage him to act on the offensive. To the southward of Illyricum, the mouth of the Adriatic<sup>243</sup> was guarded with a small squadron by P. Cornelius Dolabella, the son-in-law

Defeat of Cæsar's lieutenants in Illyricum.

<sup>238</sup> Dion Cassius, XLI. 172, edit. Leunclav. Plutarch, in Pompeio, 12. Auctor de Bello Africano, 56.

<sup>239</sup> Cæsar, II. 25.

<sup>240</sup> Cæsar, II. 36, et seq.

<sup>241</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, II. 41.

<sup>242</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, X. epist. VI.

<sup>243</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, X. epist. VII. Appian, II. 41.

of Cicero; but like most others of the young nobility of bad character, engaged in the cause of Cæsar. Inferior as Cæsar was to his adversaries in naval means, he could only expect Dolabella to keep the sea for a time, till the fleets of the enemy should be brought together; after which it became his business to preserve his ships with the utmost care, as Cæsar was ill able to replace them, if they should be taken or destroyed. But whether from want of caution on the part of Dolabella, or from any other cause, he was attacked on the eastern shore of the Adriatic by the ships of the commonwealth, under M. Octavius and L. Scribonius Libo,<sup>244</sup> and was defeated with the loss of his entire fleet. His disaster was only the prelude to another of greater magnitude; for C. Antonius<sup>245</sup> coming up in the hope of relieving him, was surrounded by the victorious forces of the enemy, who putting on shore a portion of their seamen, blockaded him by land and sea, till he was obliged to surrender himself prisoner with all the troops under his command. The soldiers were incorporated with Pompey's army: and these successes tended, probably, to facilitate the levies which were now going on, in the name of the commonwealth, in Greece, and in the eastern provinces of the empire.

It is now proper to notice more particularly the proceedings of Pompey since his arrival in Greece in the early part of the year 704. He found himself attended by both the consuls, and about two hundred senators,<sup>246</sup> so that he might fairly consider himself as being supported by the authority of the commonwealth. For the present, indeed, almost all the magistrates of the republic were at his quarters; but as their power would expire at the end of the year, and as it was impossible to observe the proper forms of election in any other place than at Rome, it was resolved that the present officers should be continued in their commands, with the titles of pro-consuls, proprætors, &c., by a decree of the senate. This appears to have been perfectly consistent with the constitutional power of that order; and a place was accordingly marked out at

<sup>244</sup> Florus, IV. 2. Dion Cassius, XLI. 171. Suetonius, in Cæsare, 36. Cæsar, III. 5.

<sup>245</sup> Florus, Dion Cassius, ubi supra. Livy, Epitome, CX. Cæsar asserts that Antonius was betrayed by one of his officers, T. Pulcio, who afterwards served in Pompey's army; Cæsar, III. 67. It has been a favourite resource with others besides Cæsar to attribute their disasters to treason; but such statements, when resting merely on the assertion of the vanquished party, should be received with great suspicion. An officer in Antonius's army might

very possibly have deserted to the enemy on this occasion, and might have carried to them some useful information, the importance of which Cæsar would gladly exaggerate, so as to ascribe the loss of the army chiefly, or entirely to this cause.—The treason of T. Pulcio, whatever it was, is not even hinted at by Florus, Suetonius, the epitomizer of Livy, Appian, nor Dion Cassius; writers, none of whom can be called unfavourable to Cæsar, and the two latter of whom have rather a bias in his favour.

<sup>246</sup> Dion Cassius, XLI. 173.

Thessalonica, and duly consecrated by the augurs, that the auspices might be taken with the usual solemnities, and that the senate might not assemble on profane ground; a circumstance which would have violated all its acts. Meanwhile Pompey was busily employed in collecting troops and ships, and supplies of provisions from all quarters. Many of the petty princes and states of Asia Minor and the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, were indebted to him for their crowns or their dominions during his long commands in that part of the empire, so that his private influence came powerfully in aid of the name of the Roman republic, in procuring their support. He had under his immediate standard an army of nine legions of Roman citizens,<sup>247</sup> five of which he had brought with him from Italy, two had been raised by order of Lentulus in the Roman province of Asia, one was composed of the veteran soldiers who had settled in Crete and Macedonia after their term of service had expired, and one had been formed out of the soldiers of two veteran legions which had been quartered in Sicily. With these was joined an auxiliary force of infantry which Pompey had lately raised in Greece; and a reinforcement of two legions more was expected ere long to be added to the army, which Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, was to bring with him from his province in Syria. The cavalry is said to have amounted to seven thousand, but it seems to have consisted of the troops of so many different nations, that much time and a careful discipline must have been needed before such various elements could coalesce into one body. The light infantry were also numerous, but they, like the cavalry, were a motley force of Greeks, Cretans, Syrians, and natives of Pontus, whose steadiness was little to be trusted in the hour of difficulty. It is difficult to ascertain the real numbers of the whole army, because we know not whether the legions contained their full complement of men, or whether some of them were not mere skeletons, which it was intended to fill up from time to time with new levies. But whatever was the numerical strength of Pompey's troops, they were so decidedly inferior in quality to those of the enemy, that their general, under present circumstances, could not venture to oppose them to Cæsar's veterans in the open field. He was fully sensible, indeed, of their inferiority, and exerted himself to the utmost, during the interval of leisure that was afforded him, in improving their discipline, and training them incessantly in those military exercises which the nature of ancient warfare rendered so important.<sup>248</sup> Pompey himself took part in these exercises with all the spirit and activity of youth, and added at once to his own popularity

The senate assembles at Thessalonica.

Strength of Pompey's army.

<sup>247</sup> Cæsar, III. 4.

<sup>248</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 64. Appian, II. 49.



and to the confidence of his soldiers by his skill and strength in throwing the javelin, and the perfect address with which he managed his horse, while he was directing the manœuvres of the cavalry. He hoped to keep the enemy at a distance by the aid

*His fleet.*

of his numerous fleet, till he had sufficiently organized and disciplined his army, to return to Italy with every prospect of final success. All the maritime countries of the eastern part of the Mediterranean had contributed their quotas of ships,<sup>249</sup> and the whole naval force was placed under the command of M. Bibulus, the colleague of Cæsar in his first consulship, who felt a strong personal enmity against him in consequence of their differences at that period. Finally, ample magazines of corn had been collected from Thessaly, Asia Minor, Egypt, and Cyrene, that the army might be enabled to wait patiently the issue of their general's plans, and might not be driven to risk any desperate measures from the want of provisions. Mean-

*Language held by his party.*

time the language held by Pompey was in the highest degree lofty and uncompromising. Not only were Cæsar's partisans deservedly spoken of as rebels, and threatened with the vengeance of the laws, but all who had remained in Italy, and had taken no share in the defence of the commonwealth, were considered as guilty of an abandonment of their duty, and it was proposed to confiscate their property, in order that the faithful soldiers, by whose aid the constitution should be preserved and restored to its independence, might be rewarded by its distribution. Cicero several times speaks in the strongest terms of the severities which would have followed the victory of the constitutionalists,<sup>250</sup> and declares that they would have ordered a general proscription, as unsparing as that of Sylla. We are told, indeed, by Plutarch,<sup>251</sup> that a resolution was passed, at Cato's suggestion, by the senate assembled at Thessalonica, declaring that no Roman citizen should be put to death out of the field of battle, nor any city subject to the Roman government given up to plunder. If this be true, we must suppose that the declaration was meant to apply only to the period of actual hostilities; nor is it unlikely that the humanity of Pompey and Cato might have been able thus far to mitigate the horrors of warfare, while the violence of some of their associates would have defied any such restraint in the event of the final triumph of their party. The character of Pompey himself is most remote from cruelty, although he may have been unable to check the excesses of his partisans, or may have threatened to punish, perhaps with an excessive severity, the treasons from which he himself, as well as the commonwealth, had suffered so heavily. But it is also consistent with

<sup>249</sup> Cæsar, III. 3. 5.

<sup>250</sup> Ad Atticum, IX. epist. VII. X. XI. ;

X. epist. VII. ; XI. epist. VI. Ad Familiares, IV. epist. IX. ; VII. epist. III.

<sup>251</sup> In Pompeio, 65 ; in Catone, 53.

other parts of his life to believe, that whatever irritation he might now feel, while witnessing the present success of the rebellion, yet when the supreme power was placed in his hands, he would have used it with the utmost moderation and fairness, and would himself have been sincerely desirous of restoring peace and liberty to his country. On the other hand, it must be confessed that the members of the high aristocratical party, who had regarded him with jealousy from his earliest youth, might have overruled his own dispositions, and have either forced him to become the instrument of their rapacious and cruel designs, or have sacrificed him to secure their own exclusive ascendancy. And doubtless the happiness of mankind was ultimately far better secured by the victory of Cæsar, and the establishment even of his successor's despotism, than it would have been by the unchecked dominion of the most profligate members of a corrupt aristocracy.

Such was the state of Pompey's party, when the negligence or over-confidence of his naval officers allowed Cæsar, as we have already mentioned, to transport without opposition from Italy the first division of his army, and to effect a landing on the coast of Greece. On the very day of the disembarkation, Cæsar advanced to summon the town of Oricum,<sup>252</sup> which was held by an enemy's garrison under the command of L. Torquatus. But already the cause of the commonwealth felt the disadvantage of having abandoned the seat of government, and having allowed Cæsar to receive at Rome, from the people assembled in the ordinary place of election, the title of Roman consul. The garrison, consisting of Illyrian soldiers, and the citizens of Oricum, alike refused to resist an officer bearing the rank of the chief magistrate of the Roman people; and Torquatus, thus deserted, was obliged to surrender himself and the town to Cæsar. This example was followed by the people of Apollonia,<sup>253</sup> and by a great many other places in the neighbourhood; so that Cæsar immediately acquired a firm footing in the country, and by his possession of the towns on the coast, was enabled, in a great measure, to neutralize the naval superiority of the enemy.

It is probable that the lateness of the season, which though nominally the month of January was in reality the beginning of November, together with Cæsar's known want of shipping, had impressed Bibulus with the belief that no attempt to invade Greece would be made at present; and that Cæsar would require the winter months to complete his preparations, before he thought of commencing hostilities. Surprised, therefore, by the tidings that the enemy were actually arrived on the coast of Greece,<sup>254</sup> Bibulus put to sea in haste from Corcyra,

Operations of Cæsar  
after his landing.

Proceedings of Pom-  
pey's fleet.

<sup>252</sup> Cæsar, III. 11.

<sup>253</sup> Cæsar, III. 12.

<sup>254</sup> Cæsar, III. 8.

in the hope of intercepting a part, at least, of the transports employed in the passage: but Cæsar had already landed in safety, and Bibulus only succeeded in cutting off about thirty of the empty vessels, which Cæsar had ordered instantly to return to Brundisium. His vexation at his own want of vigilance, combined with his general hatred against Cæsar, led him to commit an atrocious act of cruelty upon the masters and crews of the vessels which thus fell into his hands; for having set the ships on fire, he burnt the men in the same flames. He then lined the coast with detachments of his fleet from Salone to Oricum, a distance of about two hundred miles; and as a mark of his resolution to use every possible exertion, it is said that he lived entirely on board his ship, even at that inclement season. The ancient ships of war, it should be remembered, being calculated chiefly for coasting voyages, and accustomed to send their crews ashore on every occasion to take their meals and to sleep, were very ill provided with accommodations in themselves, and could neither hold a large supply of provisions, nor afford tolerable quarters on board for the officers and men. To remain, therefore, continually at sea, was attended with great inconvenience, and considerable distress; and thus when Cæsar's occupation of the landing-places on the coast prevented the enemy from coming on shore, or from getting supplies of wood and water, he retaliated upon them to the full the annoyance which he suffered from their blockade. But Bibulus, and the officers and men under his command, bore their privations with the utmost patience and resolution; transports were employed in bringing them regular supplies of wood, water, and provisions, from Corcyra;<sup>255</sup> and when the badness of the weather on one occasion interrupted this communication, they are said to have wrung the dew from the skins with which the holds of their ships were covered, and thus to have allayed the intensity of their thirst. They enjoyed, however, the satisfaction of feeling that they were effectually stopping the passage of the second division of Cæsar's army, which it had been intended to transport without loss of time on board the vessels which had returned to Brundisium, after carrying over the first division. The troops were actually embarked, and had just left the harbour, when a despatch arrived from Cæsar, announcing the strict blockade maintained on the opposite shore by the enemy's cruisers. Immediately the ships returned to Brundisium; and one single private vessel, which had no troops on board, resolving still to attempt the passage, was taken by Bibulus off Oricum, and, according to Cæsar,<sup>256</sup> the whole ship's company, both freemen and slaves, were by his orders put to death. Cæsar thus seemed left to his fate in an enemy's country with only half his army, cut off from all relief, and obliged to

<sup>255</sup> Cæsar, III. 15.<sup>256</sup> Cæsar, III. 14.



depend for subsistence only on the narrow district immediately subject to his control.

But his system of always acting on the offensive, tended at once to keep up the confidence of his own soldiers, and to make public opinion think favourably of his situation. After having gained possession of Oricum and Apollonia, he hastened forward in the hope of surprising Dyrrhachium, one of Pompey's principal magazines, and the place in which he had designed to fix his winter-quarters, in order to be at hand to counteract Cæsar's expected invasion in the spring. At the moment of Cæsar's landing, Pompey was in the interior of Macedonia,<sup>256</sup> proceeding slowly towards his intended winter-quarters, by the great road which crossed the whole country from Thessalonica, on the Ægean, to Dyrrhachium and Apollonia on the Ionian gulf. He was already advanced as far as Candavia, which lies at nearly equal distances between the two seas, when he was met with the news of Cæsar's invasion. He immediately hastened his march towards Apollonia; but finding that this town had already fallen, he turned off to the right, and pressed on with a rapidity, almost resembling a flight of a beaten army, in order to save his magazines at Dyrrhachium. As the troops marched by day and night without halting, many of the soldiers, unable to bear the fatigue, dropped behind,<sup>258</sup> threw away their arms, and deserted; and this produced so much disorder and consequent dejection, that although Pompey accomplished his object, and, having outstripped his antagonist, encamped his army in front of Dyrrhachium to cover the town, yet T. Labienus, and the other principal officers, thought it expedient to renew, in a public and solemn manner, their oath of fidelity to their general, swearing that they would abide by him in every extremity of fortune. The troops all followed this example; and soon afterwards their spirits were revived by an order to make a movement somewhat in advance; for Cæsar, finding himself cut off from Dyrrhachium, had halted on the river Apsus, intending to winter there under canvass, in order to protect the country in his rear which had espoused his cause, and proposing there to await the arrival of the rest of his army from Italy. Cæsar thus having fixed himself on the left bank of the Apsus,<sup>259</sup> Pompey advanced with his army from Dyrrhachium, and occupied a line on the right bank of the same river, to which he brought together his entire force, both Roman and auxiliary. A pause of some length then ensued in the operations on both sides, partly on account of the season of the year, and partly because neither general wished to risk an action at present; the one being desirous of improving

Cæsar attempts in vain to surprise Dyrrhachium.

The two armies are opposed to one another on the Apsus.

<sup>257</sup> Cæsar, III. 11. Strabo, VII. 374, edit. Xyland.

<sup>258</sup> Cæsar, III. 13.

<sup>259</sup> Cæsar, III. 13. Appian, II. 56.

still further the discipline of his soldiers, and the other being anxious to gain an accession to his numbers.

During this interval some proposals of peace were exchanged between the two parties, but without producing any effect. Indeed, the officer from whom Pompey had received the first tidings of Cæsar's landing in Greece, was himself the bearer of a message from Cæsar,<sup>260</sup> conjuring Pompey to consider the evils which a protracted contest would certainly bring upon their country; proposing that each commander should take an oath, in the presence of his army, to disband his forces within three days; and that the terms of a permanent peace might be settled at Rome by the senate and people; offering, meantime, as a pledge of his sincerity, to disband at once all his own soldiers, whether they were in the field or in garrison. There was no time for replying to these propositions, till Pompey's army was settled on the Apsus; then, when L. Vibullius Rufus, the bearer of them, was proceeding to state them in detail, Pompey is said to have interrupted him,<sup>261</sup> and to have declared, "that he valued neither his life nor the enjoyment of his country, if he must receive them as a favour from Cæsar." A little before this, Bibulus and L. Scribonius Libo,<sup>262</sup> who were maintaining their blockade off the harbour of Oricum, proposed to Cæsar's officers, commanding in the town, that a truce should be concluded between the fleet and Cæsar's troops stationed along the coast, in order to allow time for entering upon a negotiation for peace. Cæsar himself had just left his lines on the Apsus, and had marched southward with a single legion, to secure some of the towns that were situated at a greater distance in his rear, and to procure some supplies of corn. In pursuit of these objects, he was now at Buthrotum, a town on the main land of Epirus, immediately opposite to Corcyra, when he received intelligence from his officers at Oricum, of the proposals made by Bibulus and Libo. He at once hastened in person to the spot, and Libo came on shore alone to meet him; Bibulus, it seems, thinking that an interview between himself and Cæsar was more likely to inflame the existing quarrel than to allay it. Libo assured Cæsar that nothing could be concluded without Pompey's authority; and only requested that a truce might be arranged till proposals of peace should be presented to Pompey, and till his answer to them could be known. He asserted, that Pompey was most anxious to terminate the contest; and that for himself, his advice, and that of the other officers, would all lead to the same conclusion. Cæsar, in return, pressed Libo to guarantee the safety of the officers whom he might send to Pompey's camp; and with regard to the naval armistice, he said that

<sup>260</sup> Cæsar, III. 10, 11.

<sup>261</sup> Cæsar, III. 18.

<sup>262</sup> Cæsar, III. 15, 16, 17.

he was willing to grant it, if the enemy's fleet would renounce their blockade, and allow the free passage of his troops from Italy. Libo replied, that he could guarantee nothing, but referred every thing to Pompey ; at the same time he again urged the conclusion of the naval armistice. But Cæsar perceiving, as he says, that nothing more was designed by the enemy than to procure some relief for their ships, by obtaining leave to get supplies from the shore, broke off the conference, and turned his thoughts to the active prosecution of the war.

Such is the representation of these transactions which Cæsar or his partisans have given to the world. We may repeat it, in the absence of all other testimony ; but we should remember, that it is the statement of the chief of a victorious party, and that it relates to matters of which he himself, when his account was published, was the only witness who dared to deliver his evidence. In the narrative, also, of this very transaction, there is one remarkable expression, which seems to imply that the writer was anxious to record nothing that would not redound to Cæsar's honour. Libo, it seems, during his conference with Cæsar, entered into some representation of the merits of the cause which he espoused, and of the amount of Pompey's forces ; "but on these points," says the historian,<sup>263</sup> "Cæsar thought proper to make no reply at the time, nor do we see any sufficient reason for dwelling on the subject now." The writer of this sentence, whether it was Cæsar himself, or one of his officers writing under his authority, was well aware that the merits of his cause could not bear any minute detail, and that the manner in which the friends of the commonwealth represented them was too forcible, and in the main too just, to admit of any satisfactory reply. He acted wisely, therefore, as a party writer, in passing by the subject altogether ; but he has by so doing left us, at the same time, a sufficient proof how little he deserves the title of a historian.

Yet the narrative of this writer, such as it is, and rendered in parts still more defective from the corrupt state of the text in our present copies, is our sole authority for any particular account of the operations of this important campaign. The English reader will, perhaps, have a more lively sense of its incompetence, if he considers what sort of a history could be drawn up of the events of more modern wars, if we had no other materials than the gazettes or bulletins of one party only. We must request those, therefore, who may follow us through our narrative of the ensuing transactions, to remember, once for all, that we are fully aware of the unsatisfactory foundation on which it rests ; and that if we

<sup>263</sup> "Huc addit pauca (Libo) de causâ, et de copiis auxiliisque suis. Quibus rebus neque tum respondendum Cæsar exis-

timavit ; neque nunc, ut memoriæ prodatur, satis causæ putamus," III. 16, 17.

Cæsar's account of these matters is to be regarded with suspicion.



do not repeat our sense of its uncertainty in every page, it is only to avoid unpleasant and needless interruptions to the course of our relation. Besides, in ordinary cases, we are willing to leave the reader to the exercise of his own judgment, whenever the story becomes justly suspicious, rather than attempt on every occasion to dictate to him ourselves. Unquestionably, the writer of Cæsar's "Commentaries" had the best opportunities of knowing the truth; and he is perfectly free from those blunders in indifferent matters which are the result of mere ignorance. His misrepresentations and misstatements are for the most part wilful; and it becomes a matter of great difficulty and uncertainty, to say how often the temptation was sufficiently strong to induce him to write against that better knowledge, which makes him, where no such temptation has interfered, so respectable a witness.

Whilst the two armies were encamped on the Apsus,<sup>264</sup> several attempts were made, on Cæsar's part, to keep up a correspondence between the soldiers of either party, and to impress on the minds of Pompey's followers, his own eagerness to terminate the contest. The generals of the commonwealth, remembering the issue of a similar correspondence between the troops of Sylla and Scipio in the last civil war, were no way inclined to expose their newly-raised and ill-assorted soldiers to the seductions of Cæsar's veterans; it being sufficiently obvious which side was most likely to entice the other from its duty. The meetings between the men and the inferior officers of the two parties, which had gone on to a considerable extent, were at last forcibly broken off, on one occasion, by Pompey's generals, and some of the centurions and soldiers of Cæsar's army were wounded. This was in the same spirit with the conduct of Petreius in Spain, and was dictated by a similar sense of danger. It was a proceeding of great severity, but yet not inconsistent with the laws of war, as the meetings were not authorized by the commander-in-chief of the commonwealth's army, who alone, as Cæsar had been on a late occasion particularly informed, had power to guarantee the safety of any negotiator from the enemy. The assertion of Cæsar that Labienus himself appeared at the conference, and was actually in conversation with P. Vatinius, Cæsar's officer, when the meeting was broken off by acts of hostility on the part of Pompey, is intended to convey a charge of wilful treachery, of which we cannot, in fairness, convict Labienus on the sole testimony of his personal as well as political adversary.

While the war was thus pausing in its course, and M. Antonius, with the second division of Cæsar's army, was still detained at Brundisium, unable to join his

Irregular communication between the soldiers of the two armies.

It is suddenly broken off by Pompey's generals.

Tumults excited at Rome by M. Cælius Rufus.

commander, a wild attempt was made to effect a counter-revolution in Italy.<sup>265</sup> The name of M. Cælius Rufus has already been mentioned in our account of the turbulent period of Pompey's third consulship. He was then one of the tribunes, and exerted himself warmly in behalf of Milo, amidst the agitations which followed the murder of P. Clodius; he also made himself particularly notorious by his opposition to the laws then proposed by Pompey with a view to the regulation of Milo's trial; and he so provoked Pompey as to draw from him the threat, "that if he met with any more obstructions, he would protect the interests of the commonwealth by force of arms." Like Curio, he was eloquent, unprincipled, and ambitious of distinction; and therefore, during the height of Pompey's power at Rome, he delighted, like Curio, in appearing to defy him, as the readiest means of gaining favour with the multitude, who are ever ready to admire a spirit of resistance to authority. He thus was led to favour the pretensions of Cæsar, to which he was further induced by his friendship for Curio,<sup>266</sup> and his enmity to Appius Claudius, who was now closely connected with Pompey. Yet his intimacy with Cicero, to whose notice he had been early recommended by his father,<sup>267</sup> and who had defended him some years before under a criminal prosecution, might have restrained him from openly taking part against the commonwealth, had he not been led to accompany Curio to Ariminum at the beginning of the war,<sup>268</sup> and been brought to a personal meeting with Cæsar, by consenting to be the bearer of a message to him from Cicero, urging him to lay aside his designs of hostility. It seems that Cæsar's winning address and behaviour, together with a nearer view of the resources by which he was supported, decided him in remaining with the rebel army, and accepting employment in Cæsar's service. He accordingly attended him on his way towards Spain,<sup>269</sup> and on his return thence, at the end of the year, he was elected prætor, as a reward for his attachment to his cause.<sup>270</sup> But the death of Curio had removed the principal link between him and his present associates; and although he was one of the prætors, yet he held only the less dignified rank of *Prætor Peregrinus*; the office of *Prætor Urbanus*, which possessed exclusive jurisdiction in all causes between citizens and citizens, was conferred on C. Trebonius,

<sup>265</sup> Cæsar, III. 20, 21, 22.

<sup>267</sup> Cicero, pro Cælio, 3.

<sup>266</sup> Cicero, ad Familiæ. VIII. epist.

XVII.

<sup>268</sup> Cicero, ad Familiæ. VIII. epist.

XVII.

<sup>269</sup> Cicero, ad Familiæ. VIII. epist. XV.

<sup>270</sup> It appears from some brief intimations in Cicero's letters to Atticus, that Cælius was already disgusted with Cæsar's party before the end of the campaign in

Spain: and that he was engaged in some attempts to excite disturbances among the legions left for the protection of Italy. Possibly, therefore, Cæsar did not take him with him into Spain, but left him with those troops, in Cisalpine Gaul, which did, in fact, break out into mutiny, as already related, about the time of Cæsar's return from Spain. Vide Cicero, ad Atticum, X. epist. XII. XV. XVI.

who had conducted the operations by land at the late siege of Massilia. His love of distinction, therefore, was ill gratified by his present situation; he felt himself slighted, and was desirous of at once revenging his fancied affronts upon Cæsar's party, and of regaining the friendship of the aristocrats, who were his old and natural connexions, and whom his late behaviour had alienated.

Under the influence of these motives, Cælius began to tread in the steps of the old popular tribunes,<sup>271</sup> and, complaining of Cæsar's late regulations with regard to the payment of debts, he declared that he would support any debtor who should appeal against a sentence of the *Prætor Urbanus*, adjudging payment according to the terms fixed by Cæsar. Finding, if we may believe Cæsar, that no appeals were brought to him, he proceeded to propose a law of his own, directing that debts were to be paid at six instalments, without any interest. It is very probable that many of the timid and indolent part of the aristocracy, who preferred remaining at Rome under Cæsar's government, rather than submitting to the labours and perils of a civil war, were delighted to find their new circumstances suddenly reconciled, by these innovations of Cælius, with the line they would naturally take in politics. P. Servilius, Cæsar's colleague in the consulship, whose father had in like manner been the colleague of Sylla, and who himself, a few years before, had been remarked as affecting to imitate Cato,<sup>272</sup> was now called upon, while supporting the government of Cæsar, to act like the high aristocratical consuls of former times, L. Opimius, or Cn. Octavius, or Q. Catulus. Supported by the other magistrates, he resisted the measures of Cælius, who finding his present law not sufficiently stimulating, proposed two others of a tendency still more revolutionary; one releasing all tenants of houses in Rome from their liability to be sued for rent during one year; and the other proclaiming a general release to all insolvent debtors from the claims of their creditors. Cælius had now degraded himself low enough to become the head of the most worthless portion of the community: mobs assembled as in the days of L. Saturninus, P. Sulpicius, and P. Clodius; and Trebonius was driven by violence from his seat of judgment. Servilius laid the consideration of these disturbances before the senate, and that body passed a resolution, the very same which had formerly been passed against Cæsar himself in his prætorship, that Cælius should be suspended from the duties and privileges of his office. He still attempted to harangue the people, but was forcibly pulled down from the rostra; and the support of the mere rabble

Violent measures of Cælius in his prætorship.

He is obliged to leave Rome.

<sup>271</sup> Cæsar, III. 20. Livy, Epitome, CXI. Dion Cassius, XLII. 195.

<sup>272</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, II. epist. I.



being, as usual, utterly powerless in the time of need, he resolved to quit Rome, professing that he was going over to Macedonia, to offer to Cæsar an explanation and apology for his conduct.

There is still extant a letter from Cælius to Cicero,<sup>273</sup> written apparently when he was just entered on this career of fruitless opposition to Cæsar's government. He flatters himself that he had alienated the general feeling at Rome from the cause of Cæsar; and that the poorer citizens who had hitherto regarded it as the popular side, now thought that it had abandoned their interests, and were ready to receive the friends of Pompey with open arms. He assures Cicero that it was Pompey's own fault that he had not recovered possession of Rome, for that every body there, with the exception of a few usurers, was now become his partisan. He promises to insure the triumph of the aristocracy, even against their will, and laments the blindness of Pompey in neglecting the fair field that was open to him in Italy, and persisting to combat Cæsar's veteran army in direct and open warfare. But a short time proved how greatly he had overrated the effect of his measures and of his abilities. On leaving Rome he had entered into a correspondence with his old associate, T. Milo,<sup>274</sup> who was ready to join in any attempt against Cæsar, as he had been alone excepted by him from the general pardon granted to all who had been banished by the sentence of the tribunals in Pompey's third consulship. Milo still retained,<sup>275</sup> either in his service or under his influence, some of those numerous gladiators whom he had formerly employed in his contests with Clodius. At the head of a party of these he appeared in arms in the neighbourhood of Capua; and professing that he had received, through Bibulus, a commission to levy troops in Pompey's name, he began to solicit the inhabitants of the different towns to join him. His character and resources, however, held out little encouragement; but having collected a certain number of runaway slaves, and of those who were kept at work in fetters in some of the work-houses, he made an attempt upon the town of Compsa,<sup>276</sup> and there lost his life by a stone discharged from one of the engines on the walls. Cælius, meantime, had not entirely thrown off the mask. He had secretly endeavoured to surprise Capua by the help of some gladiators who were then kept at Naples, and of some partisans in the town itself; but the plot being discovered in time to prevent its execution, he continued his journey southward, as if still pursuing his original design of going to Cæsar in Greece. But when he reached Thurii, he conceived hopes

He invites Milo to join him in an attempt to revive the interests of Pompey in Italy.

<sup>273</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. VIII. epist. XVII.

<sup>275</sup> Cæsar, III. 21, 22.

<sup>274</sup> Cæsar, III. 21.

<sup>276</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 68.

of gaining that important place for Pompey, and accordingly he began to tamper with some of the inhabitants, and also with some Gaulish and German horse whom Cæsar had left there as a garrison. To have secured a harbour for Pompey's ships on the coast of Italy, would have been one of the most signal services that could have been rendered at this period to the cause of the commonwealth; but the attempt was unsuccessful, and, according to Cæsar, Cælius was killed by some of those soldiers whose fidelity he was endeavouring to corrupt. Like most other fruitless insurrections, the disturbance excited by Cælius and Milo being thus quickly suppressed, rather tended, we may suppose, to strengthen Cæsar's authority; and persons possessed of property were more reconciled to his government when they found it ready to protect them against the violence of the needy and the desperate.

Cælius and Milo are killed.

About this time Pompey sustained a severe loss in the death of M. Calpurnius Bibulus, the commander-in-chief of his fleet.<sup>277</sup> The vigilance which this officer had lately exerted, in order to atone for his previous neglect in suffering Cæsar to cross the Ionian gulf, had thus far been completely successful in preventing the passage of the troops under M. Antonius, but it proved in the end fatal to himself. Fatigue, anxiety, and insufficient accommodations, severely affected his health; he refused, however, to quit his post, and persisted in struggling against his complaints till he sank under them. On his death, his place as commander-in-chief was left vacant, possibly from some intrigues at Pompey's head-quarters, which made it difficult for the general to fix upon a successor. But the bad effects of this omission were soon notorious, for each separate commander of a squadron began to act for himself; and L. Scribonius Libo,<sup>278</sup> departing from the defensive system of Bibulus, crossed the Ionian gulf with the fifty ships which formed his own division, and proposed to blockade the port of Brundisium itself, by occupying a small island which was opposite to the mouth of the harbour. His sudden appearance enabled him to surprise some vessels laden with corn, which he burnt or captured; he disembarked also a party of troops, with which he dislodged a body of Cæsar's cavalry from one of their posts near the shore; and, elated with these exploits, he wrote to Pompey to assure him that he might safely venture to bring the rest of the fleet into port to refit, for that he himself, with his single squadron, would engage to prevent the passage of Cæsar's reinforcements. A short time, however, proved the emptiness of these promises, for the island which Libo occupied was unable to furnish the ships with a suf-

<sup>277</sup> Cæsar, III. 18.

<sup>278</sup> Cæsar, 23, 24.

ficient supply of fresh water; and after the first surprise was over, Antonius stationed his parties of cavalry along the shore in such numbers, that they could not be dislodged, and thus effectually cut off the enemy from all communication with the land. The inability of an ancient fleet to act with success without military co-operation was thus again proved; and Libo was obliged to abandon the blockade of Brundisium, and resume his original station on the coast of Greece.

At length the winter was an end,<sup>279</sup> and Pompey's naval force had kept the sea through the most unfavourable season of the year with unabated resolution. Their task would now become much easier, and the difficulty of effecting a passage would be proportionably increased to Cæsar's second division. He himself complains that his officers at Brundisium had neglected some opportunities of which they might have availed themselves; and being impatient of their long delay, he wrote to them in very strong terms, enjoining them to put to sea with the first fair wind, and recommending them to steer for the coast of Apollonia, if possible, which, from its want of harbours, was less guarded by the enemy's fleet; adding, that they might there run their ships aground, and that the loss of the vessels was comparatively of no importance. But trusting, above all things, in the effect of his own presence, he made a bold attempt to cross over in person to Brundisium; and having left his army secretly by night, he embarked in disguise on board of a small vessel, and although the weather was very tempestuous, and the wind against him, he endeavoured at the utmost hazard to effect the passage of the Ionian gulf; nor was he induced to desist till he found it utterly impossible to accomplish his purpose.<sup>280</sup> His letters, however, had produced a sufficient effect; the soldiers themselves, he tells us, pressed their officers to risk the voyage; and M. Antonius and Q. Fufius Calenus, with four legions and about eight hundred cavalry, at length set sail with a south wind from Brundisium. But, with the wind in such a quarter, they not only failed to reaching Apollonia, but could not even make any land southward of Dyrrhachium. They were thus seen from Dyrrhachium by C. Coponius,<sup>281</sup> one of the *propræters*, who commanded the Rhodian squadron at that port, and he instantly put to sea in pursuit of them. Flight was their

Cæsar becomes impatient at the delay of his expected reinforcements.

M. Antonius embarks his troops at Brundisium.

<sup>279</sup> Cæsar, III. 25.

<sup>280</sup> Valerius Maximus, IX. 8. The story, as given in the text, is copied from Valerius Maximus, the earliest writer in whom we have found any mention of it. The famous additions to it, which are given by Florus, Dion Cassius, Appian, and Plutarch, that Cæsar encouraged the terrified master of the vessel, by discover-

ing himself to him in the midst of the storm, and telling him not to be afraid, for that he carried with him *Cæsar* and *his fortune*, resemble those embellishments of some simple expression or occurrence which anecdotes of great men are apt to gain in proportion to the number of persons who successively report them.

<sup>281</sup> Cæsar, III. 26, 27.



only resource, and they ran before the wind northward, towards the harbour of Nymphæum, which, though open to the south, and threatening the loss of their ships, still held out a chance of their effecting a landing. But, by one of those remarkable instances of good fortune which have occurred in our own naval history on some memorable occasions, the wind suddenly shifted to the south-west, as soon as the transports had reached Nymphæum; and thus, owing to the position of the harbour, they were now in perfect safety, whilst sixteen of the enemy's ships, that were most forward in the chase, were all driven on shore and wrecked. Of the crews a considerable number perished, and many were taken by Cæsar's soldiers; but these last, he tells us, he treated with humanity, and dismissed them unhurt to their own homes.

Two of Antonius's transports, being heavier sailers than the rest,<sup>282</sup> were overtaken by the night, and, not knowing what was become of their companions, came to an anchor off Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commanded Pompey's garrison in the town, sent off a number of armed boats and vessels to attack them, and summoned them both to surrender. One of them, which had on board 220 men of a newly-raised legion, submitted immediately;<sup>283</sup> but the other contained about 200 veterans, who, although weakened and wretched from the confinement and sickness of a stormy voyage, preserved their courage, and compelled the master of the transport to run the ship on shore. They found a position favourable for their defence; and, after repulsing an attack that was made upon them on the following morning, they reached the main body of the army, which had landed at Nymphæum without loss. Immediately afterwards, Lissus, which was within the limits of Cæsar's province of Illyricum, and had received some favours from him during his government as proconsul, opened its gates to Antonius; and that officer, having sent back most of the transports to Italy, to bring over some reinforcements that were yet expected, sent word to Cæsar of his landing, informing him of the numbers that he had brought with him, and of the part of the country at which he had effected his descent.

As the transports had been seen from the shore passing by Apollonia and Dyrrhachium,<sup>284</sup> their arrival in the neighbourhood was known both to Cæsar and Pompey; but neither was at first aware of the precise point at which they might have come to

<sup>282</sup> Cæsar, III. 28, 29.

<sup>283</sup> Cæsar adds, that they were all massacred, although their lives had been solemnly promised to them. We can only regret that we have not the report of Otacilius Crassus on this affair; but as it is, we cannot admit into the body of our nar-

rative a statement of this nature, which is utterly improbable in its present form, although it be very likely founded on something which did actually happen under different circumstances.

<sup>284</sup> Cæsar, III. 30.

shore. Both generals immediately broke up from their positions on the Apsus; Pompey, with the hope of surprising and cutting off the troops under Antonius, and Cæsar with the view of effecting his junction with them. But, as Cæsar was delayed by being obliged to march up the left bank of the Apsus for some distance, in order to find a ford, Pompey might possibly have succeeded in his object, had not his approach been communicated to Antonius by some of the people of the country. Thus aware of his danger, Antonius suspended his march, (for it seems that he had set out from Lissus to meet Cæsar,) and kept his troops during one whole day within the protection of their camp; till, on the next day, Cæsar, having recovered the ground which he had lost, came up with the main body of his army. It was now Pompey's turn to be apprehensive for his safety; and, accordingly, he fell back to avoid being surrounded, allowed the enemy's two divisions to effect their junction, and marching with his whole force to Asparagium, a small town subject to the people of Dyrrhachium, but whose exact situation is not known, he there encamped his army again in a favourable position. Cæsar, on the other hand, now found himself enabled to extend the scene of his operations.<sup>285</sup> To maintain a large force on the coast was become less important; he diminished, therefore, the number of his troops in that quarter, and sent three considerable detachments into Ætolia, Thessaly, and Macedonia, as he had reason to expect that the inhabitants of those countries would declare in his favour, as soon as they could do so with safety; and as his supplies by sea were rendered worse than precarious by the superiority of the enemy's navy, it was highly expedient that he should command the resources of a more extensive district than that narrow strip of coast to which he had hitherto been confined. He himself, as soon as he learned the new position in which Pompey had placed his army,<sup>286</sup> followed him thither, and offered him battle. The challenge was declined; for if Pompey had not thought proper to meet his enemy in the field before the arrival of Antonius, he was much less likely to risk a general action now. But an army, which feels itself superior to its antagonists, enjoys a great advantage in the freedom of its movements; for, as it is its interest to bring on a general engagement, it may attempt any enterprise it pleases, with the twofold chance either of winning that particular object, or of forcing the enemy to a battle if he endeavours to offer any opposition. In this manner, Cæsar, finding that his adversary was resolved to avoid an action, conceived the plan of marching upon Dyrrhachium, which, as we have already stated, was one of the principal magazines of Pompey. To mislead his enemy, he set

He effects his junction with Cæsar.

Cæsar follows Pompey to Asparagium.

<sup>285</sup> Cæsar, III. 34, 35, et seq.

<sup>286</sup> Cæsar, III. 41, 42.

out at first from his camp in a different direction ; and it was not till the following morning that Pompey, having discovered in the mean time his real intention, commenced his own march towards

He marches upon Dyrrhachium, and encamps before the town.

Dyrrhachium, in order to counteract it. Cæsar, however, had gained in time more than he had lost in distance by the circuitous route which he had

taken ; he pressed his march, moreover, with the utmost activity, allowing his men to rest only during a short portion of the night, and thus he appeared in front of Dyrrhachium early in the morning, and formed his camp before the town, so as to cut off all ap-

Pompey encamps at Petra, near Dyrrhachium.

proach to it. Pompey, finding himself shut out from Dyrrhachium, took up a position on some high

ground near the sea, known by the name of Petra, or Cliff, and which commanded a small barbour or bay, where vessels with some winds might ride at anchor, or be drawn on the beach with safety. Hither, accordingly, he collected a part of his fleet, and hither he ordered his supplies to be brought by sea from all the parts of the empire which acknowledged his authority.

Thus were the two contending parties opposed to one another at Dyrrhachium ; and notwithstanding Cæsar's good fortune in seeing his whole army united on the eastern side of the Ionian gulf, he had as yet no prospect of bringing the war to a speedy termination. The naval force of the enemy preserved and even improved its ascendancy ;<sup>287</sup> and not only cut off all chance of supplies from Italy, but had lately made one or two successful attacks on some of the ports of Epirus, which were in the possession of his troops, and had burnt or captured most of the ships which he had detained there out of the fleets used in transporting his army from Brundisium. Nor had Pompey been obliged to divide his own forces in order to oppose the detachments which Cæsar had recently sent into Thessaly and Macedonia ; for his father-in-law, Scipio,<sup>288</sup> had just arrived from Asia with the legions which he had raised in his province of Syria, and was able to occupy the attention of Cæsar's lieutenants, without requiring any assistance from the commander-in-chief. Under these cir-

Cæsar proposes to blockade Pompey in his position.

cumstances, Cæsar formed the plan of blockading

Pompey's army in its position at Petra, by constructing lines of circumvallation extensive enough to intercept all the enemy's communications with the interior of the country ; a measure to which, as he tells us, he was led by several considerations ;<sup>289</sup> for he hoped, in the first place, to render useless the fine and numerous cavalry of Pompey, and to secure his own foraging parties from its attacks ; and he wished, besides, to preserve the reputation of his arms, and to gain the credit of block-

<sup>287</sup> Cæsar, III. 40. 42.

<sup>289</sup> Cæsar, III. 43.

<sup>288</sup> Cæsar, III. 31—38.



ading Pompey the Great in his camp, and forcing him thus practically to confess his own inferiority. Above all, it was necessary for him to employ his army in some active operations; in the course of which, he flattered himself, circumstances might arise which might bring his troops into contact with the enemy, in spite of Pompey's determination to avoid every engagement, and to trust to time and his naval superiority for a successful termination of the war.

An attempt to detail minutely all the operations that followed, would scarcely be of any value, without a more intelligible guide than our present copies of Cæsar's "Commentaries" can supply, and without a more perfect knowledge of the ground than it is now, perhaps, possible to obtain. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with a general view of the object pursued by each party, and of the manner in which this first act of the campaign, if we may use the expression, was brought to a conclusion. No sooner did Pompey perceive his adversary's design of hemming him in on the sea coast,<sup>290</sup> than he began to construct lines on his side, which he continually carried out to a greater distance, that he might command a larger space for the quarters of his own army, and might multiply the labour and difficulty of the operations of the enemy. The fortifications of each party consisted of forts placed on the most commanding points of the country, and connected with one another by a rampart and ditch. Frequent contests took place between the troops employed in these works; as the possession of any important height, if gained by Cæsar, enabled him to draw his lines more closely around the enemy; or, if secured by Pompey, threw back his adversaries to a greater distance, and gave a greater freedom of movement to his own army. The result was, that Pompey raised no fewer than twenty-four forts, all connected with each other by continuous works, and thus gained a space of fifteen miles in circuit for the accommodation and subsistence of his soldiers; while Cæsar, persevering in his original design, completed a blockading line of the extraordinary length of eighteen miles,<sup>291</sup> following the whole extent of the works of the enemy. Nor was this all; for, where his line came down to the sea, he constructed a second line parallel to it at the distance of about two hundred yards, and facing towards the opposite direction, to prevent his main line from being attacked in the rear, if Pompey should embark troops on board his ships, and direct them to cause a diversion, by landing on the outside of the blockading line, and attacking it on that quarter. For further security, these two lines were to be connected by a transverse line parallel to the sea, and closing up the open-

Description of the lines and operations in the neighbourhood of Dyrrhachium.

<sup>290</sup> Cæsar, III. 44.

<sup>291</sup> Cæsar, III. 63.

ing between them; but this third work was not completed, owing to the immense magnitude of the labour which the army had to perform in other quarters; and the omission was afterwards attended, as we shall see, by some important consequences.

Both armies suffered some privations in this extraordinary kind of warfare.<sup>292</sup> Cæsar's soldiers were most pressed by the scarcity of wheat, an article which they seem to have considered so indispensably necessary, that their general Inconveniences suffered by both armies. praises their fortitude in high terms for enduring the want of it; although their condition does not seem to have been very deplorable, if, as Cæsar admits, they were plentifully supplied with meat, vegetables, barley, and a root which he calls chara, and which, he tells us, they used to prepare with milk, and make cakes of it. On the other side, Pompey's troops had wheat in abundance; but their situation in other respects was much worse than that of the enemy. As their position was near the sea, the streams naturally flowed down through it from the higher ground occupied by Cæsar's lines; and Cæsar was thus enabled either to turn their course, or to pond up the water with great labour in those narrow valleys or gorges into which the springs of the hills first discharged themselves, before they reached the lower and more open country. Deprived thus of the natural supply of running water, Pompey's soldiers were obliged to dig basins or reservoirs in the marshy grounds near the sea; and the water thus gained was not only bad in itself, but quickly dried up under the heat of the sun, as the season was now advanced to the middle of summer. In addition to this most severe suffering, they were reduced to the greatest want of forage for their horses, insomuch that they were obliged to give them leaves from the trees, and the roots of reeds, to eke out the supplies which they received by sea; and thus most of the draught animals of the army, being less considered than the cavalry horses, died, and the stench of their carcasses in the hot summer weather, and in the low and comparatively confined space occupied by the troops, produced a considerable effect, we are told, on the health of the men. How far Cæsar may have exaggerated the distress which his blockade occasioned to his adversaries, it is not easy to decide; but it is probable that in one respect his views were answered, and that Pompey suffered in general estimation, by allowing himself, with an unbroken and numerous army, to be hemmed in by his antagonist. "He cannot escape with honour," says Dolabella in a letter to Cicero,<sup>293</sup> written about this time from Rome, "driven as he has been from Italy; deprived of Spain with the loss of a veteran army; and now even blockaded in his camp; a disgrace which scarcely any other of our commanders

<sup>292</sup> Cæsar, III. 47, 48, 49. 58.

<sup>293</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar, IX. epist. IX.

has ever endured." Yet Pompey, it is likely, was daily improving the quality of his troops, by exercising them in those partial conflicts to which the nature of the operations on both sides constantly gave occasion ; and it may be conjectured that Cæsar had better reasons for praising the patience and fortitude of his soldiers than he chooses to confess ; for every account of these transactions dwells upon the distress which they suffered from the want of provisions, in a manner not very consistent with Cæsar's statement, that they had every thing in abundance except wheaten bread. At length Pompey thought that the time was come at which he might act on a more vigorous system. Whether he was urged, as Cæsar says, by the distress which he suffered in his present position, or whether he wished at last to make some trial of the fitness of his soldiers to oppose the enemy in the field, he resolved to break out from his confinement, and force a passage through Cæsar's lines. Having been accurately informed by some deserters of the disposition of the enemy's troops,<sup>294</sup> and of all the defects of their works, particularly of the opening left between their first and second line near the sea, owing to the unfinished state of the transverse line which was intended to connect them together, Pompey prepared his plan of attack accordingly. Directing his main effort against the weak point of Cæsar's works, he assaulted the first line in front with his legionary soldiers, whilst he embarked on board his small craft a large force of his light infantry, and caused them to be landed, some on the outside of the second line to attack it in front, and some in the opening between the two lines, where they could distract the defenders of both by assailing them in the rear. These combined movements were crowned with complete success. The attack was made at daybreak, the lines were forced with great slaughter, and Pompey had taken up a new position beyond the works which had been constructed with so much labour to confine him, before Cæsar could come up to the support of his men from the remote part of his lines in which he had fixed his usual quarters. When he did arrive on the spot, and saw that all his plans must at once be changed, he gave orders to form a new camp near that of Pompey. But scarcely was the work completed,<sup>295</sup> when some of his reconnoitering parties brought him word that a portion of the enemy's army, apparently amounting to an entire legion, was stationed by itself at some distance from its main body, and might possibly be cut off by a sudden attack. Eager to retrieve the loss which he had sustained in the early part of the day, Cæsar caught at the chance of success thus held out to him, and advanced with about three legions to assail the single legion

Pompey resolves to  
release himself from  
his blockade.

He forces Cæsar's  
lines.

<sup>294</sup> Cæsar, 59, et seq.

<sup>295</sup> Cæsar, III. 66, et seq.



of the enemy. But the ground, it seems, was intersected with walls and ditches which had been made in some of the multiplied operations of the last few weeks, and these impediments delayed and disarranged the order of the advancing troops, and gave Pompey time to come up with a strong reinforcement. Cæsar's soldiers, confused amidst the difficulties of the ground, and now themselves attacked both in front and rear, were seized with a panic and fled. In vain did Cæsar attempt to stop the rout; when he caught hold of the colours which the terrified bearers were carrying off in their flight, they were thrown away, or left in his grasp; when he stopped the horses of any of his fugitive cavalry, the riders leaped off, and ran away on foot. But the same impediments which had first thrown the vanquished party into disorder, obstructed in their turn the pursuit of the conquerors; and Pompey, himself, it is said, surprised at his easy victory, suspected that the flight of the enemy was counterfeited, in order to draw him into some ambuscade, and accordingly did not press upon them so closely as he might have done. Still he had gained a great and decisive advantage, for Cæsar at once felt that he could not continue the campaign on his present ground; and having brought together all his scattered detachments, and abandoned all his lines, he determined to retreat from the neighbourhood of Dyrrhachium with the greatest expedition, and began to concert measures to preserve his army during its retreat from the annoyance likely to be offered by the victorious enemy.

For this purpose he sent off all his baggage with the sick and wounded in the early part of the night, under the escort of a single legion.<sup>296</sup> The main body of the army commenced its march a little before daybreak, but Cæsar remained in the camp, with two legions, for some little time longer; and then, after the usual order had been given for the soldiers to prepare to march, he set out with the utmost expedition and soon overtook the other legions, which had already made some progress. The order for marching was generally, it appears, conveyed through the camp with considerable noise,<sup>297</sup> being notified by repeated calls to get the baggage together, and thus it might easily be heard by an enemy, when posted at the little distance which was customary in Roman warfare. Pompey, accordingly, no sooner heard this signal, than he put his own army in motion, supposing that the enemy were only then beginning their retreat; but Cæsar, through the precautions which he had employed, was so much in advance that he could not be overtaken till he came to the Genusus, a river which falls into the sea a little to the south of Dyrrhachium, and whose steep and rocky banks necessarily occasioned

Affair of Dyrrhachium, in which Cæsar is defeated.

Cæsar retreats from Dyrrhachium.

<sup>296</sup> Cæsar, III. 75.

<sup>297</sup> Cæsar, de Bell. Civili, I. 66.

some delay ere the passage of it could be effected. Here Pompey's cavalry came up with the rear of the retreating army; but Cæsar ordered his own cavalry up to the scene of action, and by supporting them with a detachment of his light-armed legionary infantry, enabled them, according to his own account, though greatly inferior in numbers, to repulse the enemy with some loss. Having thus crossed the Genusus in safety, he led his troops into a camp which they had formerly occupied, described before as being close to Asparagium,<sup>298</sup> and which was distant about eight miles from the position which they had quitted in the morning.<sup>299</sup> The cavalry were immediately sent out to forage, as if Cæsar intended to halt here for the night; but they were ordered to return quickly to the camp, by the gate furthest removed from the enemy, and about noon the order was given to resume the march, and the army continued its retreat for eight miles more without the least disturbance. Pompey, on his part, had occupied his old camp near Asparagium, and concluding that Cæsar would move no further during that day, had not only sent out his cavalry as usual to collect wood and forage, but had allowed many of the soldiers to return to their position of the morning, in order to collect various articles of their baggage which they had been forced to leave behind when summoned so suddenly to move in pursuit of Cæsar. It was thus impossible for him to follow his adversary, and the advance which Cæsar had gained was so important, that no subsequent exertions of Pompey could make up for it. Accordingly, on the fourth day he discontinued the pursuit, and Cæsar arrived at Apollonia without interruption. This town, it seems, was one of his most valuable posts,<sup>300</sup> and he had placed there his military chest, which he now required for the payment of his soldiers; he judged it also to be the place where he could most securely leave behind his wounded; and for both these reasons he had fixed upon it as his first point of retreat. He had no intention, however, to remain there long, as he had decided to move at once into Thessaly. Accordingly, having sent orders to Cn. Domitius Calvinus, the commander of that part of his army which was in Lower Macedonia, to join him as soon as possible, and having

He is pursued by  
Pompey without  
effect.

<sup>298</sup> Cæsar, III. 76.

<sup>299</sup> This is spoken of as a day's march, although it was completed some time before noon, and the distance seems very inconsiderable. It should be remembered, however, that it was now midsummer, a season at which it would be desirable, in the climate of Greece, to avoid marching in the heat of the day; and, besides, the circumstance of finding a camp ready formed, would be a reason why the army should halt a little sooner than usual,

rather than advance a few miles at the price of having to undergo the whole labour of raising the customary works for itself. The passage of the Genusus, moreover, was probably more fatiguing than a march of some length over a plain country; and the armies had both moved at an unusual pace during the whole day; so that altogether it was not unnatural to suppose that Cæsar might really intend to halt in his camp at Asparagium.

<sup>300</sup> Cæsar, III. 78.

left garrisons at Apollonia, Lissus, and Oricum, to facilitate his communications with Italy, he set out once more to commence what may be called a new campaign; and turning aside from the coast, he commenced his march towards the interior of the country, through Epirus and Athamania.<sup>301</sup>

The final success of Cæsar at Pharsalia, ought not so far to impose upon us as to prevent us from seeing that his plans, up to the moment of his retreat from Dyrrhachium, had entirely failed, and that Pompey's confidence in the wisdom of his own system had hitherto been fully justified. By exposing his soldiers gradually in partial encounters, and under favourable circumstances, he had enabled them to meet and to vanquish Cæsar's veterans; while Cæsar, after undergoing a series of labours for the purpose of tempting his adversary to fight, and having seen the patience of his troops tried to the utmost from the want of provisions arising from the enemy's naval superiority, had imposed all this suffering upon them without deriving the least benefit from it; and when at last he did meet Pompey in battle, he was beaten and obliged to change his whole plan of the campaign. But although he had thus been baffled, he allowed no signs of dejection nor of a sense of difficulty to appear in his conduct. He had so artfully soothed the vanity of his soldiers by extenuating their defeat,<sup>302</sup> and imputing it to any cause rather than to a want of courage or zeal on their part, that the men were less dismayed than irritated by their disaster; and feeling grateful to their general for the kindness of his behaviour towards them, they were impatient for an opportunity of retrieving their disgrace, and of proving to him that his confidence in them had not been bestowed unworthily. The success with which the retreat to Apollonia had been conducted, was likely to lessen their impression of the events at Dyrrhachium; and they now had the prospect of resuming at once the offensive, of drawing away the enemy from the neighbourhood of

He resolves to march into Thessaly.

His reasons for so doing.

<sup>301</sup> The reading in the only two editions of Cæsar which we have consulted, (neither of them, it must be confessed, of any great value, or of recent date,) is "Acarnania;" "per Epirum atque Arcarnaniam iter facere cœpit," 78. It is evident that Cæsar could not march through *Acarnania*; but *Athamania* is the name of that wild mountain region which lies between Epirus and Thessaly, and which immediately overhangs the valley in which Gomphi stands. Vid. Livy, XXXI. 41. "Imminet Althamania huic urbi;" sc. Gomphis. It should be remembered, that in the part of his history from which these words are quoted, Livy, has so generally copied Polybius, that his geography is unusually

clear and correct. See also Strabo, VII. 378, and IX. 491. Plutarch also says, expressly, ἐβάρυξε δὲ τὴν Ἀθαμάνων εἰς Θεσσαλίαν. in Pompeio, 66. Another blunder occurs in the very next chapter in the same editions of Cæsar, where the Heraclea, through which Pompey passed, is called Heraclea Sentica. Heraclea Sentica, or Sintica, was near the eastern frontier of Macedonia, between the Strymon and the Axios; Vid. Livy, XLV. 29; but the Heraclea, through which Pompey passed, was on the western frontier, and was, in fact, situated on the Ignatian way, at the eastern foot of the Candavian mountains. Vid. Strabo, VII. 374.

<sup>302</sup> Cæsar, III. 73, 74.



the sea, which had hitherto given him so great an advantage, and of enjoying the supplies which the approaching harvest promised them in the rich and comparatively unwasted plains of Thessaly. Still, however, the utmost expedition was necessary; for it was not to be doubted that Pompey, after having ceased to pursue Cæsar, would at once march into Macedonia by that great and direct communication called the Ignatian way,<sup>303</sup> which, as we have already mentioned, crossed the whole country from Dyrhachium on the Ionian gulf, to Thessalonica on the Ægean sea. Whichever general should first arrive to support his officer who commanded in Lower Macedonia, was likely to gain an important advantage by overwhelming the detachment of the enemy; and thus, whilst Pompey was hastening to join Scipio, Cæsar was equally anxious to unite his army with that of Cn. Domitius.

Cn. Domitius Calvinus had been consul with M. Messala during the latter part of the year 700, after the long interregnum which lasted through all the earlier months of it. He was then reputed a partisan of the aristocracy, but was implicated, while a candidate, in that corrupt agreement with the consuls of the preceding year which forms so remarkable an instance of audacious profligacy.<sup>304</sup> Such a man had probably little to guide him, except his interest or his passions; and accordingly he was now an officer under Cæsar, and had been sent into Macedonia some time before with two legions, to gain, if possible, that important province.<sup>305</sup> Here he had been opposed to Scipio, who had just brought with him from Asia an army of nearly equal force; and as Scipio imitated the policy of Pompey and declined an action, the two armies lay opposite to one another for some time on the banks of the Haliacmon, without engaging in any affair of importance. It seems, however, that this system of warfare was as annoying to Cæsar's lieutenants as to himself, for we find that Cn. Domitius, having exhausted the resources of the country immediately around him, was obliged to change his position, and had moved towards Heraclea,<sup>306</sup> a town situated on the Ignatian way, and at the eastern foot of the Candavian mountains, which are the central chain from whence the streams flow eastward to the Ægean, and westward to the Ionian gulf. This movement took place exactly at the time that Pompey was marching to join Scipio; and as Heraclea was one of the towns through which his road lay, he would have cut off Domitius and his troops without difficulty, had they not escaped in the utmost haste only four hours before his arrival. The news of Cæsar's defeat at Dyrhachium, exaggerated as usual by report, had produced every where a strong sensation; and the people of the country, con-

<sup>303</sup> Strabo, VII. 374, edit. Xyland.

<sup>304</sup> Vide p. 216.

<sup>305</sup> Cæsar, III. 34.

<sup>306</sup> Cæsar, 79. Strabo, VII. 374.

sidering his cause desperate, hoped to recommend themselves to the conqueror, by cutting off his communications, and practising against him all those desultory modes of annoyance which a retreating or beaten army is so apt to suffer from such hands. For a long time, therefore, neither Cæsar nor Domitius could receive any intelligence from each other; but at last Domitius, having learnt at once the march of Cæsar towards Thessaly, and his own danger from the advance of Pompey, fell back southwards with all his haste, and met Cæsar at Æginium,<sup>307</sup> a town of considerable natural strength, standing amongst the mountains of Athamania, which immediately overhang the plains of Thessaly. Scipio, who had, perhaps, been earlier informed of the approaching change of the seat of war, left the banks of the Haliacmon, and stationed himself at Larissa, on the Peneus, one of the principal cities of Thessaly, and which it was of importance to lose no time in securing. As for the detachment which had been sent by Cæsar into Thessaly while he was himself opposed to Pompey near Dyrrhachium,<sup>308</sup> it had been driven out of the country by Scipio, just before Cn. Domitius began to engage the whole attention of that officer in Macedonia; so that Cæsar, when he arrived at Æginium, had nothing else to trust to for a favourable reception except the affections of the Thessalians themselves, and those, he tells us, had been greatly alienated by the exaggerated reports which prevailed of the desperate situation of his affairs.

On descending from Æginium into the plain of Thessaly, the first town of importance on the line of Cæsar's march was Gomphi.<sup>309</sup> He found the gates shut against him, although he tells us that the citizens had sent to him some time before to offer him their services, and to invite him to garrison their city. But when he represented to his soldiers the importance of striking terror into the Thessalians by vigorously chastising this first act of hostility, and encouraged them by promises of the plunder of a wealthy town, they were animated with such a spirit that they scaled the walls within three or four hours after their arrival before the place, and sacked the town with all the eagerness of men who had been long unused to every indulgence. The example, however, produced the desired effect. Metropolis, the next place on the army's route, submitted at once; and here, as a contrast to the fate of Gomphi, the soldiers were forced to observe the greatest forbearance. With such a lesson before their eyes, the other towns of Thessaly followed generally the behaviour of the people of Metropolis, so that Cæsar rapidly advanced, till he found

He joins Cn. Domitius, his lieutenant, on the frontiers of Thessaly.

He takes Gomphi, and wins over most of the Thessalian towns, and encamps in the plains of Pharsalia.

<sup>307</sup> Cæsar, 79. Livy, XXXI. 41; XXXII. 15.

<sup>308</sup> Cæsar, 36.

<sup>309</sup> Cæsar, 80.

himself in the midst of a country covered with crops of corn almost ready for harvest,<sup>310</sup> where he determined to await the approach of Pompey, and again, if possible, try the fortune of a battle. His camp was pitched a few miles to the south of Larissa, at no great distance from the right bank of the river Enipeus, in the ever-memorable plains of Pharsalus or Pharsalia.

Meanwhile the victory of Dyrrhachium and the retreat of Cæsar had produced a fatal effect on the mind of Pompey, and made him less firm in resisting the rash and violent counsels of his officers. His soldiers had saluted him with the title of imperator on the field of battle, a name usually given in this manner by an army to its victorious general, and expressive of the sense entertained by his troops of the greatness of his success. But it is mentioned, that although Pompey adopted the title thus conferred on him,<sup>311</sup> he abstained from the general custom of wreathing his fasces, or surrounding his letters with laurel; implying that he intended to claim no triumph for a victory gained over his own countrymen. His generals immediately began to propose various plans for the future operations of the army. L. Afranius (who had brought with him from Spain a part of the troops which he had formerly commanded there,<sup>312</sup> having enlisted, perhaps afresh, some of those soldiers who had been discharged according to the capitulation granted them by Cæsar) strongly urged that Pompey should avail himself of the first renown of his victory,<sup>313</sup> and should transport his army at once into Italy, that he might thus easily recover the seat of government, and might deprive his adversary of the resources which he now drew from Sicily, Sardinia, Gaul, and Spain. But Pompey replied, that he would never consent to expose Italy and Rome itself to the miseries of war; that besides, by leaving Greece at this moment he abandoned Scipio and his two legions to certain destruction; whereas, by effecting a junction with him, he might reasonably hope to complete the work which they had so well begun, and might return to Rome within a short period, without leaving behind them any cause for apprehension or future anxiety. It is said that some of the members of the high aristocratical party were in the habit of reproaching Pompey for his procrastinating system of warfare,<sup>314</sup> and accused him of wishing to protract the contest, that he might the longer enjoy the distinction of seeing the flower of the nobility of Rome obeying him as their commander-in-chief. But his policy was so evidently wise, that, inclined as he was to defer too much to public opinion, he yet persevered in his own plans till after the battle

<sup>310</sup> Cæsar, 81.

<sup>311</sup> Cæsar, 71.

<sup>312</sup> Cæsar, 88.

<sup>313</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 66. Appian, II. 65.

<sup>314</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 67. Appian, II. 67. Cæsar, 82.



of Dyrrhachium. The unexpected panic which he had on that occasion witnessed among Cæsar's veterans, inclined him, perhaps, to think that he had judged too highly of their superiority; while his confidence in his own soldiers would be proportionably raised. He thought that his long course of cautious training had at last been brought to perfection; and that with a more numerous army, now flushed with victory, and a very superior cavalry, he need not fear to face his enemy in the field. This feeling was heightened when he found that the plains of Thessaly were to become the scene of the contest; for on no ground could his cavalry act with more advantage; and we are told that he placed his main reliance on that part of his forces.<sup>315</sup> But be this as it may, he set out with the bulk of his army to follow Cæsar, as we have already related, having left fifteen cohorts at Dyrrhachium, under the command of M. Cato, to secure his magazines in that town.<sup>316</sup> Two other distinguished individuals remained also at Dyrrhachium, and thus were not present at the battle of Pharsalia; M. Varro, who had been lately one of Pompey's lieutenants in Spain, and who was accounted the most learned Roman of his time; and M. Cicero, who, though warmly attached to Pompey himself, was disgusted at the language and conduct of some of his principal officers, and was, probably, not sorry for the indisposition which, according to Plutarch,<sup>317</sup> prevented him from taking a more active part in the contest. He had always been anxious for peace, and had left Italy in the preceding summer, and joined Pompey in Greece more out of personal friendship to him, and a regard to his own character, than from any ardent zeal in the quarrel, or still less from an approbation of the manner in which it was conducted.

Pompey, on his arrival in Thessaly, formed a junction with Scipio's army, and then advanced and pitched his camp at no great distance from that of Cæsar. He was abundantly supplied with provisions from the sea, and from the country in his rear, while Cæsar could command only the resources of that part of Thessaly which was in his own immediate occupation; and these, though plentiful at present, must of necessity be soon exhausted. Cæsar, therefore, lost no time in offering battle to his antagonist; but this was for some days declined; and Pompey, though he drew his troops out in order, yet kept them so near to the protection of their camp, that Cæsar could not venture to attack him.<sup>318</sup> There was still, perhaps, a struggle in Pompey's mind between his own better judgment and his deference to the wishes, or rather the clamours, of his generals, combined with that confidence in his strength with which his late victory had

<sup>315</sup> Cæsar, 86.

<sup>317</sup> In Cicerone, 39.

<sup>316</sup> Cicero, de Divinatione, I. 31. Plutarch, in Catone, 55.

<sup>318</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Civili, III. 85.

inspired him. At length Cæsar resolved to change his ground, calculating, he tells us, that by moving often from place to place, he should be able to subsist his troops more readily,<sup>319</sup> and if he was pursued, might have some opportunity of forcing the enemy to an engagement during the march. Besides, he still looked upon Pompey's soldiers as raw levies in comparison with his own practised veterans, and hoped to weary out their spirits and patience by harassing them incessantly, and keeping them in continual motion. But when the order for marching had been actually given, when the tents were already struck, and the troops were moving out of the gates of the camp, word was brought that the enemy was formed in line of battle at a greater distance from his intrenchments than usual, as if disposed to venture an action on equal terms. Immediately the march was stopped, the red ensign, or signal of battle, was displayed at the general's quarters,<sup>320</sup> and the soldiers, freed from the load which they were accustomed to carry when marching, were instantly led out into the plain equipped merely for battle, and were drawn up in front of the enemy.

Pompey is persuaded to hazard a battle.

The engagements of modern warfare cannot be understood without an exact knowledge not only of the grand-er features of the scene of action, but even of the minutest details of its hills, valleys, streams, woods, roads, villages, and insulated houses. A space of several miles is occupied by the contending armies, and a battle is for the most part a game of positions, in which the carrying one important point renders the retreat of the enemy a matter of necessity. Generals, therefore, are obliged to calculate time and distance, with the utmost exactness, as success will depend on the combined movements of different bodies of men acting out of sight of one another, and over a wide extent of country; and meeting with obstacles of a very unequal nature in their respective operations. But in ancient times, the great battles, which decided the fate of a campaign or a war, were conducted on a much more simple system. The two parties descended, as by agreement, into a wide field for action; both were drawn up in parallel lines, and there decided the contest by hard fighting, man to man, with seldom any other attempts at manœuvring, than those made by either army to turn the flank of its antagonist. In this manner, Cæsar and Pompey met in the plains of Pharsalia. Their lines fronted one another in the usual order of battle; the right flank of Pompey's army, and the left of Cæsar's, were covered by the river Enipeus, whose banks were steep and broken;<sup>321</sup> while Pompey had stationed his whole cavalry on his left, at once to cover that extremity of

Disposition of the two armies.

<sup>319</sup> Cæsar, 85.

<sup>320</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 68.

<sup>321</sup> Cæsar, III. 88.

his own line, and to turn the wing of the enemy. To obviate this, Cæsar formed a reserve of six cohorts, which he had drafted from the legions of his third line, and placed them on his right, behind his own cavalry, ready to present a front and to charge the cavalry of the enemy so soon as they should prepare to execute their intended manœuvre. He, himself, besides, took his station on the right of his line, at the head of the tenth legion, the most distinguished body of troops in his army; while Pompey, equally aware that this would be the most important point in the field, placed himself on his own left wing, at the head of the two legions which had formerly belonged to Cæsar, and which had been recalled from his army in Gaul, as we have already seen, a little before the beginning of the war. The numbers on each

side are, as usual, uncertain; the writer of the *Commentaries* (for the more we read them the less can we persuade ourselves to consider Cæsar as their author, although, to avoid circumlocution, we often speak of them as his work,) states the amount of Pompey's infantry at 45,000, and that of Cæsar's at 22,000.<sup>322</sup> In cavalry, Pompey's superiority is made out to be still greater; he had 7000 men, and Cæsar, only 1000.<sup>323</sup> Appian, also, without referring directly to the "*Commentaries*," gives exactly the same numbers, following, he says, the most credible authorities on the subject;<sup>324</sup> but he mentions several other statements, some representing the disparity between the two armies to have been greater, and others to have been less than he has recorded. The auxiliary troops on both sides were very numerous but their exact amount, says Appian, is not known; because the Romans considered the foreign part of their forces as of little importance. Almost every province of the empire had given assistance to one or other of the two antagonists; and it was on the foreign troops in Pompey's army that Cæsar ordered his soldiers to glut their fury, while he commanded them to spare all who were Romans, as soon as they should cease to resist. Yet it was the most beneficial result of Cæsar's final victory, that the distinction between the Italians and the inhabitants of other parts of the empire was gradually lessened, till it was at last removed altogether. And although, to effect this equality, Rome was somewhat degraded, as well as the provinces raised, yet the general interests of mankind were promoted by the change, inasmuch as a larger portion of it became admitted to that rank and that civil condition which were the highest and most desirable existing at the time in the world.

The signal for attack was first given by Cæsar;<sup>325</sup> and his soldiers rushed forward to the onset. But finding that the enemy did not advance to meet them, and

Battle of Pharsalia.

<sup>322</sup> Cæsar, III. 88, 89.

<sup>323</sup> Cæsar, 84.

<sup>324</sup> Appian, II. 70.

<sup>325</sup> Cæsar, 90. 92. Florus, IV. 2.



fearing to exhaust their strength before they closed, they halted, of their own accord, for a few minutes, in the middle of their course, to recover their breath; and then, renewing their charge, they launched their javelins against the adverse ranks, and instantly drawing their swords, engaged the enemy hand to hand. The soldiers of the commonwealth received the attack with coolness, and the action soon became general; when the cavalry,<sup>326</sup> which was stationed on the left of Pompey's line, moved forward to charge Cæsar's right, accompanied by all the light troops, which formed a numerous body. Cæsar's cavalry, unable to stand the attack, was presently beaten; and the victorious cavalry of Pompey were beginning to fall on the defenceless flank of the line of infantry, when the reserve of six cohorts, or about 3000 men, which Cæsar had formed for this very purpose, suddenly advanced; and without waiting to receive the charge of the cavalry, itself charged them with great impetuosity. Pompey's cavalry, as we have seen, consisted mainly of foreigners, and those of many different nations.<sup>327</sup> Startled, therefore, at this unexpected attack, afraid of the high courage and discipline of Cæsar's regular infantry, galled by the terrible discharge of the javelins, and perhaps, in some disorder at the moment from not having completed the manœuvre in which they were engaged, the soldiers on whom Pompey had placed his chief dependence were seized with a shameful panic, and fled.<sup>328</sup> The light troops, abandoned to their fate, were instantly cut to pieces; and the reserve, still pushing its success, fell upon the flank and rear of the line of Pompey's infantry, which was at that moment warmly engaged in front with the best troops in Cæsar's army, the famous tenth legion. At the same instant Cæsar brought up the third line of his army, which had not hitherto been engaged;<sup>329</sup> and the arrival of a fresh force at once overpowered the resistance of the enemy; who, wearied with a long contest already, and attacked at once in front and in rear, were unable to withstand this third attack, and broke and fled. The impression communicated itself rapidly, and the whole line of Pompey's infantry began to give ground. Still, however, they disputed the approach towards their camp; when Cæsar issued the order to give quarter to all Roman citizens, and only to kill the foreign auxiliaries.<sup>330</sup> Many of the legionary soldiers instantly embraced the safety thus offered to them, while the auxiliaries, deserted by the most effective part of the army, were slaughtered

<sup>326</sup> Cæsar, III. 93, 94.

<sup>327</sup> Cæsar, III. 4. Confer. Lucan, *Pharsalia*, VII. 521, et seq.

<sup>328</sup> The reader will recollect the similar circumstances which occasioned the disgraceful rout of Preston Pans in the rebellion of 1745. The dragoons, who were ordered to charge the Highlanders as they

advanced, were beaten off and fled, leaving the artillery and infantry to their fate. And it is remarkable, that, till then, the cavalry had been regarded as the particular kind of force which was likely to be most efficacious against the Highlanders.

<sup>329</sup> Cæsar, 94.

<sup>330</sup> Appian, II. 80.

Defeat of Pompey.

without difficulty and without mercy. In this manner the conquerors soon arrived at Pompey's camp, which they proceeded to storm, and carried it after a brief but sharp resistance from some Thracians and other auxiliaries who had been stationed to defend the rampart.<sup>331</sup> From the camp the fugitives fled in a body to some very high ground, which rose immediately behind it;<sup>332</sup> and Cæsar having authority enough to call off his soldiers from the spoil that was lying before them, instantly followed to complete his victory.<sup>333</sup> But the enemy finding that their position was destitute of water, abandoned it, and continued their retreat towards Larissa. Cæsar still pursued them with a part of his forces, having left the other part to secure his own camp, and that which he had just taken from the enemy. The fugitives, finding that he was gaining ground upon them by moving on a more practicable road, halted again on another height, which had a stream flowing at its foot. Night was coming on, and the exertions of the day had almost exhausted both parties; but Cæsar encouraged his men to make one effort more, and to raise works between the hill and the stream, that the enemy might not supply themselves with water during the night. His wish was accomplished; and the unfortunate fugitives, exposed to all the horrors of thirst after a day of intense fatigue, and at the hottest season of the year, sent some of their number to offer an immediate surrender.<sup>334</sup> Some senators, it is said, who were on the hill, not choosing to submit to Cæsar, escaped during the night; but the rest of the fugitives, as soon as morning came, were ordered to come down into the plain and give up their arms; after which their lives were granted to them; and in the cruelty of ancient warfare they had reason to congratulate themselves on their fortune, in being preserved alike from massacre and from

Surrender of a large portion of his army.

<sup>331</sup> Cæsar, 95.

<sup>332</sup> Cæsar, 95. 97.

<sup>333</sup> It was on this occasion that Cæsar exclaimed, in the hearing of Asinius Pollio, upon witnessing the total defeat of the commonwealth's army, "*Hoc voluerunt: tantis rebus gestis C. Cæsar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem.*" The words of Napoleon Buonaparte were in the same spirit when he was exciting the indignation of his soldiers against the Jacobin members of the Council of Five Hundred, on the memorable 19th Brumaire, (10th November, 1799.) "*J'allais leur faire connaître les moyens de sauver la république, et de nous rendre notre gloire. Ils m'ont répondu à coups de poignard. Ils voulaient ainsi réaliser le désir des rois coalisés. Qu'aurait pu faire de plus l'Angleterre? Soldats, puis-je*

*compter sur vous?*"—*Mémoires de Napoléon*, I. 91.

<sup>334</sup> Pompey was murdered the day before his birthday; that is, according to Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* XXXVII. 2, on the 29th of September, which, allowing for the disordered state of the Roman calendar at this time, was really about one of the latter days of July. Consequently the battle of Pharsalia must have been fought about the beginning or middle of July; but we have found no record of the precise day, and indeed one might imagine, from some words of Lucan, that it was not exactly known even in his time. He says—

"*Tempora signavit leviorum Roma maiorum,  
Hunc voluit nescire diem.*"

*Phars.* VII. 410.

slavery. The indefatigable conqueror, having thus completed the destruction of the enemy's army, ordered the legions which he had with him to be relieved by those which, on the preceding afternoon, he had sent back to the camp, and then continuing his advance, he reached Larissa on that day, and entered it without resistance.

Such was the battle of Pharsalia. It is needless to inquire what was the number of the slain on the part of the vanquished, or of the conqueror; for a victory so complete is to be estimated rather by its results, than by the immediate slaughter in the field; and where the empire of the world was lost and won, no subordinate considerations could aggravate the defeat, nor materially lessen the joy of the victory. L. Domitius, who had been named by the senate at the beginning of the war as Cæsar's successor in Gaul, was killed in the pursuit;<sup>335</sup> T. Labienus and L. Afranius had escaped to Dyrrhachium; whilst P. Lentulus, L. Lentulus, the late consul, Scipio, and Pompey the Great himself, were seeking shelter and protection from foreigners. But the fortunes of Pompey deserve to be traced more particularly. When he saw his cavalry defeated,<sup>336</sup> and the reserve of Cæsar's six cohorts threatening to surround that part of his line in which he had taken his place, it is agreed that he instantly left the field, and rode back to his camp. As he entered the gates, he addressed himself to the centurions who were stationed there on guard, charging them to do their duty in defending the camp, if it should be needful, and adding, "that he was going to visit the other gates, and to increase the guards at every point." Yet we are told that he went directly to his own tent, and there remained as if stupified, till he found that the enemy had already forced their way into his intrenchments. We find, indeed, that when he saw his cavalry routed, he suspected that he was betrayed; and this feeling, working vaguely on his mind, was likely, above all others, to make him helpless and irresolute. Yet, if he were afraid of treason in the field, it was, perhaps, his wisest plan to retire to his camp, and endeavour to secure that at least from the enemy: and his subsequent flight did not take place till all hope of resistance had clearly vanished. Then he changed his dress, and withdrawing from the camp by the back gate, he rode off, attended by about thirty horsemen, amongst whom were Publius and Lucius Lentulus, and M. Favonius,<sup>337</sup> the friend and professed imitator of Cato. He fled first to Larissa, but did not halt there; and thence continuing his flight during the whole night, he reached the sea at the mouth of the Peneus, and was there taken on board a small trading vessel, which happened to be passing by the coast. At first he bent his course towards the mouth of the Strymon,<sup>338</sup>

Personal adventures  
of Pompey.

<sup>335</sup> Cæsar, III. 99. Cicero, de Divinatione, I. 31. Dion Cassius, XLII. 190.

<sup>336</sup> Cæsar, III. 94. 96.

<sup>337</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 53.

<sup>338</sup> Cæsar, III. 102.



and lay there at anchor for one night, in order to learn the state of his affairs ; but finding them desperate, and having procured a supply of money from his friends at Amphipolis, he crossed over to Mitylene, in Lesbos, where he had left his wife, Cornelia, and his younger son, Sextus.<sup>339</sup> The purity and tenderness of Pompey's private character, rendered his meeting with his family particularly affectionate. Cornelia had heard no tidings of the war since the exaggerated reports which she had received of her husband's success at Dyrrhachium ; his arrival, therefore, as a fugitive, was a shock for which she was wholly unprepared. She joined him on board his vessel immediately ; for he would not go on shore, although warmly invited by the Mitylenæans to do so, and although he was detained by contrary winds for two days off the harbour. He would not, he said, expose his friends to the resentment of the conqueror, by availing himself of their kindness ; but recommended them to submit to Cæsar, adding, that they would find him disposed to be merciful. But being here joined by some other small vessels, he sailed to the southward, hoping to make a stand in the southern part of Asia Minor, or in Syria ; and trusting that at that distance he might rally his navy, and with the assistance of the eastern provinces again renew the contest. The effect of the battle of Pharsalia, however, was rapidly felt in every quarter. Rhodes,<sup>340</sup> which still retained some part of its old naval renown, and which had contributed a squadron to Pompey's fleet, now refused to admit the fugitives within its ports ; and Pompey, mortified at this first check to his hopes, continued his voyage along the coast as far as Cilicia, without meeting any where with any decided encouragement or support. His views were now turned, it is said, towards Syria. That province was still, by law, subject to the government of his father-in-law, Scipio, and its own resources might be powerfully supported by the arms of Parthia ; a power to which Pompey was inclined to look for assistance in this extremity of fortune. But when he arrived at Paphos, in Cyprus, he learnt that Antioch, the capital of Syria, had declared against him ;<sup>341</sup> that the citadel of that place had been secured for the very purpose of excluding him ; and that the citizens had given notice that none of the fugitives of Pompey's party should be allowed to enter their territories. There was no hope then of renewing the war in Syria ; and Pompey was strongly advised not to take refuge at the court of Parthia ;<sup>342</sup> a place the least calculated to offer an honourable protection to a Roman lady, who was now the wife of Pompey, and whose first husband had been the son of Crassus. It was then suggested that he should retire to Africa, where the friendship of Juba and the triumphant state of his party

<sup>339</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 74.

<sup>340</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist.

<sup>341</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 15. Cæsar, 102.

<sup>342</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, 76.

seemed naturally to invite him. But this plan he declined, and, in an evil hour, resolved to throw himself on the gratitude of the king of Egypt. The present sovereign was a mere boy ; He resolves to seek an asylum in Egypt. but his father had owed the recovery of his kingdom, as we have seen, to Pompey's influence ; and this, it was hoped, would now insure a hospitable reception from the son. Pompey accordingly sailed to Pelusium ;<sup>343</sup> and, before he landed, he sent a message to the young king, to request an asylum at Alexandria, and assistance for himself and his friends in their distress. It happened that Ptolemy then lay with an army on the most eastern boundary of Egypt, in order to repel an expected invasion from his sister, the famous Cleopatra, who, having been left by her father's will joint heir of the kingdom with her brother, had been since expelled by him, and was now endeavouring, with some aid which she had procured in Syria, to effect her restoration. Pompey's messenger, accordingly, found the king near Mount Casius, some miles to the eastward of Pelusium ; and having discharged his commission, was sent back with a kind answer, and an invitation to Pompey to join the king immediately. But Ptolemy had at this time in his service a number of Roman soldiers, who, having belonged to that army with which Gabinus had restored the late king to his throne, had since chosen to remain in Egypt, and to transfer their obedience to a new master. Gabinus had been raised entirely by Pompey's influence, and many of his soldiers had served against the pirates, or against Mithridates, and might thus be supposed to retain some respect and affection for Pompey, their old and most illustrious commander. As a Roman proconsul, Pompey would little hesitate to recall these men to his own standard ; and as the Roman people had been named by the late king as his executors, their officer might interfere, more than Ptolemy wished, in the quarrels of the royal family, and might even attempt to dispose of all the resources of Egypt by his own authority. The king's council, therefore, resolved to tempt Pompey into their power, and to murder him ; an act by which they hoped to merit the favour of Cæsar, while they freed themselves from a guest who might, if once admitted, become too powerful to be dismissed or to be resisted.

At Cyprus<sup>344</sup> Pompey had supplied himself with money from the funds of the farmers of the revenue, and from the contributions of some private individuals ; he He is murdered. had also raised, as we are told, about 2000 men, chiefly from the large slave establishments belonging to different persons in the island ; and with this force, having been joined besides by several senators from different quarters, he had crossed over to the coast of Egypt. The whole of his little squadron followed him from

<sup>343</sup> Plutarch, 77. Cæsar, 103.<sup>344</sup> Cæsar, 103. Plutarch, 78, 79.

Pelusium, when he went to meet the king ; and on board of his own ship, as we have already mentioned, were his wife Cornelia, and his son Sextus. As he came near Mount Casius, the Egyptian army was seen on the shore, and their fleet lying off at some distance, when presently a boat was observed approaching the ship from the land ; and it was soon found to contain one of the king's chief officers, a man of the name of Achilles, attended by two or three other persons of inferior rank. Among these was a Roman, named L. Septimius, who had served as a centurion under Pompey in the war with the pirates, and who, when the boat came near the ship, addressed his old general in Latin, by the title of Imperator, while Achilles, saluting him courteously in Greek, invited him to enter the boat, informing him that there was not water enough near the shore for a vessel of any burden. The king himself,<sup>345</sup> and a group of his principal officers, were at this time seen on the shore, as if waiting to bid their illustrious guest welcome ; and Pompey accordingly descended into the boat, accompanied by two centurions, by one of his freedmen, and by a single slave. As the party were borne towards the land, Pompey is said to have recognised L. Septimius, and to have observed to him, " that he thought they must have formerly served together ;" to which Septimius answered by a mere movement of assent. No one seemed willing to break the silence, upon which Pompey took out an outline of a Greek address which he had intended to deliver on his introduction to the king, and amused himself with reading it. At last the boat touched the shore, and several of Ptolemy's officers crowded down to the water's edge as if to receive Pompey immediately on his landing. He rose from his seat, and leaning on his freedman's arm, was in the act of stepping on shore, when L. Septimius stabbed him in the back, and instantly, on this signal, Achilles and his Egyptian soldiers drew their swords to complete the work. It is said that Pompey did not utter a single cry, but folding his gown over his face, received the blows of his assassins without attempting to resist or to escape. As soon as the murder was finished, his head was cut off and embalmed, in order to be presented to Cæsar, and his body was cast out carelessly and left upon the beach. His freedman lingered near it, till the crowd was dispersed, and then burnt it on a rude funeral pile of such broken pieces of wood as he found scattered along the shore, assisted, as it is said, by an old Roman soldier, now in the Egyptian service, and who remembered that Pompey the Great had once been his general. Cornelia and her friends, who saw the murder committed, instantly put to sea and escaped the pursuit of the Egyptian fleet, which at first threatened to intercept them. Their feelings, as is natural, were for the moment so en-

<sup>345</sup> Appian, *Bell. Civili*, II. 84. Plutarch, *ubi supra*. Cæsar, 104.



grossed by their own danger, that they could scarcely comprehend the full extent of their loss,<sup>346</sup> nor was it till they reached the port of Tyre in safety, that grief succeeded to apprehension, and they began to understand what cause they had for sorrow.

But the tears that were shed for Pompey were not only those of domestic affliction; his fate called forth a more general and honourable mourning. No man had ever gained, at so early an age, the affections of his countrymen; none had enjoyed them so largely, or preserved them so long with so little interruption; and at the distance of eighteen centuries the feeling of his contemporaries may be sanctioned by the sober judgment of history. He entered upon public life as a distinguished member of an oppressed party which was just arriving at its hour of triumph and retaliation; he saw his associates plunged in rapine and massacre, but he preserved himself pure from the contagion of their crimes; and when the death of Sylla left him almost at the head of the aristocratical party, he served them ably and faithfully with his sword, while he endeavoured to mitigate the evils of their ascendancy by restoring to the commons of Rome, on the earliest opportunity, the most important of those privileges and liberties which they had lost under the tyranny of their late master. He received the due reward of his honest patriotism in the unusual honours and trusts that were conferred on him; but his greatness could not corrupt his virtue; and the boundless powers with which he was repeatedly invested he wielded with the highest ability and uprightness to the accomplishment of his task, and then, without any undue attempts to prolong their duration, he honestly resigned them. At a period of general cruelty and extortion towards the enemies and subjects of the commonwealth, the character of Pompey in his foreign commands was marked by its humanity and spotless integrity; his conquest of the pirates was effected with wonderful rapidity, and cemented by a merciful policy, which, instead of taking vengeance for the past, accomplished the prevention of evil for the future: his presence in Asia, when he conducted the war with Mithridates, was no less a relief to the provinces from the tyranny of their governors, than it was their protection against the arms of the enemy. It is true that wounded vanity led him, after his return from Asia, to unite himself for a time with some unworthy associates; and this connexion, as it ultimately led to all the misfortunes, so did it immediately tempt him to the worst faults of his political life, and involved him in a career of difficulty, mortification, and shame. But after this disgraceful fall, he again returned to his natural station, and was universally regarded as the fit protector of the laws and liberties of his country, when they were threatened by Cæsar's

Character of Pompey.

rebellion. In the conduct of the civil war he showed something of weakness and vacillation ; but his abilities, though considerable, were far from equal to those of his adversary : and his inferiority was most seen in that want of steadiness in the pursuit of his own plans, which caused him to abandon a system already sanctioned by success, and to persuade himself that he might yield with propriety to the ill-judged impatience of his followers for battle. His death is one of the few tragical events of those times which may be regarded with unmixed compassion. It was not accompanied, like that of Cato and Brutus, with the rashness and despair of suicide ; nor can it be regarded like that of Cæsar, as the punishment of crimes, unlawfully inflicted indeed, yet suffered deservedly. With a character of rare purity and tenderness in all his domestic relations, he was slaughtered before the eyes of his wife and son ; whilst flying from the ruin of a most just cause, he was murdered by those whose kindness he was entitled to claim. His virtues have not been transmitted to posterity with their deserved fame ; and while the violent republican writers have exalted the memory of Cato and Brutus ; while the lovers of literature have extolled Cicero ; and the admirers of successful ability have lavished their praises on Cæsar ; Pompey's many and rare merits have been forgotten in the faults of his triumvirate, and in the weakness of temper which he displayed in the conduct of his last campaign. But *he* must have been in no ordinary degree good and amiable, for whom his countrymen professed their enthusiastic love, unrestrained by servility, and unimpelled by faction ; and though the events of his life must now be gathered for the most part from unfriendly sources, yet we think that they who read them impartially will continually cherish his memory with a warmer regard, and will feel that in themselves the prophecy of the poet has been fulfilled.

"Hæc et apud seras gentes, populosque nepotum  
 Spesque, metusque simul, perituraque voto movebunt.  
 Attonitique omnes, veluti venientia, fata,  
 Non transmissa, legent, et adhuc tibi, Magne, favebunt."

Lucan, *Pharsalia*, VII. 207.

## CHAPTER IX.

CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR.—A SKETCH OF THE ROMAN HISTORY FROM THE APPOINTMENT OF CÆSAR TO THE COMMAND IN GAUL TO HIS DEATH.—FROM U.C. 695 TO 710, A.C. 59 TO 44. [CONTINUED.]

CÆSAR was fully aware of the importance of pursuing Pompey, as he knew that the whole cause of the commonwealth depended on him alone, and that if he were once removed, his partisans would instantly be divided, and probably only a small portion of them would be inclined to continue the contest. Accordingly, while M. Antonius led the greater part of the victorious army back to Brundisium,<sup>1</sup> Cæsar himself crossed by the Hellespont into Asia, and by the fame of his arrival dissipated an assemblage of some citizens of rank, who had been called together at Ephesus to sanction the removal of the treasures of the temple of Diana, for the service of Pompey and the commonwealth. After a short stay in the province of Asia, he received information that Pompey had been seen at Cyprus; and thinking it probable that he would seek an asylum in Egypt, he resolved to follow him thither. Already the news of the battle of Pharsalia, and of the flight of Pompey, had induced many of the squadrons which had been sent to support the cause of the commonwealth by the states in alliance with Rome, to return to their own countries. The Egyptian fleet had been one of this number; whilst the Rhodians, taking a more decisive part, had excluded Pompey, as we have seen, from their harbours, and now furnished Cæsar with ten ships of war, to enable him to follow the man in whose cause they themselves had been so lately engaged. These, with a few other vessels procured in the ports of the province of Asia, sufficed to transport the two incomplete legions, which at this moment were the whole of Cæsar's disposable force, and of which one had followed him immediately from Pharsalia, and the other had been sent for from the south of Greece, where it had been employed on a separate service,

From U. C. 695 to 710,  
A. C. 59 to 44.  
Cæsar pursues Pompey.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, Philippic, II. 24. Cæsar, III. 105, 106.



He arrives in Egypt, and is there involved in a war, by his interference in the disputes of Ptolemy and Cleopatra.

and consequently had not been present at the late battle. With these two legions he landed at Alexandria, and there was informed of Pompey's murder, and saw his head and his ring presented to him as a grateful offering by the murderers. He is said to have shed tears at the sight;<sup>2</sup> and those signs of mere physical susceptibility so little imply any real humanity of character, that they flowed very probably from a spontaneous feeling; and Cæsar may have indulged them with pleasure, flattering himself that they were a proof of the tenderness of his nature. At any rate it cost him no effort to refuse any expressions of gratitude to the murderers; for he was immediately involved in a quarrel with them, because he claimed the right, as Roman consul,<sup>3</sup> to arbitrate in all disputes which related to the execution of the late king's will. Thus the very interference, from the fear of which Ptolemy's counsellors had resolved to murder Pompey, now threatened them in a much more alarming shape, when Cæsar announced it as his decision that Ptolemy and Cleopatra should both dismiss their armies, and repair to his quarters at Alexandria, there to state their respective pretensions before him. The king's officers, indignant at the affront thus offered to the crown of Egypt, instantly brought up their army from the Syrian frontiers, and prepared to attack Cæsar; but the young king himself, with his tutor and minister Pothinus, was already in Alexandria, and in Cæsar's power; so that the attempts of his subjects to deliver him were represented by his oppressor as a rebellion against his authority. Cleopatra too was in Cæsar's quarters; but she was no unwilling prisoner, if the common stories of the time may be credited,<sup>4</sup> which tell us, that trusting to the influence of her charms, she readily obeyed Cæsar's summons, and finding that access to him was precluded by the besieging army of her brother, she caused herself to be wrapped up in a package of carpeting, and in this manner was safely conveyed into Cæsar's presence. It is added, that she was not disappointed in her expectations; that Cæsar's interference in the dispute between her and her brother, which had originated in political and ambitious motives, was continued after his interview with Cleopatra from feelings of a different nature, and that his passion for her involved him more deeply in a contest, in which he had at first found himself engaged unexpectedly, and from which, when it became serious, he might otherwise have deemed it politic to extricate himself. Be this as it may, Cæsar remained some months at Alexandria, maintaining a difficult and sometimes a perilous struggle with the Egyptians. Without entering here into the detail of his adventures, we must

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 48. Livy, Epitome, CXII.

<sup>3</sup> Cæsar, III. 107.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 49. Dion Cassius, XLII. 201, edit. Leunclav.

take a survey of the state of the Roman empire during his absence, and describe the effects of his victory at Pharsalia, and of that subsequent neglect of his affairs which delayed for two years the full enjoyment of its advantages.

If Pompey ever received intelligence, during his flight, of the services performed by his navy in the seas westward of Greece, and of the sudden check given to this career of success by the fatal issue of the battle of Pharsalia, he must have been most bitterly sensible of his error in staking his fortunes on the event of a general action by land. At the very moment when he was escaping as a fugitive from the scene of his defeat in Thessaly, one of his squadrons was again blockading the harbour of Brundisium;<sup>5</sup> and another, under the command of C. Cassius, was infesting the coasts of Sicily, and had lately burnt the entire fleet of the enemy, amounting to thirty-five ships, in the harbour of Messina. But the news of Pompey's defeat at once deterred his lieutenants from pursuing their advantages; their squadrons retreated from the coasts of Italy and Sicily, and repaired to Corcyra, at which place the principal surviving leaders of the party of the commonwealth were at this time assembled. We have already mentioned that M. Cato had been left with fifteen cohorts to defend Dyrrhachium, when Pompey set out in pursuit of Cæsar into Thessaly, and that M. Cicero, M. Varro, and some other distinguished individuals, had remained from different causes at Dyrrhachium also. In the midst of their anxiety for the issue of the campaign, T. Labienus arrived a fugitive from the rout of Pharsalia,<sup>6</sup> and the tidings which he brought produced at once a general consternation and disorder. The magazines of corn were presently sacked by the soldiers, who, considering the war as ended, were resolved to pay themselves as they best could for their services; nor could they be induced to accompany their officers in their flight, but proceeded to burn the transports in the harbour, that none of their number might be able to separate their fortunes from those of the rest. But the ships of war for the most part were still faithful, and in these the chiefs of the vanquished party hastened to escape to Corcyra. When they had reached that island a new scene of distraction ensued. The command of the forces was offered to Cicero, as he was the oldest senator present of consular dignity;<sup>7</sup> but he being determined to take no further part in the contest, declined it; and being protected, as it is said, by Cato, from the violence of Cn. Pompeius, Pompey's eldest son, who wished to kill him as a deserter from the cause of the commonwealth, he returned to Italy to throw himself on the mercy of the victori-

Proceedings of Pompey's partisans after the battle of Pharsalia.

<sup>5</sup> Cæsar, III. 100, 101.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch, in Cicerone, 39.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero, de Divinatione, I. 31.

ous party. D. Lælius,<sup>8</sup> one of the commanders of the Asiatic squadron in Pompey's fleet, followed the example of Cicero. There were others, and these formed a considerable body, who neither chose to continue the war nor to submit to Cæsar, but who resolved for the present to remain in Greece, and there to observe from a distance the course of events at Rome.

Cato withdraws to Africa.

But Cato,<sup>9</sup> Cn. Pompeius,<sup>10</sup> Labienus, and several others, hoping that Pompey would be able to make a stand in some of the eastern provinces, determined to carry their fleet thither in order to join him; and accordingly set sail to the south without delay. They touched at Petræ, on the coast of Peloponnesus, and there took on board Petreius and Faustus Sylla, after which they continued their voyage to the coast of Africa. Here they met with Cornelia and her son Sextus Pompeius, who, finding no secure asylum in the east, were now probably flying to the province of Africa, which, since the death of Curio, had remained in the peaceable possession of the friends of the commonwealth. On receiving the disastrous tidings of Pompey's murder, a fresh division took place amongst his partisans. C. Cassius, afterwards so distinguished, abandoned his associates, and sailed at once with the Syrian squadron, which he commanded, to Syria, intending to offer his submission to Cæsar. Cato, and those who with him were resolved to persist in their opposition to the prevailing party, saw that the province of Africa was now the quarter which held out to them the most favourable prospects. The command of the forces was by common consent bestowed on Cato; and he resolved to attempt to carry his troops by land across the desert from Cyrene to the frontiers of the Roman province; whether it was that the departure of the Syrian squadron had deprived him of the means of transporting his whole force by sea; or whether the navigation of the neighbourhood of the great Syrtes was looked upon as more formidable than the fatigues and privations likely to attend on the march by land. However, the army arrived in the province in safety, and found that Scipio had already escaped thither from Pharsalia, and that Juba, king of Mauritania,

<sup>8</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XI. epist. VII. XIV.

<sup>9</sup> Dion Cassius, XLII. 190, 191. Plutarch in Catone, 56.

<sup>10</sup> We had originally added here the name of Afranius, on the authority of Dion Cassius. But if Afranius had been with Cato, the command would naturally have devolved on him, as being a person of consular dignity; exactly on the same principle that Cato, on his arrival in the province of Africa, ceded the chief authority to Scipio. Again, we have followed Dion Cassius in representing C. Cassius

as only leaving Cato on the news of Pompey's death; but it seems probable, from one of Cicero's letters, that he sailed directly from Coreyra to Syria, to offer his submission, as soon as he had received the news of the battle of Pharsalia. Epist. ad Familiar. XV. epist. XV. Appian confounds C. Cassius with his brother Lucius, and supposes him to have been in the Hellespont with his fleet when Cæsar crossed over into Asia in pursuit of Pompey. So difficult is it to ascertain the truth, even in such indifferent matters, when good contemporary testimony fails us.



was disposed, as heretofore, to support the cause of Pompey to the uttermost. Meantime the tyranny and exactions of Q. Cassius Longinus,<sup>11</sup> whom Cæsar had left with the chief command in what was called Further Spain, and who, when tribune of the people, had fled with M. Antonius from Rome to Cæsar's quarters at the beginning of the contest, had provoked a very serious mutiny among the legions of his province. The troops, supported by the inhabitants of Corduba, transferred their obedience to M. Marcellus, his quæstor; and some of them were inclined to espouse the cause of Pompey, had not Marcellus, though not without difficulty, prevented them; being himself, it is said, not inclined to take so decisive a step till the state of Pompey's affairs in other quarters should appear more promising. At length the disturbance was appeased by the arrival of M. Lepidus, proconsul of the province of Hither Spain, who took the command of the revolted legions without resistance; and soon after C. Trebonius was sent to supersede Cassius Longinus in the command of the Further Province; and the ex-governor, while proceeding to Italy by sea with the plunder which he had acquired by his exactions, was lost in a storm at the mouth of the Ebro. It appears that Cæsar attached great importance to the service which Lepidus had rendered him on this occasion, insomuch that he afterwards rewarded him with the honours of a triumph;<sup>12</sup> and indeed the mutiny of the legions in Spain produced a strong sensation in Italy,<sup>13</sup> coupled as it was with the tidings of the great force acquired by Scipio and Cato in Africa, and of some disasters which had befallen Cæsar's arms at the same time in Illyricum and in Asia Minor. M. Octavius,<sup>14</sup> whom we have already had occasion to mention as the commander of one of the squadrons in Pompey's fleet, had lingered in the Illyrian seas after Cato's departure from Corcyra; partly relying on the courage and fidelity of some of the native tribes of Illyricum, and partly, perhaps, hoping to organize a force out of the remains of Pompey's army, which were still numerous, although in a state of dispersion and despondency. The absence of Cæsar favoured his hopes; many persons of distinction, who had remained in Greece rather than follow Cato into Africa, and who would have submitted to Cæsar at once if he had returned directly to Rome, began now to accuse themselves of pusillanimity, when they heard of the war which was beginning in Egypt; and some of them began to draw together into Illyricum, and to put themselves in a hostile attitude. Upon this A. Gabinus, Cicero's

Unpromising state of Cæsar's affairs in different parts of the empire. 1. In Spain. Mutiny of the troops against Q. Cassius Longinus.

2. In Illyricum. Defeat and death of A. Gabinus.

<sup>11</sup> Auctor de Bell. Alexandrino, 48, et seq. Dion Cassius, XLII. 192.

<sup>12</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 214, edit. Leunclav.

<sup>13</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XI. epist. X. XVI.

<sup>14</sup> Auctor de Bell. Alexandrino, 42, et seq.

ancient enemy, who, in his tribuneship, had proposed to invest Pompey with the extraordinary command against the pirates, and who now, like most other men of equal profligacy, was the partisan of Cæsar, received orders to cross over from Italy with some legions that had been lately raised, and secure Illyricum and Macedonia. But Gabinius found himself unequal to the task imposed on him; the country, which was the seat of war, was unable to support his army, and the stormy season was by this time arrived, which rendered his supplies by sea very precarious. He struggled to relieve his wants by taking some of the strongholds occupied by the enemy; and in these attempts, being often repulsed with loss, he was at last obliged to retreat to Salona, a town on the sea coast, in which he hoped to defend himself during the winter. But the Illyrians attacked him on his march, and defeated him with considerable loss, so that he reached Salona in a very miserable condition; and being blockaded by the victorious enemy, and reduced to great extremities, he was taken ill in the course of a few months, and died. His disasters were afterwards retrieved by P. Vatinius, a man of equally profligate character, who, in his tribuneship, had rendered himself the tool of Cæsar, and on whose motion Cæsar had been originally appointed to his fatal command in Gaul. Vatinius obliged Octavius to resign the contest and escape to Africa; and in a short time from his first arrival in Illyricum, he reduced the whole province to a state of obedience. But before this change took place, and while Gabinius was shut up in Salona, the aspect of Cæsar's affairs was very un-

3. In Asia. Defeat of Cn. Domitius Calvinus by Pharnaces, son of Mithridates.

promising; and it was at the same time that another of his lieutenants, Cn. Domitius Calvinus, sustained a severe defeat in Asia from Pharnaces, the son of the famous Mithridates. This prince having received from the Romans the kingdom of the Bosphorus,<sup>15</sup> or what is now the Crimea, as the reward of his treason against his father, now, it seems, wished to avail himself of the distracted state of the Roman empire to recover some other parts of his hereditary dominions, and began to invade Cappadocia and the lesser Armenia, which were possessed by two petty princes under the protection of Rome. Application was presently made by one of them to Cn. Domitius Calvinus for aid, as Cæsar had intrusted that officer with the chief command in the different provinces of Asia Minor; and after some fruitless attempts at negotiation, Domitius advanced with an army into the Lesser Armenia; and there coming to an engagement with Pharnaces, he was defeated, and obliged to fall back as far as the province of Asia. Pharnaces, meanwhile, overran the whole of Pontus, which had been the chief seat of his father's government, and congratulated himself on having so

<sup>15</sup> Appian, de Bell. Mithridat. 113. Auctor de Bell. Alexand. 34, et seq.

soon recovered so large a portion of that which Mithridates had lost. During all this time Cæsar was still in Egypt; and the various reports which arrived from that country, together with the certain ill success of his affairs in other quarters, produced a constant accession of strength to the party of the commonwealth in Africa.

From this sketch of the condition of some of the provinces, we turn back, with an eager curiosity, to inquire what was the state of Rome itself, and with what tem- State of Rome and of Italy. per the bodies which still retained the names of the senate and people, were disposed to receive their new master. After Cicero had crossed over into Greece, about the middle of the year 704, to join the army of the commonwealth, none, it is probable, remained in Italy, but such as were the active partisans, or the unresisting slaves of Cæsar. Among the latter was T. Pomponius Atticus, who, according to the tenets of the Epicureans, considered it an unwise disturbance of his enjoyments to take any part in political contests, calculating that, whatever became of the liberties of his country, he should still retain his own villas and gardens through the influence of his friends on one side or on the other. Men of this stamp were a clay that might be moulded to any shape at the pleasure of the conqueror; and the daily growth of this selfish spirit, under pretence of an aversion to the horrors of a civil war, will easily account for the introduction of that mere despotism which was established as soon as the contest in Africa was decided. Out of the capital it seemed vain to look for any remains of public feeling: some of the boldest and hardest of the Italian tribes had been nearly extirpated by Sylla's victories and massacres; the general admission of the Italians to the privileges of Roman citizens would naturally attract the most enterprising and active part of the population to Rome; and their places would be ill supplied by that multitude of disbanded soldiers whom Sylla had converted into landed proprietors, by settling them in the districts which he had desolated. It is probable, that many of these soldiers would soon, moreover, be glad to part with their land, either to cover their losses in farming, or to supply their extravagances. As early as the period of Catiline's conspiracy, we find many of them ready to promote a new scramble for plunder; and in the fourteen years which had since elapsed, we may suspect that a very large proportion of the estates, granted by Sylla to his veterans, had passed into the hands of the great nobility, by whom the soil of Italy was so generally monopolized. Wherever land was held by a proprietor of this description, the free population quickly withered away, and slaves were the only cultivators, and the only inhabitants. The towns were overwhelmed by the disproportionate greatness of the capital, and were each of too little importance to form a rallying point in op-



position to Rome; whilst the local distinctions and prejudices which divided the Tuscan from the Campanian, or the Apulian from the inhabitant of Picenum, were still too strong to admit of much habitual sympathy of feeling or concert in action between the people of different parts of the peninsula. Besides, they had no longer that peculiar and direct interest in the civil wars of Rome which they had felt in the times of Marius and Sylla. Then every town of Italy was conscious that its enjoyment of the envied privileges of Roman citizens, the elevation of its people from the rank of subjects to sovereigns, would be secured by the victory of Cinna and Carbo, and would be at least endangered by the triumph of the aristocracy. But now, whatever was the issue of the war, Nola and Volaterræ, Asculum and Corfinium, would only share the fate of Rome; and what the capital could submit to endure, the provincial towns could scarcely presume to consider as an evil. It was this want of confidence in themselves, this political helplessness, leading the rest of Italy to follow tamely in the steps of Rome, and disposing the people of Rome itself to rely for every thing upon their government, and to be incapable of any organized exertions among themselves, which, above all other causes, tended to lower the character of the times, and marked each successive generation, during a course of many centuries, with a deeper stain of timidity and weakness.<sup>16</sup>

Whatever, therefore, might have been their secret wishes, the people of Rome and of Italy had remained tranquil during the campaign in Greece, had given no support to the attempts of Cælius and Milo, and were now ready to receive the destruction of their liberties as the natural consequence of the battle of Pharsalia. After that battle, M. Antonius, as we have seen, returned with the greater part of the victorious legions to Italy. It was soon shown that the power of the sword was henceforth to be paramount; the troops were quartered on the inhabitants of the different towns, and indulged themselves in the full license of unrestrained soldiers;<sup>17</sup> the general, after exhibiting a second time a scene of scandalous debauchery in his progress through the country, arrived at Rome, and there commenced the work of confiscation and pillage. We hear nothing further of P. Servilius, who was the nom-

<sup>16</sup> It implies a much higher national character to be anxious for the general liberty, good government, and positive amelioration of the state of the whole people, than to make a desperate struggle for the removal of invidious distinctions between one class of the community and another. The Romans and the Italians had vigour enough to do the latter, but they wanted the much higher qualities requisite to insure the former. In like manner, Napoleon Buonaparte has observed, "Que le

peuple Français tenait plus à l'égalité qu'à la liberté." (*Mémoires*, I. 145.) The revolution succeeded completely in destroying the offensive privileges possessed by the aristocracy; but it may be doubted whether, even at this day, the French entertain a just value for the general freedom and political welfare of the whole state; and it is certain that they did not do so twenty years ago.

<sup>17</sup> Cicero, *Philippic*. II. 25.

inal consul of the republic ; the government of Italy seems to have been vested solely in Antonius, although he possessed no other title than that of Cæsar's lieutenant. But it was soon proposed that the office of dictator should be again conferred on Cæsar, although he was then far from Italy ; and when this power was bestowed on him, by a vote of the people, for the term of a year, M. Antonius was, at the same time, named his master of the horse, and thus appeared to be in some sort invested with a legal authority. It is said by Dion Cassius,<sup>18</sup> that a vote of the people empowered Cæsar to punish the adherents of Pompey as he thought proper, and gave him besides the power of consul for five years, and that of tribune of the people for life. There was no reasonable ground for bestowing these unusual honours ; for the original pretext of Cæsar's rebellion was merely to place himself on a level with Pompey in retaining or resigning his province, and to obtain the right of becoming a candidate for the consulship. He was now at this time consul, and Pompey's death had left him not only without a superior in dignity, but without an equal. He had already gained, therefore, all that he pretended to fight for ; and a general amnesty might now have been passed, which, while it saved him from the punishment due to his treason, would have left him in undisputed possession of the first place in the commonwealth. Nor had he, like Sylla, any public evils to remedy ; no undue preponderance of the aristocratical or of the popular party required the aid of a legislator with absolute powers to restore the constitution to a healthier condition. There were no wrongs to be redressed, but those which he had himself caused ; nor was there any voice which called for a reform of the constitution, except that of his own ambition.

Cæsar appointed dictator, M. Antonius master of the horse.

It is probable that Cæsar's protracted absence, and the want of all ordinary magistrates at Rome, impelled individuals of the victorious party to aspire to greatness independently of the patronage of their chief. P. Dolabella,<sup>19</sup> Cicero's son-in-law, procured his election, as one of the tribunes of the people, for the year 706 ; and when he had entered on his office, he began to revive the laws lately proposed by M. Cælius, for exempting tenants from all demands for the rent of their houses during one year, and for a general abolition of debts. The master of the horse was likely, he thought, to support him, both from personal friendship, and from his general inclination to uphold the cause of the needy and the profligate, and if his countenance could be procured, there was no effectual opposition to be dreaded. L. Trebellius, indeed, one of Dolabella's colleagues,<sup>20</sup> attempted to defend the interests of landlords and creditors, and

Disturbances caused by P. Dolabella in his tribuneship, U. C. 706.

<sup>18</sup> XLII. 194.

<sup>19</sup> Dion Cassius, XLII. 198. Cicero ad Atticum, XI. epist. XXIII.

<sup>20</sup> Cicero, Philippic. VI. 4.

scenes of great disorder were frequently exhibited in the streets of Rome in consequence of these disputes, in the course of which many lives were lost on both sides ; but as long as M. Antonius allowed Dolabella to go on with impunity, his party was likely to prevail in the contest. But the senate called upon the master of the horse to exert his power for the preservation of the public peace ; and it was rumoured that he was made acquainted at this time with a criminal intercourse subsisting between Dolabella and some female friend or relation of his own.<sup>21</sup> This private injury made him more willing to listen to the senate's call ; he brought troops into the city, and when the populace broke out into a riot in support of Dolabella's laws, he chastised them with great severity, and is said to have put no fewer than 800 of the rioters to the sword.<sup>22</sup> The present masters of the commonwealth, although at the beginning of their career they professed to espouse the popular party, had now obtained a power which enabled them to cast off their old connexions ; and declared, by their conduct, that it was to the swords of a disciplined army, and not to the uncertain favour of a tumultuous populace, that they were resolved to owe their ascendancy.

Yet at this very time the obedience of the army itself was beginning to waver. Antonius, while indulging in every excess himself, connived, it is probable, at many irregularities in the conduct of the soldiers ; and the other officers,<sup>23</sup> from a wish to gain popularity, or from the natural relaxation consequent upon victory, permitted the discipline of the troops to be seriously impaired. It was known that Cæsar intended to transport his veteran legions into Africa, as soon as the affairs of the East should leave him at liberty ; and the soldiers were highly dissatisfied at finding that they were to be exposed to another campaign,<sup>24</sup> while no mention was heard of fulfilling the promises which had been made to them on former occasions. They confirmed one another in their resolutions not to leave Italy till their previous claims were satisfied ; and when P. Sylla, an officer of high rank,<sup>25</sup> who had commanded the right wing of Cæsar's army at Pharsalia, endeavoured to pacify them, the soldiers of the twelfth legion assailed him with stones, so that he narrowly escaped with his life. Several other persons experienced the same treatment, and some individuals of prætorian dignity are said to have been actually murdered by the mutineers.<sup>26</sup> Intelligence of these disorders quickened Cæsar's wish to return to Italy. He had at last, about the middle of the year 706,

Discontents in Cæsar's army in Italy.

<sup>21</sup> Plutarch, in Antonio, 9.

<sup>22</sup> Livy, Epitome, CXIII.

<sup>23</sup> Auctor de Bell. Alexand. 65.

<sup>24</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XI. epist. XX. XXII.

<sup>25</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XI. epist. XXI. XXII.

<sup>26</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 51. Dion Cassius, XLII. 209.



brought the war in Egypt to a conclusion, by placing Cleopatra and her younger brother on the throne,<sup>27</sup> as the elder Ptolemy had perished in the course of the contest ; and from Egypt he had marched into Syria, and thence to Cilicia and Capadocia ; arranging on his way the affairs of those several provinces, receiving the submissions of all the petty princes or chiefs dependent on the Roman empire, and continuing them in their respective governments on such conditions as he judged proper. These matters were easily and quickly settled ; but Pharnaces, king of the Bosphorus, was likely to occasion a longer yet an unavoidable delay. It was the boast of the Romans never to allow a foreign power to take advantage of their domestic quarrels ; and it would have reflected disgrace on Cæsar had he suffered Pharnaces to enjoy his late conquest without molestation, from his eagerness to prosecute his own private contest with his countrymen. Accordingly he called upon Pharnaces to evacuate Pontus without delay ; and finding, according to the statement of his anonymous partisan,<sup>28</sup> that his demands were evaded, because it was well known how anxious he was to return to Italy, he marched instantly in quest of the enemy. Pharnaces was at this time encamped near Zela,<sup>29</sup> a town of Pontus, on the spot on which his father had gained one of his most famous victories over the Romans ; and when Cæsar arrived and encamped at no great distance from him, his confidence in the fortune of the place, and in his own recent successes, induced him to attack the Roman army in the strong position which it had occupied. His rashness was quickly punished by a total defeat ; he himself fled from the field of battle with only a few horsemen ; and the whole of Pontus was lost by this single blow. Cæsar, unusually delighted at this rapid and most seasonable conquest, left two legions to secure Pontus, and himself hastened on his way towards Italy ; still however, as before, employing the time on his journey in settling the affairs of the provinces, and accustoming the petty Asiatic princes to look upon the government of Rome as already become monarchical. It was late in the year,<sup>30</sup> according to the corrupt calendar of the period, when he arrived in the capital, and there proceeded to exercise that sovereign authority with which his office of dictator, and still more the swords of his soldiers, had invested him.

He passes through Syria and Cilicia.

He defeats Pharnaces and recovers the province of Pontus.

M. Antonius, on his return to Italy, after the battle of Pharsalia,<sup>31</sup> had published an edict by Cæsar's express orders, forbidding all the fugitives of the vanquished party to set foot in Italy without having received their pardon

He returns to Rome.

<sup>27</sup> Auctor de Bell. Alexand. 33—65, et seq.

<sup>28</sup> Auctor de Bell. Alexand. 71.

<sup>29</sup> Auctor de Bell. Alexand. 72, et seq.

<sup>30</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 51.

<sup>31</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XI. epist. VII.

His acts of spoliation  
and wanton display of  
power.

from Cæsar himself. In this manner a multitude of distinguished citizens were condemned to live in banishment; but their property was not in every instance confiscated, and some were afterwards allowed, as we shall see hereafter, to return to their country. The rapacity of the conqueror, however, had been abundantly gratified in the eastern provinces; where he had amassed immense sums,<sup>32</sup> partly by imposing fines on those princes or states who had supported the cause of the commonwealth, partly by the direct plunder of their wealthiest temples, and partly by receiving a price for the grants or titles which he gave or confirmed to any city or individual. But the demands of the approaching campaign in Africa could not be answered without further exactions; and although he had a very considerable fund in the numerous golden crowns, figures, and other articles, which were presented to him from every quarter through fear or flattery, he deemed it expedient, on his arrival in Italy, to raise money to a large amount by compulsory loans from different cities as well as from private individuals; and at the same time he proceeded to confiscate and expose to public sale the property of some of his most distinguished opponents,<sup>33</sup> which Antonius had not ventured to touch by his own authority. It was on this occasion that the house and furniture of Pompey the Great were set up to auction by the command of his father-in-law; and that Antonius, amidst the general grief and indignation of the Roman people, became their purchaser. At this time, also, if we may believe Dion Cassius,<sup>34</sup> Cæsar made some additional regulations in favour of insolvent debtors, and actually enforced the proposed law of Dolabella, for relieving tenants from rent for one year, in all cases where the rent amounted to five hundred denarii, or about 15*l.* 12*s.* 6*d.* His chief partisans were rewarded by being appointed to various public offices, of which he assumed the complete disposal; and as a cheap method of gratifying the vanity of some of his associates, he conferred the empty title of consuls, for the short remainder of the year, on Q. Fufius Calenus, his late lieutenant in Achaia, and on P. Vatinius, who had rendered him most important services in Illyricum. The prostitution of a dignity so respected, excited a general disgust; and in this open assumption of absolute power he already betrayed the same contempt for the feelings of his countrymen which afterwards, when exhibited with still greater aggravation, contributed principally to the fatal conspiracy of the ides of March. But amongst all this distribution of honours and benefits, the veteran legions found that they were still to trust only to promises; and that the period when they should obtain their

<sup>32</sup> Dion Cassius, XLII. 208. Suetonius, in Cæsare, 54.

<sup>33</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 26, et seq.  
<sup>34</sup> XLII. 209.

discharge, and be rewarded with settlements of lands, was still far distant. Aware of their own importance on the eve of another campaign, but not sufficiently appreciating the able and resolute character of their commander, they broke up from their quarters in Campania,<sup>35</sup> and advanced to Rome, committing various excesses on their march, and filling the country and the capital with terror. When they arrived before the city, Cæsar allowed them to enter the walls, retaining only their swords, and instantly presented himself before them in the Campus Martius, and demanded why they had left their quarters, and what they wanted at Rome. They replied that they were come to claim their release from any further service; upon which Cæsar answered, without any apparent reluctance, that their claim was reasonable, and that he would discharge them instantly; assuring them at the same time that all their comrades who had served their full term of years should be discharged in the same manner, and promising still to give them the settlements in lands which he had before allowed them to look for. The soldiers were not prepared for this treatment, and in proportion to his seeming readiness to part from them, their wish to continue in his service revived. Cæsar perceived his advantage, and persisted in giving them their discharge, expressing particularly his surprise and sorrow to find the soldiers of his favourite tenth legion implicated in this meeting. At last, on their repeated entreaties to be forgiven, he said that he would retain them all except the tenth legion; nor could he be prevailed on to receive that legion into his favour,<sup>36</sup> so that it followed him to Africa without his orders, from the mere zeal of the soldiers to do something that might entitle them to pardon. After all, he punished those who had been most active in the mutiny, by depriving them of a third part of their share of the plunder gained in Africa, and of the lands which he afterwards bestowed on his army; some also he actually discharged at once, and settled them in different parts of Italy; and others, it is said, he found means to employ in the most dangerous services in the ensuing campaign,<sup>37</sup> and thus freed himself from their turbulence, while he made their deaths useful by occasioning a loss to his enemies.

Mutiny of his army.

He quells it by his firmness, and address.

Campaign in Africa.

Having thus re-established his authority over his legions, he proceeded with his usual activity to carry the war into Africa. He arrived at Lilybæum, in Sicily,<sup>38</sup> on the seventeenth of December, and having waited there till he had assembled a force of six legions, and about two thousand cavalry, he embarked from Sicily on the twenty-seventh, and

<sup>35</sup> Dion Cassius, XLII. 209, 210. Appian, de Bello Civili, II. 92, et seq.

<sup>36</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 70.

<sup>37</sup> Dion Cassius, XLII. 211.

<sup>38</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, I, et seq.



reached the coast of Africa on the thirtieth. He landed near Adrumetum with no more than three thousand men, the rest of his forces having been dispersed in different directions on their passage; and as he knew not what points of the coast might be least occupied by the enemy, he had been unable before his departure from Sicily to appoint any particular spot as the place of destination for the whole armament. Finding Adrumetum too strongly garrisoned to be attacked with any hope of success, he put his troops in motion again on the first of January, and on the evening of that day halted at Ruspina, from whence he again set out on the following morning, and approached Leptis. The inhabitants of that town sent to offer their submission to him, and he accordingly occupied the gates with a guard, and having given strict orders that no other soldiers should be allowed to enter the walls, he encamped for the night in the neighbourhood of Leptis; and was joined on that very evening by a part of his army from Sicily, which had put in by a fortunate accident at this very point of the coast. On the third of January he returned to Ruspina, and there remained for some time, having collected considerable supplies of provisions from the adjacent country, and having received a large accession of strength by the arrival of another division of the troops from Lilybæum. But his numbers were as yet very inferior to those of the enemy, and he could not depend for the permanent subsistence of his army on the resources of a country which was almost entirely possessed by his opponents. He waited therefore anxiously for the arrival of additional reinforcements, as well as of supplies of provisions from Sicily, Sardinia, and other parts of the empire;<sup>39</sup> whilst he secured himself for the present by bestowing extraordinary care on the fortifications of his camp, and by carrying lines from this and from the town of Ruspina down to the sea-shore, in order that ships might approach the land with safety, and that the succours of whatever kind, which might be contained in them, might reach his camp without molestation.

It appears that the supporters of the commonwealth had by this time organized a very large army in Africa; and that their navy, although not possessing the command of the sea so exclusively as during the campaign in Greece, was yet strong enough to cause great annoyance to the enemy, and during Cæsar's absence in Egypt had made descents on the coasts of Sicily and Sardinia,<sup>40</sup> and had carried off from them several vessels, and a considerable quantity of arms. While Italy was suffering under the misrule of Antonius, and Rome itself was distracted by the turbulent tribuneship of Dolabella, it was expected that Scipio and Cato would transport their forces

Forces of Scipio  
and Cato.

<sup>39</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 20.

<sup>40</sup> Dion Cassius, XLII. 211.

from Africa, and avail themselves of so fair an opportunity for regaining possession of the seat of government.<sup>41</sup> But we must suppose that they had not yet collected an army sufficient to encounter Cæsar's veteran legions; and perhaps the want of arms for their regular infantry was a principal obstacle to such an attempt. With cavalry and light troops they were abundantly provided; for the Numidians of the Roman province were admirably calculated for those services, and to them was added the whole force of the kingdom of Mauritania, which Juba furnished to the cause of the commonwealth. Utica, the most considerable city in Africa, was held by M. Cato,<sup>42</sup> and he had made it a great magazine of arms and provisions, as well as a depôt for the new levies which he was constantly forming to reinforce the main army in the field. That army was commanded by Scipio, with the title of proconsul; and although the military talents of the general-in-chief were not very highly distinguished, yet Labienus and Petreius, his principal lieutenants, were officers of great experience and ability.

In landing on the coast of Africa with a force very inferior to that of his opponents, Cæsar may be supposed to have had two objects in view; first, to prevent the enemy from carrying the war into Italy, and to preserve his usual character of being always the assailant; and, secondly, to deprive them by his presence of some part of the resources of the province, of which otherwise they would have had the complete disposal. His great renown as a general, his success in other parts of the empire, and that character of the lawful representative of the Roman people, which he derived from the possession of the capital, gained him immediately some partisans among the cities and tribes of Africa,<sup>43</sup> and thus produced at once a diversion in his favour. Yet soon after his first landing he was severely harassed by the attacks of the enemy's cavalry under Labienus and Petreius; and had Juba united his forces to those of Scipio, their combined efforts might have been too overwhelming for Cæsar to resist. He was saved from this danger by an unexpected interference. P. Silius, of Nuceria, had been in his early life engaged in money transactions, on a very extensive scale,<sup>44</sup> not only with many persons in different parts of the empire, but also with some foreign princes, and amongst the rest with the king of Mauritania, the father of Juba. The sums embarked in these various speculations were not always easily to be recovered: Silius had incurred heavy debts at Rome, which brought him into the society of dissolute and desperate men, and had made him acquainted with L. Catiline and his associates at

Difficulties of Cæsar at the opening of the campaign.

Diversion made by P. Silius in his favour. Adventures of Silius.

<sup>41</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XI. epist. XV.

<sup>43</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 7. 32, 33

<sup>42</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 22. 36. Plutarch, in Catone, 58.

<sup>44</sup> Cicero, pro P. Sylla, 20.

the eve of their memorable conspiracy. Whether he himself entered into their schemes is uncertain. It appears that he went about that period to Africa, professedly to settle some business with the king of Mauritania, but, as many asserted,<sup>45</sup> to employ his influence with that prince in levying an armed force against the commonwealth. However, his innocence or his good fortune saved him from the fate of the other conspirators, and Cicero himself, while defending P. Sylla from the same charge of having been Catiline's accomplice, took occasion equally to deny the accusation against Sitius. But he was a man of ruined fortunes, and it seems that he was afterwards brought before the tribunals for some private offence,<sup>46</sup> and was obliged to go into exile. He repaired again to Africa, with an armed force which he had raised in Italy and Spain, and which it seems could easily be collected by any adventurer of notoriety, while every part of the empire was full of slaves and other needy and desperate persons, to whom all change was gain. Thus accompanied, Sitius appeared in Africa, like one of the chiefs of the free companies in Italy during the fourteenth century; and sold his services to the highest bidder in the constant petty wars which the wild tribes and barbarian sovereigns of that country were carrying on against one another. His fame soon became great, for the party which he espoused was always victorious; and if the king of Mauritania was slow in paying his debt to him, we may the less wonder that he readily associated himself with those inferior chiefs who were constantly engaged in predatory warfare with that more powerful sovereign. In this way he was closely united with a prince of the name of Bogud, according to Roman orthography, at the time that Cæsar landed in Africa. By attacking Juba now, Sitius might hope to gain far more than plunder, or the pay of a poor barbarian chief; he might obtain the repeal of his banishment, and expect besides a splendid reward from the sovereign of the Roman empire for a service so seasonably rendered to him. Bogud himself had before shown himself friendly to Cæsar,<sup>47</sup> probably because Juba supported the party of Pompey; and now when Juba was on his march to join Scipio with a considerable army, Bogud and P. Sitius attacked his kingdom,<sup>48</sup> took Cirta, one of his principal cities, and committed such ravages in his country, that he was obliged to return with his whole force to oppose them, and even to recall the troops which he had before sent to serve under the Roman general, his ally. Meanwhile Cæsar was reinforced by the arrival of two veteran legions from Sicily;<sup>49</sup> and when at length Juba yielded to Scipio's pressing applications, and

<sup>45</sup> Sallust, de Bello Catilinar. 21. Cicero, pro Syllâ, ubi supra.

<sup>46</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, IV. 54. Dion Cassius, XLIII. 214.

<sup>47</sup> Auctor de Bello Alexandrino, 59.

<sup>48</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 25.

<sup>49</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 34.



came to join him, leaving one of his generals to contend with Bogud and Sitius,<sup>50</sup> the decisive moment was already passed, and Cæsar's army was now too formidable to be seriously injured by any force which Juba could bring against it.

From this time the event of the campaign might be looked for with little hesitation. Cæsar was soon after reinforced by two more of his veteran legions, the ninth and tenth; and he was anxious, as before in Greece, to bring the enemy to a general action as soon as possible. But his situation now was very different from what it had been in his campaign against Pompey. Then he was opposed to a general of talents far less disproportioned to his own, and of reputation equal or even superior; the fleets of his adversaries commanded every sea and cut off all hope of supplies and reinforcements; and the army of the commonwealth was as yet unvanquished; and under the command of its great leader was daily gaining fresh strength and confidence. At present, he was continually receiving deserters from the enemy's army,<sup>51</sup> and offers of submission and assistance from the towns of the province and of Mauritania; the regular infantry of his opponents was utterly unable to resist his veteran legions; and the only annoyance which he experienced was from their superior cavalry and light troops, whose attacks became daily less alarming as his soldiers grew more familiar with them, and better understood how to oppose them most effectually. Scipio, indeed, carefully avoided a battle; but the rapidity of Cæsar's movements, and the extraordinary celerity with which his troops were accustomed to construct works of every description, at last obliged him to depart from his system of caution. On the fourth of April, Cæsar gained a march upon his antagonists by night,<sup>52</sup> and appeared on the following morning before the town of Thapsus, a place which had shown peculiar attachment to Scipio's cause,

Battle of Thapsus.

and which was at this time defended by a strong garrison. Without loss of time, Cæsar began to form lines of circumvallation, and to occupy every important post in the neighbourhood so effectually, that when Scipio arrived to protect the town, he found his communications with it already cut off. Under these circumstances, Scipio, unwilling to abandon so important a place to its fate, prepared to form his camp on a spot upon the sea-shore, from which he hoped to obstruct the operations of the enemy; and whilst he was employed in the construction of the rampart and ditch, he drew out his army in order of battle to cover the parties engaged in the work. In this situation he was attacked by Cæsar and completely defeated. His troops first fled to the camp, which was as yet unfinished, and this being forced, they hastened to the camp

<sup>50</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 48.

<sup>52</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 79, et seq.

<sup>51</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 52. 56.

they had left the day before, in the hope of being enabled there to make a stand. But finding no officer to rally them, if we may believe the statement of Cæsar's partisan, they fled, as a last resource, towards the camp of Juba, which was at some distance from that of Scipio; but which they now found equally in possession of the victorious enemy. Despairing of any further resistance, the fugitives halted on a neighbouring hill, laid down their arms, and implored quarter. But Cæsar's soldiers, with the ferocity natural to men who respected no law, and who felt that their swords were disposing of the empire of the world, not only massacred the whole of this defenceless multitude, but wounded and murdered several persons of distinction who were present in their own army, against whom they had some supposed grounds of offence. Cæsar himself was an eye-witness of this butchery, which, according to his partisan's narrative, he in vain endeavoured to prevent. Such a scene might have taught him to what a brutal and unmanageable power he had subjected his country; but the crimes of his soldiers were forgotten in the splendour of their victory, by which the campaign was irrevocably decided. The news of the battle spread rapidly in every direction, with an effect as powerful as the tidings of the rout of Pharsalia two years before. Scipio, with three or four other superior officers, escaped by sea from the scene of their

Deaths of Scipio,  
Juba, Afranius, and  
Petreius.

defeat, in the hope of finding an asylum in Spain.<sup>53</sup>

They were driven by contrary winds into the port of Hippo, where they were surrounded by a superior naval force, employed, as we are told, in the service of the fugitive, P. Silius. Scipio's ship was instantly boarded, and he killed himself to avoid falling into the hands of the enemy; the officers who were with him, amongst whom we find the noble name of L. Manlius Torquatus, either followed his example or were put to death. Of the other generals of the vanquished party, Labienus effected his escape into Spain with Atius Varus and Cn. Pompeius, who, during the late campaign, had both held commands by sea. Juba, accompanied by Petreius, fled to his own dominions;<sup>54</sup> but finding that the forces which he had left to protect them had been totally defeated by Bogud and P. Silius, and being shut out of Zama, his capital, by his own subjects, who wished to make their peace with the conqueror, he continued his flight to one of his country houses, and there Petreius and he resolved to die by each other's hands. But Juba having easily killed Petreius, and having attempted without effect to stab himself, persuaded one of his own slaves to become his executioner. The fate of Petreius was soon shared by L. Afranius, his former colleague in the command of Pompey's army in Spain. Afranius, with Faustus Sylla,<sup>55</sup> while attempting to

<sup>53</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 96. Livy, Epitome, CXIV.

<sup>55</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 95. Florus, IV. 2. Dion Cassius, XLIII. 219.

<sup>54</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 91. 94.

reach Spain along the northern coast of Africa, fell, together with the wife and children of the latter, into the hands of P. Silius. They were soon after killed, according to Suetonius and Dion Cassius, by Cæsar's orders; but the statement of Cæsar's partisan attributes their death to a disturbance in the army and the violence of the soldiers. The wife of Faustus, who was a daughter of Pompey, was spared, together with her children, and the enjoyment of all her property was granted to her.

Intelligence of the battle of Thapsus was brought to Utica by a party of Scipio's cavalry, who were flying from the action under the command of Afranius.<sup>36</sup> Cato attempts in vain to defend Utica.

With the usual temper of a defeated and desperate army, these fugitives began to revenge themselves for their defeat by plundering and murdering many of the citizens of Utica, who were supposed to be attached to the cause of Cæsar. M. Cato alone, with a spirit unbroken amidst the disasters of his party, in vain endeavoured to give their feelings a better direction, by persuading them to defend the town against the enemy; and when he saw that they could not be induced to do their duty, he distributed a sum of money to every soldier amongst them, to prevail on them to depart without committing any further excesses. They thus pursued their retreat along the coast on their way to Spain, as we have already mentioned; and in the mean time numerous parties of the vanquished army arrived in Utica, with all of whom Cato was earnest in his efforts to induce them to continue the contest, and to maintain the place. But when he found that their minds were possessed by an overwhelming panic, he furnished them with all the ships in the harbour to convey them wherever they wished to go; and recommended his son and his other friends to the intercession of L. Cæsar, his quæstor, who, as being related to the conqueror, might be supposed to possess some influence with him. His anxiety, however, for the safety of those about him appears less amiable when we find him too proud to accept for himself that mercy which he wished to procure for them, and resisting with passionate violence the solicitations of his son, that he would consent to live for his sake. When the evening came he retired to his own apartment,<sup>57</sup> and employed himself for some time in reading one of Plato's "Dialogues," endeavouring, it is said, to lull the suspicions of his friends by seeming to take a lively interest in the fate of those who were escaping by sea from Utica, and by sending several times to the sea-side to learn the state of the wind and of the weather. But towards morning, when all was quiet, he stabbed himself. He kills himself. He fell from his bed with the blow, and the noise of his fall immediately brought his son and his servants into the room, by

<sup>36</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 87, et seq.    <sup>57</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, 70.



whose assistance he was raised from the ground, and an attempt was made to bind up the wound. Their efforts to save him were vain; for Cato no sooner had recovered his self-possession, than he tore open the wound again in so effectual a manner that he instantly expired.

Such was the end of a man, whom a better philosophy, by Character of Cato. teaching him to struggle with his predominant faults instead of encouraging them, would have rendered truly amiable. He possessed the greatest integrity and firmness; and, from the beginning of his political life, was never swayed by fear or interest to desert that which he considered the cause of liberty and justice. He is said to have foreseen Cæsar's designs long before they were generally suspected; but his well-known animosity against him rendered his authority on the subject less weighty; and his zeal led him to miscalculate the strength of the commonwealth, when he earnestly advised the senate to adopt those measures which gave Cæsar a pretence for beginning hostilities. During the civil war he had the rare merit of uniting to the sincerest ardour in the cause of his party a steady regard to justice and humanity; he would not countenance cruelty or rapine because practised by his associates or coloured with pretences of public advantage. But the pride and coarseness of his mind, of which we have already given some instances in his behaviour to his private friends, overshadowed the last scene of his life, and led him to indulge his selfish feelings by suicide, rather than live for the happiness of his family and friends, and mitigate, as far as lay in his power, the distressed condition of his country. His character, however, was so pure, and since Pompey's death so superior to all the leaders engaged with him in the same cause, that even his enemy's partisans could not refuse him their respect and praise; and his name has become a favourite theme of panegyric in after-times, as the most upright and persevering defender of the liberties of Rome.

Cæsar meantime was advancing from Thapsus towards End of the war in Africa. Utica,<sup>58</sup> and had occupied without resistance, on his march, the towns of Usceta and Adrumetum, in both of which he found considerable magazines of arms and provisions. As he drew near to Utica, he was met by L. Cæsar, who implored his mercy; and to whom, says his partisan, he readily granted it, according to his natural temper and habits of clemency. At the same time he spared the lives of Cato's son and of a number of other individuals who threw themselves on his mercy; but he levied heavy fines on those Roman merchants and citizens of other descriptions who had formed Cato's council, and had contributed money to the cause of the commonwealth.

<sup>58</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 89.

He imposed also large contributions on the inhabitants of Leptis, Adrumetum, and Thapsus;<sup>59</sup> and sold by auction the property of Juba, and of all the Roman citizens resident in Mauritania who had borne arms in his service; after which he reduced his kingdom to the form of a Roman province, and intrusted the government of it to C. Sallustius Crispus, the historian, with the title of proconsul. On the other hand, Cæsar bestowed rewards on the people of Zama for having excluded their sovereign from their walls; and divided the territories of another Mauritanian prince, who had been Juba's ally, between Bogud and P. Silius.<sup>60</sup> Having thus brought the war in Africa to a conclusion, he embarked at Utica on the thirteenth of June, and sailed to Sardinia, there to impose fresh fines, and to order confiscations against some towns and individuals that had assisted the party of his adversaries. He sailed from Sardinia again on the twenty-ninth of June, and after a tedious voyage of eight and twenty days,<sup>61</sup> arrived at Rome about the twenty-seventh of July, or, according to the true calculation, about the end of May.

From the date of Cæsar's return from Africa to his assassination, there is a period of somewhat less than two years; and even of this short time nine months were engrossed by the renewal of the war in Spain, which obliged him to leave Rome once more, and contend for the security of his power at the point of the sword. He enjoyed the sovereignty, therefore, which he had so dearly purchased, during little more than one single year; from the end of July, 707, to the middle of the winter, a period of between seven and eight months, owing to the reformation of the calendar which he introduced during this interval; and again, from October 708, to the ides of March in the following spring. After giving this outline of the order of events, we shall first briefly notice the disturbances in Spain, and in other parts of the empire, by which the tranquillity of Cæsar's sovereignty was interrupted; and shall then endeavour to present our readers with a general view of the nature of his government, and of the internal state of Rome under his dominion; which last subject will naturally lead us to trace the origin of the conspiracy formed against him, and to follow it up to the moment of its fatal termination.

The condition of Spain had become far from tranquil before the conclusion of the campaign in Africa. Cnæus Pompeius, who, as we have mentioned, was invested with a naval command, had been invited thither by some of the Spanish cities,<sup>62</sup> which had taken part in the resistance offered against Q. Cassius, Cæsar's lieutenant, and

Renewal of the civil war in Spain by Scapula and Cn. Pompeius.

<sup>59</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 97.

<sup>60</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, IV. 54.

<sup>61</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 98.

<sup>62</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 228.

which were apprehensive that their conduct, though not hitherto noticed, must necessarily have excited Cæsar's resentment. Accordingly Cn. Pompeius sailed from Africa to the barbarian islands,<sup>63</sup> and succeeded in making himself master of them; but being seized with an illness, he was detained there till after the defeat and death of Scipio, and the conclusion of the African campaign. When the tidings of Cæsar's victory arrived in Spain, the party which had invited Pompeius to be their leader, finding that he was still delayed by sickness, resolved to seek out another chief; and for this purpose they fixed on T. Annius Scapula,<sup>64</sup> a man of great rank and influence in the province, and who had been deeply concerned in the opposition against the authority of Q. Cassius. His own slaves and freedmen were a numerous body, and with them he first took up arms; but his adherents daily became more formidable, being swelled partly by the accession of Roman and native soldiers from Spain itself, and partly by the fugitives from Africa, who sought his standard as their last refuge. At length Pompeius himself appeared, and was acknowledged as commander-in-chief of the whole assembled force. The popularity of his name gained him the zealous support of the Spaniards; and soldiers resorted to him from every quarter of the empire, as if it were reserved for the son of Pompey to revenge the fate of his father and of the commonwealth. Cæsar's lieutenants, to whom he had intrusted the government of Spain, were unable to withstand the progress of the enemy; and Cæsar himself was obliged to suspend his labours for the civil administration of the empire, and once more appear at the head of an army.

Cæsar leaves Rome,  
and goes into Spain.

He set out from Rome, as has been already observed, about the end of the year 707; and exerting his accustomed activity, he is said to have arrived at Obulco,<sup>65</sup> near Corduba, in the province of Farther Spain, in twenty-seven days from the time of his leaving the capital. His presence, as usual, encouraged those cities which still remained faithful to him, and restrained those which were inclining to the enemy. The troops which he found in Spain, added to those which followed him from Italy, formed an army superior to that of the enemy in the quality of its infantry, and in the numbers of its cavalry; and Cæsar therefore, as in his former campaigns, was anxious to bring on a general action; and in order to accomplish this, whilst he was advancing his own cause at the same time in other respects, he employed himself in laying siege to some of the towns that were garrisoned by his opponents. In this manner he besieged and took Alegua, and one or two other places;<sup>66</sup> till Cn.

<sup>63</sup> Dion Cassius, *Auctor de Bello Africano*, 23.

<sup>64</sup> *Auctor de Bello Alexandrino*, 55.

*De Bello Hispaniensi*, 33. Cicero, *ad Familiares*, IX. *epist.* XIII.

<sup>65</sup> Strabo, III. 169, *edit* Xyland.

<sup>66</sup> *Auctor de Bell. Hispan.* 6, *et seq.*



Pompeius, unwilling to discourage his partisans by appearing unable to offer any resistance to his enemy's enterprises, and having persuaded himself that the soldiers in Cæsar's present army were no longer the same veterans who had conquered at Pharsalia or at Thapsus, was induced to offer battle in the neighbourhood of Munda. He disposed his army, however, upon Battle of Munda. ground so defensible by nature,<sup>67</sup> and his soldiers conducted themselves so bravely, that the first attack of the enemy was vigorously repelled; and it is said that Cæsar dismounted from his horse, and by offering to expose his life as a common soldier in the front of the line, at last with difficulty rallied his men, and retrieved the fortune of the day.<sup>68</sup> The victory, though hardly won, was complete and decisive. Labienus and Atius Varus were killed in the field, and Cn. Pompeius was wounded, but effected his escape in a litter to Carteia. From thence, mistrusting the fidelity of the inhabitants, he endeavoured to withdraw by sea to a safer refuge,<sup>69</sup> but being pursued by a squadron of Cæsar's, and being surprised at the very moment when his ships had put in to shore to obtain fresh supplies of water, his vessels were all taken or burnt, and he was obliged once more to pursue his flight by land. He at first attempted to defend himself with the aid of the few followers who still remained with him, on one of the strong positions which the country afforded; but when his pursuers began to construct regular works, under cover of which they might gain a footing on the high ground occupied by his party, he was forced to fly, and his men began to disperse on every side. His wound disabled him from escaping on foot, and the country was impracticable for a carriage, or even for a horse; so that concealment was his only remaining chance of safety, and he took shelter in a cavern, in one of the wild and lonely glens among the mountains, such as have afforded a sure protection to the fugitives of a vanquished or oppressed party in various periods of Spanish history. But he was discovered by the information of some prisoners whom the enemy had taken, and was slaughtered in his place of refuge. His head was cut off and presented to Cæsar, Death of Cn. Pompeius. who at that very moment was entering Hispalis in triumph; and this bloody trophy being instantly by his orders exhibited to the multitude, informed them that the ruin of Pompey's cause was complete. Scapula had put an end to his own life a short time before at Corduba,<sup>70</sup> and Sex. Pompeius, the younger son of Pompey the Great, having fled from the same place on the news of the battle of Munda, sought a refuge amongst the Iaccetani or Lace-

<sup>67</sup> Auctor de Bell. Hispan. 29, et seq.

<sup>68</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 55.

<sup>69</sup> Auctor de Bell. Hispan. 37, 38, 39.  
Velleius Paterculus, ubi supra.

<sup>70</sup> Auctor de Bell. Hispan. 33.

tani,<sup>71</sup> one of the tribes of Hither Spain, who lived between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, in what is now a part of Navarre and Arragon. More fortunate than his brother, Sex. Pompeius was enabled, by the attachment of the natives, to baffle the vigilance of his pursuers, and soon to commence a predatory warfare, which became more serious after Cæsar's departure from Spain, and gradually assumed the shape of an organized hostility. But for the present he was reduced to the condition of a fugitive; and Cæsar pursued a course of executions and confiscations for some

The whole of Spain is reduced to submission, and Cæsar returns to Rome.

months,<sup>72</sup> till he had destroyed every appearance of regular opposition, and had enriched himself and largely rewarded those towns or tribes which had taken part with him in the late contest. The arrangements necessary to be made of one kind or another, detained him in Spain till the autumn, so that, as we have already observed, he did not return to Rome till the month of October.

There was one other part of the empire in which Cæsar's authority was still disputed, nor was tranquillity ever fully established in it during his lifetime. On his hasty progress from Egypt towards Pontus, when he was preparing to attack Pharnaces, he had conferred the command of the province of Syria upon Sex. Cæsar,<sup>73</sup> a friend and connexion of his own. At this time there was a Roman knight residing at Tyre, of the name of Q. Cæcilius Bassus,<sup>74</sup> who had served in Pompey's army during the late campaign, and after the battle of Pharsalia had taken refuge in Syria. As belonging to the equestrian order, he was likely to have been engaged in commerce, and he probably had some friends or connexions in the great trading town of Tyre, which led him to fix on that place as his asylum. He was an active and enterprising man, and when reports began to be circulated that Cæsar was in a state of great danger and difficulty in Africa,<sup>75</sup> Bassus thought that he saw a favourable opportunity for reviving the cause of Pompey in the east. His command of money enabled him easily to raise soldiers in these times of general disorder, and also to corrupt those of Sex. Cæsar, as different detachments were successively placed in garrison at Tyre; we are told also, that when his military preparations became so notorious as to excite alarm, he satisfied Sex. Cæsar by assuring him that they were intended only to assist Mithridates of Pergamus in taking possession of his kingdom of the Bosphorus, which Cæsar had bestowed on him as a reward for the services he had rendered him in his Egyptian campaign.<sup>76</sup> Suspicion being thus

<sup>71</sup> Strabo, III. 170, edit. Xyland. Dion Cassius, XLV. 275. Appian, de Bello Civili, IV. 83. Cicero, ad Atticum, XII. epist. XXXVII.

<sup>72</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 233.

<sup>73</sup> Auctor de Bello Alexandrino, 66.

<sup>74</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVII. 342. Livy, Epitome, CXIV.

<sup>75</sup> Cicero, pro Deiotaro, 9. Dion Cassius, ubi supra.

<sup>76</sup> Auctor de Bell. Alexand. 78.

lulled asleep for the present, Bassus soon afterwards pretended to have received letters from Scipio, announcing the defeat and death of Cæsar in Africa, and bestowing on himself the government of Syria. Accordingly, by virtue of this imaginary commission, he took possession of Tyre; and in a very short time won over to his side the whole army of Sex. Cæsar, whose soldiers, corrupted by the money of his antagonist, murdered him, and then deserted to Bassus. In this manner a private individual, with no other means than the money and influence which he had acquired by his commercial dealings, became master of an army, and of the province of Syria. He fixed his head-quarters at Apamea,<sup>77</sup> a town of remarkable strength, situated on a hill rising out of a level country, and protected partly by the river Orontes, which flows almost round it, and partly by a tract of marsh or stagnant water, which obstructs the approach of an enemy. It commanded, besides, the resources of a most abundant district, which had long been famous for its wealth and fertility; and there were several other strong fortresses in its neighbourhood, the petty chiefs of which were induced by the money, or by the credit of Bassus, to support him in his enterprise. We are told, too,<sup>78</sup> that the chief of one of the wandering Arab tribes, inhabiting the desert between Syria and the Euphrates, was bribed by promises of high pay to himself and his followers, to offer his services to the same cause; nor did Bassus scruple to call in the more powerful succour of the sovereigns of Parthia, who were naturally glad to foment the internal quarrels of the Romans, and who once or twice relieved Apamea by their sudden appearance, when Bassus was hard pressed by the forces employed by Cæsar against him.<sup>79</sup> Thus there were two private individuals acting a conspicuous part in two different extremities of the empire, and each indebted for his political importance to the connexions with foreign princes which he had formed in the course of his commercial dealings. We have already noticed the services rendered to Cæsar in Africa by P. Silius, at the very time that Q. Cæcilius Bassus in Syria was organizing an opposition against him. Other more important occupations prevented Cæsar from employing a very considerable force to put him down; and he continued, therefore, to retain possession of Apamea, and to command the troops which had deserted to him from Sex. Cæsar, till C. Cassius, after the death of Cæsar, became the head of the party of the commonwealth in Asia, when the superior fame and rank of Cassius induced the soldiers of Bassus to commit a second act of desertion, to abandon him, and put themselves under the command of Cassius.<sup>80</sup>

There are few more curious historical records, than that which

<sup>77</sup> Strabo, XVI. 871. Dion Cassius, LXVII. 342.

<sup>78</sup> Dion Cassius and Strabo, locis citatis.

<sup>79</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. IX.

<sup>80</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. XII.



Evelyn, in his "Memoirs," has left of the state of England immediately after the great civil war. He gives a journal of an excursion which he made through the midland and northern counties just at that period; and draws a most lively picture of the state of the country and of the towns, and of the marks of havoc and confiscation which naturally attended the decision of so obstinate a contest. But when we would strain our eyes to discover what was the condition of the Roman empire when the sword was at last sheathed, and the victory of Cæsar was no longer disputed, we are obliged to turn away in disappointment, and can only indulge a vain regret, that the materials for obtaining a really valuable knowledge of ancient history are so exceedingly scanty. We have seen that Spain and Syria were even yet disturbed by the show of actual warfare; that Sex. Pompeius was the chief of a formidable band of plunderers in the one country, while Q. Cæcilius Bassus possessed in the other a strong and important city, and the command of a Roman legion. Before we return to Italy itself, we wish to glean a few facts illustrative of the condition of the other provinces of the empire, and to describe the characters of some of the persons, to whose care Cæsar had committed them.

The countries on the eastern side of the Adriatic and the Ionian gulf, which had been so lately the principal seat of the civil war, were now governed by P. Vatinius and Ser. Sulpicius. We have already mentioned the services which Vatinius had rendered to Cæsar in Illyricum, when he succeeded A. Gabinus in the management of the war in that province, and obliged M. Octavius to abandon the contest and withdraw into Africa. He had been rewarded with a titular consulship during the last three months of the year 706,<sup>81</sup> and was afterwards appointed to command

the province of Illyricum, as proconsul. He was continually occupied in reducing the strongholds of the neighbouring Dalmatians,<sup>82</sup> who had taken an active part against Cæsar throughout the late war; and it appears, too, that some Roman officers, who had probably taken refuge in Illyricum after the defeat of Pompey, were carrying on a plundering and desultory warfare, accompanied with all that wanton cruelty which usually marks the last vindictive struggles of a vanquished party in a civil war. Achaia,

under which name was included the whole of Greece southward of Thermopylæ, was at this same period under the government of Ser. Sulpicius. Sulpicius, the most distinguished lawyer of his day, had been one of those who remained in Italy when Pompey first withdrew into Greece, nor had he at any subsequent time been induced to follow him. The

Sketch of the state  
of the different Pro-  
vinces.

Illyricum.

Achaia.

<sup>81</sup> Dion Cassius, LXII. 211.

<sup>82</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, V. epist. X.

neutrality thus observed by a man of his high birth and character, was too grateful to Cæsar to pass unrewarded; and when Q. Fufius Calenus returned home to share the honours of the consulship with P. Vatinius, Cæsar fixed upon Sulpicius as the most fit person to succeed him in the government of Greece.<sup>83</sup> Such a task was probably not an easy one: there were several distinguished persons who had been involved in the defeat of Pompey,<sup>84</sup> and who were now living in Greece in exile; many again of the Greeks themselves had been forward in opposing Cæsar,<sup>85</sup> and were to pay the penalty of their conduct by the forfeiture of their properties; while the adherents of the victorious party could not, at once, lay aside the license to which the war had accustomed them, and still indulged themselves in frequent acts of lawless violence,<sup>86</sup> which it might not be safe or practicable for Sulpicius to punish. Yet, on the whole, his professional attachment to the laws, and his moderate character, disposed him to alleviate, as far as possible, the sufferings of the people whom he governed; and the state of Greece was, perhaps, enviable, when compared with that of some of the other provinces of the empire.

Of the condition of Asia, little appears to be known, except that the province, called by that name, was now under the government of P. Servilius Isauricus,<sup>87</sup> Asia. who had been Cæsar's colleague in the consulship in the year 705, and whom Cicero compliments on his beneficent and equitable administration. Deiotarus,<sup>88</sup> king of Galatia, who had formerly assisted Pompey in the civil war, but after the battle of Pharsalia had endeavoured to appease Cæsar's anger by his active services in the war with Pharnaces, was about this time accused, by his own grandson, of having intended to assassinate Cæsar, when passing through Asia Minor two years before, on his return from Egypt. Although he had been acknowledged as an independent sovereign by Cæsar himself, yet Deiotarus was obliged to apply to Cicero, with whom he had long been familiarly acquainted, to defend him against this charge, and the cause was tried by Cæsar in his own house. It appears that nothing was determined immediately; and as Cæsar was forming plans for an expedition into Parthia, he may have deferred his judgment on Deiotarus till he should be himself in Asia, and should be able to ascertain more fully what decision would be most conducive to his own interests.

Cæsar's late conquests in Africa had been intrusted (as we

<sup>83</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, IV. epist. III. IV.; VI. epist. VI.

<sup>84</sup> For instance, M. Marcellus, A. Torquatus, Cn. Plancius. Vid. Ciceron. ad Familiares, IV. epist. VII. XIV.; VI. epist. I.

<sup>85</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XIII. epist. XIX.

<sup>86</sup> Magna est gladiatorum licentia: sed in externis locis minor etiam ad facinus verecundia. Cicero, ad Familiares, IV. epist. IX.

<sup>87</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XIII. epist. LXVIII.

<sup>88</sup> Cicero, pro Deiotaro.

Africa. have already mentioned) to the command of C. Sallustius Crispus the historian.<sup>89</sup> His oppressions and extortions are said to have been carried to such a pitch, that he was more like a plunderer than a proconsul; and the unfortunate inhabitants, finding the miseries of war succeeded by the tyranny of such a government, must have been amongst the most wretched of all the subjects of the Roman empire.

The return of Cæsar from Africa, in the end of July, 707, was almost immediately followed by his triumphs, which he now celebrated in commemoration of his various successes in Gaul,<sup>90</sup> in Egypt, in Pontus, and in Africa. Each of these pageants occupied a separate day, and there was an interval of some days between them, that the interest of the people might be kept alive, and that each might pass off without weariness. In the first triumph, Vercingetorix,<sup>91</sup> who had been made prisoner at the famous siege of Alesia six years before, was led amongst the captives in the procession, and was immediately afterwards put to death. It is mentioned that an accident happened to Cæsar's triumphal chariot on this occasion, by which he was nearly thrown out of it; and so natural is superstition, even to men of the greatest natural abilities, if unenlightened by the knowledge of God, that he was accustomed,<sup>92</sup> ever afterwards, as soon as he had seated himself in any carriage, to repeat a certain form of words three times over, by way of a charm for the security of his journey. The injury which the chariot had sustained, rendered it necessary that another should be substituted for it; and the procession was so long delayed, that it was dark before the final ceremony of ascending into the capitol could take place. But the spectacle lost nothing by this circumstance; for we are told that forty elephants were ranged in order on both sides of the way,<sup>93</sup> supporting, in their trunks, a number of candelabra filled with lights. It seems, however, that the accident of the morning had produced a strong impression on Cæsar's mind; and that, with the feeling so common in ancient times of wishing by a voluntary humiliation to disarm the envy with which the gods were supposed to regard excessive prosperity, he climbed, or rather crawled, up the steps leading to the capitol upon his knees.<sup>94</sup> In his Egyptian triumph, Arsinoë, the younger sister of Cleopatra, appeared amongst the prisoners, and excited a general feeling of compassion, which, together with Cæsar's fondness for her sister, saved her from sharing the fate of Vercingetorix. The triumph over Pharnaces was rendered remarkable by the display of a

<sup>89</sup> Auctor de Bello Africano, 97. Dion Cassius, XLIII. 217.

<sup>90</sup> Livy, epitome, CXV. Suetonius, in Cæsare, 37.

<sup>91</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 223.

<sup>92</sup> Pliny, Hist. Natural. XXVIII. 2.

<sup>93</sup> Suetonius, 37.

<sup>94</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 224.



banner, with the famous words "Veni, Vidi, Vici;"<sup>95</sup> and we may imagine that Cæsar delighted in representing his victory over the king of Pontus as so easily won, in order to depreciate Pompey's glory as the conqueror of Mithridates. In his African triumph, Juba, the son of the late king of Mauritania,<sup>96</sup> was the most distinguished prisoner; but his life was spared, and he afterwards became an historian of considerable eminence, and recovered his hereditary throne, with an accession of territory, from the favour of Augustus. The civil wars, according to the constant practice of the Romans, could not be the subject of a regular triumph; but, if we may believe Appian,<sup>97</sup> pictures were exhibited in the procession representing the deaths of Scipio, Petreius, and Cato, although their names were not mentioned in the list of conquered enemies, which, as usual, was displayed to the people as a part of the ceremony. Indignation was naturally excited by this indirect glorying at the deaths of some of the most distinguished citizens of the commonwealth; but the splendour of the pageant drove all other considerations, we are told, from the eyes of the multitude;<sup>98</sup> and when they were informed that Cæsar had brought into the treasury, as the fruit of his conquests, a sum exceeding 4,843,750*l.* of our money,<sup>99</sup> few would be disposed to estimate justly the immense price of wickedness and misery at which this plunder had been purchased.

His triumphs were followed by various largesses of provisions and money to the populace, and by a succession of splendid spectacles, which were perhaps equally effectual in winning the affections of the multitude. Magnificent public entertainments were given, and the people were feasted, we are told, at two and twenty thousand tables;<sup>100</sup> besides which every one of the poorer citizens received a certain portion of meat,<sup>101</sup> about two bushels and a half of corn, ten pounds of oil, and 3*l.* 4*s.* 7*d.* in money. A year's rent,<sup>102</sup> or possibly a year's house-tax, was also remitted to every person in Rome who paid for his dwelling less than 16*l.* 2*s.* 11*d.*, and to every one in Italy who paid less than 4*l.* 0*s.* 8½*d.*; or possibly the remission to the Italians was now given in addition to that which Cæsar had already given to the Romans, according to Dion Cassius, before he set out for Africa, in the preceding winter.<sup>103</sup> But it is said that he somewhat less-

Largesses to the populace and to the soldiers.

<sup>95</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 37.

<sup>96</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 55. Strabo, XVII. 959.

<sup>97</sup> De Bello Civili, II. 101.

<sup>98</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 223.

<sup>99</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II.

<sup>100</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 55.

<sup>101</sup> "Visceratio," Conf. Suetonium, in Cæsare, 38.

<sup>102</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 38. Dion Cassius, XLII. 209.

<sup>103</sup> It is not quite clear what was the nature of the payment which Cæsar remitted on this occasion. To have deprived all landlords of a year's rent seems a measure more violently iniquitous than Cæsar was likely to have sanctioned; especially as he, or his partisan, represents this very same thing as one of the mischievous

ened the effects of these liberalities by a previous scrutiny and reduction of the number of citizens who were to profit by them ; for finding that the list of paupers at Rome,<sup>104</sup> or of persons receiving relief from the distributions of corn issued at the public expense, amounted to three hundred and twenty thousand, he caused this account to be rigorously examined, and diminished it by about one-half : providing moreover by a law, that no new claimants on the public bounty should be admitted, unless when vacancies in the number now established should be occasioned by death. To his soldiers he gave at the rate of 161*l.* 9*s.* 2*d.* to each of the common men ; 322*l.* 18*s.* 4*d.* to the centurions ; and 645*l.* 16*s.* 8*d.* to the military tribunes.<sup>105</sup> The cavalry are said to have received at the rate of 193*l.* 15*s.* a man. In addition to these presents in money, settlements in land were given to the army ; yet we are told that the soldiers were dissatisfied with the rewards conferred on them ;<sup>106</sup> and something of real bitterness mingled perhaps with the wild license of the moment, when, as they followed their leader in his triumphal procession, they sang doggerel verses attacking the infamous profligacy of his youth, reproached him with their miserable fare of roots at Dyrrhachium, and parodying the sentiment of the Stoics, told him that if he acted honestly he would be condemned for his treason, but if he played the villain he might win the throne. Already, too, they assumed so much of the self-importance of the guards of a military despot, that they murmured loudly against the extravagance of Cæsar's spectacles ; and if we may believe Dion Cassius, they actually showed symptoms of mutiny, which were only suppressed by the vigour of their chief, in seizing one of them with his own hand, and ordering him to be executed immediately. Yet wiser and better citizens might have joined them in condemning the profusion of

proposals of M. Cælius in his prætorship, brought forward by him at the same time with a law for the general abolition of all debts, which exposed him to the censures of those persons to whom Cæsar had intrusted the administration of the capital. Possibly it was a remission of all rents due to the government, which may have been the proprietor of a large portion of the land occupied by buildings in Rome, as well as in many other towns in Italy. Dion Cassius says, that in consequence of the repeated conflicts which took place between the soldiers of Octavius Cæsar and the citizens, both in Rome and in the other towns of Italy, after the battle of Philippi, in the course of which a great many houses were burnt, there was granted also a remission of rent both in the capital and in the country towns ;

but he does not say whether this was an act of the government, or an arrangement generally made between the landlords and their tenants, in consideration of the temporary distress of the latter. Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 362.

<sup>104</sup> Suetonius, 41. Dion Cassius, XLIII. 224.

<sup>105</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, II. 102. The sum here stated appears enormous ; yet a natural correction of the text of Suetonius, which in its present state is clearly corrupt, makes his testimony exactly confirm that of Appian ; and all parts of the empire had been plundered to furnish Cæsar with the means of enriching his soldiery.

<sup>106</sup> Pliny, XIX. 8. Dion Cassius, XLIII. 224. 226. Suetonius, in Cæsare, 49. 51.

the entertainments now given to the multitude, and might have recognized the invariable policy of tyrants, in the conduct of Cæsar, thus pampering the populace with shows and feasts, while he was plundering and oppressing the rich, the respectable, and the industrious. He had built a forum, or great square, which was called after his own name, an amphitheatre, and a temple in honour of Venus, giving her the epithet of "*Genitrix*," or "the Ancestress," in allusion to the fabled descent of the Julian family from Iulus, the son of Æneas. These various buildings were now to be opened, or consecrated; and this, together with the pretence of paying honours to the memory of his daughter Julia,<sup>107</sup> who had died about eight years before, furnished him with an occasion of gratifying the favourite taste of the multitude to the utmost. Dramatic entertainments were exhibited in all the different quarters of the city,<sup>108</sup> and were performed in several different languages, for the amusement of the numerous strangers assembled in the capital from all parts of the empire. It was in one of these performances that Dec. Laberius, a Roman knight, and well known as a writer of farces, was forced at Cæsar's request to appear as an actor on the stage in one of his own plays; and having thus forfeited his rank by becoming one of a profession which the Romans considered infamous, he recovered it again from Cæsar as a reward for his condescension, and received besides a large present in money. But the dramatic spectacles were little regarded in comparison with the sports of the circus, and the amphitheatre, the combats of gladiators, and the exhibition of the naumachia. The hunting of different animals was continued during five days; and it is said that the camelopard, or giraffe, was on this occasion for the first time exhibited at Rome.<sup>109</sup> On the last day a regular engagement took place, in which twenty elephants, thirty horsemen, and five hundred foot-soldiers fought on each side; and at another time twenty elephants,<sup>110</sup> mounted with their turrets, and assisted by sixty light-armed soldiers, were opposed to five hundred infantry and twenty horsemen. The combats of gladiators were also on the grandest scale; and if we may believe Suetonius, Furius Leptinus, a man whose father had been prætor, and Q. Calpenus, a senator, fought in these contests amongst the hundreds of prisoners taken in war, or criminals condemned to die, who in general were the combatants. In like manner, the martial exercise, called the Pyrrhic dance, was performed by the sons of men of the highest rank in the provinces of Asia and Bithynia; and many of the young Roman nobility appeared as

Shows of various kinds exhibited to the people.

Dramatic entertainments.

Sports of the amphitheatre.

Combats of gladiators.

<sup>107</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 55. Dion Cassius, XLIII. 225.

<sup>108</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 39.

<sup>109</sup> Dion Cassius, ubi supra.

<sup>110</sup> Pliny, VIII. 7.



Naumachia, or  
sea-fight.

drivers of chariots in the races of the circus. But the naumachia, or seat-fight, excited greater admiration than even the combats of the gladiators or of the elephants. An immense pond or lake was dug near the Tiber, and having been filled with water, ships of war, of different sizes, of which some are said to have been quadriremes, or vessels with four rows of oars, were introduced upon it. Two fleets were formed, one consisting of Egyptians, and the other of Tyrians; and it is said that there were on board of each two thousand rowers,<sup>111</sup> and one thousand fighting men, who engaged with one another, and displayed all the horrors of real warfare. Even the habitual inhumanity of the Romans was shocked, we are told, in some measure, by this enormous and wanton effusion of blood;<sup>112</sup> yet they were much more shocked, it is added, at the thought of the vast sums of money which were thus prodigally expended. Amongst other instances of magnificence it is mentioned, that the whole forum in which the gladiators fought, together with the whole length of the Via Sacra, was covered over with awnings to protect the spectators from the sun;<sup>113</sup> and some accounts which Dion Cassius had seen, added the incredible circumstance that these awnings were made of silk. Yet, however justly there might have existed a partial and temporary feeling of indignation or disgust at so much prodigality and cruelty, the entertainments were altogether so attractive, that the multitudes which flocked to Rome to witness them were obliged to live in booths or tents, with which they lined the roads near the capital, as well as the principal streets;<sup>114</sup> and many lives were continually lost from the pressure of the crowd, two senators, it is said, perishing amongst the rest in this manner. One circumstance yet remains to be told, in order to complete the picture of these festivities. For some cause, which

Human sacrifices  
offered in the Cam-  
pus Martius.

Dion Cassius could not learn, human sacrifices were judged to be necessary, and accordingly two men were offered up in the Campus Martius, by the pontifices and the priest of Mars.<sup>115</sup> Such were the scenes exhibited in the capital of the civilized world, under the express direction of the sovereign of the empire, himself a man of the highest and most cultivated intellect in his dominions.

We have called Cæsar the sovereign of the empire, for, independently of that actual power which his sword had conferred on him, the senate, since the tidings of his successes in Africa, had showered upon him all the dignities and offices of the commonwealth. He had been appointed dictator for ten years,<sup>116</sup> and *Præfectus Morum*, or superintend-

Powers and honours  
bestowed on Cæsar.

<sup>111</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, II. 102.

<sup>112</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 225, 226.

<sup>113</sup> Pliny, XIX. 1.

<sup>114</sup> Suetonius, 39.

<sup>115</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 226.

<sup>116</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 220. Cicero, ad Familiares, IX. epist. XV.

ent of public manners and morals, with the whole vast authority formerly enjoyed by the censors, for three years. He was to nominate the other magistrates, who were before elected by the people, although it appears that he did not avail himself of this power to its full extent, but with the exception of the consuls, allowed all other public officers to be appointed half by the tribes, as usual, and half by himself.<sup>117</sup> He was allowed to have his curule chair in the senate placed on a level with those of the consuls, and he was entitled to deliver his opinion before every other person in the debates. To all these were added some of those profane and disgraceful flatteries<sup>118</sup> which were afterwards so commonly bestowed on the Roman emperors. His statue, raised upon a figure representing the earth, was placed in the capitol opposite to the statue of Jupiter, and on it was the inscription, "He is a demigod." Other divine honours were voted to him, either now, or after his return from the campaign against the sons of Pompey, in Spain. His statues were carried, together with those of the gods, in the processions of the circus, temples and altars were dedicated to him, and priests were appointed to superintend his worship. These things he received with a vanity which affords a striking contrast to the contemptuous pride of Sylla. Cæsar took a pleasure in receiving every token of homage, and in contemplating with childish delight the gaudy honours with which he was invested. It was a part of the prize which he had coveted, and which he had committed so many crimes to gain; nor did the possession of real power seem to give him greater delight than the enjoyment of these forced, and therefore worthless, flatteries.

When Sylla had raised himself to the supreme power, there was a definite object before him which he never lost sight of—the depression of the popular party, and the strengthening the aristocracy; and when he had accomplished these ends he laid aside his individual sovereignty, and took his station as the chief of that part of the commonwealth on which he had conferred an absolute ascendancy. But Cæsar's policy was entirely selfish: he could not pretend to act for the benefit of the aristocracy, or of the lower orders. There were no grievances in the old constitution which could be redressed only by his despotism; there had been no offence committed by the senate and people of Rome which deserved that their liberties should be surrendered into the hands of one profligate individual. Those therefore who draw comparisons between Sylla's proscriptions and Cæsar's clemency, forget the utterly different circumstances in which the two dictators were placed. Wicked as Sylla's cruelties were, they were a retaliation for former atrocities, or a security for the establishment

<sup>117</sup> Suetonius, 41.

<sup>118</sup> Dion Cassius, 41. Suetonius, 76.

of the interests of the high aristocratical party at Rome. The Samnites were butchered to maintain the ascendancy of the Romans over the Italian allies; the proscription lists were opened to exterminate, if possible, the adherents of the popular faction, who had abetted the violences of Sulpicius and Cinna, and had so lately trampled the nobility under their feet. But after the deaths of Pompey, of Scipio, of L. Domitius, of M. Bibulus, of L. Lentulus, of M. Cato, and of all the most eminent citizens of the commonwealth, whom could Cæsar wish to proscribe? His own wrongs, even if we were to admit his own statement, had been abundantly revenged already; the security of his government could not be insured by massacres, when every one seemed ready to submit to his power; and if he had wished to get rid of all those whose interests were incompatible with his own, he must have destroyed every free citizen in the empire. Cæsar's policy was to draw a veil over the past, as far as possible; to conciliate, by an apparent clemency, those whom he held in subjection; and to invest himself, as early as he could, with all the splendour and popularity which attend a prince of commanding abilities ruling over a great empire. Had he but retained a small military force about his person, to save him from the danger of assassination, there was no probability that his power would ever have been disturbed by any national resistance; he might have died, like Augustus, in a peaceful old age, quietly enjoying the imperial crown, and might have transmitted his dominions to his successor, without the intervention of that period of misery which elapsed, between his murder and the final exaltation of his nephew Octavius, after the battle of Actium.

One of the most necessary measures for the security of Cæsar's government, was the granting settlements of lands to his victorious soldiers. He did not wish to plant them all together in any one part of Italy;<sup>119</sup> partly that by being dispersed into different quarters they might be less likely to remember their own power, and attempt to overthrow the throne which they had raised; and partly in order to avoid the odium of expelling a large body of the lawful occupants of the soil in order to make room for them. It was professed that for this purpose Cæsar could find land enough amongst the forfeited estates of the adherents of Pompey, or in those parts of Italy and Cisalpine Gaul which were the property of the commonwealth. But it appears that the commissioners whom he appointed to manage this business, might extend, with little control, the limits of what they chose to call national or confiscated lands; and thus we find them dividing out the districts of Veii and Capena;<sup>120</sup> threatening

<sup>119</sup> Suetonius, 38. Dion Cassius, XLII.  
<sup>210.</sup> Appian, II. 94.

<sup>120</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, IX. epist.  
 XVII.



the neighbourhood of Tusculum, so that Cicero entertained some fears for the safety of his own villa; seizing on the estates in Cisalpine Gaul,<sup>121</sup> which belonged to the corporation of the town of Atella, in Campania; claiming the whole territory of Volaterræ,<sup>122</sup> because Sylla had decreed its confiscation, although it had since been protected by an especial law passed by Cæsar himself in his first consulship; and by a still more striking instance of arbitrary power, marking out for distribution a property which had already been sold by public auction under Cæsar's authority,<sup>123</sup> as belonging to an adherent of Pompey; and had been purchased by C. Albinus, a senator, in the natural confidence that Cæsar would cause the validity of such sales to be religiously observed, inasmuch as his own credit and interest were concerned in maintaining his own acts. But in this manner, at whatever expense of individual oppression and misery, the veterans were provided for; and the favour of the army was conciliated towards a chief, whose sole dependence was on their support, and who had shown himself ready to repay their services with the rewards which they most coveted.

It is not possible to estimate the amount of property forfeited in different parts of the empire, on account of the support given by its owners to the party of Pompey. Purchases of forfeited property by Cæsar's adherents. At Rome the sales of houses and lands were constantly going on, and as it was naturally considered odious to become a purchaser,<sup>124</sup> monied men of low character, and some of Cæsar's partisans, who cared not for public opinion, were able to buy splendid possessions at a very low price. It is said that M. Antonius,<sup>125</sup> having thus bought the house which had belonged to Pompey, was very unwilling to pay the price of it; presuming that his services to Cæsar entitled him to share in his spoils gratuitously. But Cæsar, on his return from Africa, insisted absolutely on the payment being made; and when Antonius still demurred, he ordered a military guard to take possession of his property. It was now time to give up the plea of right, and to appeal to Cæsar's forbearance, that he would not press for immediate payment; and Cæsar, whose main objection was to the principle on which Antonius had before refused to pay, having no wish to distress so useful an adherent, readily allowed him a longer time to discharge his debt. It does not appear that it was ever paid; for the profligacy of Antonius kept him always poor, and Cæsar did not wish to exasperate him, and to run the risk of offending a large party among his principal officers, by seeming to grudge them any portion of the fruits of his usurpation. We are told that, whilst Cæsar was in

<sup>121</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XIII. epist. VII.

<sup>122</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XIII. epist. IV.

<sup>123</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XIII. epist. VIII.

<sup>124</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XII. epist. III.

<sup>125</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 29.

Spain,<sup>126</sup> Antonius proceeded as far Narbo, in Gaul, to join him, but went no further; and after staying there some time returned to Rome, in order to prevent the sale of his property, with which he was at that period threatened for his insolvency. During his stay at Narbo,<sup>127</sup> he is said to have communicated with C. Trebonius some design against Cæsar's life; and it was owing to this circumstance that Trebonius afterwards led him aside out of the senate house, when Cæsar was assassinated, supposing that he, who had once himself proposed the very same deed, would feel no regret when it was carried into execution. But it is not unlikely that some among the conspirators were actuated by the same motives which had led Antonius to contemplate the murder of Cæsar; and that it was the creditor rather than the tyrant whom they wished to destroy. Be this as it may, the friends of Cæsar seized largely upon the spoils of the defenders of the commonwealth; and although in many instances the property thus gained was speedily dissipated, yet the scandal and the suffering occasioned by these proceedings was great and deplorable.

We shall take this opportunity of noticing some of those persons who had been Cæsar's principal supporters in the civil war, and who were now raised by his victory to the highest situations in the commonwealth. Of all these, M. Antonius was the most distinguished.

M. Antonius.

He has been, necessarily, often mentioned already in the course of this history; and we have seen that his flight from Rome during his tribuneship, furnished Cæsar with a pretence for commencing his rebellion in the year 704; that he was afterwards intrusted with the government of Italy during Cæsar's absence in Spain in the same year; that he held a high command in Cæsar's army in the subsequent campaign in Greece; and that, after the battle of Pharsalia, he carried the greatest part of the victorious legions back to Italy, and enjoyed the government of that country for the second time till the return of Cæsar from Egypt in the autumn of 706. He was then named master of the horse to Cæsar in his second dictatorship; but he did not follow him into Africa, and employed himself, during his stay at Rome, in wasting, amidst the grossest excesses, the property which he had purchased at Cæsar's auctions. Next to Antonius we may

P. Dolabella.

rank P. Cornelius Dolabella, Cicero's son-in-law, whose early profligacies and extravagancies had led him to join Cæsar at the beginning of his rebellion as the natural patron of men of broken fortunes; who had since fought under him at Pharsalia,<sup>128</sup> had distinguished himself by his revolutionary proceedings when tribune, during Cæsar's absence in

<sup>126</sup> Cicero, Philippic. 30, 31. Ad Atticum, XII. epist. XVIII.

<sup>127</sup> Cicero, Philippic. 14.

<sup>128</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 30.

Egypt, and had afterwards gone with him into Africa, and had served under him through the whole of that campaign. On his return to Italy, after Cæsar's final victory, he appears to have lived in a style of great magnificence, and the excellence of his entertainments is recorded by Cicero,<sup>124</sup> who at this time often visited him, and through him, and one or two other friends, maintained a friendly intercourse with the prevailing party. M. Æmilius Lepidus is entitled to our notice, more from the elevated situation to which circumstances after-

M. Æmilius Lepidus.

wards raised him, than from any merit or abilities of his own. Having been prætor at the beginning of the rebellion, he had remained at Rome when the consuls and the great majority of the senate left it to follow Pompey;<sup>130</sup> and when Cæsar returned from Spain, towards the end of the year 704, Lepidus presided at the comitia, which conferred on him the office of dictator. For thus giving the sanction of a lawful magistrate to Cæsar's proceedings, he was rewarded with the government of the province of Hither Spain,<sup>131</sup> which he retained for two years; and having made himself useful in quieting the disturbances occasioned by the unpopularity of Q. Cassius, he received the honours of a triumph on his return to Rome, and was named Cæsar's colleague in the consulship for the year 707. This dignity he was now enjoying; and when Cæsar again set out for Spain, at the close of the year, being then invested with the dictatorship, Lepidus was appointed his master of the horse, and was intrusted with the care of the capital during his absence. The principal partisans of Cæsar are enumerated by Cicero in one of his letters,<sup>132</sup> where we find the names of Pansa, Hirtius, Balbus, Oppius, Matius, and Postumius. C. Vibius Pansa had been tribune in the year 702, and being already devoted to the interests of Cæsar, he inter-

C. Vibius Pansa.

posed his negative upon some of the earliest resolutions passed by the senate,<sup>133</sup> with a view to the appointment of a new proconsul in the province of Gaul. We know not how actively he was engaged in the civil war; but it appears that he preserved, through the whole it, an unblemished character,<sup>134</sup> and so distinguished himself by various acts of kindness and protection towards distressed individuals of the vanquished party, that when he was appointed to succeed M. Brutus in the government of Cisalpine Gaul, in the year 708, he received from the people, on leaving Rome, the liveliest tokens of their good-will and gratitude. A. Hirtius was also a friend of Cæsar before the civil war broke out, and was with

A. Hirtius.

<sup>129</sup> Ad Familiares, IX. epist. XVI.

<sup>130</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IX. epist. IX.

Dion Cassius, XLI. 170.

<sup>131</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 214. Auctor de Bello Alexand. 59.

<sup>132</sup> Ad Familiares, VI. epist. XII.

<sup>133</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, VIII. epist.

VIII.

<sup>134</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XV. epist.

XVII. XIX. Ad Atticum, XII. epist. XXVII.



him in Gaul in the year 705,<sup>135</sup> from whence he was despatched to Rome, to make arrangements with some of Cæsar's partisans in the capital, and returned to Cæsar immediately after, so that he was probably with him when he first began his rebellion. We hear of him again as residing in Italy in the year 707,<sup>136</sup> when he, like Dolabella, was famous for the sumptuousness of his table, and flattered Cicero's vanity by coming frequently to receive instructions from him in the art of oratory. He is known as the author of the eighth book of the "Commentaries of Cæsar's Wars in Gaul,"<sup>137</sup> and was by some said to have written also those narratives of the campaigns in Egypt, Africa, and Spain, to which we have so often referred in our account of those events. He also took upon himself to write an invective against Cato in answer to Cicero's panegyric on him;<sup>138</sup> and he is said to have displayed some talent in the work, but to have incurred much greater ridicule, for the evident spirit of flattery to Cæsar by which it was dictated. Both Hirtius and Pansa appeared inclined, after Cæsar's death, to acknowledge the authority of the old constitution; they were both consuls together in the year 710, and both perished in the actions fought at Mutina, when commanding the armies of the commonwealth against the rebellious attempts of M. Antonius. The names of Balbus and Oppius are generally coupled together in Cicero's letters, as if either personal or political friendship had established the closest union between them. L. Cornelius Balbus

was a native of Spain, and by birth a citizen of Gades. He distinguished himself in the service of the Roman government in the war so long carried on against Sertorius, and was rewarded by Pompey with the rights of a Roman citizen.<sup>139</sup> From this period he removed to Rome, where he lived in a style of affluence, and, as it appears, was exposed to some odium on account of his wealth and luxury.<sup>140</sup> He soon became acquainted with Cæsar, to whom, perhaps, his money enabled him to be useful; and his intimacy with him was already firmly established, when Cæsar, after his prætorship, obtained the province of the Farther Spain; for we find that Cæsar conferred many kindnesses for his sake on his native city Gades.<sup>141</sup> When Cæsar was afterwards consul, Balbus was one of those whom he most warmly patronized; and when, in the year 697, his title to the character of a Roman citizen was disputed in a court of justice, by the instigation, probably, of those who hated him as Cæsar's friend, Crassus, Pompey, and Cicero pleaded for him in his defence. Whilst Cæsar was in Gaul, Balbus occasionally

<sup>135</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VII. epist. IV.

<sup>136</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XII. epist. II.  
Ad Familiares, VII. epist. XXXIII.; IX.  
epist. XVI. XVIII. XX.

<sup>137</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 56.

<sup>138</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XII. epist. XL.  
XLI. XLIV. XLV.

<sup>139</sup> Cicero, pro Balbo, 2, 3.

<sup>140</sup> Cicero, pro Balbo, 25.

<sup>141</sup> Cicero, pro Balbo, 19.

visited him,<sup>142</sup> and found opportunities, we may suppose, of adding to his fortune from the plunder of that country and Britain; for Cicero, in one of his letters,<sup>143</sup> alludes to the gardens and a Tusculan villa of the favourite, as the fruits of Cæsar's friendship. When the civil war broke out, he remained at Rome, and was not required by Cæsar to take any active part in the quarrel,<sup>144</sup> as he was under great obligations to Pompey, and to L. Cornelius Lentulus, then consul, from whom he had taken his name when he became a Roman citizen. But he was always highly valued by Cæsar, and possessed great influence with him; insomuch, that Cicero relied chiefly on his interest to procure for him the favour of the conqueror after the battle of Pharsalia.<sup>145</sup> He was an Epicurean in principle and in practice, building splendid villas after Cæsar's victory in Africa,<sup>146</sup> and enjoying the gifts of fortune to the uttermost. According to the philosophy which he professed, he seems to have been a selfish but easy tempered man, willing to keep up a friendly intercourse with persons of all parties, and studying to preserve his fortune unhurt through all the political changes which he witnessed. In this object he was fully successful; for after the battle of Philippi he obtained the title of consul from M. Antonius and Octavius in the year 713,<sup>147</sup> being the first individual who rose to that honour without being an Italian or a Roman citizen by birth; and at his death he was rich enough to bequeath the sum of 16s. 1d. to every individual of the Roman people.

His associate, Oppius, was a man of mean, or at least of humble birth,<sup>148</sup> and apparently became acquainted with C. Oppius. Cæsar by furnishing him with money at a time his profligacies were continually draining his means and ruining his credit. When Cæsar was in Gaul, Oppius seems to have been employed by him as his agent at Rome,<sup>149</sup> and was in the habit of forwarding the letters which passed between him and his principal officers and their friends in the capital. Like Balbus, he enjoyed the confidence of Cæsar without interruption, and his name is constantly mentioned as that of a person whose influence in the internal administration of affairs was very considerable. But we have been unable to find any particulars recorded of him which throw light upon his individual character.

C. Matius was a citizen of the equestrian order,<sup>150</sup> and became, at an early period of his life, acquainted with C. Matius.

<sup>142</sup> Cicero, Epist. ad Q. Fratrem, III. epist. I.

<sup>143</sup> Ad Atticum, VII. epist. VII.

<sup>144</sup> Ad Atticum, IX. epist. VII.

<sup>145</sup> Ad Atticum, XI. epist. VII. VIII. &c.

<sup>146</sup> Ad Atticum, XII. epist. II.

<sup>147</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 376. Pliny, VII. 43. Velleius Paterculus, II. 51.

<sup>148</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, IX. epist. VII. Tacitus, Annal. XII. 60.

<sup>149</sup> Cicero, ad Q. Fratrem, III. epist. I.

<sup>150</sup> Tacitus, Annal. XII. 60.

Cæsar. He was with him for some time in Gaul,<sup>151</sup> and exerted himself at that period to reconcile him to Cicero, for whom he entertained an old regard. At the beginning of the civil war he did his utmost to preserve peace; but when his efforts proved fruitless, a most false estimate of the claims of private friendship led him to follow Cæsar, though at the same time he disapproved of his cause. He does not appear, however, to have taken much part in the war, nor did he acquire either riches or honours by its event; but availed himself of his influence with the conqueror to mitigate the sufferings of the vanquished party, and to recommend a system of clemency. After the death of Cæsar, when his assassins were at the height of their power, Matius never disguised his sorrow for the loss of his friend, and was one of the first persons to notice and support C. Octavius, when he came forward to claim the name and inheritance of his uncle. Octavius did not forget his kindness, but lived on terms of friendship with him<sup>152</sup> when the course of events had raised him to the imperial throne: and Matius lived to old age, possessed of fortune and influence, without reproach, amusing himself with his gardens and trees, and, like our own Evelyn, leaving a name behind him for his attention to the practice of horticulture and the ornamenting of pleasure grounds.

Of Postumius we have been able to collect no other notices than that he was employed by Cæsar in the civil war,<sup>153</sup> and after his death undertook, together with C. Matius, the directions of the games which were celebrated by Octavius in honour of his uncle's victories.

One reflection naturally presents itself when we read over this list of names, hitherto unknown in Roman history, and now raised to the highest eminence of wealth and political importance. With all the misery which they had occasioned, the civil wars had yet produced the beneficial effect of depriving the oligarchy of great Roman families of that predominant share of power and honours which they had been accustomed to enjoy. In times of commotion, men of wealth, or of personal qualifications, naturally made their way to distinction and greatness; and more monied men and foreigners were thus introduced into the highest class of society, and gave a severe wound to that narrow aristocratical spirit which would perpetuate nobility in one particular caste, and considers it as a profanation to admit individuals taken from the mass of the people into the ranks of this privileged order. It was a general benefit to the provinces of the Roman empire when Balbus obtained the consulship; it was a general elevation of the commercial and monied classes of the Roman people, when Op-

<sup>151</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. XXVII. XXVIII.

<sup>152</sup> Pliny, XII. 2; XV. 14.

<sup>153</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, II. 58. Cicero, ad Atticum, XV. epist. II.



pius and Matus were raised to a degree of power and importance above the families of the oldest nobility in the commonwealth ; while, at the same time, it was a fortunate circumstance towards maintaining a just, but not excessive respect for noble ancestry, that the person who had seized the very highest place in the republic, was one whose birth made him on a level with the proudest of the patricians, and thus rendered his sway less galling than if his abilities and crimes alone had exalted him above them.

It may be remarked, also, that almost all the friends of Cæsar whom we have enumerated, were men of Epicurean principles ; and the same may be said of T. Pomponius Atticus and C. Mecænas, two of the most distinguished individuals of the equestrian order, who flourished about this same period. The doctrines of Epicurus naturally suited a class of men who enjoyed wealth without political dignity ; and such was the general character of the equestrian order, to which the persons of whom we have been speaking originally belonged. Where these principles were united with an amiable temper and kindly feelings, the mischief to which they led was either indolence and a sort of elegant selfishness, or, in the most favourable circumstances, it was a preference of feeling to principle, and a habit of substituting kind and generous actions for the harder task of balancing the claims of conflicting duties, and following that which was right, rather than that which was agreeable. It is probable that Matus and Pansa thought that their conduct in supporting Cæsar was amply atoned for by their acts of personal kindness and disinterestedness after his victory ; so prone are men to purchase the privilege of declining a painful duty by the practice of those amiable virtues which confer at once the greatest self-complacency on themselves, and most attract the admiration of others. This tendency was especially encouraged by the doctrines of Epicurus, which making pleasure the end of human conduct, represented virtue as the surest means of attaining it. Men of coarser and viler natures abused this philosophy, as was natural, far more grossly ; but its evil tendency was most shown in the lives of its best disciples : for they who believed virtue to be indeed the truest road to pleasure, were yet misled by perceiving that the virtues most agreeable to their natures, led them to pleasure most readily ; and, content with the practice of these, they failed altogether in assigning to each virtue its proper comparative rank, and in disciplining their natures to choose their highest duty, when the gratification of their intellect or their feelings was to be the necessary sacrifice.

Meantime Cæsar proceeded to turn his attention to the general settlement of the commonwealth, and, like Sylla, to attempt to terminate the disorders from which he

Laws and regulations  
of Cæsar.

had now nothing further to gain. With this view he proposed and carried a law, restricting to two years the term during which any command in the provinces might be held;<sup>154</sup> and ordering that all those provinces which were governed by prætors or pro-prætors should be held only for one year. But as he had himself marched with his army out of his province by his own sole authority, in open defiance of the Cornelian law of Sylla, which rendered such conduct treasonable, so a popular adventurer, or an able and ambitious general, would not fail to procure or retain the command of a province for as long a time as might suit his purposes, notwithstanding the prohibitions of this law of Cæsar. Another law in which also the example of Sylla was followed, proposed to increase the severity of the criminal code.<sup>155</sup> Wilful murderers were to incur the forfeiture of all their property, in addition to the penalty of exile, which had hitherto been the utmost extent of punishment legally inflicted on the most enormous crimes; other criminals, when banished, were to forfeit the half of their fortunes; and persons condemned for disturbing the public peace,<sup>156</sup> or for any other of those offences against the public welfare included under the term "*Majestas imminuta*," or "*læsa*," were to be expelled from Italy by the form of forbidding them the use of fire and water within so many miles of the capital. But this strictness ill accorded with the indemnities which he had himself granted to so many persons condemned for bribery and other offences;<sup>157</sup> or with his reversing the sentences of degradation formerly passed by the censors upon several who had since served him in the civil war. A third law, which was most completely at variance with the popular principles on which he had professed heretofore to act, contained an alteration of the Aurelian law respecting the persons to whom the judicial power was to be intrusted. By that law, passed as we have seen in the first consulship of Pompey and Crassus (v.c. 683), the judges were to be chosen from the senate, the equestrian order, and from a description of men among the plebeians who possessed a competent fortune, and were known by the name of *Tribuni Ærarii*. But Cæsar now made the *Tribuni Ærarii* no longer eligible, and confined the judicial power exclusively to the members of the senate, or of the equestrian order.<sup>158</sup> Another of Cæsar's measures was directed against extravagance in the expenses of the table, being a renewal and an enforcement of the old sumptuary laws. Intemperance in eating and drinking was not Cæsar's favourite sensuality; and perhaps his feelings as a soldier may have made him dislike an indulgence which he might think inconsistent with the hardness of a military nation. But he found

<sup>154</sup> Cicero, Philippic. I. 8.

<sup>155</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 42.

<sup>156</sup> Cicero, Philippic. I. 10.

<sup>157</sup> Suetonius, 41.

<sup>158</sup> Suetonius, 41. Dion Cassius, XLIII.

that the impatience which men feel at being controlled by law, in a matter so entirely of a domestic nature, was too strong in this point for his authority ; and learning that as soon as he left Rome his enactments were disregarded, he wrote angrily from Spain to say that he was resolved henceforward to remain constantly in the capital, that his laws might be duly observed ;<sup>159</sup> and afterwards, he is said not only to have posted guards at the markets, to prevent the sale of any forbidden articles,<sup>160</sup> but sometimes to have sent his lictors and soldiers into private houses, and to have actually carried off from the table any dishes which exceeded the allowed expense of private entertainments. There were others of his acts which excited great odium against him at the time, and which proceeded indeed, very probably, from selfish motives ; but which were really wise and liberal, and loudly called for by the existing circumstances of the empire. He conferred the rights of Roman citizenship on a whole legion of soldiers whom he had raised in Transalpine Gaul, and called by the name of the *Alaudæ*.<sup>161</sup> He bestowed also the same privilege on many of the inhabitants of Cisalpine Gaul, and intended to communicate it to all the people within the Alps,<sup>162</sup> a purpose which was carried into effect soon after his death by M. Antonius and Octavius. He gave also the inferior distinction of the rights of Latin citizenship, "*Jus Latii*," to all the inhabitants of Sicily.<sup>163</sup> He introduced a number of persons into the senate, so that the majority of the whole body were said to owe their admission to him ;<sup>164</sup> and amongst the rest were several Transalpine Gauls ;<sup>165</sup> upon which an ironical notice was handed about in Rome, ordering "that no one should pretend to show the new senators the way to the senate-house." He raised several new families to the dignity of patricians,<sup>166</sup> in order to supply the diminution of that order in the late war ; and he admitted all physicians, as well as the professors of all other liberal arts and sciences, resident at Rome, to the right of citizenship. All these acts had a beneficial tendency, as far as they contributed to place the inhabitants of different parts of the empire on a level with each other ; and prepared the way for their forming gradually one united nation, instead of regarding one another, as hitherto, in the light of masters and slaves, between whom

<sup>159</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIII. epist. VII.

<sup>160</sup> Suetonius, 43.

<sup>161</sup> Suetonius, 24.

<sup>162</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, V. 3.

<sup>163</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. XII.

<sup>164</sup> Cicero, de Divinatione, II. 9.

<sup>165</sup> Suetonius, 76. 80.

<sup>166</sup> Suetonius, 41. Tacitus, Annal. XI.

25. Dion Cassius makes Q. Fufius Calenus say, in his speech in defence of M. Antonius, that Cicero's family was among

those raised, on this occasion, to the rank of patricians. This is not impossible, as Cæsar would naturally fix upon those families which were noble, though not patricians ; and, as Cicero was almost the only man surviving who had been consul before the civil wars, his family would readily suggest itself as one of the first to receive this accession of dignity. Dion Cassius, 306.



there existed an insuperable barrier. Another class of Cæsar's measures regarded the important subject of population, and was an attempt to relieve the capital from some portion of that multitude of indigent citizens by which it was overburdened, and to substitute free inhabitants in the room of some of the slaves, who were now almost the sole cultivators of the soil in many parts of Italy. He is said to have settled no fewer than eighty thousand citizens,<sup>167</sup> many of them freedmen, in different colonies, and to have restored on this occasion many towns which had been ruined in former wars, particularly Carthage and Corinth. These two famous cities had been both destroyed in the same year, exactly a century before the period of their restoration; they were now rebuilt together, and in a very short time rose to a high degree of wealth and importance. Then, to insure the existence of a free population in Italy,<sup>168</sup> he forbade all citizens, between the ages of twenty and forty, from being abroad for more than three years together, except on military service; nor were the sons of senators allowed to leave the country at all, except they travelled in the suite of a magistrate. He also insisted that all graziers, and persons who fed sheep or other animals on a large scale, should employ freedmen in the proportion of at least one-third out of the whole number of their shepherds or herdsmen. But the short duration of Cæsar's power prevented these regulations from producing any sufficient effect; and in the reign of Augustus<sup>169</sup> it was still matter of complaint that many districts of Italy were only redeemed from desolation by the number of slaves belonging to the great landed proprietors of Rome.

The reform of the calendar, which was accomplished by Cæsar, is too famous to be altogether passed over in silence. It has been observed several times in the Reform of the calendar. course of this history, that the nominal time was about two months in advance of the real season of the year, so that what was called midsummer, was in reality the latter end of April. This confusion was mainly owing to the strange power allowed to the pontifices of intercalating or adding to the year what number of days they pleased; and this power was very capriciously exercised, as the interests of their friends might require a greater number to be added to lengthen the period of their being in office, or a less number in order to shorten the term, when the annual magistracies were held by men of the opposite party. Cæsar now employed the ablest astronomers of the age to place the computation of time on a true footing;<sup>170</sup> and two months were added to the current year, that on the ensuing first of January the real and nominal time might agree with one another. For the future,

<sup>167</sup> Suetonius, 42. Strabo, VIII. 436; XVII. 968, edit. Xyland.

<sup>169</sup> Livy, VI. 12.

<sup>168</sup> Suetonius, ubi supra.

<sup>170</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 59. Suetonius,

the year was to consist of three hundred and sixty-five days, and a single day was to be added every fourth year, according to our present practice; so that this Julian calendar has been followed ever since by the nations of Europe, with only the slight correction introduced by Pope Gregory XIII. in 1582, and adopted in Great Britain in 1752, under the denomination of the New Style.

Such were the principal public measures of Cæsar's government; but it was not by these that he provoked the conspiracy to which he fell a victim, so much as by the arrogance of his personal behaviour, and his open assumption of the state, as well as of the power, of an absolute sovereign. After his last victory over the sons of Pompey in Spain, the flattery of the senate added yet more to the extravagant honours which they had already lavished on him; and it appears that the homage thus profusely offered to him was more than he could bear, and that he fancied himself greater in proportion to the increased servility with which he was regarded. It was voted that he should be styled the "father of his country," and that the title "imperator" should be prefixed to his name;<sup>171</sup> that his person should be declared sacred; and that he should be appointed dictator for life. His statue was placed in the temple of Quirinus or Romulus,<sup>172</sup> and in the capitol, next to those of the seven traditional kings of Rome, and of L. Junius Brutus, the founder of the commonwealth. He was allowed to wear, on all public festivities, the dress used by victorious generals at their triumphs;<sup>163</sup> and at all times to have a crown of laurel on his head. The month in which he was born, and which had till then been called Quintilis, was now named Julius, or July, in honour of him. Money was stamped with his image; and a guard of senators and citizens of the equestrian order was voted for the security of his person. It was apparently soon after his return from Spain, that the whole body of the senate waited upon him to communicate to him the decrees which they had passed in his honour. He received them in state in front of the temple of Venus Genitrix which he had himself founded;<sup>174</sup> but he never rose from his seat, either when they first approached him, or when they presented to him so many tokens of their submission and devotion. This was an affront which was never forgiven; and it was particularly remarked,<sup>175</sup> that during his own triumph, a short time before, when L. Pontius Aquila, one of the tribunes, allowed his triumphal chariot to pass by the benches appropriated to himself and his colleagues, without rising from his place, Cæsar noticed it with great indig-

Additional honours  
bestowed on Cæsar,  
after his victory in  
Spain.  
U. C. 708

He gives offence by  
the arrogance of his  
behaviour.

<sup>171</sup> Livy, Epitome, CXVI. Dion Cassius, XLIII. 235, 236.

<sup>172</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XII. epist. XLV.

<sup>173</sup> Suetonius.

<sup>174</sup> Livy, Epitome, CXVI. Dion Cassius, XLIV. 244.

<sup>175</sup> Suetonius, 78.

nation, openly saying, that Aquila had better at once take from him the administration of the commonwealth; and for some days afterwards, whenever he promised any thing to any one who waited upon him, he used ironically to add, "But you must obtain the consent of Pontius Aquila!" On another occasion when, at the time of the Latin holydays,<sup>176</sup> Cæsar was riding into Rome in solemn procession, after having performed the usual sacrifices on the Alban hill, some voices amongst the multitude saluted him with the title of king, and a laurel crown, bound round with the white fillet or diadem, which was the well-known ornament of royalty, was placed upon one of his statues. Two of the tribunes, Epidius Marullus and C. Cæsetius Flavius, ordered the diadem to be taken off from the laurel wreath, and the man who had put it on the statue to be taken into custody. Upon this Cæsar upbraided them in strong language for endeavouring to excite the popular odium against him, as if he were really ambitious of the kingly title; and by an exercise of what Paterculus calls his censorian power,<sup>177</sup> he forbade them acting any more as tribunes, and expelled them from the senate, deploring at the same time, we are told, his own hard fortune in being thus obliged either to do violence to the clemency of his nature, or to suffer his dignity to be compromised. It is added, that Cæsar so deeply resented the conduct of these tribunes,<sup>178</sup> that he applied to the father of Cæsetius to renounce his son for his seditious behaviour, promising him that he would amply provide for his two other sons, if he complied with his wishes. But the old man replied, "that Cæsar should rather deprive him of all his children, than prevail on him to turn one of them out of his house as deserving to be given up by his father." Yet Cæsar was probably well aware of the odium to which he would be exposed if he were suspected of aiming at the honours of royalty; and it was to remove any such impression from the public mind, that he took occasion to answer to the acclamations of the populace, on one occasion, when they were saluting him with the title of king, "that he was Cæsar, and not a king." With the same view it is not unlikely that he had concerted beforehand the famous scene which took place on the fifteenth February, at the festival of the Lupercalia, when M. Antonius, who then held the office of consul, approached Cæsar, as he was sitting in state in the rostra above the forum, and presented to him a royal diadem. A murmur ran through the multitude,<sup>179</sup> but it was instantly changed into loud applause, when Cæsar rejected the proffered ornament, and persisted in his refusal, although Antonius threw himself at his feet, imploring him, in the name of the Roman people, to accept it. To complete the

<sup>176</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIV. 245. Suetonius, 79.

<sup>177</sup> II. 68.

<sup>178</sup> Valerius Maximus, V. 7.

<sup>179</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 34.



purpose for which this scene was in all probability acted, Antonius caused a memorandum to be entered in the calendar for the year, "That on the day of the Lupercalia, M. Antonius, the consul, had, by the command of the people, offered the dignity of king to C. Cæsar, perpetual dictator, and that Cæsar had refused to accept it." Yet the opinion was still entertained, that Cæsar coveted this unlawful and abhorred title; and as mankind are the slaves of words, the imputation of aspiring to be king was eagerly laid to his charge by his enemies, as one which would most surely provoke against him the popular hatred.

Another part of Cæsar's conduct which gave great offence, was his assuming so openly not only the patronage of the ordinary offices of the state, but the power of bestowing them in an unprecedented manner, in order to suit his own policy. At the beginning of the year 708, he had assumed the title of consul, together with his dictatorship, but he had no colleague, and the office was, in fact, merely nominal. But on his return to Rome in October,<sup>180</sup> after he had finished the campaign in Spain, wishing for an opportunity of rewarding two of his adherents, he resigned his consulship, and appointed Q. Fabius Maximus and C. Trebonius to succeed him for the remaining three months of the year. It happened that Q. Fabius died on the thirty-first of December, early in the morning;<sup>181</sup> and that no occasion of exercising his patronage might be lost, Cæsar caused the comitia to assemble about two o'clock in the afternoon, and to elect C. Caninius Rebilus for the few remaining hours of the year. The benefit of this short-lived honour appears to have been, that it conferred on the person who enjoyed it the rank of senator for life. Cæsar, in like manner, increased the number of prætors to fourteen,<sup>182</sup> that of ædiles to six, and that of quæstors to forty: he also added one new member to the college of augurs, one to that of the Pontifices, one to the Quindecimviri or keepers of the Sibylline books, and three to the *Septemviri Epulonum*, who had the care of providing the feasts of the gods on all great solemnities. He made a point of rewarding every one who had served him; and thus he did not hesitate to intrust the charge of the public mint to some of his own slaves,<sup>183</sup> and even to appoint the son of one of his freedmen to command three of his legions which he left in Egypt, after his departure from that country in the autumn of the year 706. He allowed the same spirit to interfere in the administration of justice; and we are told that one of his veterans,<sup>184</sup> who had received a grant of land, having been brought before him on a charge of violent and oppressive be-

<sup>180</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 236.

<sup>181</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, VII. epist. XXX. Plutarch, in Cæsare, 58.

<sup>182</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 237. 239, 240: XLII. 209.

<sup>183</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 76.

<sup>184</sup> Seneca, de Beneficiis, V. 24.

haviour towards his neighbours, was not only acquitted, but was presented by his judge with the very land on which he had unjustly encroached, as soon as he had reminded Cæsar of some personal services which he had rendered him during his first campaign in Spain. In fact, Cæsar openly avowed, that if ruffians and cut-throats had supported him in his quarrel, he should think himself bound fully to requite them.<sup>185</sup> Yet after all, in spite of his multiplication of offices, and the profusion with which he bestowed them, the claims of his partisans were more than he could satisfy; and many of those who had served him through all his career of wickedness, were afterwards in the number of his assassins, because they did not think themselves sufficiently rewarded.<sup>186</sup>

Cicero has left us a curious sketch of a visit which he received from Cæsar at his villa near Puteoli, in the month of December, 708.<sup>187</sup> On the twentieth of December, Cæsar arrived at the house of L. Philippus, the father-in-law of Octavius, attended by two thousand soldiers, who followed him either for the security of his person, or as a mere guard of honour. He spent the morning of the following day at the house of Philippus, but was engaged the whole time in transacting business in private with L. Balbus. About one or two o'clock he took a walk on the sea-shore; after which he went into a bath, and heard, with the utmost composure, a most virulent epigram of Catullus against him, in which he was taxed, in plain terms, with those abominable profligacies to which we have before alluded.<sup>188</sup> After this he took his place at Cicero's house, his immediate attendants forming part of the company, whilst the rest of his suite were entertained in separate apartments, according to their rank and respectability. "Cæsar seemed to enjoy himself exceedingly," says Cicero, "and was in very good spirits. The conversation did not touch at all on politics, but we talked much on literary subjects."<sup>189</sup> Yet, however agreeable he might make himself in private society, he kept up a degree of state at Rome, which rendered access to his person difficult and humiliating to those who had lived with him so long, in former times, on a footing of equality. Cicero complains of the vexations and mortifications which he was obliged to endure in obtaining an audience from him;<sup>190</sup> and he was told by C. Matius,<sup>191</sup> that once, when he had been detained for a long time, waiting till Cæsar could receive him, Cæsar had himself observed, "that he must

<sup>185</sup> Suetonius, 72.

<sup>186</sup> Seneca, de Ira, III. 30.

<sup>187</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIII. epist. LII.

<sup>188</sup> Catullus, Cann. 29 and 57.

<sup>189</sup> "Σπουδαῖον οἶδεν, ἰν' ὁμιλίᾳ  
λογα, multa."

<sup>190</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, VI. epist. XIV. "Quum omnem adeundi et conveniendi illius indignitatem et molestiam pertulissem."

<sup>191</sup> Epistol. ad Atticum, XIV. epist. I. II.

necessarily be very unpopular, when M. Cicero was thus kept in attendance, and could not see him whenever it suited him." "I know," he continued, "that no one would be more ready than himself to make allowances for me, but I am sure that he must detest me." There were, however, many incautious expressions of his own, which found their way into general circulation, and excited a much stronger feeling against him. He was accustomed to ridicule Sylla for resigning the dictatorship;<sup>192</sup> he used to say "that the commonwealth was now nothing; it was a mere name, totally devoid of any reality;" and in language yet more arrogant, he added, "that he ought now to be spoken to with more deference, and that what he said should be considered as law." Yet he would not believe that he had any thing to fear from popular resentment, insisting that his life was of the utmost importance to his country; for that his ambition was now satisfied; but that if he were to die, the republic would again be involved in civil wars more miserably than ever. Besides, his great courage rendered him insensible to danger, and impatient of precautions. In spite of the advice of his friends Hirtius and Pansa,<sup>193</sup> who advised him to guard by the sword that power which the sword had won for him, he used to say that he would rather die than make himself an object of terror to the people; and he so far confided in his popularity, or in the ascendancy which he had acquired, that he dismissed the guard of Spanish soldiers which had been in the habit of attending him. Meantime, as if his government at home were settled in full security, he formed plans of foreign conquests on the most extensive scale, which would employ him for some years at a distance from Rome. He talked of attacking the Parthians,<sup>194</sup> and of subduing those wild tribes who dwelt on the banks of the Danube, and who occasionally made inroads upon the Roman territory in Thrace; and in order to provide for the administration of affairs during his absence, he drew out a list of persons who were to hold the principal offices of state for the next two years,<sup>195</sup> still retaining to himself the title and authority of dictator. Nor, whilst projecting schemes of conquest, was he neglectful of the internal improvement of his dominions. It was mentioned, that he was intending to frame a digest of all the Roman laws;<sup>196</sup> to form public libraries, containing all the most valuable works of Greek, as well as of Roman literature; to build in the capital a temple in honour of Mars, and a theatre, both in the highest style of magnificence; to drain the Pontine

His confidence in his own security.

His plans of conquest and of internal improvement.

<sup>192</sup> Suetonius, 77. 86.

<sup>193</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 57. Suetonius, 86.

<sup>194</sup> Suetonius, 44. Dion Cassius, XLIII.

<sup>239</sup> Plutarch, 58.

<sup>195</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. VI. Dion Cassius, XLIII. 239.

<sup>196</sup> Suetonius, 44.



marshes; to make a grand line of communication across the Apennines from the Tiber to the Adriatic; to carry a canal from Rome to Tarracina, in order to facilitate the arrival of goods in the capital from Sicily and the East; to improve and enlarge the harbour of Ostia, and to dig through the isthmus of Corinth. Such are said to have been his designs; and preparations were already made for carrying the military part of them into execution. His nephew, C. Octavius,<sup>197</sup> whom he had named as his master of the horse for one of the years of his intended absence, was sent over to Apollonia, in Epirus, there to remain and to pursue his literary studies, till Cæsar should arrive in Greece to put himself at the head of his army; and a force both of infantry and cavalry had been already transported across the Ionian gulf,<sup>198</sup> and was quartered in Macedonia, waiting till the return of spring should enable them to commence their expedition against Parthia.

It was about this time reported, that L. Cotta, one of the Quindecemviri, or keepers of the Sibylline books, was intending to propose to the senate that Cæsar should be declared king,<sup>199</sup> and this step was to be urged on the authority of the Sibylline oracles, which declared that a king was necessary to the safety of Rome, in the event of a war with Parthia. Whether the rumour was true or false, it is said to have hastened the resolution of those persons who had already formed a conspiracy against Cæsar's life, and to have determined them to choose the fifteenth or ides of March, for the execution of their purpose, that being the day on which it was believed that L. Cotta would bring forward his proposal before the senate. It remains, therefore, that we give some account of the origin of this famous conspiracy, and of the principal persons who were engaged in it.

It is agreed on all sides that M. Junius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus were the chief promoters of the design. The former of these was the son of that M. Brutus who had taken part in the rebellion of M. Lepidus immediately after the death of Sylla, and who had in consequence been put to death at Mutina, by the orders of Pompey, in the year 676. The son, M. Brutus, was by his mother's side the nephew of M. Cato, and he accompanied his uncle to Cyprus in the year 695, when he was sent by P. Clodius to annex that island to the Roman empire. It appears, however, that he did not copy

<sup>197</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 239; XLV. 271. Velleius Paterculus, II. 59.

<sup>198</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, II. 110. Appian says there were sixteen legions, and ten thousand cavalry; a most ridiculous exaggeration. But Appian is the

worst authority, and that is saying not a little, of all the writers who have left us accounts of these times.

<sup>199</sup> Suetonius, 79. Cicero, de Divinatione, II. 54.

the example of Cato's integrity; for having become the creditor of the citizens of Salamis to a large amount,<sup>200</sup> he employed one M. Scaptius, a man of infamous character, to enforce the payment of his debt, together with an interest four times exceeding the rate allowed by law. And when Cicero governed the province of Cilicia, to which Cyprus seems to have been attached, Brutus wrote to him, and was supported by T. Atticus in his request, entreating him to give Scaptius a commission as an officer of the Roman government, and to allow him to employ a military force to exact from the Salaminians the usurious interest which he illegally demanded. Cicero was too upright a magistrate to comply with such requests; but they were so agreeable to the practice of the times, that he continued to live on intimate terms with the man who could prefer them; and the literary tastes of Brutus were a recommendation which he could not resist; so that he appears soon to have forgotten the affair of Scaptius, and to have spoken and thought of Brutus with great regard. They both, indeed, were of the same party in politics; and we are told that Brutus exerted himself very actively in Pompey's service in the campaign of 705 in Greece,<sup>201</sup> and being taken prisoner after the battle of Pharsalia, received his life from the conqueror. Before Cæsar set out for Africa to carry on war against Scipio and Juba, he conferred on Brutus<sup>202</sup> the government of Cisalpine Gaul;<sup>203</sup> and in that province Brutus accordingly remained, and was actually holding an office under Cæsar, while his uncle Cato was maintaining the contest in Africa, and committing suicide rather than fall alive into the hands of the enemy. His character, however, seems to have been greatly improved since his treatment of the Salaminians; for he is said to have governed Cisalpine Gaul with great integrity and humanity,<sup>204</sup> insomuch that his statue was preserved in Milan when Augustus had obtained the sovereignty of the empire; and the popularity which he obtained was reflected

<sup>200</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, V. epist. XXI.; VI. epist. I. II. III.

<sup>201</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XI. epist. IV. Dion Cassius, XLI. 184. Plutarch, in Bruto, 6.

<sup>202</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, VI. epist. VI.

<sup>203</sup> "Where," says Ferguson, "he remained, perhaps, rather under safe custody, than high in the confidence of Cæsar." Book V. 1. "He was induced," says Middleton, "by Cæsar's generosity, and his mother's prayers, to lay down his arms and return to Italy. Cæsar endeavoured to oblige him by all the honours which his power could bestow; but the indignity of receiving from a master what he ought to have received from a free people, shocked

him much more than any honours could oblige." Life of Cicero, II. 210, 8vo. edit. 1819.

Ferguson's conjecture, so far as we have been able to find, is as destitute of any authority or probability as Middleton's insertion of the words which we have printed in italics, and which endeavour to represent Brutus as sacrificing his patriotic independence to the entreaties of his mother. As to the rest of Middleton's statement, we can only wonder that a writer, in a Christian country, should think that he was panegyricizing his hero by imputing to him such a disposition.

<sup>204</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 6. Comparat. Dionis. cum Bruto, 5.

in some measure, we are told, upon the government of Cæsar, from whom he had received his appointment. In the year 708 he returned to Rome, but afterwards set out to meet Cæsar on his return from Spain, and in an interview which he had with him at Nicæa,<sup>205</sup> pleaded the cause of Deiotarus, king of Galatia, with such warmth and freedom, that Cæsar was struck by it, and was reminded of what he used frequently to say of Brutus, that what his inclinations might be, made a very great difference, but that whatever they were, they would be nothing lukewarm. It was about this time, also, that Brutus divorced his first wife, Appia, the daughter of Appius Claudius, and married the famous Porcia, his cousin, the daughter of Cato. Soon after he received another mark of Cæsar's favour,<sup>206</sup> in being appointed *Prætor Urbanus* for the year 709; and he was holding that office when he resolved to become the assassin of the man whose government he had twice acknowledged, by consenting himself to act in a public station under it. Sir Matthew Hale did well to accept the place of judge during the usurpation of Cromwell; but what should we think of him if, whilst filling that office, he had associated himself with Colonel Titus, and other such wretches, in their plans to remove the protector by assassination?

C. Cassius Longinus was remarkable, even when a boy, for C. Cassius Longinus. the pride and violence of his temper, if we may believe the anecdotes reported of him by Plutarch<sup>207</sup> and Valerius Maximus. He accompanied M. Crassus into Parthia as his quæstor, and distinguished himself, after the death of his general, by conducting the wreck of the Roman army back to Syria in safety. We have already spoken of him as being one of the tribunes at the beginning of the civil war; and have mentioned his having the command of the Syrian squadron in Pompey's fleet, and the interruption which he met with, whilst engaged successfully against the enemy, from the news of the battle of Pharsalia. He afterwards resigned the contest, and submitted himself to Cæsar in Asia Minor, when Cæsar was returning from Egypt into Italy; yet Cicero asserts,<sup>208</sup> that at that very time he had intended to assassinate the man whose clemency he was consenting to solicit, had not an accident prevented the accomplishment of his purpose. He was not only spared by Cæsar, but was appointed by him one of his lieutenants;<sup>209</sup> a favour bestowed by magistrates on their friends, in order to invest them with a public character, and thus enable them to reside or to travel in the provinces with greater comfort and dignity. Even during the last campaign of Cæsar in Spain, Cassius wrote to Cicero, saying that he was anxious

<sup>205</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. I.

<sup>206</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 7. Dion Cassius, XLIV. 246.

<sup>207</sup> In Bruto, 9. Valerius Maximus,

III. 1.

<sup>208</sup> Philippic. II. 11.

<sup>209</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, VI. epist. VI.



that Cæsar should be victorious,<sup>210</sup> for that he preferred an old and merciful master to a new and cruel one. He also, together with Brutus, was appointed one of the prætors for the year 709,<sup>211</sup> at a moment in which he was entirely discontented with Cæsar's government, and is said to have been the person by whose intrigues the first elements of the conspiracy were formed.

Next to M. Brutus and C. Cassius, may be ranked Decimus Brutus and C. Trebonius. These had both served Cæsar in the civil war, and had commanded the land and sea forces employed by him in the siege of Massilia. Since that time Trebonius had been appointed proconsul of the Further Spain, and more recently, as we have seen, had enjoyed the title of consul during the last three months of the year 708. Decimus Brutus was chosen to succeed to the consulship in the year 711,<sup>212</sup> and to the command of the province of Cisalpine Gaul immediately; he was also named by Cæsar in his will, amongst those persons who were to inherit his fortune, in case of the failure of his direct heirs. Another of the conspirators was L. Tillius Cimber, a man notorious for his drunkenness and low violence,<sup>213</sup> who had been throughout the civil war a vehement partisan of Cæsar, and had received from him lately the appointment to the province of Bithynia.<sup>214</sup> Ser. Sulpicius Galba, the great grandfather of the emperor of that name, had also served under Cæsar in Gaul, and probably, in the civil war; but he was now offended, because Cæsar had not given him the honour of the consulship.<sup>215</sup> L. Minucius Basilus is also mentioned as having had a command in Cæsar's army in Gaul,<sup>216</sup> and as now being one of the conspirators against him; while P. Servilius Casca, Cn. Domitius Ænobarbus, L. Pontius Aquila, and Q. Ligarius, had been attached to the party of Pompey, although they had since submitted, and received the conqueror's pardon. Ligarius, in particular, had been suffered to return to Italy in consequence of the earnest solicitations of his friends, amongst whom Cicero had appealed most strongly to Cæsar's clemency,<sup>217</sup> and had gone so far as to represent Ligarius penitent for his fault, taking refuge in Cæsar's mercy, and imploring pardon for his past conduct. Cn. Domitius<sup>218</sup> was the son of that L. Domitius, who had been the

Decimus Brutus and  
C. Trebonius.

L. Tillius Cimber.

Ser. Galba.

L. Minucius Basilus.

Q. Ligarius.

Cn. Domitius  
Ænobarbus.

<sup>210</sup> Ad Familiares, XV. epist. XIX.

<sup>211</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 7. Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. II. III.

<sup>212</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 58. 60. Suetonius, in Cæsare, 83.

<sup>213</sup> Seneca, epist. LXXXIII. De Irâ, III. 30.

<sup>214</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, III. 2. Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. XIII.

<sup>215</sup> Suetonius, in Galbâ, 3.

<sup>216</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Gallico, VI. 29. He had afterwards fought in Spain under Cneius Pompeius in 708, and had then submitted to Cæsar, promising to be faithful to him hereafter, as he had been to Pompeius. Auctor de Bell. Hispan. 19.

<sup>217</sup> Cicero, pro Ligario, 10.

<sup>218</sup> His name is mentioned amongst the

unsuccessful candidate for the consulship, in opposition to Pompey and Crassus, in the year 698, who had been appointed as Cæsar's successor in Gaul at the beginning of the civil war, who had been taken prisoner at Corfinium, and had afterwards been killed at Pharsalia. His son was also the nephew of Cato, whose sister L. Domitius had married; so that this young man was likely to inherit a violent hatred against Cæsar; nor does it appear that he had ever imitated the conduct of Brutus in accepting places of confidence and honour from the conqueror.

The motives by which the conspirators were actuated, which, perhaps, they themselves could not have analyzed exactly, have been variously guessed by historians, according to their own prevailing opinions. Personal and party feelings may be confounded unconsciously with patriotism, even by the very man who is influenced by them; nor would it be reasonable to deny that many of Cæsar's murderers had persuaded themselves that the interests of their country were promoted by their act. But if we could inquire by what process they had acquired this persuasion, and with how much self-deception it was accompanied, we should, it is probable, find that their motives were widely distinct from that purity, and singleness, and sincerity of purpose which are essential to real goodness. At any rate, it is clear that they who had served Cæsar in the civil war, and had shared in the honours and advantages of his victory, could with no shadow of justice become his murderers. Their patriotism ought to have been shown when Cæsar first commenced his rebellion; and had they then followed the example of Labienus, and forsaken their general when he began to be guilty of treason against his country, their motives might have been unquestioned, and their conduct would have been really just and honourable. Nor can even Brutus and Cassius be excused for accepting honours and offices from a government which they must have considered as unlawful and tyrannical. If Cæsar's power were required by the circumstances of the commonwealth, to destroy him was mischievous; if it were an evil which was only to be endured so long as it was inevitable, to countenance it by acting under it in a public station, was an abandonment of their duty to their country. But above all, the act of assassination is in itself so hateful, and involves in it so much dissimulation and treachery, that whatever allowance may be made for the perpetrators, when we consider the moral ignorance of the times in which they lived, their conduct must never be

assassins of Cæsar by Cicero, *Philippic. II.* 11; but Suetonius (in *Nerone*, 3,) says that he was accused, without foundation, of having had a share in the deed. Was he among those patrician youths who joined the conspirators immediately after the murder, wishing to appear concerned

in it, and did Cicero favour from policy this false pretension? or were Domitius himself and his posterity anxious in after-times to deny the fact, when he was receiving the favours of Augustus, or when one of them, Nero, ascended the imperial throne?

spoken of without condemnation. And it is satisfactory to find that crimes of this nature have generally been as fruitless as they deserved to be. Harmodius and Aristogiton, by murdering Hipparchus, only subjected Athens to a heavier tyranny; and the assassination of Cæsar furnished something of a pretence to his surviving followers, to involve the most eminent friends of the commonwealth in one unsparing destruction.

The whole number of the conspirators is said to have exceeded sixty; and their intention was at first to have effected their purpose either in the street in which Cæsar lived, or in the Campus Martius, when he was presiding at the elections of magistrates; but when they heard that the senate was summoned to meet on the fifteenth of March, and it was rumoured that the proposal of bestowing on Cæsar the title of king was then to be brought forward, they fixed upon that day, and on that meeting of the senate, as the time and place best suited for their attempt.

On the evening of the fourteenth of March, Cæsar was supping with M. Lepidus, his master of the horse, who was now at the head of a body of troops without the walls,<sup>219</sup> and was preparing shortly to march with them into Transalpine Gaul, which had been assigned to him by Cæsar as his province. It happened that Cæsar was engaged in writing, when the rest of the party began to discuss the question, "What kind of death is most to be desired?" The subject on which they were talking caught his attention, and he cried out, before any one else had expressed an opinion, "That the best death was a sudden one." A coincidence so remarkable was likely to be remembered afterwards by all who had been present; but it is said, also, that he had been often warned by the augurs to beware of the Ides of March;<sup>220</sup> and these predictions had, probably, wrought on the mind of his wife, Calpurnia, so that, on the night that preceded that dreaded day, her rest was broken by feverish dreams, and in the morning her impression of fear was so strong, that she earnestly besought her husband not to stir from home. He himself, we are told, felt himself a little unwell;<sup>221</sup> and being thus more ready to be infected by superstitious fears, he was inclined to comply with Calpurnia's wishes, and allowed some part of the morning to pass away, and the senate to be already assembled, without having as yet quitted his house. At such a moment the conspirators were alive to every suspicion; and becoming uneasy at his delay, Decimus Brutus was sent to call on him,<sup>222</sup> and to persuade him to attend the senate, by urging to him the offence that he would naturally give, if he appeared to slight that body at the very moment when they were preparing to confer on

<sup>219</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIII. 240; XLIV.

<sup>249</sup>. Plutarch, in Cæsare, 63. Suetonius, 87.

<sup>220</sup> Plutarch, 63. Suetonius, 81.

<sup>221</sup> Suetonius, 81.

<sup>222</sup> Suetonius, 81. Plutarch, 64.

Events which happened previous to Cæsar's murder.



him the title of king. Decimus Brutus visited Cæsar, and being entirely in his confidence, his arguments were listened to, and Cæsar set out about eleven o'clock to go to the senate-house.

When he was on his way thither, Artemidorus of Cnidus, a Greek sophist, who was admitted into the houses of some of the conspirators, and had there become acquainted with some facts that had excited his suspicions, approached him with a written statement of the information which he had obtained, and putting it into his hands, begged him to read it instantly, as it was of the last importance. Cæsar, it is said, tried to look at it, but he was prevented by the crowd which pressed around him, and by the numerous writings of various sorts that were presented to him as he passed along. Still, however, he held it in his hand, and continued to keep it there when he entered the senate-house.

M. Antonius, who was at this time Cæsar's colleague in the consulship, was on the point of following him into the senate, when C. Trebonius called him aside,<sup>223</sup> and detained him without, by professing to desire some conversation with him. It is said that some of the conspirators had wished to include him in the fate of Cæsar; but Brutus had objected to it as a piece of unnecessary bloodshed; and when it was remembered that he himself, not long ago, had proposed to Trebonius the very act which they were now about to perform, they consented that his life should not be endangered. Meantime, as Cæsar entered the senate-house, all the senators rose to receive him. The conspirators had contrived to surround his person in the street, and they now formed his immediate train as he passed on to the curule chair, which had been prepared, as usual for his reception. That chair had been placed near the pedestal of a statue of Pompey the Great; for the building in which the senate was assembled had been one of Pompey's public works;<sup>224</sup> and it is said that Cassius,<sup>225</sup> labouring under the strong feeling of the moment, turned himself to the image, and seemed to implore its assistance in the deed which was to be perpetrated.

When Cæsar had taken his seat, the conspirators gathered more closely around him, and L. Tillius Cimber approached him as if to offer some petition,<sup>226</sup> which he continued to press with vehemence when Cæsar seemed unwilling to grant it, and the other conspirators joined in supporting his request. At last, when Cæsar appeared impatient of further importunity, Cimber took hold of his robe and pulled it down from his shoulders; an action which was the signal agreed upon with his associates for commencing their attack. It is said that the

Assassination of Cæsar, March 15th, U.C. 709, A. C. 44 or 45.

<sup>223</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 14. Velleius Paterculus, II. 58.

<sup>224</sup> "Curia Pompeia." Cicero, de Divinatione, II. 9.

<sup>225</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare, 66.

<sup>226</sup> Suetonius, 82. Plutarch, 66.

dagger of P. Casca took the lead in the work of blood, and that Cæsar, in the first instance of surprise, attempted to resist and to force his way through the circle which surrounded him. But when all the conspirators rushed upon him, and were so eager to have a share in his death, that they wounded one another in the confusion, he drew his robe closely round him, and having covered his face, fell without a struggle or a groan. He received three and twenty wounds, and it was observed that the blood, as it streamed from them, bathed the pedestal of Pompey's statue. No sooner was the murder finished, than M. Brutus,<sup>227</sup> raising his gory dagger in his hand, turned round towards the assembled senators, and called on Cicero by name, congratulating him on the recovery of their country's liberty. But to preserve order at such a moment was hopeless: the senators fled in dismay; Antonius made haste to escape to his house; and a universal consternation was spread through the city; till the conspirators, going in a body to the forum, addressed the people, and by assuring them that no violence was intended to any one, but that their only object had been to assert the liberty of Rome, they succeeded in restoring comparative tranquillity. Still, however, distrusting the state of the popular feeling, they withdrew into the capitol, which Decimus Brutus had secured with a band of gladiators whom he retained in his service; and there, having been joined by several of the nobility, they passed the first night after the murder. Meanwhile, the body of Cæsar was left for some hours, amidst the general confusion, on the spot where it fell;<sup>228</sup> till at last three of his slaves placed it on a litter, and carried it home, one of the arms hanging down on the outside of the litter, and presenting a ghastly spectacle. It was asserted by the surgeon, who examined the wounds, that out of so many, one alone was mortal; that, namely, which he had received in the breast when he first attempted to break through the circle of his assassins.

Cæsar is said to have been in his stature tall,<sup>229</sup> and of a fair complexion, but with black and lively eyes. In attention to his person and dress he almost exceeded the bounds of mere neatness; and in gratifying his tastes for villas, furniture, pictures, statues, and in the choice of his slaves, he was accustomed to spare no expense or trouble. He was temperate in his eating and drinking, as became a soldier; and his activity of body corresponded with the extraordinary vigour of his mind. It is a remarkable feature in his character, that he seems to have been alive to so many and such various enjoyments; excessively addicted to gross sensualities, a lover of every kind of intellectual gratification, from the humblest of the fine arts to the highest and

Character of Cæsar.

<sup>227</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 12. 35. Dion Cassius, XLIV. 249, 250.

<sup>228</sup> Suetonius, 82.

<sup>229</sup> Suetonius, 45, 46, 47.

deepest parts of philosophy, enamoured at the same time of popular honours, and, above all things, ambitious of political greatness. He is said to have composed two books,<sup>230</sup> "On the Method of speaking Latin with the greatest Propriety," while he was crossing the Alps on his return from his winter quarters in the north of Italy to rejoin his army in Gaul; and on another occasion he wrote a poem entitled "The Journey," while he was travelling into Spain with the utmost rapidity to oppose the progress of the sons of Pompey in the year 708. His "Commentaries," which alone, of all his writings, have reached posterity, are admirably calculated to answer the purpose for which they were designed, the impressing his readers with the most favourable notions of himself. Although the representations which they contain are a continued picture of his abilities and successes, yet, because they are given in a quiet and unpretending style, they have gained credit for truth and impartiality; and critics, in their simplicity, have extolled the modesty of the author, because he speaks of himself in the third person. As a general, it is needless to pronounce his eulogy; we may observe, however, that the quality which most contributed to his success on several occasions was his great activity; and although this may seem a virtue no way peculiar to men of superior minds, yet in the practical business of life there is none which produces more important results. Nor is it, in fact, an ordinary quality when exhibited in persons invested with extensive power; for then it implies quickness and decision in difficulties, than which nothing confers on one man a more commanding superiority over others. In his political career Cæsar was at once patient and daring; and the uniform success of all his schemes through so many years, must prove his judgment in the choice of means to accomplish his purposes. One weakness he seems to have possessed, and that was vanity; which he indulged unseasonably and fatally in receiving so greedily the honours which were at last heaped upon him, and in disgusting the public feeling by expressing, with so little reserve, his sense of his own superiority. The submissions which he met with were indeed enough to excite his arrogance; for not the most servile flattery of our own clergy and lawyers to the Tudor and Stuart princes can equal the meanness and extravagance of the language addressed to Cæsar by the republican Romans. In fact, we see from different parts of Cicero's works, and particularly from many of the letters inserted in the collection of his correspondence, that the expressions used by inferiors towards their superiors in rank, seem to imply very little independence of feeling in the bulk of the Roman people: and the excessive compliments which Cicero delighted to receive, and which he paid with equal liberality, betray a littleness

<sup>230</sup> Cicero, de claris Oratoribus, 72. Suetonius, 56.



and indelicacy of mind which we should not have expected to meet with in men of high birth and station, the citizens of a free commonwealth.

If from the intellectual we turn to the moral character of Cæsar, the whole range of history can hardly furnish a picture of greater deformity. Never did any man occasion so large an amount of human misery, with so little provocation. In his campaigns in Gaul, he is said to have destroyed 1,000,000 of men in battle,<sup>231</sup> and to have made prisoners 1,000,000 more, many of whom were destined to perish as gladiators, and all were torn from their country and reduced to slavery. The slaughter which he occasioned in the civil wars cannot be computed; nor can we estimate the degree of suffering caused in every part of the empire by his spoliations and confiscations, and by the various acts of extortion and oppression which he tolerated in his followers. When we consider that the sole object of his conquests in Gaul was to enrich himself and to discipline his army, that he might be enabled the better to attack his country; and that the sole provocation on which he commenced the civil war, was the resolution of the senate to recall him from a command which he had already enjoyed for nine years, after having obtained it in the beginning by tumult and violence; we may judge what credit ought to be given him for his clemency in not opening lists of proscription after his sword had already cut off his principal adversaries, and had levelled their party with the dust. Yet after all his crimes, the circumstances of his death render him almost an object of compassion; and though it cannot be said of his assassins, that

“ Their greater crime made his like specks appear,  
From which the sun in glory is not clear;”

yet we naturally sympathize with the victim, when the murderers, by having abetted or countenanced his offences, had deprived themselves of all just title to punish them, and when his fall was only accomplished by the treachery of assassination.

<sup>231</sup> Plutarch, in Cæsare. 15. Pliny has estimated the sum with greater minuteness, probably from the returns exhibited at Cæsar's triumphs of the number of enemies whom he had destroyed. He makes

the persons whom Cæsar had killed in war to amount altogether to 1,192,000, exclusive of those who had perished in the civil war, and of whom no account was taken. Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* VII. 25.

## CHAPTER X.

CAIUS OCTAVIUS CÆSAR AUGUSTUS.—A VIEW OF THE HISTORY  
OF ROME.—FROM U.C. 709 TO U.C. 722, A.C. 45 TO A.C. 32.

WE have already spoken slightly of the family of Augustus Cæsar, and have mentioned his relationship to C. Julius Cæsar, as being the grandson of his sister Julia. Julia married M. Attius Balbus, a native of Aricia,<sup>1</sup> who rose to the rank of prætor at Rome; and Attia, their daughter, married C. Octavius, a man of respectable family, who also obtained the same dignity, and died when he was on the point of offering himself as a candidate for the consulship. He left behind him one son, C. Octavius, who was born at Rome on the twenty-third of September, u.c. 690, in the consulship of M. Cicero and C. Antonius. The young Octavius lost his father when he was only four years old, and his mother soon after married L. Philippus, under whose care he was brought up, till his great uncle, Julius Cæsar, having no children, began to regard him as his heir,<sup>2</sup> and when he was between sixteen and seventeen years of age, bestowed on him some military rewards at the celebration of his triumph for his victories in Africa.<sup>3</sup> In the following year he accompanied his uncle into Spain, where he is said to have given signs of talents and of activity; and in the winter of that same year he was sent, as we have seen, to Apollonia in Epirus, there to employ himself in completing his education till Cæsar should be ready to take him with him on his expedition against the Parthians. He was accordingly living quietly at Apollonia when the news of his uncle's death called him forward, when hardly more than eighteen years of age, to act a principal part in the contentions of the times.

On the morning of the sixteenth of March, Brutus and Cassius, with their associates, were still in the capitol, and Cicero and several other persons attached to the aristocratical party<sup>4</sup> had joined them there. Antonius finding himself exposed to no danger, appeared again in public, as consul;

<sup>1</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Suetonius, 8.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 35.

State of affairs in  
Rome after Cæsar's  
death.

and Dolabella,<sup>5</sup> who had been appointed by Cæsar to succeed him in the consulship, as soon as he should commence his expedition against the Parthians, now at once assumed the ensigns of that dignity; although with strange inconsistency he went up into the capitol to visit the conspirators, and if Appian may be believed,<sup>6</sup> strongly inveighed against the late dictator in a speech addressed to the multitude in the forum. M. Lepidus, who, as we have seen, was at this time invested with a military command, having been lately appointed to the government of the Nearer Spain, had some intentions, it is said, of availing himself of his actual power to establish himself in the place of Cæsar;<sup>7</sup> but Antonius, who had no wish to see his own views thus anticipated, easily prevailed upon him to lay aside such designs for the present; representing to him, we may suppose, the danger of such an attempt, and encouraging him with the prospect of obtaining hereafter all that he desired, if he would consent to temporize at the moment. But the real obstacle to the restoration of the commonwealth, consisted in the numbers and dispositions of Cæsar's veteran soldiers, many of whom were waiting in Rome to receive their promised allotments of land; and others had come up from their new settlements to compliment their old general, by attending in his train when he should march out of the city to commence his eastern expedition.<sup>8</sup> These then naturally resented the death of their benefactor, and feared at the same time lest they should be deprived of their grants of land if he were declared a tyrant, and his acts should be reversed. They were therefore a great encouragement to Antonius and Lepidus, and gave such alarm to the conspirators, that they remained in the capitol, still trusting to the gladiators of Decimus Brutus for protection, and not venturing to expose their persons in the streets or in the forum. Nor were the veterans the only set of men who were interested in upholding the legality of Cæsar's government. He had nominated, as we have seen, the principal magistrates of the commonwealth for the next two years, under pretence of preventing any disorders during his absence in Asia; and the individuals who, by virtue of these appointments, were either in the actual enjoyment or in the expectation of offices either honourable or lucrative, were little disposed to submit their pretensions to the chance of being confirmed or rejected by the free votes of the Roman people. Besides, the late civil war had so extended over every part of the empire, and every province contained so many persons who had risen to affluence or distinction in consequence of the offices or of the grants of forfeited estates conferred on them by Cæsar, that to repel all his measures,

Disposition of the  
veterans.

<sup>5</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIV. 250.

<sup>6</sup> De Bello Civili, II. 122.

<sup>7</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIV. 257.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, II. 119.



and to brand his government as an usurpation, would have at once unsettled the whole existing order of society. The foreigners who had been admitted to the rights of Roman citizens, and the many individuals who, in the course of the late commotions, had risen from humble stations to greatness, would have ill brooked the return of that exclusive and insulting system which was upheld by the friends of the old aristocracy.

Under these circumstances, the act of the assassins of Cæsar was likely to have no other effect than to expose their country to a fresh series of miseries, from which it would have no better prospect of relief, than a return at last to that very military despotism which they had so rashly attempted to overthrow. Cicero indeed had advised the only measure which could have given the conspirators any chance of maintaining their ground in Rome;<sup>9</sup> for he had urged Brutus and Cassius to summon the senate, by their authority as prætors, to assemble in the capitol immediately after Cæsar's death, before Antonius had recovered from his panic, or the veterans had had time to calculate their own strength or to look out for a new leader. But this counsel was not followed; and it was left for Antonius, in his character of consul, to call the senate together at the temple of the Earth on the seventeenth of March,<sup>10</sup> when the doors of the assembly were beset by Cæsar's veterans in arms, and when they who hoped that they had restored the old constitution of the commonwealth dared not even to leave the shelter of the capitol. Nor was it a slight circumstance, that Calpurnia, Cæsar's widow, had put into Antonius's hands the money and all the papers of her late husband;<sup>11</sup> a trust from which he intended to derive the most important benefits.

In the meeting of the senate on the seventeenth of March, the reviving strength of Cæsar's party was already distinctly marked. Instead of declaring him a tyrant, it was ordered that the late dictator should be honoured with the usual funeral rites paid to distinguished persons,<sup>12</sup> and that Antonius should deliver to the multitude an oration in his praise. All his acts were confirmed; his appointments of public officers for the next two years were pronounced valid; and all the grants of lands made to the veterans were to be preserved inviolable. In return for these concessions, the partisans of Cæsar acceded to Cicero's proposal,<sup>13</sup> that the whole transaction of the ides of March should be consigned to oblivion, and that all hostile designs should be relinquished on all sides. Antonius in particular expressed himself warmly in favour of a general and lasting peace; and this being the prevailing feeling of the assembly, the act of ob-

Meeting of the senate  
on the 17th of March.

<sup>9</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. X.

<sup>12</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. VI.

<sup>10</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. XIV.; IX. X. Philippic, I. 1. 7.

and Philippic, II. 35.

<sup>13</sup> Cicero, Philippic. I. 1. 13; II. 36.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, II. 125.

livion was passed: Antonius sent his son to the capitol as a hostage for his sincerity. The principal conspirators then descended from it; and we are told that Brutus that same evening supped with Lepidus, and Cassius with Antonius.<sup>14</sup>

A general act of amnesty passes.

After this apparent termination of all dissensions, the conduct of Antonius was exceedingly artful. He frequently invited the most distinguished members of the senate to his house, and consulted them as to the measures which it would be expedient to pursue. On the other hand, by coming forward to deliver Cæsar's funeral oration, he gave the veterans reason to understand that he was really attached to their late commander, and would not fail, when an opportunity should offer, to act upon his real sentiments. In the meantime Cæsar's will was opened and read; and it appeared that C. Octavius was

Cæsar's will opened.

named the heir to the greatest part of the property,<sup>15</sup> and that he was adopted into the name and family of Cæsar. Several of the conspirators had been appointed guardians to Cæsar's son, if ever he should have one; and Decimus Brutus, as has been said before, was mentioned amongst those who were to inherit his fortune, in case of the failure of his regular heirs. To the Roman people Cæsar bequeathed his gardens on the right bank of the Tiber; and to each citizen a sum of money amounting to about 2*l.* 8*s.* His funeral was prepared in a style of great

Cæsar's funeral.

magnificence;<sup>16</sup> the pile on which the body was to be consumed had been raised in the Campus Martius; and a small model of the temple of Venus Genitrix, which he had built and dedicated, was placed in front of the rostra in order to receive the bier, whilst the funeral oration was delivered. The bier was made of ivory, and covered with scarlet and gold, and at the head of it was displayed on a pole the very dress in which he had been assassinated. In the dramatic entertainments which were exhibited as a part of the solemnity, passages were selected from the plays of Pacuvius and Attius, which the audience might readily apply to the circumstances of Cæsar's fate; particularly one line from Pacuvius,

" Was I so merciful,  
But to provide assassins for myself?"

When then Antonius came forward in the rostra to speak the funeral oration, he ordered the crier to read aloud to the multitude all the decrees of the senate, by which Cæsar had been invested with so many and such extraordinary honours, and the oath which all the senators had taken to defend his person; after

<sup>14</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIV. 257. Plutarch, in Bruto, 19.

<sup>15</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 83.

<sup>16</sup> Suetonius, in Cæsare, 84.

which he added only a few words of his own.<sup>17</sup> But his purpose was sufficiently answered, and enough had been done to excite the feelings of the multitude, disposed as they were of themselves to remember Cæsar's brilliant achievements with admiration, and his liberalities with gratitude and regret. Instead of carrying the body to the Campus Martius, some proposed to burn it in the temple of Jupiter in the capitol, and others in the senate-house of Pompey, which had been the scene of his murder. But on a sudden, two of the veteran soldiers who attended the funeral, stepped forward armed with their swords, and each holding two javelins

His body burned in the forum.

in his hand, and set fire to the bier with lighted torches in the place where it was standing in the front of the rostra. The flames were fed by the zeal of the surrounding crowd with a quantity of dry brush-wood, and with the benches and seats which were usually left in the forum: those who had brought offerings of various kinds to present them at the funeral pile, now threw them in to increase the conflagration; the musicians and actors in the funeral games stripped off their dresses, and cast them also into the fire; several matrons added their own ornaments, and those of their children, while the veteran soldiers crowned the whole with the offering of their own arms. Groups of foreigners of various nations were seen expressing their grief according to the fashion of their several countries; and amongst these the Jews were particularly remarkable; their hatred to Pompey for his violation of the sanctity of their temple having, perhaps, disposed them to support the cause of his adver-

Riots of the populace on that occasion.

sary. When the populace were satiated with feeding the fire, they dispersed in all directions, bent upon violence and bloodshed. They attacked the houses of those persons who were known to be adverse to Cæsar;<sup>18</sup> and especially those of the chief conspirators, Brutus and Cassius, whence they were driven off by force of arms, as in the old disorders and contests between Clodius and Milo. In the midst of their fury, they fell in with a man by name Helvius Cinna; and mistaking him for Cornelius Cinna, who had given great offence by a speech delivered the day before, full of invective against Cæsar, they instantly murdered him, and carried his head about with them on the head of a pike. This display of the temper of the populace served the purposes of Antonius by intimidating the conspirators; but as he designed to establish his power on a surer basis than the support of a riotous rabble, he appeared to give no countenance to their excesses. A mixed multitude, consisting of slaves,

<sup>17</sup> *Perpauca a se verba addidit.*—Suetonius, in Cæsare, 84. Dion Cassius makes him deliver a speech on this occasion which occupies nearly nine folio pages.—He had just before filled six pages with a

speech which he ascribes to Cicero, and which is about as genuine as the pretended funeral oration of Antonius.

<sup>18</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 36. Suetonius, in Cæsare, 85.



and foreigners, and citizens of the lowest class, erected a marble pillar,<sup>19</sup> twenty feet high, in the forum, with an inscription declaring it to be dedicated to Cæsar, under the title of "Father of his country." Close by this pillar there was an altar raised, on which sacrifices continued for some time to be offered to Cæsar as a god; and parties at variance with one another would come to this spot, and decide their quarrels by an oath in Cæsar's name. The groups that used to assemble round this column menaced the capital daily with scenes of outrage similar to those which had been exhibited at Cæsar's funeral; till P. Dolabella proceeded to disperse them, and with the usual summary severity of a Roman magistrate, crucified a number of the slaves, and threw down from the Tarpeian rock those free citizens who were most forward in exciting these disturbances.<sup>20</sup> It is said that when Dolabella returned to his house after these executions, he was followed by a crowd of all ranks of persons, testifying their admiration of his conduct; that he received similar applauses shortly afterwards in the theatre; and that Cicero was warmly complimented by his friends on this earnest of patriotic intentions which his son-in-law had afforded.

Dolabella disperses the rioters.

Antonius had also an opportunity about the same time of gaining the good opinion of the higher classes of citizens by acting in a similar manner. There was a man of very low origin, of the name of C.

Story of C. Amatius, the pretended grandson of Marius.

Amatius, who some months before, in the lifetime of Cæsar, had claimed to be the grandson of the famous Marius, and had applied to Cicero as a relation and townsman of Marius,<sup>21</sup> to support him in making good his pretensions. Cicero was not disposed to commit himself by maintaining such a cause; but the name of Marius was popular amongst a large proportion of the common people; and we are told that almost all the companies of the different trades in Rome,<sup>22</sup> together with some of the newly founded colonies of the veterans, and even some considerable free towns of Italy, believed the story of Amatius, and chose him to be their patron. He was followed also by a considerable multitude when he appeared in the streets; till Cæsar, impatient of such a rival in popularity, issued a decree to banish him from Italy. But after the ides of March, he returned again to Rome, and professed, as the descendant of Marius, to feel particular regret for the murder of his relation, Cæsar; insomuch, that he continually instigated the populace to take vengeance on the conspirators, and under this pretence had formed a design, as we are told,<sup>23</sup> to mas-

<sup>19</sup> Suetonius, 85. Cicero, Philippic. I. 2.

<sup>20</sup> Cicero, Philippic. I. 2. 12; ad Atticum, XIV. epist. XVI.; ad Familiares, IX. epist. XIV.

<sup>21</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XII. epist. XLIX. Livy, Epitome, CXVI.

<sup>22</sup> Valerius Maximus, IX. 15.

<sup>23</sup> Cicero, Philippic. I. 2. Valerius Max-

sacre the principal senators of the aristocratical party, and to rule in Rome as L. Saturninus and P. Sulpicius had done in former times. But the days were past in which ambition could hope to rise by the mere support of the turbulent rabble of the capital. Antonius, glad, perhaps, to please and to blind his opponents so cheaply, employed a military force against Amatius, and having arrested him, ordered him to be put to death in prison, in pursuance of a decree of the senate, and caused his body to be dragged by a hook through the streets, and to be thrown into the Tiber. This execution took place about the middle of April;<sup>24</sup> and up to this period, Antonius had appeared desirous in several instances to maintain the old constitution of the commonwealth. To lessen the dissatisfaction that might be felt by many at the confirmation of all the acts of Cæsar,<sup>25</sup> he assured the senate that Cæsar's papers contained no grants of privileges or peculiar exemptions of any sort, and that they directed the recall of only one exile, Sex. Clodius; he agreed, moreover, to the motion of Ser. Sulpicius, that none of Cæsar's decrees or grants should be published, which had not already been announced by public advertisement before the ides of March. Above all, he proposed that the office of dictator should be for ever abolished; a proposal which was most joyfully acceded to by the senate, and for which they bestowed on him their thanks in the warmest terms. His treatment of C. Amatius, combining with his behaviour in all these instances, is said to have given satisfaction even to Brutus himself;<sup>26</sup> and seemed to afford so fair a prospect of future tranquillity, that Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, expresses his belief that Brutus might now go in safety through the forum, with a cover of gold upon his head.<sup>27</sup>

But these hopes were chequered by fears even from the beginning, and it was not long before they were destroyed altogether. The tumults in the city, and the threatening language held by Cæsar's veterans, who were now assembled at Rome in great numbers, rendered the situation of the conspirators so unsafe, or at least so uncomfortable, that they judged it expedient to withdraw for the present out of the reach of danger. At first they had remained in their own houses at Rome, and had only avoided appearing in public;<sup>28</sup> but when the disorders continued, they thought it best to remove to a greater distance; and, accordingly, Brutus, apparently accompanied by

The office of dictator is abolished by Antonius.

The conspirators retire from Rome.

imus, ubi supra. Appian, de Bello Civili, III. 2, 3.

<sup>24</sup> Conf. Ciceron. ad Atticum, XIV. epist. VII. VIII.

<sup>25</sup> Conf. Ciceron. Philippic. I. 1.

<sup>26</sup> Conf. Ciceron. ad Atticum, XIV. epist. VIII.

<sup>27</sup> Conf. Ciceron. ad Atticum, XIV. epist. XVI.

<sup>28</sup> Conf. Ciceron. ad Atticum, XIV. epist. V.

Cassius, retired to his own villa at Lanuvium;<sup>29</sup> Trebonius set out in the most private manner to go to his province of Asia; and Decimus Brutus hastened to Cisalpine Gaul,<sup>30</sup> to secure the command of that province, which Cæsar, as has been already noticed, had conferred on him before his death. This appears to have been a sudden resolution; for there is extant a letter from Decimus Brutus, to M. Brutus and Cassius,<sup>31</sup> dated in the month of April, in which he speaks in a very desponding manner of the state of his party, and says that they have no other resource but to withdraw into a voluntary exile; that they can do nothing at present, as they have no military force to support them; nor was there any quarter to which they could look for aid, except to the camp of Sex. Pompeius, in Spain, and Q. Cæcilius Bassus, in Syria. Yet on the twenty-sixth of April, Cicero had received intelligence from Atticus, that Decimus Brutus had already joined his legions in Cisalpine Gaul; and in that province he remained during the whole summer, endeavouring to strengthen himself to the utmost against any attempts of his adversaries. In order to acquire some reputation for himself, and to obtain the means of attaching his soldiers to him by his liberality, he employed his time in attacking some of the Gaulish tribes who inhabited the Alps;<sup>32</sup> and having taken many of their strongholds, and wasted their country, he received from his army the title of imperator, and was enabled, as he hoped, to gratify it with a large share of plunder.

Decimus Brutus takes possession of Cisalpine Gaul.

Soon after the departure of the conspirators from Rome, Antonius proceeded to show the use which he intended to make of the confirmation of Cæsar's acts by the senate. In spite of the restriction to which he had himself assented, that no new grant should be published after the ides of March, Antonius is accused of having commenced a system of audacious forgeries,<sup>33</sup> affixing notices in the forum of all sorts of donations and immunities, both to states and private individuals, which he pretended to have discovered amongst Cæsar's papers, but which he is charged with having invented at his own discretion, and sold as an unfailing source of revenue to himself. Besides all this, he is taxed with having appropriated an immense treasure which Cæsar had acquired by his confiscations and plunderings, and had deposited in the temple of Ops. With this money, Antonius is said to have discharged the debts of his colleague, Dolabella, and to have thus secured him to his own interests; at the same time he found his power of selling forged

Antonius forges grants in Cæsar's name, and sells them for his own benefit.

<sup>29</sup> Conf. Ciceron. ad Atticum, epist. VII. X.

<sup>30</sup> Conf. Ciceron. ad Atticum, epist. XIII.

<sup>31</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. I.

<sup>32</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. IV.

<sup>33</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 60. Cicero, Philippic. II. 37, 38; Philippic. V. 4; ad Atticum, XIV. epist. XII. XVIII.



grants so profitable to himself, that, if we may believe Cicero, he paid all his own debts, to the amount of above 300,000*l.*, in the short interval that elapsed between the ides of March and the first of April.

In order to obviate effectually all opposition to his views, he made a progress through several parts of Italy in the months of April and May,<sup>34</sup> in which he took occasion to address himself to Cæsar's veterans in their different settlements, and to conjure them to bind themselves by oath, to maintain all Cæsar's acts, and to procure the appointment of two commissioners to inspect his papers every month, in order to decide whether all their provisions were duly carried into effect. He also spread a report, that the veterans would be most nearly concerned in the discussion which was to take place in the senate on the first of June;<sup>35</sup> and this rumour induced them, as he intended, to assemble in crowds at Rome, so that it became unsafe for the conspirators or their friends to be present at the meeting. Yet, during all this time, Antonius preserved an appearance of respect and civility towards Brutus and Cassius. He had prevailed on them to dismiss their friends, who had assembled from several of the municipal towns of Italy to protect them, assuring them that it would be wise to avoid every appearance of suspicion or hostility; and he had also proposed to the senate, that Brutus should be dispensed from the observation of the law,<sup>36</sup> which forbade a prætor to be more than ten days absent from Rome. He wrote, also, to Cicero in very friendly language, requesting him to consent to the restoration of Sex. Clodius from exile; and telling him, that although he might be bound in duty to restore him, as his recall had been one of Cæsar's acts, yet he would not press the point, unless Cicero was willing to agree to it. Cicero, in return, assured Antonius of his perfect readiness to comply with his request; and added, that both on public and private grounds there was no man for whom he entertained a higher regard.<sup>37</sup> Such was his language towards the end of the month of April; in the September following he delivered his first philippic.

In the mean time, the tidings of Cæsar's murder had reached his nephew, C. Octavius, at Apollonia, whither, as we have before mentioned, he had been sent to complete his education, and to be in readiness also to attend his uncle when he should set out on his expedition into Parthia. As the probable heir of Cæsar's greatness, he already received many attentions from the officers of the army which was then quartered

He courts Cæsar's  
veteran soldiers.

C. Octavius returns to  
Italy from Epirus.

<sup>34</sup> Cicero. Philippic II. 39; ad Atticum, XIV. epist. XXI.

<sup>35</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. II.

<sup>36</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 13.

<sup>37</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. XIII.

B. Nam quum te semper amavi, primum tuo studio, post etiam beneficio provocatus; tum his temporibus Respublica te mihi ita commendavit, ut cariorem habeam neminem.

in Macedonia ; and when Cæsar's death was known, M. Vipsanius Agrippa, and Q. Sabidienus Rufus, who are here first spoken of as his friends,<sup>38</sup> advised him to embrace the offers which many of the soldiers and centurions made him, of assisting him to revenge his uncle's murder. But as he was not yet aware of the strength of that party which he would find opposed to him, he judged it expedient in the first instance to return to Italy in a private manner. On his arrival at Brundisium he learned the particulars of Cæsar's death, and was informed also of the contents of his will,<sup>39</sup> by which himself was declared his heir, and his adopted son. He did not hesitate instantly to accept this adoption, and to assume the name of Cæsar ; and, it is said, numerous parties of his uncle's veterans, who had obtained settlements in the districts of Italy, through which he passed, came from their homes to meet him, and to assure him of their support.<sup>40</sup> He arrived at Neapolis on the eighteenth of April,<sup>41</sup> and had an interview there with L. Balbus, who had been so long the confidential friend of Cæsar, and who reported to Cicero, on the very same day, that Octavius was resolved to accept the inheritance bequeathed to him. From Neapolis he proceeded to see his mother, and his father-in-law, L. Philippus, at their villa near Puteoli. It happened that Cicero was at this time at his own villa, which was almost close to that of Philippus ;<sup>42</sup> and not only L. Balbus, but A. Hirtius and C. Pansa were also staying in the same neighbourhood. Octavius, doubtless, consulted these old adherents of his uncle with some anxiety, as to the prospects which were opened to him at Rome ; he expressed, however, great respect and regard for Cicero, as he was disposed at present to conciliate persons of every party, although Cicero, in conformity with the example of L. Philippus, did not address him by the name of Cæsar. It is said, indeed, that both his mother and his father-in-law earnestly dissuaded him from coming forward as his uncle's heir, and from availing himself of his adoption into the Julian family ;<sup>43</sup> but his own resolution was taken, and he continued his journey to Rome without loss of time. On his arrival in the capital he requested an interview with M. Antonius, hoping, probably, to form at once a coalition with him, in order to take vengeance on the perpetrators of his uncle's murder ; but Antonius was at this time in the height of his power, as the executor, in a manner, of Cæsar's grants and ordinances ; nor was he disposed to admit such an associate as Octavius, who as the relation and heir of Cæsar, would naturally take the highest place in any party that might be formed to avenge his death.

He is coolly received  
by Antonius.

<sup>38</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 59.

<sup>39</sup> Dion Cassius, XLV. 271. Velleius Paterculus, ubi supra.

<sup>40</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, III. 12.

<sup>41</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. X.

<sup>42</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. XI.

<sup>43</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 60. Suetonius, in Augusto, 8.

Accordingly he treated him with great coolness, and declined any co-operation with him; upon which Octavius, not at all discouraged, proceeded to exhibit some games to the people in honour of Cæsar's victories,<sup>44</sup> the management of which was undertaken by two of Cæsar's old friends, Matus and Postumius. It was on this occasion that Octavius ventured to exhibit Cæsar's state chair, which the senate had allowed him to use whenever he appeared in public; but the tribunes of the people ordered it to be removed; and it appears that the whole of the equestrian order loudly applauded them for doing so. It is said, too, that Antonius in this instance supported the tribunes;<sup>45</sup> and that he also opposed the views which Octavius entertained of being elected tribune himself,<sup>46</sup> in the place of one of that body who happened to die about this time. Irritated at this behaviour, Octavius began to turn his attention to the aristocratical party,<sup>47</sup> to speak with apparent respect of Brutus and Cassius, and seem desirous of courting the friendship of Cicero. In the meantime he exerted himself more earnestly to secure to himself the attachment of the legions,<sup>48</sup> well knowing that if he could gain their support, he might make his own terms either with Antonius or with the aristocracy.

We may suppose that Antonius felt himself greatly strengthened by the favourable reception which Cæsar's colonies of veterans had given him, during his progress through different parts of Italy in the months of April and May. The expectations of the veterans were raised by the reports so industriously spread, that their interests would be nearly concerned in the measures to be proposed at Rome when the senate should assemble on the first of June; and it was probably whispered among them, that the aristocratical party would endeavour to recall or to diminish the grants

Cæsar's friends are suspicious of the designs of the aristocratical party.

of land which they were at present enjoying. Suspicions of a similar kind were, indeed, not confined to the soldiers and inferior officers, but were shared largely by those who had been most familiarly connected with Cæsar, by Balbus, Hirtius, Oppius, Matus, and by their friends in general. Assassination is a crime which, when once practised or defended by a political party, must render it impossible for their opponents to trust them again; and while Cæsar's friends regarded

<sup>44</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. XXVIII.; ad Atticum, XV. epist. III.

<sup>45</sup> Plutarch, in Antonio, 16. Appian, de Bello Civili, III. 30.

<sup>46</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 10. Appian, III. 31. Dion Cassius, XLV. 272.

<sup>47</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XV. epist. XII.

<sup>48</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XV. epist. IV. dated the twenty-third of May. In this letter there occurs a passage which is giv-

en variously and corruptly in the MSS. but which Schütz, in his edition, has ventured to alter, on conjecture, into *De Legionem probè*. He supposes that Cicero alludes to a disposition manifested by one of the legions to take part against Antonius. That Octavius was intriguing with Cæsar's veterans is stated by Appian, III. 31; but none of them actually joined him in arms till a later period.



the late dictator as the victim of his own unsuspecting confidence, they naturally imagined that the conspirators and their friends assumed the language of moderation only whilst they were over-awed by the populace and the veterans;<sup>49</sup> and that so soon as Decimus Brutus should have organized an army in Cisalpine Gaul, and Sex. Pompeius with his rapidly increasing force should have arrived from Spain to join him, the aristocratical party would retract the concessions made in the temple of the Earth on the seventeenth of March, and would annul all the acts of Cæsar's sovereignty, as they had formerly intended to do to those of his first consulship. With regard to Brutus and Cassius themselves, although they were living in apparent privacy at Lanuvium, yet it was suspected that they were turning their views towards the eastern provinces,<sup>50</sup> and were trusting to establish their ascendancy over that portion of the empire. Their associate Trebonius was already gone to take possession of the province of Asia. Q. Cæcilius Bassus was still in arms against Cæsar's officers in Syria; Deiotarus, king of Galatia,<sup>51</sup> whom Cæsar had deprived of a part of his dominions for his adherence to the cause of Pompey, had immediately, upon receiving tidings of Cæsar's death, reinstated himself in the territories which he had lost; the name of Cassius was highly respected in Syria, from the ability which he had shown in preserving the wreck of Crassus's army after the Parthian expedition, and more recently in conducting the operations of the Syrian squadron in Pompey's fleet, during the late civil wars; and there were in Greece and Macedonia many who had suffered severely from Cæsar's confiscations,<sup>52</sup> and who would therefore gladly contribute to aid the reviving cause of the aristocracy. On all these accounts the better class of Cæsar's friends distrusted the fair professions of the conspirators, and dreaded the approach of a

<sup>49</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XIV. epist. XXII. Ὑπόθεσιν hanc habent, (scil. Cæsariani,) eamque præ se ferunt, virum clarissimum interfectum, totam Rempublicam illius interitu perturbatam; irrita fore quæ ille egisset, simul ac desistamus timere; clementiam illi malo fuisse, quâ si usus non esset, nihil ei tale accidere potuisse.

<sup>50</sup> It is asserted by Appian, III. 2, and by Florus, IV. 7, that Macedonia and Syria had been assigned by Cæsar to Brutus and Cassius before his death; and Appian adds, that this appointment was confirmed by the senate on the 17th of March, but afterwards revoked by Antonius before the arrival of Octavius at Rome. But it is evident from Cicero, that this was not the case, and that Brutus and Cassius had not, like Trebonius and Decimus Brutus, any provinces of which they could claim the command, till the senate, in the month of

June or July, while appointing the prætors as usual to their provincial governments, bestowed on them respectively Crete and, as it appears, Cyrenaica. These proofs of the inaccuracy of the later writers make us approach with regret to that period when we shall be obliged to follow them entirely, and when we shall lose the invaluable guidance of Cicero, whose letters are our only good authority for the transactions of these times.

<sup>51</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 37.

<sup>52</sup> The people of Buthrotum in Epirus, for instance, are often spoken of in Cicero's letters as having had their lands confiscated by Cæsar for the benefit of his veterans. And the people of Dymê, in Achaia, being in the same predicament, had recourse to piracy about this very time, to afford them a maintenance. See Cicero, ad Atticum, XVI. epist. I.

counter-revolution; while Antonius and Dolabella, sharing these feelings perhaps themselves, and at any rate well aware of the policy of pretending to feel them, prepared to make these suspicions their own ground of justification for the violent course which they were now going to pursue.

The presence of the veterans at Rome, and the hostile feelings which they were said to entertain towards the friends of the old constitution, created an unwillingness on the part of the conspirators and their friends, to attend the approaching meeting of the senate on the first of June. As the day drew nearer, the violent dispositions of the soldiers seemed likely to find a leader in Antonius; and the show of military force at his disposal was so menacing, that a considerable portion of the senators absented themselves from the capital,<sup>53</sup> and their absence furnished Antonius with a pretext for neglecting the authority of the senate from

Laws passed by Antonius and Dolabella.

this time forward. Accordingly, on the second of June,<sup>54</sup> a law was passed in the assembly of the people, intrusting to the consuls the entire cognizance of all Cæsar's acts and measures, and thus sanctioning that absolute control which they already exercised, by having Cæsar's papers in their possession; and, it is added, his secretary in their pay.<sup>55</sup> Another law bestowed on Antonius the command of the province of Cisalpine Gaul for six years,<sup>56</sup> together with the army which had been sent over into Greece by Cæsar, in preparation for his expedition against Parthia. This was in direct violation of Cæsar's law, which forbade the consular provinces to be given to any one for a longer period than two years; but, if we may believe Cicero,<sup>57</sup> the soldiers of Antonius occupied all the avenues to the forum, and kept out all whom they thought likely to oppose the measure. At the same time Macedonia was given for two years, equally in defiance of Cæsar's law, to C. Antonius, the brother of Marcus, who was one of the prætors for the year;<sup>58</sup> and P. Dolabella obtained the appointment to the province of Syria.

On the fifth of June the senate was again assembled,<sup>59</sup> and it was voted that Brutus should be sent into Asia, and Cassius into Sicily, to buy corn, and see that it was transported to Rome for the supply of the market of the capital. Brutus and Cassius were at this time at Antium,<sup>60</sup> and Cicero met them there on the eighth, and consulted with them on the propriety of accepting or refusing such an appointment. The commission to buy corn they considered as degrading; and Servilia, the mother of Brutus, who,

<sup>53</sup> Cicero, *Philippic.* II. 42.

<sup>54</sup> Cicero, *ad Atticum*, XVI. *epist.* XVI.

<sup>55</sup> Cicero, *ad Atticum*, XIV. *epist.* XVIII. Appian, *de Bello Civili*, III. 5.

<sup>56</sup> Cicero, *Philippic.* V. 3; II. 42; I. 2. 8. Dion Cassius, XLV. 274.

<sup>57</sup> *Philippic.* I. 2. 10; V. 4.

<sup>58</sup> Cicero, *Philippic.* V. 3. Dion Cassius, XLV. 274. 277.

<sup>59</sup> Cicero, *ad Atticum*, XV. *epist.* IX.

<sup>60</sup> Cicero, *ad Atticum*, XV. *epist.* XI.

from her intimacy with Cæsar, enjoyed considerable influence amongst the members of his party, assured Cassius, who was particularly averse to it, that she would procure the repeal of that part of the senate's decree which related to the corn. However, both Brutus and Cassius were invested with the character of public officers, and provinces were voted to them in common with the other prætors;<sup>61</sup> but whether the vote was passed at this time, or a few weeks later, does not sufficiently appear. It was proposed, we are told, by Antonius, and was accompanied by a permission to them to appoint a greater number of lieutenants than was usually allowed; for Antonius had not yet laid aside the appearance of friendship towards them. Yet his other acts as consul seemed to declare that he was not really inclined to content himself with the condition of a citizen in a free commonwealth. He brought forward at once an agrarian law, a change in the constitution of the judicial power, and another in the manner of proceeding against persons charged with rioting, or with treasonable practices. So invariably did each new adventurer tread in the steps of his predecessors, and endeavour to reopen the door which they had successively hoped to shut against all future demagogues, so soon as they had themselves passed through it. By his agrarian law, Antonius proposed to nominate a commission of seven persons,<sup>62</sup> who were to possess the usual exorbitant powers granted to such commissioners in declaring what were national domains, and in distributing them at their pleasure. Their authority was so extensive, that Cicero hyperbolically describes them as empowered to divide the whole of Italy;<sup>63</sup> and it is mentioned, that Campania,<sup>64</sup> together with some of the most valuable lands possessed by the commonwealth in Sicily, were amongst the districts to be subjected to their disposal. The constitution of the judicial power had been, as we have seen, a frequent subject of dispute during the course of the last century; and one of Cæsar's late enactments had bestowed it, exclusively, on the senatorian and equestrian orders, and had repealed the more liberal provisions of the Aurelian law, by which it had been communicated also to some of the wealthiest class of the plebeians. Antonius, however, proposed not only to repeal Cæsar's restrictions, but to open the judicial power more indiscriminately than ever, by making any man eligible who had ever held the rank of centurion;<sup>65</sup> and, in fact, by so removing all the qualifications formerly required, that common soldiers and naturalized foreigners might now become judges. His third and worst measure was to allow an appeal to the people from all persons convicted before the ordinary tribunals, of any acts in violation of the public peace;<sup>66</sup> a law

Laws of Antonius.

<sup>61</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 13.<sup>62</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XV. epist. XIX.<sup>63</sup> Cicero, Philippic. V. 3,<sup>64</sup> Cicero, Philippic. II. 39.<sup>65</sup> Cicero, Philippic. I. 8; V. 5, 6.<sup>66</sup> Cicero, Philippic. I. 9. 10.



which was, in fact, a promise of impunity to all who should be guilty of riots or seditions. These acts were all carried, it is said, by violence,<sup>67</sup> and in contempt of all the religious impediments with which their opponents attempted to obstruct their course. Antonius was openly escorted by armed men in the forum and in the senate; and the veterans, whose grants of land he had taken care to confirm by the authority of the people, were present in crowds in the capital to support him against all opposition.

While these proceedings were going on at Rome, Brutus and Cassius were chiefly at Antium, or in Campania; and both were preparing to pass over into Asia.

Brutus was to exhibit some games at Rome in the early part of July;<sup>68</sup> but as he did not like to appear in the city himself, C. Antonius, as one of his colleagues in the prætorship, undertook the management of them in his name. It was on this occasion that the people eagerly caught at some passages in one of the dramatic entertainments which seemed applicable to Brutus, and received them with enthusiastic applause. This, perhaps, irritated and alarmed Antonius; nor was he pleased that Brutus and Cassius, in one of their proclamations which they issued as prætors, should have declared their intention still to absent themselves from Rome on account of the disordered state of the capital,<sup>69</sup> and that they were evidently preparing to leave Italy and repair to the eastern provinces. Antonius, in a counter-proclamation, treated this language as a declaration of war, and threatened to have recourse to arms; his tone in his public speeches became more arrogant; and he was heard to say openly that none could hope to save their lives, except their party should prove victorious;<sup>70</sup> which was, in other words, a denunciation of woe to the vanquished. L. Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law,<sup>71</sup> ventured to speak against Antonius in the senate on the first of August, but no one supported him, and finding all resistance hopeless, he forbore to attend in the senate again. Yet soon after this it appears that Brutus and Cassius entertained the hope of organizing a more successful opposition;<sup>72</sup> for they sent letters to all the senators of consular and prætorian rank, requesting them to be present in the senate on the first of September; and on the seventeenth of August, Brutus met Cicero at Velia; and finding that he had already renounced his design of leaving Italy, and was then returning to Rome, he expressed the greatest satisfaction at this change of purpose, and his hopes that Cicero was going to take

<sup>67</sup> Cicero, *Philippic.* I. 10; II. 42; V. 4. 6, 7.

<sup>68</sup> Cicero, *ad Atticum*, XV. *epist.* XXVI.; XVI. *epist.* I. II. Dion Cassius, XLVII. 338.

<sup>69</sup> Cicero, *ad Familiares*, XI. *epist.* III.

<sup>70</sup> Cicero, *ad Atticum*, XV. *epist.* XXII.; *Philippic.* V. 8, *nisi victorem, neminem victurum.*

<sup>71</sup> Cicero, *ad Atticum*, XVI. *epist.* VII.; *Philippic.* I. 4. 6.

<sup>72</sup> Cicero, *ad Atticum*, XVI. *epist.* VII.

an active part in the administration of the commonwealth. It is probable that Brutus and Cassius, being now fully resolved to secure to themselves, if possible, the resources of the eastern provinces, were anxious to acquire such a support in the senate as might free them from the charge of rebellion, and might insure for all their proceedings the sanction of the government at home. We cannot tell, however, by what means they hoped to deprive Antonius of his military superiority in Italy; and yet, while he retained it they could not calculate on their party's obtaining the ascendancy either in the senate or in the forum. Perhaps they trusted that many of Cæsar's old officers, and particularly Hirtius and Pansa, the two consuls elect, were disgusted with the late conduct of Antonius, and would be able to counteract his influence over the minds of the soldiers.<sup>73</sup> But their plans and their cause were finally ruined by the interference of C. Octavius, who, taking to himself the part which Hirtius and Pansa might have performed sincerely and effectually, succeeded indeed in drawing away the army from Antonius, but only to attach it to himself; and coming forward as the heir and adopted son of Cæsar, rallied around him the whole strength of his uncle's adherents, and was thus enabled, eventually, to dictate terms to Antonius on the one hand, and on the other to crush for ever the reviving hopes of the aristocracy.

It was about this time that the aristocratical party lost an army, which, if it had existed for a few months longer, might have altered the whole complexion of affairs. We have already stated that Sex. Pompeius was in arms against the officers of Cæsar in Spain, at the period of Cæsar's assassination. He had been gradually increasing his strength, had defeated C. Asinius Pollio, Cæsar's lieutenant,<sup>74</sup> and had made himself master of New Carthage, and of most of the towns in what was called the Farther Spain. The tidings of Cæsar's death gave him great encouragement, and produced a general sensation in his favour; he had seven legions under his command, which constituted a formidable force, although they were probably composed chiefly of ill-disciplined troops, and might not perhaps have had their full complement in point of numbers. Thus circumstanced, he addressed a letter to the consuls at Rome, couched, according to Cicero, in firm but temperate language, in which he demanded his restoration to his country; and that all armies in every part of the empire should be equally disbanded. At the same time he wrote to his father-in-law, L. Libo,<sup>75</sup> to say that he would conclude no peace unless he could recover the property of his father which had been confiscated by

Sex. Pompeius restored to his country by an agreement with Lepidus.

<sup>73</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XV. epist. XXII. dated on the 25th of June.

<sup>74</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XVI. epist. IV. Dion Cassius, XLV. 274, 275.

<sup>75</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XVI. epist. IV.

Cæsar, and sold to different individuals by public auction. The validity of these sales, as well as of all the rest of Cæsar's acts, had been recently confirmed by law; and besides, Antonius himself had been the purchaser of Pompey's house at Rome, and was now actually residing in it; so that it was not likely to be given up without some compensation. But at this time M. Lepidus commanded the province of the Hither Spain,<sup>76</sup> and thus found himself exposed to the first attacks of an enemy who had already overrun the whole of the Farther Spain, and had defeated one of Cæsar's lieutenants in the field. Lepidus felt himself unequal to the contest, and was therefore warmly disposed to accede to all that Sex. Pompeius requested.<sup>77</sup> The senate willingly confirmed what Lepidus had promised; and it was agreed that Sex. Pompeius should be restored to his country, and that a sum amounting to about 5,650,000*l.* should be granted to him out of the treasury, to enable him to redeem his father's property. Satisfied with these conditions, Pompeius gave up his army, quitted the province in which he had so long maintained himself, and repaired to Massilia,<sup>78</sup> where he remained for some time in a state of suspense, not deeming it expedient or safe to return to Rome in the midst of those disorders which had now again begun to distract the commonwealth.

We have said that Cicero was met by Brutus at Velia on the seventeenth of August, and was requested by him to take an active part from henceforward in the management of public affairs; in other words, to put himself at the head of the aristocratical party, and make one vigorous attempt to recover for them their ancient ascendancy. This, indeed, was now become Cicero's fixed resolution; he thought he saw a more favourable opportunity for acting with effect, than had occurred at any period of the late war between Cæsar and Pompey; and laying aside at last all hesitation, he went to Rome to commence his memorable career of opposition to Antonius, and to all the partisans of his revolutionary system. He arrived in the capital on the thirty-first of August, and on the following day the senate was to assemble, in order to vote a solemn thanksgiving to the gods in honour of Cæsar's exploits. According to his own account,<sup>79</sup> Cicero feeling some fatigue from his journey, and not considering the business on which the senate was summoned to be very important, forbore to attend the meeting. His absence greatly exasperated Antonius, who interpreted it probably into an insinuation that it was useless to appear in the senate while the debates

Cicero commences  
his opposition to  
Antonius.

<sup>76</sup> Cicero, Philippic. V. 14, 15; XIII. 4, 5. Dion Cassius, XLV. 275.

<sup>77</sup> *Quum Lepido omnes Imperatores forent meliores*, is the remark of Velleius

Paterculus on another occasion, II. 63, and it is equally applicable here.

<sup>78</sup> Cicero, Philippic. XIII. 6. Appian, *de Bello Civili*, IV. 84.

<sup>79</sup> Cicero, Philippic. I. 5, et seq.



of that body were overawed by a military force. Accordingly, Antonius spoke with great violence, and threatened to come and pull down Cicero's house, if he persisted in absenting himself. It was usual, we must remember, for the consuls to enforce the attendance of senators either by a fine, or by seizing some article of their property as a security for their appearance; but the threat of Antonius far exceeded the authority which any former consuls had been known to exercise in similar circumstances. On the following day, however, Cicero did attend the senate, when Antonius in his turn was absent; and he then delivered the speech which is known by the name of the first Philippic Oration. It contains a strong condemnation of the measures which Antonius was pursuing, expressed however in temperate language, and un-mixed with personalities; yet it gave Antonius the greatest offence. He summoned the senate to meet again on the nineteenth of September, and on that day replied to Cicero's attack upon his measures by a violent invective,<sup>80</sup> in which, amongst other things, he charged him with being an accomplice in Cæsar's murder; intending, as Cicero asserted, to excite the resentment of the veterans against him, and hoping that they would make some attempts on his life, if he ventured to appear in the senate-house. But Cicero having suspected, whether justly or no, that he could not attend without danger, was resolved not to risk the experiment: and similar fears, he tells us, kept away P. Servilius, who had expressed the same sentiments as he had done on the second of September; and L. Piso, who had set the first example of opposition to Antonius, by his speech on the first of August. The famous oration, therefore, which is entitled the Second Philippic, and which professes to have been spoken in the senate on the nineteenth of September, in reply to the invectives of Antonius, was in reality never delivered at all, but was written by Cicero about this time, and sent to Atticus in the month of October, with an express caution that he would not let it be seen by those friends of Antonius who were in the habit of visiting at his house.<sup>81</sup> In fact Cicero retired into the country soon afterwards, and remained for some time at one or other of his villas, only going to Rome at intervals, and leaving it again immediately. He thought that nothing could be done in the senate till the new consuls entered upon their office; meantime an unexpected enemy suddenly came forward against Antonius, and attacked him with weapons more effectual than Cicero's eloquence.

We have seen that C. Octavius had been coolly received by Antonius at his first arrival in Rome, after Cæsar's murder. It is said, that not content with slighting

C. Octavius comes forward against Antonius.

<sup>80</sup> Cicero, Philippic. V. 7: ad Familiares, XII. epist. II.

<sup>81</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XVI. epist. XI. Caleni interventum et Calvenæ cavebis.

him as a political associate, Antonius endeavoured to obstruct, or at least to delay, his adoption into the Julian family; as he could not claim the possession of his uncle's inheritance<sup>82</sup> till he had gone through the forms by which he became Cæsar's adopted son. On this provocation, Octavius resolved to do himself justice by the most atrocious means, and although he was only nineteen years of age, he suborned some ruffians to assassinate Antonius,<sup>83</sup> the consul of the republic, in his own house. The attempt was discovered in time, but it threw Antonius into the utmost perplexity and alarm. As it had not succeeded, a large portion of the people doubted its reality, and believed that the charge had been falsely brought forward against Octavius, in order to procure his ruin, that Antonius might enjoy his property without disturbance. So strong in fact was the public feeling, and so unpopular was Antonius at this period, that he did not think it advisable to bring his intended assassins to trial. But he trembled at the insecurity of his situation; and finding that Octavius was now leagued with his enemies, and being informed probably of the intrigues which he was carrying on with Cæsar's veterans, he thought that he should require the support of a stronger military force than the guard with which he had hitherto protected his person, and by which he had overawed the senate and the forum. In justice to his memory we should remember, that the assassination of Cæsar might well have deterred him from exposing himself in a similar manner to the daggers of the conspirators or of their partisans; and that when Cicero so loudly complains of the introduction of a barbarian guard into the senate-house, he should have reflected that the crime, committed by his own friends, had rendered such a precaution natural, if not necessary. Be this as it may, Antonius thought his present force insufficient any longer to defend him; and, accordingly, he set out on the ninth of October for Brundisium,<sup>84</sup> in order to secure the four legions which were quartered in that neighbourhood, and which having formed part of the army assembled in Macedonia by Cæsar for his Parthian expedition, had lately returned to Italy, and remained still embodied, under no other authority than that of their own immediate officers. When he arrived at Brundisium<sup>85</sup> he proceeded to address the soldiers, and offered to each man a gratuity of about *3l. 4s. 7d.*, in order to win them to his interests; but far from receiving this offer with thankfulness, the troops murmured at it and ridiculed it, as utterly inadequate to their expectations; and many of the centurions and soldiers appeared inclined to disown his authority altogether. Alarmed at these symptoms, he sent for several of those centurions,

<sup>82</sup> Florus, IV. 4. Dion Cassius, XLV. 272.

<sup>83</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. XXIII. Seneca, de Clementiâ, I. 9.

<sup>84</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. XXIII.

<sup>85</sup> Dion Cassius, XLV. 276. Cicero, Philippic. III. 2; V. 8.

whom he most suspected, to his own quarters, and there caused them to be instantly executed. But this severity failed to effect its object; the legions could not be prevailed upon to follow him; and at the same time the tidings which he received of the proceedings of Octavius, made him feel the necessity of returning to Rome without delay. In fact, no sooner had he set out for Brundisium, than Octavius hastened into Campania, and by giving to each man a donation of about 16*l.*,<sup>86</sup> he prevailed upon Cæsar's veterans, who had been settled at Casilinum and Calatia, to join his standard. He then applied to some other of the military colonies in that neighbourhood, and succeeded in raising a considerable force, which he began to organize at Capua with the greatest activity. The municipal towns,<sup>87</sup> no less than the establishments of the veterans, testified the strongest attachment to his cause; and he wrote at the same time to Cicero, requesting a personal interview with him, asking his advice as to his subsequent movements, and wishing him to come forward as his avowed associate, and to exert his influence in the senate in his behalf.

He persuades Cæsar's veterans to join him.

Cicero could not but entertain a natural distrust of so dangerous an assistant; and expressed, in a letter to Atticus,<sup>88</sup> his unavailing wishes that Brutus were at hand instead of Octavius to turn the impending crisis to the advantage of the commonwealth. But Brutus and Cassius were already on the other side of the Ionian Gulf; and to wait for their return was impossible. In an evil hour, therefore, for himself, did Cicero listen to the advances of Octavius, and encourage him to repair to Rome, and endeavour to strengthen his party by the favour of the popular assembly. Octavius adopted this plan, and was introduced into the forum, and brought forward to speak, by the tribune Tiberius Canutius,<sup>89</sup> one of the most violent enemies of Antonius. But his speech was ill calculated to please the aristocratical party; for he attempted, we are told, to recommend himself to the popular favour as the heir and adopted son of Cæsar; he dwelt largely on the great services of the late dictator; and when making some promises with regard to his own future conduct, he stretched out his hand towards a statue of Cæsar, which Antonius had lately placed in the rostra,<sup>90</sup> and swore that he would be true to his word, "as he hoped to arrive at his father's greatness." But not feeling himself strong enough as yet to maintain the capital against Antonius, and finding, if we may believe Appian, that the veterans were not well disposed to fight in such a quarrel, he withdrew into Tus-

<sup>86</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum. XVI. epist. VIII. IX.

<sup>87</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XVI. epist. XI.

<sup>88</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XVI. epist. VIII. "O Brute, ubi es? quantam *εὐκαρίαν* amittis!"

<sup>89</sup> Dion Cassius, XLV. 276. Appian, de Bello Civili, III. 41.

<sup>90</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. III. ad Atticum, XVI. epist. XV. Jurat., "ita sibi parentis honores consequi liceat;" et simul dextram intendit ad statuum.



cany with his forces, and endeavoured to get some assistance from that quarter.

In the mean time, Antonius was returning with all speed to Rome, attended by the legion of the *Alaudæ*,<sup>91</sup> a corps which had been raised by Cæsar in Transalpine Gaul, and had afterwards, as we have seen, been admitted by him to the rights of Roman citizens. Since his death this legion had been greatly favoured by Antonius, and its common soldiers had been rendered capable, by his law, of serving amongst the third order of judges on criminal trials. He had, therefore, apparently taken it with him to Brundisium, and was now returning with it to Rome; for the four legions which he had gone to secure, had not received him so cordially as to induce him to rely on them in any critical service; and he was well satisfied that they should consent to march by themselves towards Gaul, there, as he hoped, to receive him as their commander, when he should arrive to take possession of that province. The *Alaudæ* then formed his escort when he approached Rome, and were left by him at Tibur, while he entered the city with no other force apparently than that which he had been long in the habit of employing to support his authority or secure his person. He then, as consul, issued a number of proclamations,<sup>92</sup> charging Octavius with rebellion, and threatening the severest punishments against some other individuals whom he considered as his abettors. He summoned the senate to meet on the twenty-fourth of November, and announced that if any member absented himself, he would be justly considered as a conspirator against the consul's life, and a party to the treasonable counsels of Octavius. But he soon learned that one of the legions from Brundisium,<sup>93</sup> instead of pursuing its march towards Gaul, had suddenly turned off towards the capital, and had actually stationed itself at Alba in a state of open disobedience to his authority. He then repaired to the troops whom he had left at Tibur, and tried, we may suppose, to assure himself of their fidelity, by promising to them abundant rewards out of the property of his antagonists.

Again he returned to Rome, feeling it important, if possible, still to maintain possession of the capital; and not choosing, whatever was his reason, to attend in the senate on the twenty-fourth, he postponed the meeting of that body to the twenty-eighth,<sup>94</sup> and summoned the senators then to assemble in the capitol. He was extremely anxious to fortify himself by their authority, and to obtain a vote which should declare Octavius and his abettors public enemies. For this purpose he prohibited three individuals by name,<sup>95</sup> all of them his vehement opponents, from appearing

Two of the legions desert Antonius and join Octavius.

<sup>91</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XVI. epist. VIII.

<sup>92</sup> Cicero, Philippic. III. 7, 8.

<sup>93</sup> Cicero, Philippic. III. 3; XIII. 9.

<sup>94</sup> Cicero, Philippic. III. 8.

<sup>95</sup> Cicero, Philippic. III. 9.

in the senate on this occasion; threatening one of them with death, according to Cicero, if he ventured to disobey his injunction. But just before the senate assembled, he was informed that the fourth legion,<sup>96</sup> another of those which he had met at Brundisium, had not only stopped its march towards Gaul, but had actually joined the standard of Octavius in Tuscany. Under the impression produced on men's minds by this intelligence, he dared not submit to the senate his intended motion on the state of the commonwealth, lest the decision of the majority might rather favour his enemies than himself. His only hope lay in the success of his arms, and in stopping, by his presence, the growing spirit of disaffection among the soldiers. Accordingly, the senate was only consulted on the question of voting the usual thanksgivings to the gods in honour of M. Lepidus for his services in Spain; and as soon as the senators separated, Antonius proceeded to the customary allotment of the provinces to the different magistrates of the year on the expiration of their term of office. His brother, C. Antonius, received his nomination to the province of Macedonia, which had been already, as we have seen, conferred on him by the people; and he himself, in the same manner, entered upon his own appointment to the command of Cisalpine Gaul. He immediately assumed the military dress, Antonius retires from Rome to Cisalpine Gaul. and left the city with the utmost secrecy to take the command of his troops at Tibur;<sup>97</sup> whence he hastened, by cross roads, towards his province, fearing lest Octavius might intercept his march.

On his arrival at Ariminum, he found there the two remaining legions from Brundisium, which acknowledged his authority without dispute; and with them a third, according to Appian,<sup>98</sup> which had returned from Macedonia after Antonius's departure from Brundisium, and, choosing to embrace his party, had followed the other two which still adhered to him into Gaul. These forces, together with the legion of the Alaudæ, and a considerable number of the veterans from Cæsar's colonies, who preferred his service to that of Octavius, formed altogether an imposing army; and there was nothing in Cisalpine Gaul which could offer to them any resistance in the field. But Decimus Brutus, He is opposed by Dec. Brutus, whom he besieges in Mutina. who, as we have seen, had held the command of that province for some months, was resolved not lightly to abandon it; and, accordingly, threw himself into the town of Mutina,<sup>99</sup> to maintain that place against the invader. Antonius immediately advanced and began to lay siege to it; and thus the commonwealth was again involved in a civil war, when little more than a year had elapsed since the termination of hostilities in Spain, and the last triumphant return of Cæsar to Rome.

<sup>96</sup> Cicero, Philippic. III. 3. 9.<sup>97</sup> Cicero, Philippic. III. 10.<sup>98</sup> De Bello Civili, III. 43. 48.<sup>99</sup> Cicero, Philippic. XIII. 9.

When Antonius left the capital to take possession of Cisalpine Gaul, his colleague, P. Dolabella, seems to have been already on his way towards Syria. We find that he was at his villa, near Formiæ, in the latter end of October,<sup>100</sup> and that he was then making some arrangements for the payment of a debt due from him to Cicero, while he should be absent from Italy.

Hence he probably crossed over into Greece soon afterwards, accompanied by a small military force; so that Rome, in the beginning of December, was deserted by both the consuls, while of the tribunes, two at least, Tiberius Canutius and L. Cassius, were warmly devoted to the party of the aristocracy. The senate and people of Rome seemed now, for the first time during many years, to have been left to express their sentiments freely; the terror of a military force was removed on the one hand, nor does the peace of the city seem to have been disturbed by any disorders of the populace on the other. The measures of the government, therefore, and the votes of individuals were likely now, if ever, to be independent, and wise, and pure, debased only by that inevitable alloy which the actions and principles of men will always contract from the original folly and selfishness of human nature. But the influence of eloquence is a less unworthy motive than the fear of the sword; and it was a fit reward for the general purity of Cicero's character, that his ascendancy marked the last moments of his country's freedom; and that when Rome was left to herself, she followed his guidance with enthusiastic affection.

Cicero returns to Rome.

Immediately on the departure of Antonius, he hastened to return to the capital, where he arrived on the ninth of December.<sup>101</sup> The tribunes had summoned the senate to meet on the twentieth, that a vote might be passed empowering the consuls elect, Hirtius and Pansa, to provide for the assembling the senate in safety on the first of January. A very few days before the twentieth, there appeared a proclamation from Decimus Brutus, in which he engaged to maintain the province of Cisalpine Gaul against the attempts of Antonius, and to preserve it in a state of obedience to the authority of the senate and people. This declaration was likely to encourage the timid and the wavering; and that the impression produced by it might not be lost, Cicero went very early to the senate on the morning of the twentieth, and having thus awakened an interest in men's minds, and procured a full attendance of senators, he delivered the speech which is entitled the third philippic. In this he proposed that the senate should declare its approbation of the conduct of Decimus Brutus, and of the province of Cisalpine Gaul, in upholding the senate's authority; that it should also express its gratitude to Octavius,

<sup>100</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XV. epist. XIII.

<sup>101</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. V. VI. Philippic. III. 4, 5.



and to the two legions which had deserted Antonius; and that it should order Decimus Brutus, and all other officers who held commands in the provinces by virtue of Cæsar's arrangements, to retain their governments till the senate should think proper to supersede them. The senate agreed to all that Cicero wished;<sup>102</sup> and thus not only was M. Antonius adjudged to have no pretensions to the province of Gaul, but the claims of his brother upon Macedonia, and of P. Dolabella upon Syria, were condemned on the same ground. Meanwhile the siege of Mutina was carried on with vigour by Antonius, and Octavius having intercepted some cavalry, archers, and elephants,<sup>103</sup> which were on their way to join the besieging army, was proceeding to attempt the relief of the town, as soon as he should be strengthened by the arrival of the consuls with fresh troops from Rome. Such was the state of things when the first of January arrived, and the new consuls, A. Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa, entered upon their office. They assembled the senators on the very U. C. 710. first day of their consulship; first to consult them generally on the commonwealth, and then to determine on the honours which were to be paid to C. Octavius and to his followers, according to the resolution passed before at the meeting of the twentieth of December.

It was not to be expected, composed as the senate was in a considerable proportion of the partisans of Cæsar, that Antonius should be left altogether without an Q. Fufius Calenus defends Antonius in the senate. advocate. The person who first came forward in his behalf was Q. Fufius Calenus, who had been made consul by Cæsar during the last three or four months of the year 706, and had before commanded a separate division of his army in the campaign of the preceding year in Greece. At an earlier period, in the year 692, he had been one of the tribunes; and it was owing to a law proposed by him,<sup>104</sup> and directing that the judges should be chosen by lot, instead of selected by the prætor, that P. Clodius obtained an acquittal, when tried for his infamous profanation of the mysteries of the Bona Dea in Cæsar's house. He now moved that a deputation from the senate should be sent to Antonius, to demand of him that he should raise the siege of Mutina;<sup>105</sup> that he should abstain from all acts of hostility against Decimus Brutus and the province of Cisalpine Gaul; and that he should submit himself to the authority of the senate and people. If he refused to comply with these demands, he was to be declared a public enemy, and the whole population of the state was to assume the military dress, as in a war of the last importance to the general safety. It

<sup>102</sup> Cicero, Philippic. IV. 1, et seq. Dion Cassius, XLV. 277.

<sup>103</sup> Cicero, Philippic. V. 17. Dion Cassius, XLV. 276.

<sup>104</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, I. epist. XVI.

<sup>105</sup> Cicero, Philippic, VI. 2, 3.

was not supposed that Antonius would accede to the terms offered him; and as he would gain time to prosecute the siege of Mutina, and to strengthen his party whilst the deputation should be going to his camp from Rome and returning with his answer, Cicero, well aware of the necessity of decisive measures, was anxious, on this very account, that he should be declared a public enemy immediately, and that the people should be summoned at once to take up arms against him. After a vehement debate, however, which was protracted by successive adjournments during three days, the proposal of Q. Calenus prevailed, and it was resolved that a deputation should be sent to Antonius.<sup>106</sup> On other points, the opinion of Cicero was followed; settlements of land were promised to the veterans and to the two legions which had joined Octavius;<sup>107</sup> and an exemption from military service was granted to them and to their children, except in the case of a war breaking out in Gaul or in Italy. L. Egnatuleius, the quæstor who had led the fourth legion over to Octavius, was allowed to be a candidate for and to hold any public office three years before he should have attained the age prescribed by law. To Octavius still higher honours were paid. He was constituted an officer of the commonwealth, with the title and authority of proprætor; he was admitted into the senate among the senators of prætorian rank; he was allowed to be a candidate for all public offices several years earlier than the law permitted; and on the motion of his step-father, L. Philippus,<sup>108</sup> an equestrian statue was erected to his honour in the rostra.

Immediately after this debate, the deputation, which was to carry the commands of the senate to Antonius, set out on its journey. It consisted of three members: A deputation sent from the senate to Antonius with proposals of peace. Servius Sulpicius, the celebrated lawyer whom Cæsar had appointed proconsul of Achaia in the year 707; L. Philippus, the step-father of Octavius; and L. Calpurnius Piso, the father-in-law of Cæsar, who had formerly, when consul, countenanced the attacks of Clodius upon Cicero, in order to win the favour of the triumvirate. About the same time, A. Hirtius took the field and marched to the relief of Mutina;<sup>109</sup> while his colleague, C. Pansa, remained at Rome to superintend the levies of troops which were carrying on with the greatest activity. Cicero meanwhile was exerting himself to the utmost to strengthen the cause of the commonwealth by securing the fidelity of the different commanders in the western provinces. If Antonius were obliged to retreat from before Mutina, it was a question of the last importance to him, to ascertain whether he could hope to find an asylum and support in the armies of Spain and of Trans-

<sup>106</sup> Cicero, Philippic VI. 1.

<sup>107</sup> Cicero, Philippic. V. 17. 19.

<sup>108</sup> Cicero, ad Brutum, I. epist. XV.

Velleius Patereulus, II. 61.

<sup>109</sup> Cicero, Philippic. VII.

alpine Gaul. There were three officers who held commands at this time in those countries; M. Æmilius Lepidus, the proconsul of Gallia Narbonensis, and of the Hither or Nearer Spain; L. Munatius Plancus, who enjoyed the government of all the other parts of Transalpine Gaul added by Cæsar's conquests to the Roman empire; and C. Asinius Pollio, who had been employed in the Farther Spain against Sex. Pompeius with the title of Cæsar's lieutenant, and still possessed the chief authority in that province. Of these three men, Lepidus was likely to join that party which could most work upon his hopes of personal advantage; but his inclinations would lead him to oppose the cause of the commonwealth, inasmuch as the forms of the old constitution would confine within moderate bounds his irregular ambition. L. Munatius Plancus is mentioned as one of those persons who received large presents from Cæsar, at the time when he was employing the plunder of Gaul in purchasing partisans among the needy and the prodigal at Rome.<sup>110</sup> When the civil war began, we find that L. Plancus was in Cæsar's service, and held a command in his army in Spain during the campaign against Afranius and Petreius.<sup>111</sup> At a later period he was one of his lieutenants in Africa;<sup>112</sup> and on the whole, his conduct throughout the war obtained for him from Cæsar the appointment to the province of Transalpine Gaul, and the nomination to the consulship for the year 711, together with Decimus Brutus, so that he was at this time consul elect. His reputation however had not kept pace with his fortune. Cicero tells him plainly, in one of his letters,<sup>113</sup> that he had been generally regarded as a time-server; and Paterculus speaks of him as "behaving with that wavering honour which was characteristic of him."<sup>114</sup> But as he was at the head of an important province and a considerable army, Cicero tried to attach him to the cause of the commonwealth, and wrote to him a number of letters to this effect, which he answered with the fairest professions of his zeal in behalf of his country, but without declaring his sentiments with regard to Antonius. C. Asinius Pollio, whose name reminds us that we are arrived at the age of Virgil and Horace, was early distinguished as an orator,<sup>115</sup> and at the beginning of the civil war espoused the party of Cæsar, because, according to his own account,<sup>116</sup> the power of some one of his personal enemies in the camp of Pompey made him afraid to join

Account of the officers commanding in Gaul and Spain.

M. Æmilius Lepidus.

L. Munatius Plancus.

C. Asinius Pollio.

<sup>110</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, VIII. epist. I.

<sup>111</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Civili, I. and Auctor de Bello Africano.

<sup>112</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Civili, I. and Auctor de Bello Africano.

<sup>113</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. III.

<sup>114</sup> II. 63. Plancus, dubiâ, id est, suâ Fide.

<sup>115</sup> Quintilian, XII. 6.

<sup>116</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XXXI.



the standard of the commonwealth. He served Cæsar faithfully, and was left by him, as we have seen, in the command of the province of Farther Spain, after the defeat of Cnæus Pompeius at Munda. He had since been opposed to Sex. Pompeius, and had been defeated by him, as we have already mentioned. Yet he professed a great zeal for the liberties of his country, and a determination to resist any person whatsoever who should again attempt to gain absolute sovereignty.<sup>117</sup> He was at the head of an army of three legions;<sup>118</sup> and Antonius had endeavoured already to seduce one of these to his own service, nor had Pollio been able to retain it in its duty without difficulty. In fact, the dispositions of the soldiers in general were so adverse to the establishment of the old constitution, that when they understood the quarrel to be between Antonius and the cause of the senate and the people, they could not be prevailed upon to support the latter; and it was this circumstance that insured the success of Octavius, when a few months afterwards he revealed his own treasonable intentions, and enslaved the senate whose authority he was now affecting to uphold.

Meantime the deputation from the senate had proceeded to the camp of M. Antonius. Ere its members had reached the end of their journey,<sup>119</sup> Ser. Sulpicius, the most distinguished of their number, died of an indisposition which had attacked him before he left Rome, and which had been aggravated by the fatigue of travelling, and by the anxiety which he felt for the success of his mission. His surviving colleagues, L. Philippus and L. Piso, were too nearly connected with the family of Cæsar to be very zealous in the cause of the commonwealth. They presented the commands of the senate to Antonius, and consented to carry back to Rome a counter proposal on his part,<sup>120</sup> in which, far from complying with the orders which he had received, he agreed to give up Cisalpine Gaul only on condition of receiving in exchange the province of Transalpine Gaul for five years,<sup>121</sup> with an army of six legions, and that his brother should retain Macedonia as long as Brutus and Cassius should enjoy the command of any provinces as consuls or proconsuls. Besides these

Antonius rejects the proposals of the senate.

<sup>117</sup> Si id agitur ut rursus in Potestate omnia unius sint, quicumque is est, ei me profiteor Inimicum.—Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XXXI.

<sup>118</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XXXII.

<sup>119</sup> Cicero, Philippic. IX. 7.

<sup>120</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. IV.

<sup>121</sup> Cicero, Philippic. VIII. 9. The text towards the latter end of the ninth chapter of the eighth Philippic is evidently defective. One sentence relative to C. Antonius is marked by Schütz as inserted in

this place by mistake; but it seems to us that some words have rather been omitted in the preceding sentence, and that the clause, "tamdiuque ut obtineant, quamdiu M. Brutus, C. Cassius, Consules, prove Coss. Provincias obtinebunt," refers to C. Antonius, and not, as Schütz imagines, to Marcus. M. Antonius throughout speaks of himself in the first person, and immediately after the stipulation in behalf of his brother, which we have just quoted, he adds, "Ipse autem ut quinquennium obtineam."

concessions, he demanded grants of lands for the soldiers who had followed him, a confirmation of all grants already made by himself and Dolabella, and of all the decrees issued by them on the pretended authority of Cæsar's papers; and that his law relating to the judicial power should be maintained inviolate. When these proposals were reported to the senate, L. Cæsar,<sup>122</sup> the uncle of Antonius, moved that the country should be declared in a state of disturbance; and the whole people assume the military dress in token of the imminent danger which threatened the commonwealth. The spirit of all ranks, if we may believe Cicero,<sup>123</sup> was keenly alive to the necessity of putting down the rebellion of Antonius; with the exception only of those citizens who were of consular dignity, whom age or the honours and emoluments which they had gained in the last revolution, made unwilling to risk the chances of another. Besides, many of these persons had been so connected with the party of Cæsar, that the revival of the old aristocratical interests, supported by the eloquence and integrity of Cicero, was to them a prospect full of apprehension. They served the cause of Antonius at present, by professing an extreme anxiety for peace; but they hoped to espouse it more effectually, and to introduce divisions amongst the opposite party, so soon as they could find a handle to insinuate that whilst Cæsar's friends were quarrelling with one another, the partisans of Pompey were watching for the moment in which they might once more establish their own ascendancy.

Nor was the opportunity which they sought for backward in presenting itself. Brutus and Cassius had left Italy in the preceding autumn, with the intention, we may suppose, of strengthening themselves against the enmity of Antonius by the resources of the eastern provinces. The opposition begun by Cicero in the senate on the second of September, and the subsequent state of terror under which the senate was said to be kept by the military force of Antonius, induced them, or furnished them with a pretext to act in a more decisive manner. Brutus at first had repaired to Athens,<sup>124</sup> and had remained there for some time, apparently engrossed with the philosophical studies of the place; but during this interval his emissaries had been at work in Macedonia, endeavouring to conciliate to his interests the soldiers that were still quartered there; and he was himself gaining partisans among that numerous body of young men of family or talent who were in the habit of resorting to Athens as the university of the ancient world. He was, however, principally enabled to declare himself openly in consequence of an important service

Proceedings of Brutus and Cassius.

<sup>122</sup> Cicero, Philippic. VIII. 1.

<sup>123</sup> Compare, besides his assertions in

his Philippics, Epist. ad Familiares, XII. epist. IV. V.; XI. epist. VIII.; X. epist. V.

<sup>124</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 24.

rendered him by M. Apuleius,<sup>125</sup> who had some time past filled the office of quæstor in the province of Asia. Apuleius happened to be returning to Rome with a large fleet, on board of which was a large sum of money belonging to the government, collected by him in his province for the benefit of the revenue of the commonwealth. Brutus met him on the coast of Eubœa, and prevailed upon him to make over the whole of this treasure. He was thus in a condition immediately to raise an army, partly by inviting to his standard those soldiers who had formerly served under Pompey,<sup>126</sup> and who it seems were still numerous in Thessaly; and partly by tampering with the troops belonging to P. Dolabella, which were at this time passing through Greece on their way towards Syria. It is particularly mentioned, that two divisions of Dolabella's cavalry were thus persuaded to desert their officers and join Brutus;<sup>127</sup> and the same means were probably used with effect towards a legion commanded by one of the lieutenants of C. Antonius, which submitted itself to M. Cicero, Cicero's son, one of those young men whom Brutus had won to his interests during his residence at Athens. Soon afterwards, Q. Hortensius, the son of the famous orator of that name, who was at this time proconsul of Macedonia, put the whole resources of his province at the disposal of Brutus; and he was thus become so formidable, that P. Vatinius, proconsul of Illyricum, and one of Cæsar's oldest and most zealous partisans, finding himself unable to depend upon his soldiers, surrendered to him the important town of Dyrrhachium, and saw his troops immediately enter into the service of his enemy. In this manner Brutus made himself

Brutus obtains possession of the provinces of Achaia, Macedonia, and Illyricum.

master of the provinces of Achaia, Macedonia, and Illyricum, and was become the general of an army of seven legions;<sup>128</sup> while C. Antonius, who had set out from Italy in the hope of entering upon the government of Macedonia, found that province now armed against him, and the troops which he expected to command adding themselves to the forces of his enemy. Thus disappointed, he threw himself into Apollonia with seven cohorts which still remained faithful to him;<sup>129</sup> and being master of that city, and of one or two other places in the neighbourhood, he prepared to resist the attacks of Brutus.

Dolabella surprises and plunders the province of Asia and murders C. Trebonius.

It is difficult, while relying upon Cicero's authority for almost the whole of our accounts of these times, not to forget that this authority is not equally to be followed in its judgments of men and actions as in its re-

<sup>125</sup> Cicero, Philippic. X. 11; XIII. 16. Plutarch, in Bruto, 24. Appian, de Bello Civili, IV. 75. Cicero, ad Familiares, XIII. epist. XLV.

<sup>126</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 25.

<sup>127</sup> Cicero, Philippic. X. 6. Plutarch, in Bruto, 25.

<sup>128</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 65.

<sup>129</sup> Cicero, Philippic. X. 6; XI. 11.



ports of matters of fact. We catch insensibly the opinions of a writer whom we are continually consulting; and we do not remember that during all the transactions which we are now relating, he was the active leader of a party, and could not, therefore, represent with impartiality the motives or the merits of the conduct of his opponents. This remark must apply particularly to those proceedings of Dolabella which we are now called to notice. He found that the assassins of Cæsar were resolved to consider as illegal all the acts of his colleague M. Antonius and of himself in their late consulship. Decimus Brutus was maintaining Cisalpine Gaul against M. Antonius, in defiance of the decree of the people; M. Brutus was occupying Macedonia, which had been equally given by the people to C. Antonius; and C. Cassius was proceeding towards Syria to take away that province in a similar manner from Dolabella himself. Already, as we have seen, Dolabella's cavalry had been seduced from his service, and had joined the army of Brutus; so that under these circumstances, whilst his enemies, by their own sole authority, were converting to their own use the resources of the empire, he might think himself justified in following their example, and in depriving their officers of their provinces, as he himself and his friends had been deprived of those held by themselves. With this view he formed the design of securing the province of Asia, which was now held by C. Trebonius. But in the execution of this purpose he is charged with acts of the greatest perfidy and cruelty; he is said to have entered the province of C. Trebonius as if he were merely passing through it on his way to Syria:<sup>130</sup> he had an interview with Trebonius, in which he professed the most friendly dispositions towards him; and having thus lulled him into a fatal security, he made a sudden assault by night upon the city of Smyrna, in which Trebonius then was, and thus obtained possession of his person. Trebonius thus treacherously seized, was immediately put to the torture to draw from him some information as to the treasure of the province; and after he had suffered these cruelties for two days, he was beheaded with circumstances of additional barbarity; his head was carried about on the point of a spear, and his body was exposed to the insults of Dolabella's soldiers, and finally cast into the sea. After this murder, Dolabella enriched himself by seizing some of the public money in the province, and by the plunder of a great number of individuals;<sup>131</sup> but not having a sufficient force to enable him at once to maintain Asia, and to prosecute his march towards Syria, he abandoned the prize which he had gained, and continued his progress towards the east. But receiving alarming accounts of the force

<sup>130</sup> Cicero, Philippic. XI. 2, 3. Livy, Epitome, CXIX.

<sup>131</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares. XII. epist. XV.

under C. Cassius, and thinking it probable that Syria would be effectually barred against him, he prepared a large fleet of transports in the ports of Lycia, on board of which he intended, in case of need, to embark his troops and his treasures, and return to join Antonius in Italy. This scheme was defeated by the activity of P. Lentulus Spinther, the son of that Lentulus who had been consul in the year 696, and to whom Cicero was largely indebted for his recall from banishment. The younger P. Lentulus had been quæstor under Trebonius in Asia, and had first retired into Macedonia after the murder of the proconsul;<sup>132</sup> but finding that Dolabella did not retain possession of Asia, he returned thither, and having re-organized the administration of that province, he hastened to Rhodes with the fleet under his command, in order to procure assistance from the government of that island to enable him to attack the fleet of Dolabella in Lycia. The Rhodians, however, had suffered too severely under the dominion of the old aristocracy at Rome to be inclined to support its defenders. They had refused to receive Pompey himself within their walls, when he was a fugitive after the battle of Pharsalia; and a squadron of their ships had joined Cæsar at that period, and had distinguished itself most highly in his service during the contest in which he was involved in Egypt. But P. Lentulus, even without their aid, was strong enough to effect his purpose; the ships of war belonging to Dolabella fled from Lycia, and either dispersed and abandoned his cause, or retreated to Cyprus and Syria, while the transports thus left to themselves were immediately secured by

Dolabella is shut out from Syria by Cassius.

Lentulus. Dolabella arriving in Syria with a force which was probably not very considerable, found the gates of Antioch closed against him,<sup>133</sup> and having in vain endeavoured to force an entrance, he fled in disorder to Laodicea.

He is besieged in Laodicea, and kills himself.

In this distressed state of his fortunes, his soldiers began to desert him, and he soon found himself besieged by C. Cassius, who had gained full possession of the province of Syria, and now commanded an army of ten legions. Laodicea was blockaded by land and sea, till Dolabella, hopeless of relief, and dreading the fate which he had inflicted on Trebonius, ended his life by suicide.<sup>134</sup> This event took place in the summer of 710, and the tidings of it reached the capital, and cheered the aristocratical party with a moment's exultation immediately before their complete and final overthrow.

The army with which Cassius had obtained this great success, had been collected by him from various quarters, since his first departure from Italy in the autumn of the preceding year. He had first visited Trebonius in

<sup>132</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. XIV. XV.

<sup>133</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. XIII. XIV. XV.

<sup>134</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 69. Livy, Epitome, 121.

the province of Asia,<sup>135</sup> and was liberally supplied with money by his quæstor, P. Lentulus, who also claimed the merit of winning over to his interest a large body of cavalry forming part of Dolabella's army, which had been sent on by him from Macedonia, to precede his march into Syria. Some forces were also raised in the province itself; and Cassius, thus provided with men and money, did not hesitate to proceed to Syria without delay, while Dolabella was still lingering in Europe. He reached Syria in the depth of the winter, perhaps about the end of January or beginning of February, when the ascendancy of the aristocratical party in Rome, and the measures taken against Antonius, were already known in the east. There was at this time in Syria an army, according to Appian, of six legions,<sup>136</sup> under the command of L. Staius Murcus, and Q. Marcius Crispus, which had been committed to them by Cæsar for the purpose of reducing Q. Cæcilius Bassus, and the legion with which he maintained himself in Apamea. Both of these officers had served under Cæsar in the civil war, but they were men of little ambition, and were disposed to obey any authority which might seem entitled to command them. Accordingly, they gave up their legions to Cassius without hesitation,<sup>137</sup> believing that by so doing, they should most consult the wishes of the government at Rome; and this example was presently followed by the legion under Q. Bassus; for although that officer himself was sufficiently desirous of retaining his command, yet his soldiers looked upon Cassius as so much more respectable a leader, that he was unable to prevent them from making him an offer of their services. Soon afterwards, A. Allienus, who had been employed by Dolabella to lead from Egypt four legions which had been mostly left there by Cæsar to secure the throne of Cleopatra, meeting Cassius in Syria, and being neither willing nor able to resist him, surrendered to him the whole force which he commanded. With regard to foreign states, it may be mentioned that the inhabitants of Syria in general,<sup>138</sup> and particularly the people of Tyre, as also Cæsar's old enemy, Deiotarus, king of Galatia, were inclined to support Cassius; while on the other hand, Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, the Rhodians, the Lycians, the people of Tarsus,<sup>139</sup> and the Jews, were the enemies of the old aristocracy, and devoted to any one who should profess himself the representative of the party of Cæsar. The Jews, however, being placed in the midst of the forces of Cassius, were soon obliged to submit to him; and he proceeded soon afterwards to attack the Rhodians, whose eminence as a naval power made their opposition more formidable.

<sup>135</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. XIV. Dion Cassius, XLVII. 342.

<sup>136</sup> De Bello Civili, IV. 58.

<sup>137</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. XI. XII.

<sup>138</sup> Cicero, Philippic. XI. 13, 14.

<sup>139</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. XIII. Dion Cassius, XLVII. 343.



We have thus carried on our narrative of the state of affairs in the east to a period some months later than that at which we had arrived, in describing the course of events at Rome and in Italy. When M. Brutus had made himself master of Macedonia and Achaia, he sent despatches to the senate containing an account of his successes.<sup>140</sup> After they had been read, Q. Fufius Calenus proposed that they should be acknowledged by an answer of mere compliment, and that Brutus at the same time should be ordered to give up the legions, the command of which he had gained so irregularly. But Cicero, rejoicing to see a powerful army in the hands of a general on whom he could so fully rely, moved on the contrary, "that the senate highly approved of the conduct of Brutus, and that it confirmed to him in the fullest manner the possession of the armies and provinces which he had acquired, requesting him at the same time to remain with his forces as much as possible in the neighbourhood of Italy, that he might be ready to lend his assistance to the commonwealth if necessary." This motion, it appears, was carried, and excited probably no small jealousy amongst the partisans of Cæsar. Soon afterwards, tidings arrived of the murder of Trebonius, and the seizure of the province of Asia by Dolabella. The cruelty which had accompanied this action excited a general feeling of indignation. Q. Calenus,<sup>141</sup> with a frankness highly creditable to him, being first asked his opinion by his son-in-law, C. Pansa, moved that Dolabella should be declared a public enemy, and that his property should be confiscated; adding, that if any senator should propose a decree of greater severity, he would gladly assent to it. But the unanimity which had been thus happily produced by the cruelty of Dolabella, was soon disturbed. It was next to be considered to whom the commonwealth should intrust the duty of revenging the death of Trebonius, and prosecuting the war against Dolabella. L. Cæsar,<sup>142</sup> who had been consul twenty-one years before, in the year preceding the conspiracy of Catiline, the uncle of M. Antonius, but who had always firmly and honestly opposed his ambitious and violent measures, proposed that P. Servilius Isauricus should be the person selected. Servilius had been Cæsar's colleague in the consulship in the year 705; but even then he had supported the aristocratical interests with vigour against the mischievous laws of M. Cælius. He had since been himself proconsul of Asia, and had borne the character of a moderate and humane magistrate,<sup>143</sup> so that his appointment seems to have been most unexceptionable, and was likely to have answered Cicero's purposes sufficiently in putting

Vote of the senate in favour of Brutus.

Dolabella declared a public enemy by the senate.

<sup>140</sup> Cicero, Philippic. X. passim.

<sup>141</sup> Cicero, Philippic. XI. 6.

<sup>142</sup> Cicero, Philippic. XI. 8; Epist. ad Familiares, XII. epist. V.

<sup>143</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XIII. epist. LXVI. LXVIII.

down Dolabella, without giving offence to the partisans of Cæsar. Another proposal advised that the war should be committed to the two consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, who were to be appointed to the command of the two provinces of Asia and Syria. By this method it was artfully intended to allure the two consuls from Italy by the prospect of an honourable command in the most lucrative stations in the empire; to leave Octavius by their departure at the head of the troops opposed to Antonius, and above all to stop the progress of Cassius, who was suspected of seizing Syria by his own authority. Nothing seemed so likely to disappoint this scheme as the proposal of L. Cæsar, which, if supported by the aristocratical party, would probably have been carried. But Cicero most injudiciously opposed the nomination of Servilius, as well as that of the consuls, and moved "that the war with Dolabella, together with the province of Syria, and all the troops in that part of the empire, should be intrusted to C. Cassius; that for the prosecution of the war he should be invested with an absolute control over the fleets and revenues of the east; that his command should extend to the provinces of Asia, Pontus, and Bithynia, as well as to Syria; and that into whatsoever province he should enter in the course of his hostilities against Dolabella, his authority in that province should immediately supersede that of the regular officers of the commonwealth." Even the very mother and brother of Cassius,<sup>144</sup> who were at that time in Rome, remonstrated with Cicero upon the gross impolicy of such a proposal. When Brutus had so lately been confirmed in the command of three provinces, and an army of seven legions, how was it to be expected that even moderate men, and much less that the partisans of Cæsar, should consent to invest another of the conspirators with powers and resources still more ample? The only effect of Cicero's motion was to render him an object of increased suspicion to all the friends of Cæsar's government, and to procure the triumph of that party who wished to give the command of the war with Dolabella to the consuls Hirtius and Pansa. It is true that they did not live long enough to avail themselves of the vote of the senate in their favour; and Cassius, as we have seen, soon afterwards destroyed Dolabella by his own authority. But Cicero, by thus showing himself so intemperate a partisan of the assassins of Cæsar, and of those two in particular who had even during the civil war been among the adherents of Pompey, gave a general disgust to that numerous portion of the commonwealth who wished to see Cæsar's system and measures preserved under certain limitations, and who dreaded and abhorred the exclusive dominion of the high aristocratical party.

The proceedings of Antonius, however, during his consulship

<sup>144</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. VII.

Vote of the senate  
against Antonius.

had been so violent, that the majority of the senate were disposed to pass the strongest decrees against him individually, however unwilling they might be to concur in the excessive powers and honours proposed by Cicero for the assassins of Cæsar. It was resolved that the laws passed by Antonius were not binding;<sup>145</sup> that he had forged decrees of the senate; and that he had corruptly appropriated to himself above five millions sterling of the public money. By these resolutions the senate seemed to declare that their quarrel with him was perpetual; and although they were so far moved by L. Piso and Q. Calenus as to vote that another deputation should be sent to him, in the expectation that he would submit implicitly to their orders, yet when they found that this expectation was not likely to be realized, the measure was dropped altogether. Nay, when letters were received from M. Lepidus,<sup>146</sup> urging them to put an end to the civil war, they voted according to the sentiments of P. Servilius, who moved, that peace with Antonius was prejudicial to the commonwealth. It was about this time also, that is, the beginning of April, that M. Varisidius arrived at Rome,<sup>147</sup> being the bearer of a letter addressed by L. Plancus to the senate. In this letter Plancus asserted that he had an army of five legions under his command; and that both himself, his soldiers, and the people of his province of Gaul, were entirely devoted to the interests of his country, and ready to undertake any service to which the commonwealth might think proper to call them. There was an ambiguity in the terms "country" and "commonwealth," of which Plancus possibly designed hereafter to avail himself; yet the tone of his letter was so promising, and his language in a private letter to Cicero was so strongly in favour of his attachment to the course now pursued by the senate, that Cicero thought proper to move for a grant of extraordinary honours to him, in recompense of his fidelity. This motion was opposed by P. Servilius; and when the majority of the senate agreed to it, P. Titius, one of the tribunes, interposed his negative at the request of Servilius, and thus stopped the decree. The debate was adjourned to the following day, the ninth of April, when Cicero spoke with great vehemence against Servilius and Titius; and at last, partly from the effect of his own eloquence, and partly owing to the impression produced by the arrival of despatches from P. Lentulus in Asia,<sup>148</sup> containing an account of the progress of Cassius

<sup>145</sup> Cicero, *Philippic.* XII. 5.

<sup>146</sup> Cicero, *Philippic.* XIII. 4, et seq.

<sup>147</sup> Cicero, *ad Familiares*, X. epist. VIII.  
XII.

<sup>148</sup> Cicero, *ad Brutum*, II. epist. II. We are aware that the genuineness of the two books of "Epistles to Brutus" has been

often questioned; and Schütz has classed them, together with five orations commonly ascribed to Cicero, among the works which he believes to be forgeries; and has published them in a separate volume.— But judging from the arguments which he brings to prove their spuriousness, the gen-



in Syria ; the opinion of Cicero triumphed, the tribune withdrew his negative, and the vote of honours to L. Plancus was carried. But the subsequent conduct of Plancus seems to indicate that with regard to him, as well as to Octavius, Cicero either believed or pretended to believe their professions much too readily ; and by his lavish votes in their favour injured, in fact, the dignity of the commonwealth, and gave to the contest the appearance of a personal quarrel with Antonius, rather than of a general opposition to the principle of usurped and illegal power and military tyranny.

wineness of a work was never more unreasonably suspected. He says, that the letter which we have just quoted (II. epist. II.) must be a forgery, because it speaks of the arrival of tidings concerning Cassius on the 9th of April ; whereas in another letter to Brutus, dated on the 5th of May, the writer says that nothing was known of the forces of Cassius. But on attending to the whole passages in both letters, the inconsistency vanishes. Despatches had reached Rome, on the 9th of April, from P. Lentulus, who had been quæstor to Trebonius, and who appears to have written them from the province of Asia. They contained a report of the information which he had received from Syria, of the occupation of that province by Cassius, and of the surrender of the legions under L. Murcus and Q. Crispus. It is not said that the despatches of Lentulus entered into any particulars ; but they probably stated in general terms, as was natural, what he had heard of events which had occurred in a distant province. Nearly a month afterwards, Cicero informs Brutus that the senate had given him a discretionary power to act against Dolabella or not, as he should judge most expedient ; and adds, as the reason why so much was thus left to his own judgment, that nothing was known about the army of Cassius ; nothing, that is, as to its position, its operations, or even its means of taking the field. It was known that Cassius had an army and a province ; but this knowledge was of no use towards deciding the question, whether he might require the aid of Brutus in destroying Dolabella or no ; and therefore, as far as that point was concerned, it was equivalent to a "total ignorance about the army of Cassius."

We have quoted the "Epistles to Brutus" without hesitation ; for we think that all the positive arguments of inconsistency with themselves or with other authorities, which Schütz has repeated from Tun-

stall, are founded on mistakes and misinterpretations of the passages attacked.—Another class of arguments, if they deserve to be called so, is built on the pretended occurrence of unclassical or inelegant expressions in these letters ; and sometimes a letter is condemned because "*tota ejus compositio prorsus a Ciceronis elegantia abhorret.*" Schütz, *Præfat.* in tom. VIII. p. 3. Ciceron. Oper. It must be a very strong case indeed that could warrant us in pronouncing a work to be a forgery, on account of fancied inelegancies in its style, or even of dissimilarity from the usual language of the writer. But in the present instance we see no such dissimilarity ; and as for the inelegance of particular expressions, we do think that it is quite absurd to pretend to decide, in a dead language, what expressions might or might not have been used in the familiarity of a private letter.

The evidence in favour of the "Epistles to Brutus" is the same on which we believe the genuineness of any ancient writing ; namely, that they have been transmitted down to us amongst the other works of Cicero, and profess to be his composition. If the arguments brought against them be of no weight, if there be, as we think there is not, no evidence to render them suspected, we may receive them as genuine on the external evidence of their having been always ascribed to Cicero, without inquiring whether they afford any positive internal evidence in their own favour. But we think that they possess also this mark of genuineness, and that they are such letters as no man was likely to have forged, from the brevity and uninteresting nature of many of the numbers ; and from their real, but neither apparent nor designed, agreement with what we know from other really respectable authorities concerning the facts to which they allude.

While the aristocratical party was thus triumphing in the fancied support of Plancus, Antonius was endeavouring to seduce the officers who were employed against him, A. Hirtius and C. Octavius. He addressed to them a letter,<sup>149</sup> in which he represented the impolicy of their conduct in serving the purposes of the Pompeian party, and fighting against their old comrades and natural associates, in behalf of men by whom they were hated in reality as bitterly as he himself. And he spoke of Lepidus and Plancus as being united with him in all his designs, and approving his proceedings. This letter was transmitted by Hirtius to Cicero, and was by him read aloud in the senate. To Octavius, doubtless, it suggested nothing which he had not himself clearly perceived before. It was not, and could not be his real intention to exalt the cause of Pompey, or to see the assassins of his uncle in possession of the greatest power and dignity in the commonwealth. Nor ought the enemies of Antonius to have neglected that part of his letter in which he boasted of the entire co-operation of Lepidus and Plancus. With regard to Lepidus, the whole course of his former life, as well as his recent interference to procure peace for Antonius, rendered the assertion extremely probable; and if Lepidus deserted the cause of the commonwealth, the fidelity of Plancus would be exposed to a very severe temptation. On the other hand, the consuls Hirtius and Pansa, the latter of whom had now taken the field with the army which he had been levying and organizing at Rome, possessed and deserved the entire confidence of the senate; and whilst the greatest part of the forces employed against Antonius was in their hands, Octavius must of necessity remain faithful, and the contest might be decided before Lepidus or Plancus should venture to throw aside the mask which they now thought it prudent to wear.

Meantime the events of the campaign were becoming of the highest importance. In the month of February, Antonius, while closely besieging Decimus Brutus in Mutina, was in possession of the important places of Parma, Regium Lepidi or Reggio, and Bononia or Bologna. These three towns were all situated on the Æmilian way, at that time probably the only good line of communication by which it was possible to reach Mutina; and lying two to the westward and one to the eastward of the place that was besieged, the occupation of them by the besieging army rendered it difficult for Hirtius and Octavius to advance to its relief. The season, besides, was unfavourable, and C. Pansa was still busied in levying troops at Rome; so that Hirtius and Octavius remained quiet for some time; the former at Claterna,<sup>150</sup> and the latter at Forum Cornelii, or Imola; both of which towns were situated

Battle of Mutina.  
U. C. 711.

<sup>149</sup> Cicero, Philippic. XIII. 10, et seq.

<sup>150</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. V.

on the Æmilian way, between Bononia and Ariminum. But as the spring came on, and Decimus Brutus began to suffer severely from the strictness of the blockade, Hirtius and Octavius deemed it necessary to act more vigorously. They advanced towards Mutina, and Antonius thought proper to abandon Bononia to them, so that they were enabled to approach very near to the lines of the besiegers; and in this situation they were endeavouring to open a communication with Decimus Brutus, and were waiting at the same time for the arrival of Pansa with his newly raised legions from Rome. It was about the middle of April,<sup>151</sup> when Hirtius was informed that Pansa was approaching at the head of four legions of newly-raised troops; and in order to favour his safe arrival, which Antonius would naturally endeavour to prevent, he despatched the prætorian cohorts of himself and Octavius, together with one of his legions, by night to join him, and strengthen him on his march. It happened that this was the Martian legion, which had first set the example of desertion from Antonius, and which was animated by the fiercest animosity against him. Antonius, not aware of the reinforcement which Pansa had thus received, marched with two of his veteran legions, and some of Cæsar's disbanded soldiers, whom he had assembled under his standard at the beginning of the campaign, to intercept him on his way. But on the first appearance of his light troops and cavalry, the Martian legion, unable to restrain its impetuosity, advanced hastily forward, and followed by the two prætorian cohorts, engaged with the enemy before it could be supported by the newly-raised legions, which were at some distance in the rear. It was in consequence overpowered and defeated with severe loss;<sup>152</sup> Pansa, who had taken the command of it in person, after having vainly endeavoured to check its imprudent advance, was dangerously wounded, and carried off to Bononia; and Antonius following up his advantage, attempted to take the camp of the enemy. Here, however, he was repulsed by two of Pansa's newly-raised legions, and finding that he could do nothing further on that side, he commenced his retreat towards his own camp before Mutina. But Hirtius, who had received intelligence of Pansa's danger, had set out with two legions to his rescue, leaving Octavius to defend their camp; and although he could not arrive in time to prevent the defeat of the Martian legion, yet he fell in with Antonius when retreating towards Mutina after his victory, and assaulting his soldiers, fatigued as they were by their preceding exertions, he totally routed and dispersed them. Antonius reached his lines in safety at the head of his cavalry, a kind of force with which Hirtius was unprovided, and

<sup>151</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XXX.

<sup>152</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XXX.; Philippic. XIV. 9, 10. 14.



found that the troops whom he had left there in the morning, had made an attack upon the enemy's camp during the absence of Hirtius, but had been repulsed with loss by the forces left with Octavius to guard it.

By this action the army of Antonius was greatly weakened, but as it yet retained its lines around Mutina, the relief of Decimus Brutus had not been effected by the success of his associates. Hirtius and Octavius, therefore, were anxious to bring Antonius to a second action; and this they accomplished by threatening to force their way into Mutina at a distant and ill-guarded quarter of his lines. Antonius was forced to fight in order to oppose this attempt; but he was again defeated with great loss; and Decimus Brutus making a sally at the same time with the garrison of Mutina, he had no other resource but to abandon all his positions, and fly with the wreck of his infantry, covered by his still unbroken cavalry, in the direction of the Alps.<sup>153</sup> Unfortunately for the cause of the aristocracy, Hirtius, while pursuing the enemy into their lines, had fallen, and the command of his army devolved thus suddenly upon Octavius. This circumstance deprived Decimus Brutus for the moment of any co-operation. Octavius drew back his troops into his own camp, and Brutus, not aware of the death of Hirtius,<sup>154</sup> waited in expectation of receiving some communication from him. When he learned that Octavius was now the sole general of the army of the commonwealth, he wished to ascertain his sentiments before he ventured freely to act with him; and having requested and obtained an interview with him, although Octavius removed all suspicion by the language which he held, yet it was too late in the day, after this meeting, to take any active steps in pursuing Antonius. On the following morning Decimus Brutus was summoned to Bononia to see Pansa, who was lying there ill of his wounds; but on his way thither he received intelligence of the consul's death, and returned immediately to Mutina, having lost irreparably another day. Meantime Antonius was retreating with the utmost rapidity, marching in no regular order, and swelling his numbers by opening all the workhouses, and enlisting the slaves who were kept there under their taskmasters.<sup>155</sup> His object was to enter Gaul as soon as possible by way of the Maritime Alps; and accordingly he allowed himself no respite till he had crossed the Apennines and arrived at Vada,<sup>156</sup> a spot which still retains the name of Vado, and is situated on the road from Genoa to Nice, a little to the westward of Savona. Here he received a most seasonable support in the junction of P.

Defeat of Antonius.  
Death of the two  
consuls.

Antonius retreats to-  
wards Gaul, and is  
joined by Ventidius.

<sup>153</sup> Cicero, ad Brutum, I. epist. IV.

<sup>154</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. XIII.

<sup>155</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. X.

<sup>156</sup> Strabo, IV. 221, edit. Xyland.

Ventidius with three legions. This officer was a native of Asculum, and when that town had been taken by Cn. Pompeius Strabo in the Italian war, Ventidius, then quite a boy, had walked amongst the other prisoners in the triumphal procession of the conqueror. Since that time he had risen to considerable eminence, and had probably become acquainted with Antonius while they both served under Cæsar. When the civil war was again begun by the siege of Mutina, and Italy seemed likely to be the scene of a bloody contest, as in the times of Marius and Sylla, Ventidius repaired to his native country, Picenum, and there began to raise soldiers, partly from among Cæsar's veterans, and partly from the inhabitants. He had collected a force of three legions, and was apparently still in Picenum, or its neighbourhood,<sup>157</sup> when he received intelligence of the defeat of Antonius. Without loss of time he set out to join him, and as Octavius took no pains to intercept him, he crossed the Apennines by roads scarcely practicable, and succeeded in his attempt. Their cavalry was exceedingly formidable,<sup>158</sup> and L. Antonius was sent forwards with it to occupy the passes of the Alps, on the coast road from Vada to Forum Julii, or Frejus. Antonius himself arrived at Forum Julii on the fifteenth of May,<sup>159</sup> with the first divisions of his infantry; Ventidius following at the distance of two days' march in the rear. They found that M. Lepidus had arrived with his army at Forum Vontii, a place distant little more than twenty miles from them; and whatever private reasons Antonius might have had for depending on his assistance, yet his avowed object was to prevent the fugitive army from entering his province, and he had called upon L. Plancus to co-operate with him for that end. Plancus, as we have seen, had been rewarded with thanks and honours by the senate, on the motion of Cicero, in return for the assurances of patriotism which he had sent to Rome from his province in the month of March. He crossed the Rhone, near Lyons and Vienne, on the twenty-sixth of April,<sup>160</sup> with the intention, as he declared, of marching into Italy to the relief of Decimus Brutus; but receiving intelligence of the battles of Mutina a few days afterwards, he halted between the Rhone and the Isere, and began to communicate with Lepidus on the best means of serving the commonwealth.

Lepidus pretends to oppose his passage.

The chief agent in this correspondence was M. Juventius Laterensis, who was at this time one of the lieutenants of Lepidus; but, unlike his general, had been through life, and still continued to be, a fearless and sincere supporter of the old constitution.<sup>161</sup> Laterensis, believing what he

Movements of Plancus and Decimus Brutus.

<sup>157</sup> Cicero, Philippic. XII. 9.

<sup>158</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XV. XXXIII. XXXIV.

<sup>159</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XVII.

<sup>160</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. IX.

<sup>161</sup> Laterensis had abandoned his canvass for the tribuneship in the year 694, because all candidates for any magistracy were required to take an oath that they

wished, assured Plancus of the good intentions of Lepidus, and earnestly entreated him to move to his assistance against Antonius. It was on the twelfth of May that Plancus had thrown a bridge over the Isere, and had crossed the river; but he had remained on the left bank for nine days, being inclined, he said, to wait there for the arrival of Decimus Brutus, on whose co-operation he could more safely rely than on that of Lepidus. But being urged by the repeated entreaties and assurances of Lepidus and Laterensis, he moved forward from the Isere with four legions on the twenty-first of May,<sup>162</sup> having built and garrisoned two towers at the two extremities of his bridge, in order to secure the passage for Decimus Brutus, if he should arrive from Italy to join him. Three days only after he left the Isere Decimus Brutus was at Eporedia, or Ivrea,<sup>163</sup> in the direct road from the plains of the Po to the passage over the Alps by the Little St. Bernard, by which, retracing Hannibal's footsteps, he would have descended into the plains of Dauphinè by Montmeillan, and the road to Vienne. Brutus had under his command an army of seven legions,<sup>164</sup> consisting of the legions raised by Pansa, those which he had levied himself, and one legion of veterans; but having been delayed at first in pursuing Antonius after the battle of Mutina, having lost the co-operation of Octavius, and being unprovided with the means of adequately supplying his army, he was probably an unequal match for the united forces of Antonius and Ventidius, and therefore was obliged to rest his dependence on the assistance of Plancus. But when he had reached Eporedia, he was induced to suspend his march by the alarming reports which he received of the dispositions of Octavius and his veterans,<sup>165</sup> reports which made him unwilling to leave Italy, and to abandon the seat of government to the ambition of one who was far more dangerous than Antonius. Meanwhile Plancus moved forwards from the Isere to join the army of Lepidus;<sup>166</sup> but by this time the soldiers of Antonius were in communication with those of Lepidus, and these last had openly told their general that they were determined to have peace, and would fight with none of their fellow-soldiers. M. Laterensis, perceiving that Lepidus took no steps to check these feelings in his soldiers, wrote to Plancus to warn him that he should advance no further; and Plancus accordingly halted

would never propose to the people any alteration in Cæsar's agrarian law, relative to a division of lands in Campania. Cicero, ad Atticum, II. epist. XVIII. And he had afterwards loudly taxed Cicero with a disgraceful tergiversation, when he allowed himself to court the friendship of Pompey and Cæsar in opposition to the senate after his return from exile. Cicero, pro Plancio, 38, 39.

<sup>162</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XVIII.

<sup>163</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. XX.  
<sup>164</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XXIV.: XI. epist. X.

<sup>165</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. XX.  
<sup>166</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XXI.

XXIII.



within forty miles of Forum Julii to wait the event. On the twenty-ninth of May, Lepidus united his forces with those of Antonius, and the two generals instantly began to march in pursuit of Plancus. He fell back upon the Isere as they advanced, recrossed the river without suffering any annoyance, and having broken down his bridge, resolved again, according to his own account, to look forward to the arrival of Decimus Brutus. But it may be suspected that Antonius and Lepidus would have pursued him more vigorously, had they apprehended any serious effects from his hostility; and the indecision of Plancus may have joined with the treachery of Lepidus in provoking Laterensis to that act of despair by which, when he saw the junction with Antonius consummated, he fell upon his own word.

Union between Antonius and Lepidus.

Suicide of Laterensis.

It is now time to return to Rome, and to notice the effect produced in the capital by the tidings of the battle of Mutina. When it was known that the siege of Mutina was raised, and that Antonius was flying in disorder with the wreck of his army, the expressions, and probably the feelings of public joy, were great and general.<sup>167</sup> The people, as if all danger were at an end, laid aside the military dress: a triumph was voted to Decimus Brutus,<sup>168</sup> an ovation to Octavius, and a public funeral in the Campus Martius to the two consuls, Hirtius and Pansa. Antonius and all his followers were declared public enemies; and as the death of the consuls left vacant the charge of conducting the war against Dolabella, P. Servilius moved that it should be now conferred on Cassius; and it was added, on the suggestion of Cicero, that M. Brutus might take part in it or not, as he should judge most expedient for the commonwealth. The first check which his exultation sustained was from the tidings of the unmolested retreat of Antonius, and of his junction with P. Ventidius; and the public complained loudly of the neglect of Decimus Brutus and Octavius in suffering their defeated enemy to escape. Decimus Brutus, however, had so deep an interest in the success of the aristocracy, that he cannot be suspected of any want of vigour in their cause; and his own justification, which he sent to Cicero in one of his letters, appears entirely satisfactory.<sup>169</sup> We have already men-

Proceedings at Rome.

<sup>167</sup> Cicero, ad Brutum, I. epist. III.—There is a story told by Valerius Maximus, V. 2, which seems to confirm the statement of Cicero, that the war with Antonius was regarded by the people in general as a struggle for their liberty.—When M. Cornutus, the prætor, was proceeding to contract for the funeral solemnities of Hirtius and Pansa, the principal undertakers in Rome begged that they

might be allowed to furnish every thing that was required, even to the labour of their slaves, without receiving any sort of payment, because they considered the two consuls to have fallen in the service of their country.

<sup>168</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 62, edit. Oxon. 1693. Cicero, ad Brutum, I. epist. V. XV.

<sup>169</sup> Ad Familiares, XI. epist. XIII.

tioned the circumstances which detained him two days from the pursuit of Antonius immediately after the battle; and it became then impossible for him to overtake the fugitives, who were making their way with the utmost expedition by tracts which were probably impracticable for a regular army, whose order was unbroken. But Decimus Brutus requested Octavius to cross the Apennines and intercept the division of Ventidius;<sup>170</sup> for the troops of Antonius, if left to themselves, would naturally dwindle away by desertion; whereas, if they were reinforced immediately by a fresh army, their spirits would gradually recover, and their fidelity to their chief would be confirmed.

And here we want a more detailed account of events, and a more careful specification of dates than it is now possible to gain. All the veteran legions, which had been commanded by the late consuls, were now, with one exception, under the orders of Octavius; but it seems that neither they nor their general were inclined to obey the senate any longer. What excuses he made to Decimus Brutus for not attempting to intercept Ventidius, we cannot tell; but no such attempt was made, and it was impossible for him, so soon after the battle, to have received intelligence of those decrees of the senate which his partisans represent as so injurious to him. The fact appears to be, that the death of both the consuls instantly opened to Octavius a new prospect; and that his thoughts were henceforward bent far more on forwarding his own schemes of ambition at Rome, than on lending any effectual assistance to Decimus Brutus. He conceived the design of procuring his own election to the consulship for the remaining months of the year; and possibly he showed some symptoms of his intentions immediately after the battle of Mutina; for Decimus Brutus gives some intimations of this kind in a letter to Cicero, dated on the fifth of May.<sup>171</sup> If this were at all suspected, it was just and reasonable that the senate should endeavour to transfer the chief command of the armies in Italy to an officer on whom more reliance could be placed; and, accordingly, it was proposed by L. Livius Drusus,<sup>122</sup> the father of the future wife of Octavius, and by L. Æmilius Paulus, that the fourth legion and the Martian should be given up to Decimus Brutus. This was never done, for the soldiers would not be commanded by one of Cæsar's assassins,<sup>173</sup> and Octavius was not at all unwilling to avail himself of their inclinations, and to plead his inability to comply with the senate's order.

Yet although his conduct in this matter, combined with his

<sup>170</sup> Ad Familiares, XI. epist. X.

<sup>171</sup> Ad Familiares, XI. epist. X. *Primum omnium, quantam perturbationem rerum urbanarum afferat obitus Consulum, quantamque cupiditatem hominibus injiciat*

*vacuitas, non te fugit. Satis me multa scripsisse, quæ literis commendari possint, arbitror. Scio enim, cui scribam.*

<sup>172</sup> Ad Familiares, XI. epist. XIX.

<sup>173</sup> Ad Familiares, XI. epist. XIV.

designs upon the consulship, and his negligence in acting against Antonius and Ventidius, must have given just offence, nothing was decreed by the senate against him; but a deputation of senators was sent to the legions to try whether they could not be prevailed upon to remain firm in their duty, and to pacify them with regard to some claims for pay and military rewards which they had been lately advancing.<sup>174</sup> In times of civil war, which are necessarily accompanied by great public and private distress, the government naturally finds it difficult to pay the armies by which it is supported; and this inability is commonly made a handle by the soldiers and their generals to colour their own usurpations. The poverty of the Roman treasury was very great, and it seemed impossible to supply it without having recourse to direct taxation,<sup>175</sup> from which the Romans had been exempted ever since the conquest of Macedonia by L. Æmilius Paulus. A property tax of one per cent. appears accordingly to have been levied;<sup>176</sup> but the money thus procured was no more than sufficient to discharge the promises formerly made by the senate to the fourth legion and the Martians for their early desertion of the cause of Antonius. A vote passed besides, that lands should be distributed among the soldiers of four legions;<sup>177</sup> but which they were, is not mentioned. And as a commission of ten senators had lately been appointed,<sup>178</sup> for the purpose of examining the acts of Antonius during his consulship, and amongst the rest his grants of lands to Cæsar's veteran soldiers, it appears that some of the members of this commission were anxious to have the management of the grants now proposed to be made to the four legions, which they would have connected with the reversal of those made by Antonius. All the commissioners were warm partisans of the aristocracy, and Cicero was amongst the most distinguished of the number; but on account of the jealousy which was felt towards every military man who might possess a dangerous influence over the soldiery, neither Decimus Brutus nor Octavius were included amongst them. In these measures there was a spirit manifested which alarmed and irritated all the partisans of Cæsar, and which made the army fear that they should soon be deprived of the fruits of their victories. The veterans expressed their indignation, that while their own generals were slighted, all the acts of government were directed by Cicero;<sup>179</sup> and all the bounties which they were to receive were

The army is irritated against the senate.

<sup>174</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 62. Appian, III. 86.

<sup>175</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. XXX. Pecunia conquiritur undique, ut optimè meritis militibus promissa solvantur; quod quidem fieri sine tributo posse non arbitror.

<sup>176</sup> Cicero, ad Brutum, I. epist. XVIII. Obdurescunt magis quotidie boni viri ad

vocem tributi; quod ex centissimâ collatum impudenti censu locupletum in duarum legionum præmis omne consumitur.

<sup>177</sup> Ad Familiares, XI. epist. XX.

<sup>178</sup> Ad Familiares, XI. epist. XX. XXI. Appian, III. 82.

<sup>179</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist. XX.



to be given them by men of whom they had no knowledge, and from whose gratitude or ambition they had nothing to expect.

Such language repeated by every person around him served, perhaps, to excuse to Octavius himself the guilt of the conduct which he meditated. He threw himself into the hands of his soldiers, with the mutual understanding that he should defend their interests while they served the ends of his ambition. His own grounds of offence against the senate were utterly trifling. It is a mere mockery of all government, when a military officer thinks himself justified in committing treason, because his services have not been rewarded according to his estimate of their merits; and Decimus Brutus had as much right as Octavius to complain of the omission of his name among the ten commissioners. But Decimus Brutus, instead of turning the irritation of the soldiers to his own purposes, wrote to Cicero to acquaint him with it, and to advise him to take some steps to pacify it. He recommended that no one legion should be favoured above the rest; that the lands which had belonged to the soldiers of Antonius, should be divided amongst the veterans who had fought under the late consuls and Octavius; and that Octavius and himself should be intrusted with the distribution of them. Cicero, in answer, expressed his entire approbation of these proposals;<sup>180</sup> assured Decimus Brutus that he had already prevented his colleagues in the commission from having the management of the division of lands, and that it was not his fault that neither Decimus nor Octavius had been included amongst the commissioners. Under these circumstances, it was the army, and not Octavius personally, whom it seemed expedient to the senate to conciliate. Their demands of pay and of rewards in land, were to be satisfied or moderated; their jealousy of the senate and of the civil authorities, was to be lessened; and they were to be persuaded to show their obedience and their respect to the usual practice of the commonwealth, by submitting to the command of Decimus Brutus, who was consul elect, rather than to that of a youth of nineteen, who had been only qualified to exercise any military authority at all, by the extraordinary favour of the senate in dispensing with the strict observance of the laws in his behalf. But when the deputation of the senate reached the camp of Octavius, the soldiers professed to be indignant that they were addressed distinctly from their general;<sup>181</sup> and Octavius, who had probably determined already on the part which he was to act, affected to be deeply injured, and while he professed his readiness to obey the senate, only inflamed the veterans still more by his pretended meekness, and determined

They refuse to listen to a deputation sent to them by the senate.

<sup>180</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XI. epist.

<sup>181</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 62.

them to persist in their refusal to listen to any communication which they did not receive through him.

The defection of Lepidus, which took place, as we have seen, on the twenty-ninth of May, made Octavius more anxious than ever to terminate his opposition to Antonius. It seems that in the beginning of June, Plancus had carried his forces across the Alps, and had formed a junction with those of Decimus Brutus, in the neighbourhood of Eporedia or Ivrea. Their united army consisted of four veteran legions, of one of two years' standing, and of nine newly levied;<sup>182</sup> so that although some of these were probably incomplete, yet the numerical strength of the whole must have been very considerable. But hardly any superiority of numbers could enable the newly-raised troops to meet veterans in the field; so that in opposing the united armies of Lepidus, Antonius, and Ventidius, the four veteran legions were the only part of their force on which Plancus and Brutus could safely calculate. Plancus, therefore, sent repeated letters to Octavius, requesting him to march to their assistance; and Octavius answered them by assurances that he was coming without delay, although, in fact, he was bent on moving in the very opposite direction, and on employing his troops, not against Antonius, but against the senate and people of Rome. Meantime, the senate, on the thirtieth of June, declared M. Lepidus a public enemy, together with all his adherents;<sup>183</sup> and it The senate declares Lepidus a public enemy. seems to have been a question whether or no the veteran legions in the province of Africa, and M. Brutus, with his victorious army in Greece, should be recalled for the defence of Italy. It seems probable that Cæsar's friends, as long as the intentions of Octavius were any way doubtful, represented that it could not fail to disgust and alienate him entirely, if the senate appeared to mistrust his fidelity; and, above all, if M. Brutus were called in to overawe him in the centre of Italy, whilst the command of the war in the north had been just transferred from him to Decimus. Accordingly, the fear of offending Octavius seems to have had such influence, that M. Brutus, although privately urged by Cicero to cross over into Italy, was never officially summoned home by the senate; but two legions from the army in Africa were sent for, and were despatched accordingly by Q. Cornificius, the commander of the province; they did not, however, arrive in Rome till the month of August, and their arrival, after all, as we shall see, produced no benefit. It was in the month of July that Octavius sent to the capital a deputation from his army, headed by one of his centurions, to request, or rather to demand, that he should be elected consul.<sup>184</sup> Wishing, as we may suppose, to

<sup>182</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XXIV.

<sup>183</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, XII. epist. X.

<sup>184</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, X. epist. XXIV. Suetonius, in Augusto, 26.

avoid the infamy of such an outrage, he had before endeavoured to find some friend amongst the magistrates or members of the senate, who would propose his request in a less obnoxious manner; but Cicero affirms,<sup>185</sup> as a splendid proof of the unanimous good spirit by which the people were actuated, that not a single individual could be prevailed upon to countenance his ambition.

Military deputation sent by Octavius to Rome, to demand the consulship.

His soldiers, however, were less scrupulous; and it is mentioned, that when the deputation was admitted into the senate, and had declared the wishes of the army, the centurion who headed it, finding that the senators hesitated in complying, threw back his military cloak, and pointing to the hilt of his sword, exclaimed, "If you refuse our request, this shall grant it." When such treasonable language could be uttered with impunity, a military despotism was, in fact, already established. The senate could not, at once, be induced to surrender up that liberty which so lately seemed to have been securely recovered; but Octavius determined now to throw off the mask

Octavius marches to Rome, and is elected consul, together with Q. Pedius.

altogether, put his army in motion from Cisalpine Gaul, entered Italy, as we are told, by the very road which his uncle had taken at the beginning of his rebellion,<sup>186</sup> advanced without opposition to the very gates of the capital, occupied the Campus Martius with his troops, and thus, under the imminent terror of a military usurpation, he was admitted into the city, and was elected consul, together with Q. Pedius, an old officer of his uncle, in the month of August, 710.<sup>187</sup> From this moment the liberty of the commonwealth was lost for ever; the senate, now the helpless instrument of military violence, was obliged to repeal its former decrees, by which Antonius and Lepidus had been declared public enemies; and the famous Pedian law was proposed and carried by Q. Pedius, which enacted

The assassins of Cæsar are condemned by a law brought forward by Q. Pedius.

that all the assassins of Cæsar, and all who had approved of the murder, should be brought to trial for that crime, and on condemnation should be forbidden the use of fire and water, according to the usual style of attainder. It is said that M. Agrippa came forward as the accuser of C. Cassius under this law;<sup>188</sup> and as neither he nor any of the other conspirators were in Rome to answer to the charge, sentence of condemnation was passed against them all. In the midst of these disturbances, the two legions from Africa arrived in Italy;<sup>189</sup> but the soldiers were soon corrupted by the general example of their comrades, and put themselves under the command of Octavius.

We have now reached the period at which we can no longer avail ourselves of the inestimable guidance of Cicero and his cor-

<sup>185</sup> Ad Brutum, I. epist. X.

<sup>186</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, III. 88, et

seq.

<sup>187</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 65. 69.

<sup>188</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 69.

<sup>189</sup> Appian, III. 92.



respondents; and we are left at the very moment when our curiosity and interest are most intensely excited, without any means of gratifying them. We might, indeed, still present our readers with a very detailed narrative of the course of events, if we could prevail on ourselves to rely on Dion Cassius and Appian. But as we have found how little they are to be trusted when we have been able to try them by a reference to good authorities, so when we have no opportunity of doing so, we cannot follow them with confidence, nor will we injure the truth of history by the indiscriminate admission of evidence so worthless.

It seems that Octavius, soon after his usurpation of the consulship, took the field to watch the movements of Antonius, who, since his junction with Lepidus, appears to have remained for some time quietly in Gaul, and not to have made any attempts against the army of Plancus and Brutus. But it is likely that he was prepared for the change in the conduct of Octavius, and rightly augured that he should draw from his consulship the same advantages which he must otherwise have risked a battle to gain.

Asinius Pollio,<sup>190</sup> finding that Cæsar's officers were all uniting in one common cause, and that his heir

Asinius Pollio and L. Plancus join Antonius.

was on the point of taking his natural station amongst them, surrendered his legions to Antonius; and L. Plancus did not hesitate to separate his troops from those of Decimus Brutus, and to follow the example of Pollio. Of the four veteran legions which Plancus and Brutus had commanded, three had belonged to Plancus;<sup>191</sup> and when these submitted to Antonius, it is likely that the single one which had been commanded by Brutus, was easily induced to follow the example of its comrades. It is said, also, that Plancus endeavoured to make his defection still more acceptable to Antonius,<sup>192</sup> by treacherously getting the person of his late associate into his power. In this he failed, but Decimus Brutus soon found that he could not depend upon the newly-raised legions, which alone continued to acknowledge his authority. They gradually dropped away from him, and Brutus saw that his only resource was to escape, if

Decimus Brutus is deserted by his soldiers, and endeavours to escape into Greece.

possible, from Italy, and reach the camp of M. Brutus in Greece. His troops at last deserting him altogether, he assumed the disguise of a Gaul, and hoped, by avoiding all the ordinary roads, to make his way to Aquileia and Illyricum, through the territories of the Gaulish chiefs, which bordered upon the Alps. He was discovered, however, by one of the chiefs, who instantly detained him, and sent word to Antonius of his capture. Antonius sent a party of soldiers to put him to death, and to

He is taken and put to death by order of Antonius.

<sup>190</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 63. Livy, Epitome, CXX.

<sup>192</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 64. Livy, Epitome, CXX. Appian, III. 97, 98.—

<sup>191</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares. X. epist. Valerius Maximus, IX. 13.

bring his head away with them, and his commands were speedily executed. If, as it is reported, the Gaulish chief who betrayed him had formerly received great kindnesses at his hands,<sup>193</sup> Decimus Brutus met with a treatment more exactly corresponding to the peculiar perfidy and ingratitude which he had himself shown in the assassination of Cæsar. It is true that in the last part of his life he had well and honourably supported the cause of the commonwealth; but if Antonius had never been guilty of a worse crime than the putting him to death, his conduct would have had some plea of retaliation to urge; and amidst the low morality of the times, the illegality of the action might seem excused by the former illegal violence of him who was now the victim.

Octavius, or Augustus as we shall for the future call him,<sup>194</sup> now invested with the title of consul, and commanding a numerous army, marched back again towards Cisalpine Gaul, and found that Antonius and Lepidus had by this time recrossed the Alps, and were arrived in the neighbourhood of Mutina. A friendly correspondence had been carried on between the chiefs of the two armies before they were advanced very near to one another; and it was determined that all differences should finally be settled, and the future measures which they were to take in common, should be arranged at a personal interview. Accordingly, the meeting took place in one of the islands,<sup>195</sup> if so they may be called, which were formed in the low fenny district between the Apennines and the Po, by the numerous streams which descended from the mountains, and which for want of a proper drainage spread themselves to a vast extent over the low country, encircling various tracts of marshy ground in their irregular courses. On one of these spots, which the subsequent alterations in the nature of the country would soon make it almost impossible to identify, amidst a scenery, the dull and loathsome character of which well befitted the actors and the acts which they meditated, Antonius, Lepidus, and Augustus, held their conference. It was pretended afterwards by the

Meeting between  
Antonius, Lepidus  
and Augustus.

<sup>193</sup> Appian, III. 98.

<sup>194</sup> We have resolved to call Octavius henceforward by the name of Augustus, in order that the cruelties of the triumvirate, and the splendour of the imperial government, may be distinctly associated in the reader's mind with one and the same person; for otherwise the emperor seems to have derived a real benefit from his change of name, and Octavius with all his atrocities is forgotten, while we think only of Augustus, the peaceful sovereign of the civilized world, the patron of literature, and the idol of the favourite writers of our youth.

<sup>195</sup> Appian, IV. 2. Plutarch, in Anto-

nio, 19. Such a spot as that described in the text, was the isle of Athelney, in Somersetshire, to which Alfred is said to have retired when the Danes had overrun his kingdom. And the isle of Ely still retains the name of an island, which it obtained originally from similarity of situation.—The progress of agricultural improvement so alters the appearance of such districts, that Athelney now can scarcely, if at all, be recognized; and the country between the Apennines and the Po, which was in the days of the triumvirate little better than a great fen, is now described to be one of the richest and most delightful parts in Italy.

writers, who flourished under the imperial government,<sup>196</sup> that Augustus for a long time remonstrated against the bloody executions which Antonius and Lepidus were eager to perpetrate; but his language at a private meeting could not be so well ascertained as his subsequent conduct; and this, it is confessed, was more remorseless than that of either of his associates; for whilst Antonius and Lepidus listened in several instances to the influence of entreaties or of favour, and spared those whom they had condemned to death, it is mentioned that Augustus did not pardon a single victim.<sup>197</sup> But whatever discussions may have taken place between the three leaders, the result sufficiently proved that all principles and all feelings of good were overpowered in their minds by revenge and ambition. They constituted themselves into a Triumvirate, or High Commission of Three,<sup>198</sup> for settling the affairs of the commonwealth during five years; they divided among themselves those provinces of the empire which were subject to their power; and nominated the persons who were to hold the usual annual magistracies during the term of the Triumvirate; they made such liberal promises to their armies, that it is said that eighteen of the finest cities in Italy, together with the territories adjacent to them, were to be given up to the soldiers as military colonies; and they agreed to draw up a list of proscription, including the names of all those individuals whom they proposed to murder. To cement the personal union of the Triumvirs, it was resolved that Clodia,<sup>199</sup> the daughter-in-law of Antonius, being the daughter of his wife Fulvia by her first husband P. Clodius, should be given in marriage to Augustus; but she was as yet too young to become a wife, and in a short time afterwards, the nominal connexion which policy had formed, was, by a change of political circumstances, as readily dissolved.

The second triumvirate.  
U. C. 711.

Immediately after the conclusion of this agreement, and while its purport was unknown at Rome, orders were despatched to the capital for the murder of twelve or sixteen individuals whom the Triumvirs wished to destroy before any general alarm was given.<sup>200</sup> Some of these victims were suddenly assassinated in the streets, or at social entertainments; and although the armies of the Triumvirs were yet at a distance, the consul Q. Pedius, who had been left by Octavius at Rome, sanctioned these crimes by his authority, and at once showed to the people the hopelessness of the evil under which they had fallen. He attempted, indeed, to allay the panic which these first murders occasioned, by publishing the names of the individuals whom he had been ordered to destroy, and by assurances.

The great proscription.

<sup>196</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 66.

<sup>197</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 27.

<sup>198</sup> Livy, Epitome, CXX. Appian, IV. 3.

<sup>199</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 62.

<sup>200</sup> Appian, IV. 6, et seq.



that no others should be molested. But it is said that Pedius died suddenly, in consequence of his excessive personal exertions to preserve tranquillity in the city ; and the Triumvirs were thus freed from the difficulty in which his official limitation of the number of the proscribed might otherwise have involved them. A few days afterwards they entered Rome with their troops ; the comitia were assembled in mockery ; the appointment of the Triumvirate was proposed by P. Titius (one of the tribunes who had before distinguished himself by his opposition to Cicero's measures), and was of course agreed to without a murmur. Then the lists of proscription began to be published ; but gradually, as had been done before by Sylla, as if to protract the misery of the sufferers by this horrible state of suspense. The lists were accompanied by a proclamation, which Appian professes to have faithfully translated into Greek from its Latin original, and to which probably no other parallels can be found in history than that which defended the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and that which encouraged the populace of Paris to the murders committed in the prisons in September, 1792. It is remarkable, too, that in the latter of these two cases, the very same excuse was assigned for the massacres as was now alleged by the Triumvirs. "Whilst we are hastening to attack our enemies abroad," said Lepidus, Antonius, and Augustus, "we cannot with safety leave so many other enemies behind us in Rome ; nor again can we linger to take precautions against our domestic adversaries, lest the dangers with which we are threatened from abroad become too formidable to be overcome." "Whilst the patriots are hastening to the defence of their country in the plains of Champagne," said the municipality of Paris, "they cannot leave their wives and children exposed to the machinations of those numerous aristocrats who will be let loose from their prisons on the first successes obtained by the enemy, to fill our streets and our houses with bloodshed."

Under pretence of thus providing for their security, the Triumvirs inscribed on the proscription list the names of one hundred and thirty senators,<sup>201</sup> at the lowest computation, and of a far greater number of the equestrian order. All persons were forbidden to harbour or to promote the escape of any of the proscribed, under pain of being sentenced to the same fate themselves ;<sup>202</sup> while rewards were offered to any who should put them to death, and bring their heads to the Triumvirs ; and it was added, that no record should be kept of the payment of this blood-money, that he who received it might not hereafter be exposed to the public detestation. That no aggravation of wickedness might be wanting, each of the three associ-

Extent of the proscription.

<sup>201</sup> Livy, Epitome, CXX.

<sup>202</sup> Appian, IV. 11.

ates stained themselves with the blood of some near relation or former friend. M. Lepidus insisted that his brother, L. Æmilius Paulus, should be proscribed;<sup>203</sup> Antonius inserted on the list the name of his uncle, L. Cæsar; and Augustus added that of his guardian, C. Toranius. In emulation of the chiefs, L. Plancus requested that his brother, Plotius Plancus, might be amongst the victims; and, if Appian may be credited, Asinius Pollio, in like manner, procured the murder of his father-in-law. The rewards offered to the murderers added the instigations of avarice to those of revenge or fear, and produced instances of the most horrible domestic treachery; freedmen betraying their patrons, slaves their masters, and children their parents. It is the remark of Paternulus,<sup>204</sup> that the proscription was marked by the heroic fidelity of wives towards their husbands, whilst the conduct of sons towards their fathers was peculiarly undutiful and perfidious; and he imputes this to the eagerness which men feel to anticipate their hopes of future advantage; for the son hoped by the merit of his parricide to save his father's property from confiscation, and to obtain an earlier possession of his inheritance. Anecdotes of these fearful times were greedily collected, and volumes, as we are told, were filled with them;<sup>205</sup> some recording the most tragical deaths, and others the most extraordinary escapes, of those who were destined to destruction. But of all the victims of the proscription we must select the most illustrious, and follow as carefully as we can the circumstances of the fate of M. Cicero.

From the moment that we can no longer derive any information concerning him from his own writings, our knowledge of his conduct becomes much less accurate. The latest of his own letters, which has been preserved to us, is one written to M. Brutus on the twenty-seventh of July,<sup>206</sup> in which he expresses great fears lest Augustus should disappoint all his hopes, and should falsify by some act of treason all the praises which he had bestowed upon him. But two letters from Brutus are extant,<sup>207</sup> apparently of a still later date, written one to Cicero and the other to T. Atticus, in both of which Cicero is taxed with an excessive complaisance towards Augustus, and is accused particularly of having interceded with him in too humble a manner in behalf of the conspirators against Cæsar, and even of having endeavoured to conciliate him by condemning their conduct, and by attacking P. Casca, who was one of the tribunes for the year, and who, on the motion of P. Titius, had been degraded from his office by the votes of the tribes, since Augustus had usurped the consulship. It is very likely that Cicero was

Murder of M. Cicero.

<sup>203</sup> Livy, Epitome, CXX. Suetonius, in Augusto, 27.

<sup>204</sup> II. 67.

<sup>205</sup> Appian, IV. 16.

<sup>206</sup> Epist. ad Brutum, I. epist. XVIII.

<sup>207</sup> Epist. ad Brutum, I. epist. XVI. XVII.

somewhat too credulous in trusting to the fair professions which Augustus constantly made to him; he believed, besides, that in spite of the pernicious counsels of his military friends, so young a man could not yet be thoroughly corrupted, and might still be led to choose the better part, if his suspicions of the aristocracy could be lessened. With this view he thought it politic to praise him, and to move that extraordinary honours should be granted him; he may also have felt that if Augustus could be taught to respect the constitution of his country, much might be indulged to his natural resentment towards the assassins of his uncle; and that in speaking to him of them and of their conduct, the language of deprecation and censure was more fitting than any higher tone. It is true that Cicero's personal enmity against Antonius made him over-estimate the services which Augustus had rendered in first taking up arms against him; nor did he rightly appreciate the real danger which threatened the commonwealth, and which arose not from the ambition of any one man, however unprincipled, but from the power and insolence of the army at large, who were now conscious of their strength, and were determined to exert it. We are told that Cicero at one time was desirous of becoming the colleague of Augustus in the consulship;<sup>208</sup> and if he could have effected this, the evil designs of his colleague would have been in a great measure neutralized; the declarations of the senate against Antonius and Lepidus would not have been so easily repealed; the law condemning the assassins of Cæsar might not have passed, nor the nominal authority of government have been so speedily transferred to that party which had hitherto been considered as in a state of rebellion. But Augustus having the power of the sword in his hands, determined to avail himself of it to the utmost; he chose, therefore, for his colleague, not Cicero, but Q. Pedius; and the first measures of his consulship must have almost prepared Cicero for that consummation of treachery which was soon afterwards displayed in establishing the Triumvirate.

It is said that the name of Cicero was included in that first list of victims whom Q. Pedius received orders to destroy before the arrival of the Triumvirs at Rome. But be this as it may, Cicero could not doubt of his own danger, from the moment that he heard of the conferences and engagements between the three generals. He instantly, therefore, quitted the capital,<sup>209</sup> and retired to his villa near Tusculum, whence, by cross roads, he escaped to another of his villas near Formiæ, intending to embark on board of a vessel at Caieta, and make the best of his way by sea to Macedonia. A vessel was provided for him, and he

<sup>208</sup> Plutarch, in Cicerone, 45, 46.

<sup>209</sup> Livy, *Fragm.* apud Senecam, inter *Fragmenta T. Livii editum*.



commenced his voyage; but the wind was contrary, and the delay thus occasioned, together with the sickness which he always felt severely at sea, induced him to return and to take no further steps to avoid the fate which awaited him. "I will die," he said, "in that country which I have so often saved." He was now sixty-three years of age, so that death seemed to him preferable to the miseries and anxieties of a doubtful flight. He landed, therefore, once more, and returned to his Formian villa near Caieta. Here he was disposed to remain and to meet his death, but his slaves,<sup>210</sup> who were warmly attached to him, could not bear to see him thus sacrificed; and when the party of soldiers sent to murder him was advancing towards the villa, they almost forced him to put himself into his litter, and to allow them to carry him once more on board of the vessel which was still lying at Caieta. But as they were bearing the litter towards the sea, they were overtaken in the walks of his own grounds by the soldiers who were in search of him, and who were headed by one Herennius, a centurion, and by C. Popilius Lænas. Popilius was a native of Picenum,<sup>211</sup> and had, on a former occasion, been successfully defended by Cicero, when brought to trial for some offence before the courts at Rome. As the assistance of advocates was given gratuitously, the connexion between them and their clients was esteemed very differently from what it is amongst us; and it was, therefore, an instance of peculiar atrocity that Popilius offered his services to Antonius to murder his patron, from no other motive than the hope of gaining his favour by showing such readiness to destroy his greatest enemy. The slaves of Cicero,<sup>212</sup> undismayed at the appearance of the soldiers, prepared to defend their master; but he refused to allow any blood to be shed on his account, and commanded them to set down the litter, and to await the issue in silence. He was obeyed, and when the soldiers came up, he stretched out his head with perfect calmness, and submitted his neck to the sword of Popilius.

U. C. 711.

When the murder was accomplished, the soldiers cut off his two hands also, as the instruments with which he had written his Philippic orations; and the head and hands were both carried to Rome and exposed together at the rostra, at the very place where he had been so lately heard with an universal feeling of admiration, "such," says Livy, "as no human tongue had ever excited before." Men crowded to see his mangled remains, and testified by their tears, the compassion and affection which his unworthy death and his pure and amiable character had so justly deserved.

In reviewing the political life of Cicero, it cannot, we think,

<sup>210</sup> Plutarch, in Cicerone, 47, 48.

<sup>211</sup> Valerius Maximus, V. 3.

<sup>212</sup> Fragment. Livii, ubi supra.

Political character  
of Cicero.

be doubted, that none of his contemporaries surpassed him in the liberality of his views, or the integrity of his motives. He has been usually charged with vaillation and timidity throughout the period which elapsed between his return from banishment in 696, and the close of the civil war between Pompey and Cæsar. It seems, indeed, that in all great political convulsions, candour and acuteness are apt to lead to indecision ;<sup>215</sup> it is certain, at least, that they will incur the reproach of it from all the more violent partisans of either side. At Rome immediately before the commencement of Cæsar's rebellion, neither of the two parties by which the state was divided, was worthy of the cordial support of an honest and well-judging citizen. The heads of the high aristocracy were selfish and violent ; the popular tribunes and the military leaders, whose interests they served, were turbulent and unprincipled. A few years earlier, while Pompey and Cæsar were as yet acting in union with one another, the aristocratical leaders were not such as to encourage confidence ; and their jealousy of Cicero, because he was not by birth or inclination exclusively connected with themselves, was a public as well as a personal reason for his regarding them with suspicion and dislike. At the same time, Cicero must be allowed to have been biassed at this particular period by private feelings ; by the flattering language of Pompey and Cæsar on the one side, which affected the placability of his nature even more than its vanity, and by the countenance which the aristocracy at this time gave to his enemy Clodius, because they wished to employ his services in annoying the triumvirate. The greatest error into which these feelings led him, was the speech which he made in the senate "On the disposal of the consular provinces," in which he pronounced a high panegyric upon Cæsar, and urged that he should be continued in his command in Gaul, while at the same time he advised the recall of Piso from Macedonia, and of Gabinus from Syria. But six years before the commencement of Cæsar's rebellion, it was hardly to be suspected that he intended to use his province as a means of enabling him to make war upon his country, or that he had no thoughts of resigning his command in Gaul till it should be exchanged for the sovereignty of the empire.

When the civil war at last broke out, Cicero disapproved of the system on which Pompey intended to conduct it, and particularly of his purpose of leaving Italy. Yet he was only prevented at first from following him into Greece by the rapid advance of Cæsar's army into Apulia, by which he was precluded from joining

<sup>215</sup> Τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ζυνετὸν, ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν.—  
Τὸ δὲ σώφρων, τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα. Such  
was the manner in which Thucydides tells  
us that the violent and unprincipled mem-  
bers of the aristocratical and democratical

factions in Greece represented the charac-  
ters of those few moderate and upright  
men who regarded both the contending  
parties with equal disapprobation. III. 82.

Pompey at Brundisium; and afterwards, having tried in vain, yet without the least compromise of his own character, to persuade Cæsar to conclude a peace on equitable terms, he escaped from Italy on the first opportunity, and joined the standard of the commonwealth in Macedonia. There a nearer view of the avowed sentiments and designs of the aristocratical leaders, made him, indeed, a lukewarm follower of their cause. To say nothing of the immediate confiscations and proscriptions which they announced as the first fruits of their victory, Cicero might justly dread that their triumph would be followed by the re-enactment of Sylla's most tyrannical measures, the destruction of the tribunitian magistracy, and the appropriation of the whole judicial power to the senatorian order. Seeing thus so much to excite his fears in the success of either party, the miseries of civil war would naturally strike upon his mind with proportionate force; and he wished to escape, at any rate, from any personal share in a struggle which he abhorred, as soon as he could with honour. Accordingly, after the battle of Pharsalia, he took no further part in the war, but returned to Italy, and received the conqueror's permission to live in the quiet enjoyment of his own property. When Cæsar's power was finally established, Cicero kept up his former acquaintance with him on the terms of mutual civility; but he received from him no favours, unless we consider it in that light, that his family was one amongst many which Cæsar raised to the dignity of patricians, when he wished to fill up the losses sustained by that order in the late wars. At last, after Cæsar's death, when a fair prospect opened of restoring the old constitution, Cicero acted with a degree of firmness and decision, which we think adds probability to the representation which we have given of his motives and feelings in the earlier part of his career.

His main error, as it seems to us, in the latter part of his life, was his excessive partiality to the assassins of Cæsar, and his throwing so great a military force into their hands. The murder of Cæsar was an action, at the best, to be buried in oblivion. Except the single pretence of revenging his death, the new enemies of the constitution had not another excuse for their treason; while the cause which Cicero upheld was perfectly pure, if it did not needlessly encumber itself by upholding an act of assassination, and rewarding the murderers. The more respectable part of Cæsar's old officers, such as Hirtius, and Pansa, and Cornificius, and of those moderate men who had submitted to his power without having shared in the guilt of his first rebellion, such as P. Servilius, Ser. Sulpicius, L. Philippus, and others, were the very men to whom the commonwealth might most safely have trusted the defence of its liberties against Antonius; for not only would Cæsar's veterans have obeyed them without reluctance, but all that numerous party who had been gainers by the late revolution,



looked upon these men as their security against the excesses of a complete reaction, and would have willingly supported the commonwealth so long as they conducted the administration of it. And with them Cicero might safely have taken his place as their associate, or even as their leader; for his eloquence and his integrity had made him long and generally popular: and the only ground of the offence which Cæsar's veterans entertained against him, was his so closely connecting himself with the assassins of their general. Even Augustus himself might not so soon have proved a traitor, had he not seen that while Cicero was on the one hand courting his support, he was on the other conferring exorbitant powers on Brutus and Cassius, and investing them with the whole military command of the east. The restoration of the commonwealth might have been practicable; but to reinstate the old aristocracy, or the friends of Pompey, in their former supremacy, was clearly not so. But perhaps after all, the preservation of any form of civil government was become impossible, since the army was grown so formidable as to form a distinct interest of its own, and since its favour or displeasure were held up even in the debates of the senate as objects of hope or fear. Be this as it may, Cicero died as he had lived, with a reputation of patriotism and integrity; nor is his life, as a citizen, stained with any thing worse than some mixture of vanity and erroneous judgment amid many splendid instances of liberality and moderation, and wisdom and vigour.

Amongst the other distinguished persons who were murdered in the same proscription, may be noticed Q. Cicero and his son, C. Toranius, a man of prætorian dignity,<sup>214</sup> and who had been guardian to Augustus; L. Villius Annalis,<sup>215</sup> one of the prætors for the present year; C. Plotius Plancus, the brother of L. Plancus; and, according to Appian, Salvius,<sup>216</sup> one of the tribunes, and Minucius, also one of the prætors. L. Cæsar,<sup>217</sup> the uncle of Antonius, was saved by the influence of his sister; and L. Paulus, the brother of Lepidus, was allowed to escape by the soldiers sent to murder him, who respected, it is said, the brother of their general, or perhaps were shocked at the unnatural wickedness of that general, in commanding the murder of so near a relation. M. Varro,<sup>218</sup> formerly one of Pompey's lieutenants in Spain, but much more known as a man of letters, was saved by the intercession of Q. Calenus. Apulius,<sup>219</sup> perhaps the same person who was tribune in this very year, and who was warmly attached to Cicero, escaped to the army of M.

<sup>214</sup> Valerius Maximus, IX. 11. Suetonius, in Augusto, 27.

<sup>215</sup> Valerius Maximus, IX. 11. Appian, IV. 18.

<sup>216</sup> Appian, IV. 17.

<sup>217</sup> Appian, IV. 37.

<sup>218</sup> Appian, IV. 47.

<sup>219</sup> Appian, IV. 46.

Brutus in Macedonia. Some of the expedients by which individuals who had been proscribed preserved their lives, are worthy of mention, as serving to illustrate the circumstances of the times. Sentius Saturninus Vetulio<sup>220</sup> assumed the dress and ensigns of a prætor, disguised his slaves as lictors, and proceeded from Rome towards Naples, with all the state of a public officer; impressing carriages for his use, taking possession of the inns on the road, and obliging all travellers whom he met to move out of the way till he had passed. Having thus reached Puteoli in safety, he there pretended to be employed on the service of the state, and demanded some vessels for the conveyance of himself and his attendants, which being granted, he effected his passage in safety to Sicily, where Sex. Pompeius was holding the chief command. Antius Restio had been proscribed,<sup>221</sup> and escaped from his house secretly by night, while his slaves, having heard of their master's sentence, were busily engaged in plundering his property. One slave alone had watched him, and followed him in his flight; a man who had been branded in the face by his master for some offence, and had been confined in chains in his workhouse, from whence he had only been released by some of his fellow-servants at the time of the general ruin of their master's fortunes. This man overtook Antius, assured him that he entertained no resentment against him for the punishment which he had received, but rather felt grateful to him for many former kindnesses; and having concealed him out of the way of the soldiers who were in search of him, he began to construct a funeral pile, and then having, without any scruple, murdered an old man who happened to be passing by on the road, he placed his body upon it. The soldiers coming up while he was thus employed, he hastened to tell them that he had himself killed the object of their search, in revenge for the former ill-treatment which he had received from him; and as his story seemed probable, they contented themselves with taking the head of the murdered man as that of Antius, in order to obtain the usual reward from the Triumvirs on producing it; and suspicion being thus laid asleep, Antius himself was conducted from his hiding place by his slave, and escaped with him into Sicily. M. Volusius,<sup>222</sup> one of the ædiles, procured from a friend the dress of one of the ministers of Isis, and disguising himself in the long linen gown, and wearing the mask made like a dog's face, which were the distinguishing marks of that order of persons, he went about through the streets dancing and begging money of the passengers; and in this manner he made his way through a considerable part of the country, till he

<sup>220</sup> Valerius Maximus, VII. 3. Appian, IV. 45.

<sup>222</sup> Valerius Maximus, VII. 3. Appian, IV. 47.

<sup>221</sup> Valerius Maximus, VI. 8. Macrobius, Saturnalia, I. 11. Appian, IV. 43.

at last escaped out of Italy. Some of the proscribed assumed the disguise of centurions, and arming their slaves as soldiers, went about as if they were themselves employed in the pursuit of others; and once, it is mentioned, two of these parties fell in with one another,<sup>223</sup> and each mistaking the other for the real emissaries of the Triumvirs, they fought for some time without discovering their mutual mistake. One man of the name of Vitulinus,<sup>224</sup> formed a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Rhegium, partly out of those who were proscribed, and had, like himself, escaped the murderers, and partly out of the inhabitants of those eighteen cities of Italy which the Triumvirs had given up to their soldiers as settlements. Thus supported, he cut off several parties that were going about in pursuit of the proscribed, till at last, when a strong detachment was sent against him, he maintained several obstinate contests, and before he was killed had the satisfaction of knowing that his son, and several others who had been proscribed, had effected their escape to Sicily in safety. Amidst the horrors of the times, we are told that several orphans,<sup>225</sup> of tender age, who were heirs to large properties, were included in the proscription, that their wealth might become the prey of the Triumvirs. One of these, of the name of Atilius, had just gone through the ceremony of putting on the manly gown, and was going, as was the custom, attended by a numerous company of his friends, to offer sacrifice at the temples. It was suddenly announced that his name was among the number of the proscribed; the procession instantly dispersed, and Atilius, deserted by all his relations, fled to his mother's house for shelter. But even she refused to receive him, dreading to incur the penalty denounced against all who should harbour the proscribed. Thus cast off, and despairing of protection from any one else, when his own mother had abandoned him, he fled to an unfrequented part of the country and took refuge amongst the mountains; but being obliged to descend into the valleys to get food, he was seized by a kidnapper, who was in the habit of carrying off travellers, and confining them as slaves in his workhouse. Unable to bear the cruelties to which he was here exposed, he made his escape to the high road, and in utter despair gave himself up to the first military party that passed by, and was by them accordingly put to death.

If any thing could be wanting to complete the general misery,

Behaviour of the  
Triumvirs.

it was added by the utter insolence with which the Triumvirs mocked the victims of their tyranny.

Rufus Cæsetius, a senator,<sup>226</sup> had been proscribed, because he was the owner of a house and property adjoining to those of Fulvia, the wife of Antonius, and had often refused to sell them to her.

<sup>223</sup> Appian, 46.

<sup>224</sup> Appian, 25.

<sup>225</sup> Appian, 30.

<sup>226</sup> Valerius Maximus, IX. 5. Appian, 29.



He was murdered, and his head as usual was brought to Antonius, who happened to be at table with a party of his associates. After carefully examining the features of the face, Antonius said to the soldiers, "This is no acquaintance of mine,"<sup>227</sup> and desired them to take it to Fulvia, and she ordered it to be exposed, not as usual at the rostra, but in front of the house which had been the occasion of his murder. M. Lepidus and L. Plancus,<sup>228</sup> in the very midst of the proscription, determined to enjoy the honours of a triumph for some victories which they had gained while commanding respectively the provinces of Gallia Narbonensis, and Gallia Transalpina. An order was issued, commanding that the usual marks of general rejoicing should not be omitted; that the people should attend the triumphal procession, and should offer sacrifices of thanksgiving at the temples. It must be remembered that Lepidus and Plancus had each caused the name of his own brother to be inserted in the lists of the proscribed; and in allusion to this, their own soldiers, availing themselves of the customary license of the occasion, shouted aloud, as they followed their chariots, "De Germanis, non de Gallis, duo triumphant consules."<sup>229</sup>

One object of all these dreadful atrocities had been the money which the Triumvirs hoped to gain from the sale of the property of their victims.<sup>230</sup> But in this Their rapacity. hope they were greatly disappointed. The plate and most articles of valuable furniture were generally plundered by the slaves of the owner, as soon as his name was seen on the fatal list; and the horses and landed estates could only be sold at low prices, because the people in general considered it infamous to become purchasers; and A. Cascellius,<sup>231</sup> a lawyer of high reputation, steadily refused to make any instrument of conveyance for property granted by the Triumvirs, or possibly sold at their auctions, considering such means of acquiring it to be no better than robbery. Accordingly the Triumvirs, finding themselves still in want of money, drew out a list of fourteen hundred ladies,<sup>232</sup> who were ordered to make exact returns of their property, that a proportionate tax might be levied upon them. This excited great indignation, and the persons aggrieved having first applied in vain for the intercession of the female relations of the Triumvirs, assembled themselves in the forum, and trusting to the protection of their sex, addressed the Triumvirs in very forcible language, and succeeded in obtaining from them an abatement of the great-

<sup>227</sup> "Hunc ego notum non habui." Valerius Maximus, IX. 5.

<sup>228</sup> Appian, 31. Velleius Paterculus, II. 67.

<sup>229</sup> "The consuls are triumphing, not over the Gauls, but 'de Germanis,' which

signifies either 'over the Germans,' or 'over their brothers.'"

<sup>230</sup> Appian, 31.

<sup>231</sup> Valerius Maximus, VI. 2.

<sup>232</sup> Appian, IV. 32, et seq. Valerius Maximus, VIII. 3.

est part of the tax which it had been intended to raise. But as the men could not utter their complaints with equal safety, they were condemned to make up for this deficiency. Every person, of what rank or condition soever, who was possessed of property to the amount of more than 400,000 H. s., or about 3200*l.*,<sup>233</sup> was required to furnish a loan of two per cent. upon all that he was worth, and at the same time to pay the value of a year's income as a tax for the immediate expenses of the war.

But the cruelty and rapacity of the Triumvirs themselves, Crimes of the soldiers and others. great as they were, might yet have been satisfied by so many murders and confiscations as we have already recorded. A wider and almost boundless scene of misery was opened by the infinite vexations, robberies, and violences of every kind which were committed by the army at large;<sup>234</sup> when every soldier gratified his passions without scruple, and the Triumvirs dared not refuse to their instruments that same license of wickedness which they were themselves so largely enjoying. The example of the soldiers was followed by numerous bands of slaves and other low persons, who took advantage of the general confusion to plunder and to murder in their turn, and often assumed the disguise of soldiers to insure to themselves impunity. But as their resentment was not dreaded, their disorders were more speedily repressed; orders were given by the Triumvirs to punish those who committed unauthorized acts of violence; and as the soldiers were too formidable to be restrained, the inferior malefactors were the only sufferers; and of these last, several were seized and crucified.

Reflections on the proscription. Although no previous provocation, nor any prospect of future benefits to the commonwealth, could justify in any degree so atrocious a massacre, yet its wickedness becomes still more heightened when we consider the only pleas which its perpetrators could urge in their defence, and the utter selfishness of the motives by which they were actuated. Their great pretence was to revenge the murder of Cæsar; an act the guilt of which was confined to about sixty individuals, scarcely any of whom were among the victims of the present proscription. Thousands who had no share in his death, might very justly have rejoiced in the effects of it, in the dissolution of a tyrannical power, and the restoration of the lawful constitution; and after the murder had been perpetrated, the best course which could be followed was that which the senate actually adopted on the motion of Cicero, to decree a general amnesty for the past, and to resume the usual form of the government, as if Cæsar's usurpation had never interrupted it. And on this principle the more respectable of Cæsar's friends, such as Hirtius and Pansa, acted; who, while

<sup>233</sup> Appian, 34.<sup>234</sup> Appian, 35.

openly lamenting and condemning his murder, thought that it ill became them to renew the civil war for the purpose of revenging it; but that it was the duty of all good citizens to uphold that old constitution of their country which was now, by whatever means, restored; especially as all the beneficial effects of the late revolution were still maintained, in the extension of the privileges of citizenship to a great number of foreigners, and the elevation of many individuals of humble birth to the enjoyment of wealth and honours. But Antonius and Lepidus wishing to continue the system of military usurpation, and having been deservedly declared public enemies, were anxious to exterminate all those who were zealously attached to the constitution of their country; while Augustus, hoping to inherit his uncle's sovereignty as well as his name and private fortune, and animated besides with that inveteracy which men naturally feel against a cause which they have deserted and betrayed, longed to destroy, if possible, the whole of the aristocratical party, that his way to the throne might be cleared from all impediments. His conduct, accordingly, was marked by peculiar traits of malignity and hard-heartedness. We have already mentioned that he himself was not known to spare a single victim of those whom he had marked out for death; and he opposed every inclination to clemency in his associates. When the proscription was ended,<sup>235</sup> Lepidus, in a speech to the senate, made something of an apology for what was past, and said that henceforth such instances of severity would not be repeated, as enough of the guilty had been already punished; but Augustus arose and added, that he had only closed the proscription as long as he thought proper, but without meaning to impose the least restriction on himself with regard to his future measures. When he thus spoke and acted, he was scarcely one-and-twenty years old. Had his whole after-life been marked by nothing but benefits to his country, no human judgment would be warranted in attributing his altered conduct to any better motive than the absence of temptation; for he who had once plunged so deeply in wickedness, must ever be suspected of being ready to do the same again if his interests required it, unless he could give positive proof that he regarded his former crimes with remorse and abhorrence.

Whilst Italy was overwhelmed by these calamities,<sup>236</sup> three neighbouring countries afforded a secure refuge to all those of the proscribed who were happy enough to reach them. Many accordingly escaped to M. Brutus in Macedonia, and to Q. Cornificius in Africa; but a still greater number fled to Sicily, where Sex. Pompeius, in a manner worthy of his name, was exercising the most unwearied benevolence towards

The proscribed are sheltered in Greece, Africa, and Sicily.

<sup>235</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 27.

<sup>236</sup> Appian, IV. 36.



all of his persecuted countrymen to whom he had the means of extending it. We have already mentioned, that after he had been recalled from banishment, and the senate had resolved to pay him out of the treasury the value of his father's property, he remained for some time at Massilia, waiting to see the issue of the campaign at Mutina; and unable to take the active part in it which he wished, because Cæsar's veterans, who were serving under Hirtius, Pansa, and Augustus, were unwilling to receive amongst them the son of Pompey. After the battle of Mutina, however, when the treason of Lepidus, and the suspected fidelity of Augustus, made it necessary for the senate to avail themselves of some more trustworthy aid, Sex. Pompeius was appointed to the general command of the naval forces of the commonwealth,<sup>237</sup> with an authority on every part of the coast, which, like that granted to his father in the war with the Cilician pirates, extended over the whole country within a certain distance from the sea. He had retained at Massilia part of the fleet which had belonged to him in Spain; and having speedily increased it after he had received his commission from the senate, he sailed to Sicily, deeming that island a favourable situation for his head-quarters, and the whole of it, according to the tenour of his appointment, being properly included within the limits of his authority. Sicily was at that time held by A. Pompeius Bithynicus, who had received the government of it from Cæsar; but it was occupied, after some resistance, by Sex. Pompeius, and when the proscription began, he was in complete possession of it. He instantly ordered his ships and smaller vessels to cruise along the coasts of Italy,<sup>238</sup> to intimate their presence by every possible signal, and to receive on board every one who applied to them for protection. To tempt the avarice of the soldiers employed in the massacres, he offered to each individual who should preserve any proscribed person, double the sum which the Triumvirs gave for his murder. To those who reached Sicily, he offered every consolation and relief in his power, supplying them with clothing and other articles of which they stood in need, and conferring on those of higher rank amongst them some command in his army or navy. Nor did he ever afterwards, from any selfish consideration, abandon them; but when he concluded his treaty with Antonius and Augustus, he expressly stipulated that all who had fled to him at the time of the proscription, should be allowed to return to their homes in perfect safety. It is delightful to refresh ourselves for a moment with a picture of power actively exerted for objects of benevolence: and to those who revere the memory of Pompey the

Sex. Pompeius receives an extensive naval command from the senate, and occupies Sicily.

His active benevolence to the proscribed.

<sup>237</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 72, 73. edit. <sup>238</sup> Appian, IV. 36. Velleius Paterculus. 1693. Appian, IV. 84. Livy, Ius, II. 77. Epitome, CXXIII.

Great, it is pleasing to think that as his conduct in the war against the pirates was a single instance of wisdom and humanity, amidst the cruelties of other Roman generals, so the virtues of his son afford the principal relief to that dismal scene of wickedness and misery which the party of his enemies were now exhibiting.

In the midst of the horrors of the proscription, the year 711 expired; and although the whole actual power of the state was in the hands of the Triumvirs, they resolved, nevertheless, to preserve nominally the usual offices of the commonwealth; and accordingly, M. Lepidus and L. Plancus were named as consuls for the new year. Lepidus was to remain at Rome,<sup>239</sup> and superintend the government of Italy; whilst his two associates, Antonius and Augustus, were to undertake the management of the war against Brutus and Cassius in the east, and against Sex. Pompeius and Q. Cornificius in Sicily and Africa. In Africa, indeed, the contest was speedily terminated in favour of the Triumvirs by T. Sextius, one of their officers,<sup>240</sup> assisted by the power of Arabio, one of the native princes of Mauritania. Arabio's father had taken part with Scipio and Juba in the former African war; and had, on that account, been deprived of his dominions by Cæsar, and had seen them divided between Bogud, a Mauritanian prince in Cæsar's interest, and P. Sittius, the Roman exile, whose services to the cause of Cæsar, under very critical circumstances, have already been noticed. But about the time of Cæsar's death, Arabio returned home from Spain, whither he had fled to join the sons of Pompey; and by the aid of some African soldiers, who had been disciplined in their service, he expelled Bogud from his share of his father's territories, and procured the assassination of Sittius. The aristocratical party at Rome began to conceive hopes from this conduct of Arabio,<sup>241</sup> and perhaps expected that he would support their cause with the same zeal which they had formerly found in Juba. But the repeated victories of Cæsar had impressed Arabio with a deep sense of the utter hopelessness of the cause of the commonwealth; and he chose rather to purchase a pardon for his treatment of Bogud and Sittius, by proving to the Triumvirs that he was disposed to exert in their favour the power which he had seized from the hands of their partisans. Accordingly, he so effectually assisted T. Sextius, when the war broke out, that Q. Cornificius was defeated and killed, the wreck of his party dispersed, and the province of Africa became subject to Augustus without dispute, according to the terms of the agreement originally concluded between the Triumvirs.

The contest in Sicily was not terminated so easily. Augustus

<sup>239</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVII. 338.

<sup>240</sup> Appian, IV. 53, et seq.

<sup>241</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, XV. epist. XVII. Arabioni de Sittio nihil irascor.

They attack Sicily  
without success.

was eager to gain the island, because the usual supplies of corn which it sent to the Roman market were now interrupted; and the horrors of a scarcity were thus added to the accumulated miseries under which Italy was suffering. But Q. Salvidienus, one of Augustus's principal officers,<sup>242</sup> was repulsed by the fleet of Sex. Pompeius, when attempting to cover the passage of troops from Rhegium to the opposite shore; and the naval and military forces of the Triumvirs were all required immediately after in another quarter, to stop the progress of Brutus and Cassius in the east.

Since the defeat and death of Dolabella at Laodicea, which seems to have taken place about the end of June, in the summer of the year 711, Cassius had been engaged in an obstinate, but at last successful, contest with those cities and countries of Asia Minor which had manifested their attachment to the cause of his enemy. After the fall of Laodicea, he had hoped to make himself master of Egypt, in return for the succours which Cleopatra had sent to Dolabella; but being pressed, it is said, by messages from Brutus,<sup>243</sup> he abandoned his enterprise, and began to return towards the province of Asia. On his way he levied a severe contribution upon the inhabitants of Tarsus,<sup>244</sup> and having enriched himself considerably, by this and many similar exactions, he met Brutus at Smyrna, as far as appears, about the middle of the winter.<sup>245</sup> Brutus had lately crossed over with his army from Macedonia, having constantly refused to listen to the pressing exhortations of Cicero and Decimus Brutus, who had urged him to come to the assistance of the commonwealth in Italy, before the treason of Augustus had openly manifested itself. We cannot now decide whether he acted wisely or timidly in adopting a different line of conduct; but it seems impossible not to condemn the result of his subsequent meeting with Cassius at Smyrna, if the writers, whom we are now reduced to follow, have put us at all in possession of the real circumstances of the case, or of the grounds of the resolution which was adopted. Cassius,<sup>246</sup> it is said, insisted on the difficulties with which the Triumvirs were actually surrounded at Rome; on their want of money, and on the delay which Sex. Pompeius must necessarily occasion them by his occupation of Sicily; and, therefore, he urged the policy of employing the present moments in the reduction of Rhodes and Lycia, which were warmly attached to the party of the Triumvirs, and might effect a formidable diversion in the rear if left unsubdued, while Brutus and himself were ad-

<sup>242</sup> Livy, Epitome, CXXIII. Appian, IV. 85.

<sup>243</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 28. Appian, IV. 63.

<sup>244</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVII. 345.

<sup>245</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 28. Livy, Epitome, CXXII.

<sup>246</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVII. 346. Appian, IV. 65.



vancing into Greece. No reasoning could be more opposite to the soundest principles of policy and military conduct; and if Cassius really argued in such a manner, he was a very unequal antagonist to generals who had been trained like Antonius in the school of Cæsar. The event was a memorable lesson on the folly of wasting time in war upon inferior objects, and of pecking at the extremities of an enemy's power, instead of striking at the heart. Rhodes and Lycia, indeed, were successively conquered;<sup>247</sup> but the power of the Triumvirs was in the mean time consolidated, their armies were in a condition to take the field, and they themselves, acting in the true spirit of Cæsar's system, were prepared to anticipate attack, and had already despatched a force into Macedonia, to fix the seat of war in the territories of their adversaries instead of in their own.

This first division of the army of the Triumvirs was commanded by C. Norbanus and Decidius Saxa.<sup>248</sup> Of the former we can find nothing recorded, but if he were of the family of that C. Norbanus who was proscribed by Sylla, and who killed himself at Rhodes, that he might not fall into the hands of his enemies, his connexion with the party of the Triumvirs was natural. Decidius Saxa was a Spaniard,<sup>249</sup> on whom Cæsar had conferred the rights of Roman citizenship, and had afterwards caused him to be named one of the tribunes. He was with Antonius during the siege of Mutina, and is frequently mentioned by Cicero in his philippics as one of his principal adherents. At the time when Saxa and Norbanus crossed over into Greece, there was no enemy to obstruct their progress either by land or sea, for both the fleets and armies of Brutus and Cassius were still employed in Asia. They advanced, therefore, through Macedonia, till they approached Philippi, a place favourably situated for intercepting the march of an army from the Hellespont towards Greece. The great plain of the Strymon is bounded on the east by a branch of the mountains known by the name of Pangæus,<sup>250</sup> and which, running to the southward nearly at right angles with the general course of the chain, is only separated from the sea by a tract of low and marshy ground, over which there was, at this time, no practicable road. The road, therefore, from the Hellespont to Macedonia, crossed this projecting branch of Pangæus by two mountain passes, before it descended into the plain of the Strymon; and a little to the westward of the passes it came to the city of Philippi, which was itself situated on one of the lower points of the mountain range, near the head of a small stream which flowed to the westward, through the plain, to join the Strymon. The two passes to the eastward of

The Triumvirs send a force to occupy Macedonia against them.

<sup>247</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 69.

<sup>248</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVII. 347.

<sup>249</sup> Cicero, Philippic. XI. 5; and XIII. 13.

<sup>250</sup> Dion Cassius, 348. Appian, IV. 105.

Philippi were occupied by Norbanus and Saxa; and in this position they hoped to check the march of the enemy, if he should return from Asia to attack them, until they could be supported by Antonius himself, who was to join them as soon as possible with the rest of his army from Italy.

Brutus and Cassius having effected the conquest of Rhodes and of Lycia, met again at Sardis,<sup>251</sup> and thence resolved to carry their united forces into Europe. They were aware that a part of the army of the Triumvirs had already arrived in Macedonia, but they trusted, by the superiority of their naval force, to prevent the passage of the remainder; and for this purpose, L. Staius Murcus was sent with a considerable squadron to cruise off Brundisium,<sup>252</sup> exactly as Pompey's naval officers had done before in the war with Cæsar. Meanwhile they themselves crossed the Hellespont, and advanced towards Philippi. And here again the impossibility of defending a mountain line of considerable length, against a superior enemy, was fully proved.

The positions of Norbanus and Saxa were impregnable in front; but one of the Thracian chiefs pointed out a way over the mountains to the northward of the passes,<sup>253</sup> by which the army of Brutus and Cassius crossed without opposition, after a laborious march of three days through the woods, and appearing suddenly on the flank of Saxa and Norbanus, obliged them to retreat with great expedition, and to fall back across the plain of the Strymon, as far as Amphipolis. Brutus and Cassius then formed their respective camps on two hills, distant somewhat less than a mile from one another, and about a mile and a half to the westward of Philippi. Immediately to the south, or left of their position, the marsh began, and extended from thence to the sea. On their right were the mountains, the regular passes being probably covered by their own position, while they were likely to keep a watchful eye upon the more difficult track by which they had themselves effected their passage.

The space between their two camps was secured by fortifications connecting the two hills with each another; their fleet was stationed in the neighbouring harbour of Neapolis to co-operate with them; and their magazines of every kind were placed in perfect safety in the island of Thasos, which lay just opposite to that part of the coast at an inconsiderable distance from the main land. Thus situated, and having all the resources of Asia in their rear, while their enemy's communications with Italy and the western provinces would be, as they hoped, constantly intercepted by the fleets of Sex. Pompeius and L. Murcus, they trusted to follow successfully the system which Pompey, under similar cir-

<sup>251</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 34.

<sup>252</sup> Dion Cassius, 248. Appian, 88.

<sup>253</sup> Appian, IV. 103, 104.

cumstances, had been unwisely induced to abandon, and to bring the war to a triumphant end, without exposing themselves to the hazard of a battle.

But Antonius effected his passage from Brundisium with the same success which had attended him before in the very same place, and under the same circumstances, when he commanded the rear division of Cæsar's army, and joined his general on the coast of Epirus in spite of all the fleets of Pompey. After he had been blockaded for some time by L. Murcus, he sent to Augustus, who was then at Rhegium, requesting him to suspend his preparations against Sicily, and to employ his naval force in driving off the blockading squadron from Brundisium.<sup>254</sup> It does not appear, however, that the fleet which Augustus could spare for this service, was at all able to meet that of L. Murcus in battle. But the apprehension of being hemmed in in the narrow space between Brundisium and the little island which lay off the harbour's mouth, induced L. Murcus to draw off his ships, and to allow Augustus to join Antonius without opposition. The legions were then embarked on board of vessels such as were usually employed in commerce, and which were worked only by sails, while an escort of ships of war accompanied them, to be sacrificed, if needful, to the superior force of the enemy, in the hope that their resistance might at least allow the transports time to escape. But the wind, for some days, happened to blow so freshly, that the transports were carried across with full sails, at a rate which rendered it impossible for the enemy's ships of war, worked only with oars, to overtake them; and in this manner, we are told, Antonius and Augustus landed the main body of their army on the coast of Epirus without loss. Antonius instantly hastened to the support of Saxa and Norbanus, with an activity which rivalled that of his old commander, and which far exceeded, as we are told, all the calculations of his opponents.<sup>255</sup> We might wonder, indeed, why Brutus and Cassius had not followed upon Saxa and Norbanus in their retreat from Philippi, instead of allowing them quietly to strengthen themselves on the Strymon; but it is idle to attempt to give the military history of a campaign, when the writers whom we are obliged to follow have not recorded the date of any one operation or movement on either side. It only appears, that as soon as Antonius arrived at Amphipolis,<sup>256</sup> he instantly moved forwards with his whole army, and encamped near Philippi, within a short distance from the enemy; and that here he was in a short time joined by Augustus, who on his first landing had remained at Dyrrhachium on account of illness, but not choosing to be absent from the scene of action at so critical a

<sup>254</sup> Appian, 86.

<sup>255</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 38,

<sup>256</sup> Appian, IV. 107. Dion Cassius, 349.



moment, he hastened to follow his troops, as soon as he heard of the position of the two armies, and arrived in the camp while he was still too weak to discharge the most active duties of a general.

In the present contest, as in that between Pompey and Cæsar, the army of the constitutional party was the more numerous, their naval superiority was undoubted, and their resources were so ample, that they could easily afford to protract the war. But on the side of the Triumvirs there were generals and officers trained in the school of Cæsar; these were the remains of his invincible veterans; and even the newly-raised soldiers, disciplined by the same commanders, and having before their eyes in their more experienced comrades such a perfect pattern of military excellence, were likely to emulate the good conduct of the veterans themselves. Antonius, therefore, was eager to bring on a general action, and finding that the enemy remained immovable within his lines, he endeavoured to make opportunities of fighting, by carrying a road through the marsh on the left of Cassius's camp, as if he designed to turn his position.<sup>257</sup> It appears that an irregular engagement was at last the consequence of these operations; for the details of which we can best rely on the narrative of Plutarch, as he appears to have copied from the memoirs of M. Messala, an officer of the highest rank in the constitutional army, next to Brutus and Cassius. According, then, to the statement of Messala, the left of the Triumvirs' army, which was the part commanded by Augustus, was drawn out in order of battle in front of its camp, to effect a diversion in favour of Antonius. But the troops of Brutus making a sudden and unexpected sally, Messala himself, with a part of the army, turned the left flank of the enemy, pushed forwards at once to their camp, and carried it with little opposition; while Brutus, assailing them at the same time in front, broke them with great slaughter, and chased them back to their camp, which was already in Messala's possession. Meanwhile the centre of the Triumvirs' army, observing that the troops of Cassius had taken no part in the action, passed by the left flank of the victorious legions of Brutus, and attacked the left wing of the constitutional army, commanded by Cassius. Antonius himself, on the extreme right of his own army, was at the same time engaged in the marsh, in an attempt to take the cross wall which Cassius had carried out of his own camp, in order to intercept the projected road of the enemy. It appears that the veteran legions were all in that part of the army commanded by Brutus, and that the troops of Cassius were probably very unfit to maintain a contest with the disciplined soldiers of the Triumvirs. In spite, therefore, of all the efforts of their general, they were easily routed; their cavalry, instead of covering

First action at Philip-  
pi. Autumn of 712.

<sup>257</sup> Appian, 109, et seq.

the infantry, fled in disorder towards the sea ; and the enemy pursuing his advantage, not only carried the cross wall in the marsh, but attacked and took the camp of Cassius. The prospect over the field was so obscured, it is said, by clouds of dust, that the parts of both armies which were victorious, were not aware of the fortune of their friends in the other wing ; and when they were informed of it, both Brutus and Antonius returned to their own respective camps, and both parties, on the following morning, remained in the same position which they had occupied before the action. But the hasty despair of Cassius gave to a battle, which was otherwise a doubtful success, all the appearances, and some of the consequences, of a total defeat of the constitutional army. When he saw his own legions routed,<sup>258</sup> he supposed that all was lost, and could scarcely be prevailed on to despatch an officer to the other part of the field to learn what was the fate of Brutus. The officer, however, was sent, and Cassius, it is said, attended by one of his freedmen, watched his progress for a time from a hill on which he had taken refuge. He soon saw him met by a party of cavalry ; then he heard a loud shout of triumph, and presently observed that the cavalry continued to advance towards the spot where he was, and that his officer was forming one of their company. Concluding from this that the horsemen belonged to the enemy, that his officer was their prisoner, or was, perhaps, now guiding them to the place where they might find his general, Cassius conjured his freedman to save him from falling into their hands, and instantly to kill him. The freedman obeyed, and fled ; and presently after, the officer arrived on the hill, followed by the horsemen whom Brutus had

Death of Cassius.

sent to announce his success to his colleague, and who, on meeting the messenger despatched by Cassius, had shouted aloud to announce their victory, and turned him back with them, to acquaint his general with the happy tidings. It is added, that when he saw the body of Cassius lying on the ground, he immediately stabbed himself, and fell dead beside it.

The body of the deceased general was sent by Brutus to be buried privately at Thasos, lest the performance of the funeral solemnities in sight of the army should communicate some discouragement to the soldiers. Brutus himself resolved still, as before, to act on the defensive,<sup>259</sup> and hoped that the enemy would soon be obliged to retreat from want of provisions. But a system which even Pompey could not steadily persevere in, was found much more impracticable now. The soldiers, and even the superior officers, grew impatient of the taunts which the enemy continually threw out against them ; while the enemy were more

<sup>258</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 43. Appian, 113. Dion Cassius, 354.

<sup>259</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVII. 354, 355. Appian, IV. 123, et seq.

eager than ever to fight, as their situation was greatly compromised by a heavy disaster recently sustained in the Ionian Gulf. Since Antonius and Augustus had effected their passage, L. Murcus had been reinforced by a numerous squadron under the command of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the son of that Domitius who had been one of the most violent enemies of Cæsar, and who was himself charged, whether truly or not, with having been one of Cæsar's assassins. With his fleet thus strengthened, Murcus soon after fell in with a large force of soldiers which Cn. Domitius Calvinus was carrying over in transports, escorted only by a few ships of war, to reinforce the army of the Triumvirs.<sup>260</sup> The weather was now as favourable to Murcus as it had been before adverse; for the wind suddenly dropped, and the transports were left becalmed and perfectly helpless, while the enemy's ships of war could use their oars with increased facility in the smooth water. After an obstinate resistance the whole of the transports were taken, burnt, or dispersed; and a force which had consisted of two legions, and a prætorian cohort of two thousand men, besides a numerous body of cavalry, was thus almost entirely destroyed. But these successes could not decide the general issue of the war. Brutus was at last induced, as Pompey had been before him, to yield to the wishes of his army; for latterly several desertions to the enemy had taken place,<sup>261</sup> and he feared that his troops, the best of which had formerly served under Cæsar, might be persuaded, if longer suffered to remain inactive, to join the standard of the friend and adopted son of their old general. Accordingly he drew out his legions in order of battle, and was cheerfully met by the enemy, who already began to suffer serious inconvenience from want of provisions. The battle of Philippi was marked, according to our accounts, by no display of generalship on either side; but after some hours of close combat, the superior discipline of the Triumvirs' army prevailed, and the soldiers of Brutus first began slowly to give ground, and then were totally routed. Brutus himself,<sup>262</sup> being cut off from his camp, fled to a small glen or deep dell, at no great distance from the field of battle, through which a stream flowed between deep banks, occasionally covered with wood, and sometimes consisting of bare cliffs. He was accompanied by several of his friends, and amongst the rest by P. Volumnius, who from his love of literature had long lived on terms of familiarity with Brutus, and whose account of the close of his friend's life Plutarch appears to have followed as his principal authority. We may venture then to give the following particulars, as resting on the testimony of one who was present at the scene which he describes.

<sup>260</sup> Appian, 115.

<sup>261</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVII. 355.

<sup>262</sup> Plutarch, in Bruto, 51, et seq.



It was already dark when Brutus seated himself on a large piece of rock in the narrow valley, and looking up to the sky, which was bright with stars, he repeated two lines from Greek poets, one of which, from the *Medea* of Euripides, Volumnius still remembered when he wrote his narrative, and has recorded it. It was an imprecation, "that Jove would not forget to punish the author of all this misery."<sup>263</sup> He was full of the thought of the many friends who had already fallen in the battle; and he particularly lamented the loss of Labeo, who had been one of his lieutenants, and of C. Flavius, his master of the works, who had been long one of his intimate friends.<sup>264</sup> Shortly afterwards he began to express his hopes that the number of his soldiers who had fallen could not be great, upon which Statyllius, one of his companions, engaged to make his way to the camp, to send up a fire signal from thence, if he found it still in the possession of their own troops, and then to return to Brutus. He went accordingly, and after a certain interval the fire signal was observed to be made; but Statyllius did not return, so that Brutus rightly conjectured that he had fallen in with some of the enemy on his way back, and had perished by their hands. This circumstance showed that it would not be easy to regain the camp, or to rally any part of the army that might have taken refuge in its neighbourhood. Accordingly, as the night wore away, Brutus was seen to whisper something successively to two of his attendants, and his words were observed to draw tears from those to whom they were addressed. He then spoke in Greek to P. Volumnius himself; reminded him of the studies which they had shared together; and plainly requested him to lend him his assistance in killing himself. But Volumnius refusing to comply, and some one of the party observing that it would not be safe to remain any longer where they were, Brutus arose from his seat and said: "Yes, indeed, we must go hence; but it must be with our hands, and not with our feet." He then, with a cheerful countenance, shook hands successively with every one present, and declared to them the happiness it gave him to think that none of his friends had proved false to him. On his country's account he might justly, he said, complain of the cruelty of fortune; but for himself, he was even at that moment a happier man than the conquerors, inasmuch as he should leave behind him a character for goodness which neither their arms nor their treasures would ever procure for them. In conclusion, he conjured all his friends to provide for their own safety; and having said thus much, he left them, with only two attendants, and retired to some distance out of their sight. There, according to the general report, Strato,

<sup>263</sup> Ζεῦ μὴ λάθοι σε τῶνδ' ὅς αἴτιος κακῶν.  
Med. 333.

<sup>264</sup> See Cornel. Nep. in Attico, 8.

who was one of those who still remained with him, and who had been used to practise declamation with him, and to take part in his studies in oratory, yielded at last to his repeated requests, and turning away his face, held out towards him the point of his sword. Brutus having placed it exactly at his heart, threw himself upon it and expired immediately.

Meantime, whatever was the numerical loss of the constitutional army, many citizens of the noblest names in Rome had already fallen. M. Cato, the son of M. Cato of Utica, and L. Lucullus, the son of the conqueror of Tigranes, are particularly mentioned;<sup>265</sup> while Q. Hortensius, the son of the famous orator of that name, M. Favonius, so long known as the friend and imitator of Cato,<sup>266</sup> and M. Varro, who had been quæstor under Brutus in Cisalpine Gaul, and a relation probably of that M. Varro who was reputed the most learned of the Romans, had fallen into the hands of the enemy. When these prisoners were brought before the Triumvirs, they addressed Antonius with respect as an honourable adversary,<sup>267</sup> but directed against Augustus the bitterest reproaches; as, in addition to the perfidy and cruelty which he had before exhibited, he had been guilty of some atrocious instances of cold-blooded barbarity to some other captives who had fallen into his power in the last battle. Yet Antonius was not more merciful to them than his colleague, and Hortensius, Varro, and Favonius were all put to death. To complete the destruction of the aristocratical party, L. Livius Drusus, the father of the future wife of Augustus, killed himself in his tent; and Quintilius Varus, having arrayed himself in the insignia of the offices which he had borne, desired one of his freedmen to become his executioner.

The greatest part of the constitutional army rallied under the command of M. Messala and L. Bibulus, at a little distance from the field of battle, and was soon joined by several persons of distinction, who immediately after the action had taken refuge in the island of Thasos. Messala was called upon to become the leader of this last hope of the aristocratical party;<sup>268</sup> but he wisely considered all further resistance as hopeless, and preferred to submit himself and all his troops to the Triumvirs, on a promise of full indemnity for them all. The magazines of Thasos were then surrendered;<sup>269</sup> and the victorious generals, being now in fact absolute masters of the empire, concluded a new agreement between themselves, in which, disregarding Lepidus altogether, they made some new arrangements in the division of the provinces, and determined that Antonius, with the greater part of their army, should proceed into Asia, to

Dispersion of the aristocratical party.

<sup>265</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 71.

<sup>266</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 13.

<sup>267</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 13.

<sup>268</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 71.

<sup>269</sup> Appian, IV. 136; V. 3. Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 357, 358.

organize that country, and to raise contributions in order to enable him to fulfil the promises which he had made to his soldiers; while Augustus should return to Italy, to superintend the division of lands there, and to establish the veterans in the settlements which they had been encouraged to expect. Meantime the officers of Brutus and Cassius, who had been left behind by them in Asia, now fled to L. Murcus and Cn. Domitius, whose fleet still remained unsubdued. But the battle of Philippi produced an universal derangement of the constitutional party. L. Murcus,<sup>270</sup> with his squadron, joined Sex. Pompeius in Sicily, while Cn. Domitius acted for a time as an independent commander, and maintained his seamen, we must suppose, by forcible contributions raised upon the people of the sea coast, or by acts of piracy upon ships employed in commerce.

In an evil hour for himself did Antonius turn his back upon Italy, and leave the immediate government of the capital in the hands of his associate. Augustus, still suffering from ill health,<sup>271</sup> travelled slowly on his way towards Rome; whilst the population of Italy, who had already experienced his cruelty and rapacity, looked forwards with horror to the moment of his arrival, which would consign some of the finest districts of the peninsula to the occupation of a rapacious soldiery. How eagerly should we open the smallest volume of contemporary history, which might paint to us from the life the state of society in Italy, under the effects of this dreadful revolution! But not a single annalist of these times has reached posterity, and we must find our way, as best we can, with no other guidance than that of the weak and ignorant Greeks of a later age, whose testimony we have so often found worthless.

Augustus returns to Italy to superintend the division of lands among his soldiers.

It was not till the spring of the following year that Augustus returned to Rome, and found P. Servilius and L. Antonius, the brother of the Triumvir, in possession of the title of consuls. Antonius had been tribune three years before, and had then courted popularity by proposing divisions of land on a very extensive scale among the poorer citizens of Rome. He now saw a division on the eve of being made, which was to be still more extensive, and which was to benefit exclusively the officers and soldiers of the 'Triumvirs' army. So long as the aristocratical party was strong enough to excite jealousy, that union between the popular party and some ambitious military leaders, which had first been observed in the coalition between Sulpicius and Marius, had continued for the most part unbroken; but when the power of the senate was utterly destroyed, it was manifest to the most prejudiced of the popular leaders, that the liberties of Rome were at least as endangered by

L. Antonius, the consul, opposes the tyranny of the army.

<sup>270</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 72.

<sup>271</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 358.



the usurpation of the army, as they had ever been by the oppression of the rich nobility; and that large proportion of citizens who, with all their turbulence and violence, were yet, in the main, sincerely attached to their country, perceived that all their hopes of a beneficial change in the political system of the empire were about to be crushed in a manner that seemed likely to render them for ever desperate. Besides, there were considerations of immediate personal interest which aroused the inhabitants of Italy in general against the Triumvirs. Their cities and their lands were to be torn from them, merely on the plea that it was necessary to fulfil the promises made by the generals to their army. If the people had been guilty of any crime in supporting the government against the rebellion of M. Antonius, it was a crime in which Augustus himself had shared; and again, since the formation of the Triumvirate, Italy had suffered much from the proscription on the one hand, and from the loss of its ordinary supplies of foreign corn on the other, but had submitted to all its calamities without resistance. Under these circumstances, the contest which took place, nominally between Augustus and L. Antonius, may be looked upon in reality as a struggle between the people of Italy and the army; as the last effort made in defence of liberty and property against a military despotism. It is said, that L. Antonius and his sister-in-law, Fulvia, who was the partner of all his measures, at first quarrelled with Augustus, because they wished to have their share in the proposed distribution of lands to the soldiery;<sup>272</sup> and, also, that the promised rewards should be given in the name of M. Antonius as well as in that of Augustus. But the general clamours which prevailed throughout Italy against the spoliation of property, induced L. Antonius to espouse a nobler cause and to oppose altogether the pretensions of the army. In Rome itself,<sup>273</sup> and in all the principal towns of the peninsula, there were frequent and bloody engagements between the soldiers and citizens, which were attended with the destruction of a great number of houses; and as the pressure of scarcity began to be severely felt from the total cessation of all supplies from Sicily, robberies and disorders of every kind became common, till at last the shops in Rome were shut up, and the ordinary magistrates of the city, utterly unable to preserve tranquillity, gave up their offices, we are told, to pacify the people, who were indignant at seeing the semblance of government retained, when it had lost all its power of affording protection.

D. Antonius now openly professed his opposition to the illegal power of the triumvirate,<sup>274</sup> as well as the spoliation of the cities and lands of Italy. His brother,

<sup>272</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 359. Appian, V. 14.

<sup>273</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 362. Appian, V. 18.

<sup>274</sup> Livy, Epit. CXXV. Appian, V. 30.

he said, was willing to resign the title of Triumvir, to see the lawful authority of the consulship restored, and to receive himself, in his election to that office, the reward of the sacrifice which he should make to his country's good. All ranks of people joined the standard of opposition to the Triumvirate with equal eagerness;<sup>275</sup> the nobility and the commons, the patricians and equestrian order at Rome, as well as the inhabitants of all the cities of Italy, took up arms against Augustus, and the system of military tyranny of which he was the leader. He himself, leagued with his soldiers to support their mutual oppressions, was obliged to tolerate many acts of violence and disrespect to himself,<sup>276</sup> which his army, knowing their power, unscrupulously committed; and in order to attach them to his service, he plundered even the temples, wherever they were in his power,<sup>277</sup> and thus added still more to the odiousness of his cause. But on the other hand, in proportion as L. Antonius became more evidently the head of a party truly national, so the feeling of the army in every part of the empire was more interested to assist Augustus. Asinius Pollio and P. Ventidius,<sup>278</sup> who were both warmly attached to M. Antonius, and who commanded such a force in Cisalpine Gaul as would have enabled them readily to turn the scale in favour of his brother, hesitated when he saw that his success was likely to put a stop universally to the overgrown greatness of the army; and although they did not actually take part against him, yet they allowed Augustus and his lieutenants to shut him up in Perugia, without making any effort in his favour, when he advanced towards the frontiers of Cisalpine Gaul, relying on their co-operation. Abandoned thus to himself, and left to struggle against a veteran army, with only the feeble support of an undisciplined and unwarlike population, L. Antonius could only defend himself in Perugia till the provisions of his garrison were exhausted, and he was then obliged to submit to his adversary. He was himself dismissed in perfect safety, for it was not politic to exasperate M. Antonius at such a juncture by the execution of his brother; his soldiers also were pardoned, at the intercession of their comrades in the service of Augustus; but neither L. Antonius nor his troops were the chief objects of the conqueror's jealousy and hatred; and the true nature of the contest was shown by the choice of the victims who were marked out for destruction at the close of it. There were captured at Perugia a great number of Roman citizens of distinction,<sup>279</sup> who had taken up arms for the restoration of their liberties and laws; these Augustus put to death without remorse, and on this occasion displayed again the same vile and unfeeling nature

L. Antonius is obliged to surrender at Perugia.

Cruelties of Augustus.

<sup>275</sup> Appian, V. 27. 29. 31.

<sup>276</sup> Appian, V. 15, 16.

<sup>277</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 364.

<sup>278</sup> Appian, V. 32.

<sup>279</sup> Appian, V. 48. Suetonius, in Augustus, 15. Dion Cassius, XLVII. 365.

which he had shown in the whole course of his public life. Though he was only three and twenty years of age, he heard the prayers and excuses of his victims without the least emotion, answering every suppliant by a repetition of the words, "You must die;" and to show that he considered his triumph as gained, not so much over L. Antonius as over the liberty of his country, he selected three hundred persons from among his prisoners, some of the rank of senators, and others of the equestrian order, and ordered them all to be butchered on the ides of March, at an altar erected in honour of his uncle, Cæsar. To the citizens of Perusia he acted with equal cruelty; for they, in common with the people of the other Italian cities, had zealously entered into the war to save their property from military violence. He put to death all the magistrates of the town, and gave up the city to be plundered; and in the confusion thus occasioned, it was set on fire, and burnt to the ground.

Appearances of a coalition between M. Antonius and the people against the oppression of Augustus and the army.

Towards the close of the siege of Perusia, P. Ventidius and the other officers who commanded the forces belonging to M. Antonius in Cisalpine Gaul, made a show of marching to the relief of their general's brother; but their efforts were hardly more than nominal, and plainly showed that they did not enter sincerely into the quarrel. Yet the union between L. Antonius and the friends of the old constitution, seems to have brought about a temporary coalition between the remnants of the aristocratical party and the officers of M. Antonius himself; and thus Cn. Domitius, who still commanded in his own name a portion of the fleet which had belonged to Brutus and Cassius, and was cruising with it in the Adriatic to intercept the communications between Italy and the opposite coasts of Illyricum and Epirus, was now induced by Asinius Pollio,<sup>280</sup> to submit himself to the command of Antonius, on the assurance, probably, that Antonius was disposed to join with his brother in restoring the lawful government of the commonwealth. And in the same spirit, when Julia,<sup>281</sup> the mother of Antonius fled from Italy, after the success of Augustus at Perusia, she was received by Sex. Pompeius in Sicily, and treated by him with every possible attention and kindness. Amidst all the cruelties and profligacies of Antonius's life, some traits of generosity were recorded, which might lead men to believe, that he acted rather from personal resentment than from a deliberate design to enslave his country. Anecdotes in particular were told of his behaviour after the battle of Philippi,<sup>282</sup> which contrasted strongly with the mean and merciless cruelty of Augustus on the same occasion. It might not be impossible that the affronts offered to so

<sup>280</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 76.

<sup>281</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 366.

<sup>282</sup> Valerius Maximus, V. 1. Plutarch, in Bruto, 50.



many of his near relations by his ambitious associate, that the example of his brother, and some sense of the innumerable miseries under which Rome and Italy were groaning, might at last awaken the better feelings of his nature, and urge him to atone, as far as possible, for the guilt of the proscription, by becoming now the restorer of his country's liberty.

Meantime the war in Italy was brought rapidly to an end after the fall of Perusia. An armed force had taken the field in Campania,<sup>283</sup> in defence of the common cause of liberty and property, under the command of Tib. Claudius Nero, a man of the highest nobility. Ten years before this time he had been much valued as a young man by Cicero, and had nearly become his son-in-law;<sup>284</sup> he had afterwards served under Cæsar in Egypt, and had been by him created one of the pontifices;<sup>285</sup> yet, after Cæsar's death, he had supported the party of the aristocracy, though without taking a prominent share in the events of that period. He now, after the surrender of L. Antonius, endeavoured to raise the slaves in Campania to swell his forces; but failing in this attempt, he was obliged to fly to Sicily, accompanied by his wife, and by his son, a child of about two years of age. His wife was Livia Drusilla, who was shortly afterwards married to Augustus; and his son was that Tiberius who in little more than fifty years from this period became the sovereign of the Roman empire.

Such was the termination of this brief contest, which consigned the people of Rome and of Italy to many centuries of helpless weakness. In this, more than in any other of the civil dissensions of the Romans, it was a direct struggle between the army and the nation; and the triumph of the army, in which it ended, was a much more serious evil to the state, than the victories and usurpations of any political party, or even than the tyranny of Cæsar himself. It committed henceforward the whole power of the empire to a mercenary standing army; and reduced all the other classes of society to that state of conscious insignificance in the government of their country, which most surely leads to the degradation of national and individual character. Literature may flourish under such circumstances, and the physical comforts of mankind may suffer at times little diminution; but the soul of civilized society, the power and the will to take part in the administration of the great system of national government, to watch over and assist in the execution of the existing laws, and at the same time to observe their deficiencies, and propose their remedies; the spirit of real liberty which distinguishes the citizen from the mere subject—this is totally destroyed; and car-

<sup>283</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 75.

<sup>284</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, VI. epist. VI.

<sup>285</sup> Auctor de Bello Alexand. 25.

ries away with it that practical vigour of mind which, when diffused amidst the mass of the people, under the guidance of sound principles, is the greatest earthly blessing of which mankind are susceptible. The siege of Perugia, then, may be regarded as an event far more really disastrous to liberty than the battle of Philippi.

After the victory of Augustus, the proposed distribution of lands among the soldiers was probably carried into effect in every part of Italy. The occupiers of estates or of farms, thus driven from their homes, sought, for the most part, we are told, an asylum in Sicily with Sex. Pompeius.<sup>286</sup> But great numbers wandered, it is probable, into the adjacent provinces,<sup>287</sup> and there found settlements, we may conjecture, where their agricultural experience and industrious habits would make them valuable inhabitants. In this manner good may have arisen out of evil; and the civilization of Gaul and Spain, and that general dissemination of the Latin language which took place at so early a period in those countries, may have been accelerated by the desolation of Italy. There were others of the expelled Italians who repaired, it is likely, to Rome, and helped to increase the immense population of the capital; for the inhabitants of Rome were too important to be neglected; and care was taken by the government to provide for their maintenance, and even for their enjoyments, while the country of Italy was suffered to remain in a state of misery. But at the actual moment of which we are now speaking, Rome herself was sharing in the common distress; for the fleets of Sex. Pompeius still blockaded all the ports, and intercepted the supplies on which her subsistence depended.

Meantime M. Antonius had been recalled from Asia by the tidings of hostilities in Italy, and it is said was induced actually to form an alliance with Sex. Pompeius, in his dread of the ambition and ascendancy of Augustus. On his arrival off Brundisium he found the gates of that city shut against him, and he accordingly laid siege to it;<sup>288</sup> while his alliance with Sex. Pompeius, and the accession of force which he had lately gained through the submission of Cn. Domitius, gave him the undisputed dominion of the sea. But we hear nothing of his entering into the views of his brother Lucius; and his quarrel with Augustus now seems to have been of the same kind

Return of Antonius  
to Italy.

<sup>286</sup> Appian, V. 53.

<sup>287</sup> The Mantuan farmer in Virgil, speaks of his countrymen flying to Africa, to Scythia, and to Britain; but these are only hyperbolical expressions to denote that species of exile in a less favourable

climate, and a less civilized country, which was in reality, we may suppose, the lot of many of the poet's neighbours and friends.

<sup>288</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 373. Appian, V. 56.

with his final contest with him a few years later, a mere struggle for dominion between two military leaders, in which the nation had no other interest than as far as it would decide which should be sovereign. On the present occasion, however, the veteran soldiers were strongly averse to a war between Cæsar's oldest associate and his nephew, which would tend, perhaps, to raise a son of Pompey on the ruins of their common cause. Accordingly the mutual friends of the two generals endeavoured to bring about a reconciliation; and C. Mecænas was despatched by Augustus to Brundisium,<sup>289</sup> together with L. Cocceius, a common friend to both parties, to settle all their differences. The death of Fulvia,<sup>290</sup> the wife of Antonius, which happened about this time, removed, it is said, one obstacle to peace, and suggested the plan of cementing the union of the Triumvirs by the marriage of Antonius with Octavia, the sister of Augustus. In other points it was agreed, that all the provinces eastward of the Ionian Gulf,<sup>291</sup> should be held by Antonius, and those to the westward of the same boundary by Augustus; that both the Triumvirs might equally raise recruits for their armies in Italy; that Lepidus should be left in possession of Africa; and that Antonius should afford no protection to Sex. Pompeius against Augustus.

The peace of Brundisium was celebrated by both the Triumvirs with the ceremony of the smaller triumph or ovation;<sup>292</sup> and the marriage which had been agreed on between Antonius and Octavia was soon after concluded. The people of Rome,<sup>293</sup> meanwhile, finding their usual supplies of provisions still intercepted by the fleets of Sex. Pompeius, were clamorous against the Triumvirs for not relieving them from this evil; and Antonius, probably ashamed of having deserted Pompeius, was desirous of including him in the general peace. Accordingly, after some preparatory correspondence, the Triumvirs and Pompeius met at Misenum,<sup>294</sup> on the coast of Campania, and there concluded a treaty, by which Pompeius was to hold the islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, and the province of Achaia, for the same period as the Triumvirs should retain the command of the other provinces of the empire. It was agreed, besides, that he should be allowed to hold the office of consul without appearing personally at Rome; that he should be appointed a member of the college of augurs; and that the sum of about 565,104*l.* should be given to him as a

Peace of Brundisium.  
U. C. 713.

Peace between the  
triumvirs and Sex.  
Pompeius.  
U. C. 714.

<sup>289</sup> Horace, Sat. I. 5. Appian, V. 64.

<sup>290</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 374. Plutarch, in Antonio, 30.

<sup>291</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 374. Appian, 65. Plutarch, in Antonio, 30.

<sup>292</sup> Fasti Capitolini, apud Sigonium.

<sup>293</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 375, 376.

Velleius Paterculus, II. 77.

<sup>294</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 77. Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 378. Plutarch, in Antonio, 32. Appian, V. 72.



compensation for his father's property which had been confiscated. Pompeius, on his part, was to withdraw his garrisons from all the ports which he occupied on the coasts of Italy; he was not to add to the actual number of his ships, nor receive any deserters from the service of the Triumvirs; and he was to allow the usual tribute of corn to be sent from his provinces to Rome. But the stipulation which reflected most honour on Pompeius, was that in which it was agreed that all persons who had fled from Italy during the proscription, should be allowed to return in perfect safety, and should recover a fourth part of their forfeited property; that all others, who had any reason to dread the resentment of the Triumvirs, should enjoy a general amnesty; and those whose property had been confiscated should receive back its full value. The assassins of Cæsar were alone exempted; but most of these probably had already perished, and Cn. Domitius, who had at least the reputation of belonging to their number, was not only freed from all personal danger by his previous submission to Antonius, but a few years afterwards was raised to the dignity of consul. In this manner Sex. Pompeius earned the real glory of putting an end to the worst part of the miseries of the civil wars, and of closing that long course of banishments and forfeitures by which the late revolution had been accompanied. In the succeeding contests, the leaders of parties, with a few of their principal officers, were all who suffered on the vanquished side; proscription lists were no more needed, and the old constitution having been already effectually destroyed, there was no renewal of those scenes of general devastation which had marked the convulsions of its overthrow. Society began to settle in its new form, and to taste that tranquillity which, during the later years of the life of Augustus, was enjoyed so universally.

We shall make no apology for passing briefly over the events of the eight following years which intervened between the peace concluded with Sex. Pompeius, and the final contest between Augustus and Antonius. When we can copy the narrative of a good contemporary historian, the most ordinary times deserve attention; but when we can only follow the compilations of writers of a distant age, from whom it is vain to expect a faithful picture of the physical condition of mankind, or of their opinions, feelings, and morals, during the period under review, there are many wars and intrigues which may be safely dismissed with only a bare outline of their origin and issue. Such, for instance, are the campaigns of P. Ventidius and of Antonius himself against the Parthians; the last war between Augustus and Sex. Pompeius, and the deposition of Lepidus from that scanty share of dominion which he had till then been suffered to retain.

Before the battle of Philippi, Brutus and Cassius had despatched an officer to the Parthian court<sup>295</sup> to solicit the assistance of that power. The officer employed on this mission was a son of T. Labienus, of that general who alone in Cæsar's army had remembered his duty to his country, and had left the standard under which he had gained so many laurels, as soon as it became dishonoured by the guilt of rebellion. His son, the younger Labienus, found the Parthian court unwilling to give him a decisive answer, and in this manner the time passed away, till Brutus and Cassius had perished, and the aristocratical party was utterly ruined. Labienus, foreseeing that his return to his own country was now hopeless, continued to remain in Parthia; and when it was known that M. Antonius had abandoned all public business for the society of Cleopatra in Egypt, and that Augustus was engrossed in Italy with the struggle between the army and the people, Labienus prevailed on the Parthian king to seize the favourable moment and attack the Roman empire. A large Parthian army was intrusted to his guidance, and with this he suddenly invaded Syria. Many of the Roman troops in that province had served under Brutus and Cassius, and had passed under the standard of Antonius after the battle of Philippi; and these now immediately joined Labienus. Thus strengthened, he was enabled to give battle to Decidius Saxa, whom Antonius had made his lieutenant in Syria, and totally defeated him. The conquest of all Syria and Palestine, with the exception of the single city of Tyre, was the result of this victory; after which, Pacorus, the son of the Parthian king, remained in the conquered provinces with a part of the army, while Labienus, with the other part, advanced into Cilicia. There was no force capable of resisting him, so that he not only occupied the whole of Cilicia, but attacked the province of Asia, obliged L. Plancus, the governor of the province, to retire to one of the islands of the Ægean, and made himself master of all the cities on the continent, except Stratonicea, which he besieged for a long time in vain. Yet the contest between Augustus and L. Antonius in Italy seemed of more urgent importance to M. Antonius than even the recovery of the eastern provinces; and accordingly, as we have seen, he hastened to return to Italy, and Labienus was left in the undisturbed possession of his conquests till after the conclusion of the treaty between the Triumvirs and Sex. Pompeius, in the year 714.

Immediately after that treaty,<sup>296</sup> Antonius crossed over into Greece, and despatched P. Ventidius before him into Asia, to attack Labienus. The fortune of that

War in the eastern provinces. The Parthians overrun Syria, Cilicia, and Asia.

They are driven out of all their conquests by P. Ventidius.

<sup>295</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 371, et seq. Velleius Paterculus, II. 78. Livy, Epitome, CXXVII.

<sup>296</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 380. Plutarch, in Antonio, 33.

officer was as rapid in its ebb as it had been in its flood; he was surprised and driven out of the province of Asia almost without resistance; then, having halted on the frontiers of Cilicia, and being reinforced by the Parthians, he was attacked by Ventidius, and his army defeated and dispersed. He himself fled in disguise, but was discovered soon after, and, as it seems, put to death.<sup>297</sup> Cilicia was thus recovered, and a second victory over the Parthians in Syria put the Romans again in possession of all their former dominions, except the town of Aradus, which being exceedingly strong in its natural situation, was long and obstinately defended.<sup>298</sup> It was in the following year, while Antonius was still lingering in Greece, that Pacorus, the son of the Parthian king, made a second attempt to reconquer Syria, and was defeated and slain by Ventidius in a battle which the Romans dwelt on with peculiar delight as a retaliation for the defeat and death of Crassus.

Augustus, probably, was by this time well aware of the little danger he had to apprehend from the character of Antonius; and he commenced, accordingly, his attacks upon Sex. Pompeius, in order to make himself sole sovereign of the western provinces, in a spirit of undisguised ambition, which a more observant and active rival would have repressed by a timely resistance. He at this time received into his service a man of the name of Menas,<sup>299</sup> one of the ablest officers of Sex. Pompeius, who being an enfranchised slave and a mere soldier of fortune, was tempted easily to follow a master so much more powerful than his old one. Menas, not content with his own desertion, gave up to Augustus the islands of Sardinia and Corsica, and an army of three legions, which had been intrusted to his command; and when Pompeius remonstrated against this breach of the treaty, Augustus answered him by complaints of counter-violations of it on his own part; accusing him of having built new ships of war, and of still encouraging secretly the commission of acts of piracy on trading vessels bound to Italy. It appears that some of the men taken on board of some piratical ships were put to the torture,<sup>300</sup> and it was thus that the confession was extorted from them, that they were acting at the instigation of Sex. Pompeius. On the other hand, Pompeius complained that the exiles who had returned to Italy had not recovered the portion of their property which had been promised them, and

<sup>297</sup> "Extinctus est virtute et ductu Ventidii," are the words of Paterculus: "P. Ventidius Parthos, prælio victos, Syriâ expulit, Labieno eorum duce occiso," is the account of the epitomizer of Livy. But as it appears from the more detailed and seemingly probable account of Dion Cassius, that Labienus was not killed in the

field, but was made prisoner, his death seems to have taken place in the manner described in the text, and not in battle.

<sup>298</sup> Strabo, XVI. 873, edit. Xyland.

<sup>299</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 384, et seq. Appian, V. 77.

<sup>300</sup> Καὶ ὁ Καῖσάρ τινα ληστήρια συλλαβῶν ἱβασάνιζεν. Appian, V. 77.



that Achaia was not ceded to him ; but that Antonius was draining it to the utmost of all its wealth,<sup>301</sup> that when he gave it up it might be a useless acquisition to its new master. When we compare the respective grounds of complaint alleged by the two parties, and consider, besides, which was most likely to be anxious for a new rupture, there can be little doubt but that Augustus was the aggressor, and that Pompeius was in truth, according to the expression of Tacitus,<sup>302</sup> deceived to his ruin by a mere show of peace. Be this as it may, the war was speedily renewed, and Augustus requested Antonius to co-operate with him in conducting it. Antonius, who was then in Greece, crossed over to Brundisium to meet him ;<sup>303</sup> but not finding him there, he returned again immediately with so little apparent cause for his sudden departure, that men accounted for it according to their own fancies, and some attributed it to a superstitious alarm occasioned by a reported prodigy. Perhaps he was glad of any excuse for not taking part in the contest, and availed himself of some rumours respecting the progress of the Parthians in the East, as a reason for returning instantly to his own provinces. Augustus, however, resolved to carry on the war alone ; but his first attempts to invade Sicily were so foiled by storms and the resistance of the enemy, that he recalled his ablest lieutenant, M. Agrippa, from Gaul, to assume the direction of his forces, and began to make preparations for another attempt on a scale proportioned to the greatness of his power.<sup>304</sup>

It seems to have been towards the close of the year 715, when Augustus was greatly annoyed by the disappointment of his hopes of conquest in Sicily, and irritated at receiving no assistance from Antonius, that Antonius crossed over to Italy once more with a fleet, as it is said, of three hundred ships of war,<sup>305</sup> which he seemed as much inclined to employ against Augustus as in his behalf. His honour and his interest, indeed, alike urged him to defend Sex. Pompeius ; but his unsteady resolutions were liable to be influenced by any motive that could gain a momentary ascendancy over him ; and on this occasion, his wife, Octavia, was as injurious to her husband's interests, by persuading him to peace with her brother, as she was a few years afterwards, when the affronts which she received from him became one of the ostensible causes of the last decisive war. Antonius and Augustus met at Tarentum ; Antonius contributed a large portion of his fleet for the prosecution of the Sicilian war, and received in exchange two legions from Augustus to strengthen the army which he intended soon to lead into Parthia. Then, as the term of their

Treaty of Tarentum  
between Augustus  
and M. Antonius.  
U. C. 716.

<sup>301</sup> Dion Cassius, 385. Appian, 77.

<sup>302</sup> Annal. I. 10.

<sup>303</sup> Dion Cassius, 385. Appian, 79.

<sup>304</sup> Dion Cassius, 387. Appian, 96.

<sup>305</sup> Plutarch, in Antonio, 35. Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 390. Appian, V. 93.

Triumvirate was just expiring, they renewed it, by their own sole authority, for five years more ; and to cement their union more strongly, a further interchange of marriages between the different members of their families was agreed on, but was never carried into effect.<sup>306</sup> When this new arrangement was settled, Antonius left Italy, to return to it no more ; and consigning Octavia, as well as his children by his former marriage, to the care of Augustus, he immediately hastened into Asia.

About this same time Augustus married his third wife, Livia,<sup>307</sup> who was given up to him by her husband, Tiberius Nero, although she was at that very time far advanced in her pregnancy. Into this act, indecent and scandalous even in the estimation of the Romans themselves, Augustus was hurried, it is said, by his passion for the person of Livia ; and this union of mere sensuality with a temper of the utmost coldness and heartlessness, is by no means uncommon, and shows with what facility vices, apparently the most opposite, can exist together in a character totally unprincipled. We have already mentioned that the first marriage of Augustus with Clodia, the daughter-in-law of Antonius, originated altogether in political views, insomuch that he treated her with total neglect even while their connexion nominally lasted ; and he divorced her when her mother, Fulvia, joined with L. Antonius in opposing his dominion in Italy. He then married Scribonia,<sup>308</sup> the daughter of L. Scribonius Libo, and whose sister was the wife of Sex. Pompeius ; and the second marriage was concluded like the first, from mere motives of personal interest, when he dreaded the union of Antonius and Sex. Pompeius against him soon after the siege of Perugia, and was anxious to form some connexion with those whose

<sup>306</sup> The character of all these transactions between the Triumvirs is well given by Tacitus, in the following words :—" Antonium Tarentino Brundisinoque Fœdere, et nuptiis Sororis illectum, subdolæ affinitatis pœnas morte exsolvisse." *Annal.* I. 10. Augustus and Antonius were the exact counterparts of Louis XI. of France, and Charles Duke of Burgundy ; and the manner in which Augustus amused his rival, till he had cut off all his other opponents, brings strongly to mind the cautious observance which Louis showed towards Charles, till he had destroyed the count de St. Pol, and divided and broken the power of his own nobles, in whom the house of Burgundy might have found such useful auxiliaries. The cunning and calculating cruelty of Augustus, his wisdom in the choice of his servants, his skill in corrupting those of his rivals, the address with which he made his political talents

supply his total deficiencies as a general, and his utter want of generosity and noble feeling, are all represented over again most faithfully in Louis XI. ; while the violent and headstrong selfishness of Antonius, the cruelties in which he indulged from passion and resentment, the easiness with which he was managed by his adroit antagonist, that incapability of pursuing his own interest steadily, which rendered his military prowess so often nugatory, together with those gleams of a noble spirit which sometimes burst through the darker parts of his character, are qualities which the reader of Philip de Comines will recognize as distinguishing the unfortunate Charles of Burgundy.

<sup>307</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 79. Tacitus, *Annal.* I. 10 ; V. 1.

<sup>308</sup> Suetonius, in Augustus, 62. Appian, V. 53.

influence might be supposed to be powerful over Pompeius. But Scribonia's conduct, according to his own account, was exceedingly profligate,<sup>309</sup> and he chose to divorce her, it is said, on the very day on which she became the mother of his daughter, Julia;<sup>310</sup> though, as we are told that he was already enamoured of Livia, the guilt of Scribonia may be as doubtful as that of Anne Boleyn, whom her husband accused of infidelity when his own affections were diverted to a new object. It should be remembered, that when Augustus formed his new connexion with Livia, after having been twice married from political views, and having been twice divorced, he was still no more than twenty-five or twenty-six years of age.

The whole of the year 716 was employed by Augustus and Agrippa in completing their naval preparations. The Italians and the provinces were again op-  
Beginning of the  
Sicilian war.  
 pressed with a fresh load of taxation to furnish the money that was required;<sup>311</sup> while the establishments of all senators, members of the equestrian order, and other wealthy individuals, were called upon to supply a certain number of slaves to man the fleet as rowers. It was on this occasion, also, that M. Agrippa converted the lakes Lucrinus and Avernus, on the coast of Campania, into harbours, in which the ships might be assembled,<sup>312</sup> and where the seamen might be exercised at the oar in perfect safety, alike secured from storms and from the enemy. At length, in the spring of 717, Augustus commenced his operations, being supported not only by the fleet which he had received from Antonius, but by the military and naval force of the province of Africa, which the third member of the Triumvirate, M. Lepidus, was to bring over to his aid. A force thus overwhelming could gain little glory by its victory;<sup>313</sup> but Sex. Pompeius bravely resisted it, and in one engagement totally defeated the enemy's fleet, commanded by Augustus in person, and reduced to the utmost distress the legions which, under the command of Cornificius, had effected a descent on the coast of Sicily. They were, however, relieved by M. Agrippa; and soon after, Sex. Pompeius having been defeated by Agrippa in a general naval  
Sex. Pompeius is  
conquered.  
 engagement,<sup>314</sup> and being utterly unable to withstand the united

<sup>309</sup> "Cum hæc etiam divortium fecit, pertæsus, ut scribit, morum perversitatem ejus." Suetonius, in Augusto, 62.

<sup>310</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 377.

<sup>311</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 387.

<sup>312</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 387. Velleius Paterculus, II. 79.

<sup>313</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIX. 392, et seq. Velleius Paterculus, 79. Livy, Epitome, CXXIX.

<sup>314</sup> The whole account of this battle, given by Dion Cassius, is almost a trans-

cript of the famous description of the decisive defeat of the Athenians in the harbour of Syracuse, in the seventh book of Thucydides, 70, 71. We care little for the plagiarism; but it shows the manner in which the later Greek historians compiled their narratives, not giving authentic accounts of the battles or sieges which they profess to describe, but borrowing some famous passage of description from one of their old writers, and applying it, without scruple, to their own immediate subject.



forces of Augustus and Lepidus on shore, abandoned the contest, and escaped with his family and most valuable effects to Peloponnesus.

The moment was now favourable to Augustus for ridding himself of another rival. Some disputes had already arisen between him and Lepidus, because Lepidus naturally objected to that tone of superiority which his associate pretended to assume ;<sup>315</sup> but the quarrel came to an height when the army of Sex. Pompeius at Messina surrendered to Lepidus in the absence of Augustus ; and Lepidus saw no reason for yielding up to his colleague a force which had voluntarily submitted to himself. In this state of things, Augustus presented himself, with only a small guard attending his person, at the camp of Lepidus ; and being allowed to enter without suspicion, he began to tamper with the soldiers of his rival, trusting that his superior power and ability would prevail on them to desert him. But he was disappointed in this hope, and the soldiers of Lepidus, irritated by his proposals, fell upon him and his escort, and obliged him to save his life by a precipitate flight. When treachery had thus failed, he applied himself to open force, and bringing up his whole

Disputes between Augustus and Lepidus.  
 Lepidus is deserted by his army, and deprived by Augustus of all his power.  
 U. C. 718.

army, prepared to besiege the camp of Lepidus. Lepidus, destitute of all personal influence over his soldiers, saw them now gradually abandon him, and go over to his enemy ; till at length, despairing of his fortune, he laid aside his general's dress, and, in a mean habit, betook himself to the camp of Augustus, and prostrated himself before his feet. With that nice discrimination which led him to shed no blood, unless it were for his interest, and to show no mercy towards those whom he respected and feared, Augustus merely deprived Lepidus of his power as Triumvir, and granted him the free enjoyment of his life and of his private property, while he put to death, with few exceptions, every senator and member of the equestrian order whom he found amongst the followers of Pompeius, and either gave up all the slaves amongst his prisoners to their former masters for execution, or, if their masters could not be found, ordered them himself to be crucified.

Immediately after these great successes, the army in Sicily,<sup>316</sup> conscious of its power, began to mutiny ; and finding that their demands were not listened to, the legions petitioned for their discharge, imagining that Augustus would be afraid to disband them, and thus leave himself exposed to the attacks of Antonius. But the example of his uncle's conduct in similar circumstances was not lost upon him ; he professed his readiness to comply with their wishes, and first discharged all

Mutiny of the army suppressed by Augustus.

<sup>315</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIX. 398, et seq — Velleius Paterculus, II. 80.

<sup>316</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 81. Dion Cassius, XLIX. 399.

those who had served under him against M. Antonius at Mutina ; he then dismissed every soldier who had been enlisted as long as ten years ; but to these last he refused to give the rewards and settlements in land which they had expected, and by this punishment, and by declaring that he would never again employ any of the troops whom he should now discharge, he terrified the rest of the army, and made them desirous of continuing in his service. Having thus restored order, he proceeded to conciliate the late mutineers by a display of his liberality. Besides various honorary rewards, and a donation in money, he assigned to them those settlements in land which they coveted above every thing else ; and, to increase the value of the gift, he purchased, we are told, a large tract of country in Campania, to be divided amongst his soldiers,<sup>317</sup> and repaid the former colonists of Capua by a grant of

<sup>317</sup> Dion Cassius and Paterculus, *locis citatis*. We have copied the statement of Dion Cassius, but without being at all confident of its accuracy. Capua, as we believe, became a Roman colony in consequence of the Julian law, passed by Cæsar in his first consulship, v. c. 694. But the soil of this part of Campania was so much coveted, that succeeding demagogues or usurpers were not pleased to be deprived of a means of bribing or rewarding their followers ; and accordingly we find that M. Antonius, soon after Cæsar's death, planted new colonies in Campania, regardless of the rights of those already established there, and encroaching in particular on the territory of Capua. Cicero, *Philippic. II. 39, 40*. Appian tells us, that Capua was one of the cities which the Triumvirs gave up to their soldiers when they commenced their usurpation. Probably it was not a military colony, and its inhabitants might therefore have been ejected without scruple. But a colony of veterans seems to have been settled there, when Augustus divided so large a portion of all Italy amongst his soldiers, after the battle of Philippi. This colony, however, was capable of receiving a greater number of inhabitants ; *ἐποίκων ἢ πόλις πολλῶν εἰδέτο*, are the words of Dion Cassius. Possibly the veterans who had been settled there had been tempted to serve again either under Augustus or Antonius, and many of them may thus have perished, either in the East or in the actions with Sex. Pompeius. Besides, the decay of these military colonies was often inconceivably rapid, from the habitual extravagance of the soldiers and their ignorance of farming ; so that they soon parted with their shares, and

were eager to go to the wars again, to entitle themselves to a new division of spoil. But it was competent to the government to fill up the numbers of colonies thus diminished ; "*Colonos novos adscribi posse*," Cicero, *Philippic. II. 40*, because the state never lost its right of re-entering into the possession of its demesne lands, if the tenants to whom they had been granted, or their heirs, ceased to occupy them. According to Dion Cassius, however, we must suppose that Augustus gave the revenues in Crete to the old colonists of Capua, as a compensation for the land which he reclaimed, for the purpose of the state, in Campania, and which may have come into their hands as the shareholders dropped off, in the same way that the national lands were so often usurped of old by the rich citizens, as the small landholders became obliged to part with their shares. But if we could be sure that Dion Cassius had copied his account from Valerius Paterculus—and certainly the passages strongly resemble one another—we should think that he had misunderstood the writer whom he was following, and that Paterculus had meant to say, that the revenues in Crete were given to the Roman treasury as a compensation for the loss of the Campanian rents, which were at all times so valuable a part of the revenue, and which were constantly paid by the small farmers who cultivated those parts of the national lands, which had not yet been divided out as colonies. See Cicero, *de Lege Agrariâ*, *Orat. II. 30, 31*.

We should apologize, perhaps, to the general reader for this long and unsatisfactory note ; but if any person, well conversant with Roman history, should peruse

a larger revenue arising from some lands in Crete. Before he returned to Rome, he was desirous of crossing over into Africa, to superintend the settlement of that province, which, on the deposition of Lepidus, had submitted to his authority without resistance; but he was prevented by a continuance of stormy weather;<sup>318</sup> and thus, it is said, Africa and Sardinia were the only provinces in the empire which in the course of his life he never visited.

He returned to Italy in time to check a rising insurrection in Tuscany; this is all that Dion Cassius tells us;<sup>319</sup> nor have we any means of estimating the magnitude of the danger from which his timely victory in Sicily had delivered him. But, as it was, he found nothing in Italy but an excess of servility. He seemed already to be regarded as the sovereign of the empire; for he had for some years resided amidst the Romans, while Antonius was engaged in distant wars, or had been revelling in Greece and in Egypt; and now Antonius appeared to be altogether forgotten, while the senate, if we may still call it by that name, was lavishing on Augustus those excessive and odious distinctions which had before been heaped upon his uncle. As if in ridicule of its own flattery, we are told that the senate presented to Augustus a list of the different honours which had been voted to him,<sup>320</sup> that he might either accept the whole, or select as many as he thought proper. It is said that he chose the following: to enter the city with the ceremony of the smaller triumph, or ovation; that his victory should be commemorated every year by some days of solemn thanksgiving; and that his statue in a triumphal dress should be erected in the forum, on the top of a pillar ornamented with the beaks of ships. The dignity of Pontifex Maximus, which was held by M. Lepidus, was also offered to him; but as it could only be legally vacated by death, he refused to accept it; he was invested, however, with the more valuable character of perpetual tribune;<sup>321</sup> that is, his person was declared sacred; and to offer any violence to him was made as great a crime as to injure the person of a tribune. On his first arrival at Rome, he addressed the senate and the people successively in set speeches, which he afterwards published, and which contained a general exposition of his whole political career. He then promised his hearers the enjoyment of a state of peace and prosperity; and in some measure to verify his words, he remitted all the yet unpaid taxes which he had imposed for the support of

these pages, the statement of what is to us a difficulty may, perhaps, direct his attention more successfully to the same subject; and thus even a display of our own ignorance may possibly not be without its benefit to our readers.

<sup>318</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 47.

<sup>319</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIX. 400.

<sup>320</sup> Appian, V. 130.

<sup>321</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIX. 401.



the war with Sex. Pompeius, and gave a general discharge to all those who were indebted to the treasury before the commencement of the civil war; but this last piece of liberality excited some ridicule, inasmuch as he made a merit of resigning what he had little chance of ever recovering. The system of audacious robbery which the distresses of the times had long fostered in Rome, he now took effectual measures for suppressing;<sup>322</sup> and by the establishment of a strong night patrol, and the appointment of an officer, with those ample powers with which the special commissions even under the old government had always been invested, he is said to have delivered the country entirely from this evil in the space of a twelvemonth. Another of his measures rivalled in cruelty the sweeping massacres of Sylla, and was marked by a perfidy which was eminently characteristic of Augustus. Great numbers of slaves had enlisted some years before in the service of Sex. Pompeius,<sup>323</sup> and when he concluded his treaty with the Triumvirs, it was stipulated that all these persons should be allowed their liberty, and might return in safety to Italy.<sup>324</sup> But Augustus suspecting that they would cherish a fondness for the memory of Sex. Pompeius, which would make them disaffected towards himself, is said to have sent sealed orders to all his armies, with directions that they were all to be opened on the same day; and on that day all the freedmen, who had gained their liberty from the treaty between Pompeius and the Triumvirs, were arrested and sent to Rome. Augustus then ordered them all to be given back to their former masters, or to their masters' heirs, if they belonged to a Roman, an Italian, or a Sicilian; and if no one appeared to claim them, they were sent to the cities in which they had lived in their state of slavery, and were there put to death. A somewhat similar act of bloody treachery is recorded to have been committed by the Spartans upon those of their helots whose spirit and enterprise they most dreaded; but while the Spartans have been ever justly condemned for this and other such deeds, the memory of Augustus has escaped the detestation which it deserves; and this perfidy and cruelty has been called, even by a modern historian, "a severe but well-concerted reform."<sup>325</sup>

His perfidy towards the freedmen who had served under Sex. Pompeius.

<sup>322</sup> Appian, V. 132.

<sup>323</sup> Appian, V. 131.

<sup>324</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 378. Appian, V. 72.

<sup>325</sup> Ferguson, V. 7. In this instance, as well as in the account of Sylla's massacre, which we formerly noticed, Ferguson has completely misrepresented the facts of the case; for he entirely omits to mention that the slaves were men who had served under Sex. Pompeius; that they had received their liberty by a solemn treaty;

and that they were living peaceably, as far as appears, in Italy, at the moment at which they were treacherously seized.—According to Ferguson, they were slaves who, having deserted during the civil war, were "taken into the levies which were continually forming by different parties;" and Octavius wished "to purge the army of a dangerous class of men by whom it was overcharged and contaminated." If, indeed, the freedmen, who had formerly served under Pompeius, had enlisted since

Sex. Pompeius did not long survive this treatment of his old followers. When he reached the coast of Peloponnesus, he was joined by several vessels which had escaped from Sicily: but despairing of continuing the war, he recommended their captains to provide for their own safety, and himself, with a very small force which he still retained, sailed for Asia, with the intention of requesting the protection of Antonius. He first stopped at the island of Lesbos, at that very city of Mitylene,<sup>326</sup> in which his mother and himself, then a boy, had received his father in his flight from the battle of Pharsalia, and where the inhabitants still cherished with a fond regard the memory of his father's virtues. The kind reception which they gave him revived his hopes; at the same time he received tidings of the disastrous expedition of Antonius against the Parthians, and of the dissension between Augustus and Lepidus in Sicily. He is said accordingly to have played a double part, on the one hand endeavouring to win the support of the Parthians, and on the other soliciting the friendship of Antonius, when he found that he had returned from Parthia in safety. But we are told also that C. Furnius,<sup>327</sup> who was the lieutenant of Antonius in the province of Asia, had shown an unfriendly disposition towards Pompeius from the first moment of his arrival at Lesbos; and that M. Titius, whom Antonius had sent from Syria to oppose him, on the first tidings of his hostile purposes, had formerly received kindnesses from him, which he had repaid by deserting his service and going over to Antonius. What provocation then these two officers may have given, or how far they may have misrepresented to their general the conduct of Pompeius, is difficult to say; but we are told that Pompeius having collected a small force, partly from his own partisans, who now again joined him after their dispersion, and partly from that distressed portion of the population which seems in these times to have abounded in every quarter of the empire, and to have been always ready to follow any standard in the hope of plunder, began to act in a hostile manner in Asia. Some of his principal friends,<sup>328</sup> and among the rest his own father-in-law, L. Libo, are said to have left him, from a conviction of the utter hopelessness of his cause, and to have made their own terms with the officers of Antonius. Pompeius himself was willing to surrender himself to C. Furnius,<sup>329</sup> but this offer was refused; and he could not bear to put himself in

their emancipation in the army of Augustus, it only enhances the atrocity of his conduct towards them; but it does not appear that they had done so, but rather that they were living peaceably in Italy on the faith of that treaty which had stipulated for their liberty.

<sup>326</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIX. 402. Appian, V. 133.

<sup>327</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIX. 402.

<sup>328</sup> Appian, V. 139.

<sup>329</sup> Appian, V. 141.

the power of Titius, whom he considered an ungrateful traitor. But being overpowered by the force brought against him, and having in vain endeavoured to make his way into the interior of Asia Minor, he was finally taken prisoner, and, as might have been expected, was put to death by Titius,<sup>330</sup> at Miletus. It is the more probable account that this act was committed without the knowledge of Antonius; but it was received by Augustus at Rome as a triumph won by his associate,<sup>331</sup> and he celebrated it by rejoicings, and by paying some public compliments to Antonius, while the people at large, indignant at the death of the last surviving son of the great Pompey, retained a strong detestation of Titius as the author of it; and some time afterwards, when he was exhibiting some games in the theatre of Pompey,<sup>332</sup> he was driven from the theatre by a general burst of public feeling, as if one of the monuments of Pompey's munificence ought not to be profaned by the presence of the murderer of his son.

He is put to death in Asia by Titius, one of the lieutenants of Antonius, U. C. 719.

In the interval which followed before the commencement of the final contest with Antonius, we read of several wars carried on by Augustus and his lieutenants against the rude tribes inhabiting the Alps, and against the Dalmatians;<sup>333</sup> it is mentioned, also, that he now led the Roman armies, for the first time, against the Pannonians, who lived between Dalmatia and the Danube, and whom he attacked without any provocation, for the mere object of keeping his soldiers in employment. On his return from these wars to Rome, fresh honours were lavished upon him in the distinctions conferred upon his wife Livia,<sup>334</sup> and his sister Octavia, whose persons were declared sacred, like those of the tribunes; and they were allowed the privilege of managing their own affairs without a guardian or trustee, whose agency was necessary to all women in legal transactions, as no female was supposed to be independent, or was capable of acting in her own name.

The Triumvirs had renewed their power for a period of five years, as we have already seen, from the beginning of the year 716; and the succession to the ordinary offices of the commonwealth had been settled for eight years, when the Triumvirs concluded their treaty with Sex. Pompeius in the year 714. According to this arrangement, the Triumvirate properly expired on the last day of the year 720; and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Sosius were the persons who had been named as consuls for the year 721. Already were the signs of an approaching quarrel between Augustus and Antonius become clearly visible. Antonius could not be insensible to the

First beginnings of the quarrel between Augustus and Antonius.

<sup>330</sup> Appian, V. 144. Strabo, III. 150, edit. Xyland.

<sup>331</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIX. 403.

<sup>332</sup> Velleius Paternulus, II. 79.

<sup>333</sup> Livy, Epitome, CXXII. Dion Cassius, XLIX. 412, 413.

<sup>334</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIX. 414.



great accession of power which his rival had gained by his acquisition of Sicily, Sardinia, and Africa; nor was this his only ground of complaint;<sup>335</sup> but he expressed his dissatisfaction that Augustus had appropriated to himself the military resources of Italy, which were to be divided jointly between them; and that in assigning settlements in lands to the veteran soldiers, he had confined his grants almost exclusively to those who had served particularly under his own standard. Augustus, in reply, taxed Antonius with having on his part occupied Armenia, and having brought disgrace on the Roman name by the treacherous murder of its king; he said Egypt was, in fact, become his province through his connexion with Cleopatra; and that his soldiers could not claim their share of settlements in Italy till they chose to divide, with equal fairness, what they had won themselves in Media and Parthia. This was a mere insult on the disasters of Antonius's late expedition into those countries; and there was hardly more weight in another accusation which Dion Cassius ascribes to Augustus, namely, that Antonius had put Sex. Pompeius to death, whereas he himself had purposely allowed him to escape from Sicily. But Augustus's main reliance was on the feeling of national pride which he hoped to awaken in the Romans, by representing his rival as one who had cast off his duty to his country, and was become the mere slave of a foreign queen. With this view every tale of the levities in which Antonius indulged in his hours of festivity with Cleopatra, and of the attentions and gallantries which he paid to her, was eagerly caught up and industriously circulated; and the public were taught to deplore the degradation of the majesty of the Roman name, because Antonius had assumed the character of gymnasiarch, or master of the gymnastic exercises at Alexandria;<sup>336</sup> because he had called Cleopatra his queen and sovereign lady; and because she had some Roman soldiers amongst her guards, and her name was inscribed on their shields as their commander and mistress.

But the two consuls, C. Sosius and Cn. Domitius, were friends of Antonius, and as the Triumvirate was now legally at an end, the consular power might seem entitled to resume its ancient ascendancy. Accordingly, on the very first day of the year,<sup>337</sup> C. Sosius delivered a speech full of the praises of Antonius, and of invective against Augustus; and he would have immediately proceeded to employ the authority of his office in some measure adverse to the interests of the latter, had not Nonius Balbus, one of the tribunes, interposed with his negative. But this revival of the legal government of the commonwealth was, of all things, most unwelcome to Augustus; he re-

<sup>335</sup> Dion Cassius, I. 419. Plutarch, in Antonio, 55.

<sup>336</sup> Dion Cassius, I. 421.

<sup>337</sup> Dion Cassius, I. 419.

turned, therefore, speedily to Rome, (for he had absented himself purposely from the meeting of the senate on the first of January,) assembled the senate, and surrounding his person with a military force, and with a multitude of his partisans, armed, it is said, with concealed daggers, he took his seat on the curule chair, which he was used to occupy, between the chairs of the consuls, and after having spoken at some length in defence of himself, he uttered a strong invective, in his turn, against Sosius and Antonius. The actual presence of his soldiers intimated sufficiently that "the master of the legions" was not a person with whom it was safe to argue; no one therefore answered him, and he summoned the senate to meet again on a fixed day, when he assured them that he would produce written proofs of the unworthiness of Antonius. Meanwhile the consuls, followed by a considerable number of senators, left the capital privately, and repaired to Antonius; while Augustus, to avoid the odium which their retirement cast upon him, pretended that he had himself allowed them freely to withdraw, and that he would not oppose the departure of any other friends of Antonius, who might wish in like manner to join him. It appears that Antonius had already begun to prepare for war;<sup>338</sup> and that both Cleopatra and himself were about this time in Asia Minor, while their land and sea forces were gathering together in the same quarter and in the *Ægean*. Here he heard of the proceedings which were going on against him at Rome,<sup>339</sup> of the subsequent meeting of the senate which took place after the departure of the consuls, and of the language which Augustus used both in speaking and writing concerning him. Upon this he assembled a sort of counter-senate, consisting of the numerous senators who had repaired to him from Rome. After much debate, it was resolved that the war should be undertaken; and Antonius sent a formal divorce to Octavia, exactly as Augustus had divorced his first wife, Clodia, on the occasion of his quarrel with her mother Fulvia and with L. Antonius. But the notoriety of the connexion of Antonius with Cleopatra, made it appear that Octavia was rather sacrificed to his passion for the Egyptian queen, than divorced on account of his quarrel with her brother; and this also was used as a topic on which to excite the national pride of the Romans, by representing a noble Roman lady as dishonoured and despised by her husband, in order to gratify the jealousy of his barbarian paramour.

This feeling, indeed, was not confined to the Romans of the capital; even the officers of Antonius were disgusted at the evident influence which Cleopatra exercised over him, and against which their wisest counsels were sure to be

The consuls leave Rome, and return to Antonius.

Antonius renounces his connexion with Augustus, and divorces Octavia.

He is deserted by L. Plancus and M. Titius.

<sup>338</sup> Plutarch, in *Antonio*, 56.

<sup>339</sup> *Dion Cassius*, I. 420.

offered ineffectually. They might conjecture, too, from the infatuation of their general, the probable result of the war; and thus L. Plancus,<sup>340</sup> who had formerly made so many professions of fidelity to the old constitution, and had afterwards joined the Triumvirs, and procured from them the murder of his own brother as one of the rewards of his treason, now deserted the cause of Antonius. Accompanied by his nephew, M. Titius, the author of the death of Sex. Pompeius,<sup>341</sup> he hastened to Rome to transfer his services to Augustus. Plancus and Titius had been deeply trusted by Antonius, and they now betrayed to his enemy every secret of which they were in possession. Amongst the rest they intimated to him the contents of the will of Antonius, which they had themselves attested, and informed him in whose care it was deposited. Augustus immediately got this document into his power,<sup>342</sup> and with shameless baseness broke open the seals, and read the contents of it publicly, first to the senate, and afterwards to the assembly of the people. The clause in it which especially induced Augustus to commit this act, was one in which Antonius desired that his body might, after his death, be carried to Alexandria, and there buried by the side of Cleopatra. This proof of his romantic passion for a foreigner, seemed in the eyes of the Romans to attest his utter degeneracy, and induced the populace at least to credit the inventions of his enemies, who asserted that it was his intention, if victorious in the approaching contest, to give up Rome to the dominion of Cleopatra, and to transfer the seat of empire from the banks of the Tiber to those of the Nile. It is clear, from the language of those poets who wrote under the patronage of Augustus,<sup>343</sup> that this was the light in which the war was industriously represented; that every effort was made to give it the character of a contest with a foreign enemy, and to array on the side of Augustus the national pride and jealousy of the people of Rome. Nor were these arts unsuccessful; insomuch,

<sup>340</sup> Dion Cassius, I. 420. Plutarch, in Antonio, 58.

<sup>341</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 83.

<sup>342</sup> Dion Cassius, 420. Plutarch, in Antonio, 58. Suetonius, in Augusto, 17.

<sup>343</sup> "Antehac nefas depromere Cæcubum  
Cellis avitis: dum Capitolio  
Regina dementes ruinas,  
Fusus et imperio parabat,  
Contaminato cum grege turpium  
Morbo virorum."—Horace, Carm. I. ode 37.

"Hinc Augustus agens Italos in prælia Cæsar,  
Cum Patribus Populoque, Penatibus et Magnis Diis,  
Hinc ope barbaricâ, variisque Antonius armis,—  
—sequiturque, nefas! Ægyptia conjux!

\* \* \* \* \*

Omnigenumque Deûm monstra, et latrator Anubis  
Contra Neptunum et Venerem, contraque Minervam,  
Tela tenent."—Virgil, Æneid, VIII. v. 678. 685. 698.



that the infamy of stealing and divulging the contents of a will was forgotten in the indignation felt by the Romans at the preference shown by Antonius to Egypt, rather than to his own country; and it is said that the senate, as soon as they had heard the will read, decreed that Antonius should be deprived of the consulship to which he was to have succeeded in the following year,<sup>344</sup> and of all his other authority as an officer of the Roman commonwealth. His adherents moreover were encouraged to desert him by promises of indemnity and honours.

At the same time war was declared against Cleopatra, and Augustus discharged the office of *fecialis* or herald, in going through all the usual ceremonies in denouncing it. But for a contest of this magnitude, immense resources were requisite; and accordingly Augustus imposed an income tax of twenty-five per cent. on all the free citizens who possessed any land in Italy,<sup>345</sup> and a tax upon capital at the rate of 12*l.* 10*s.* per cent. on all freedmen who were worth fifty thousand *denarii*, or about 161*l.* The inequality of these burdens was greatly resented by the freedmen, and numerous disturbances were the consequence, insomuch that it was supposed that the appearance of Antonius in Italy at that moment would have insured him a complete victory over his rival. But whether Antonius was not sufficiently advanced in his preparations to risk such an attempt, or whether there was any failure of enterprise on his part, it is certain that Augustus was suffered to crush the discontents of Italy without any interruption. His fleet was assembled in the neighbourhood of Brundisium,<sup>346</sup> and threatened the opposite coast of Epirus, about the autumn of the year 722; and Antonius judging it too late in the season to commence any active operations, fell back from Coreyra, to which place he had advanced in the hope of carrying the war into Italy before his adversary was ready to meet him, and passed the winter at Patræ, on the north-western coast of Peloponnesus. And thus having brought the two parties to the eye of the decisive struggle, we shall here pause in our narrative; and referring our readers to the history of Egypt<sup>347</sup> for the details of the Actian war, we shall hereafter resume the story of Augustus at the period when his ambition was fully gratified, and he was become the sole sovereign of the Roman empire.

<sup>344</sup> Dion Cassius, I. 421.

<sup>346</sup> Dion Cassius, 424.

<sup>345</sup> Dion Cassius, I. 424. Plutarch, in Antonio, 58.

<sup>347</sup> Ency. Metrop.

Declaration of war  
against Cleopatra.

## CHAPTER XI.

CAIUS OCTAVIUS CÆSAR AUGUSTUS.—A VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF  
ROME.—FROM U.C. 722 TO U.C. 766, A.C. 32 TO A.D. 13.

IF we were to judge of God's moral government exclusively from the various earthly fortune of good and bad men, From U. C. 722 to 766, A. C. 32 to A. D. 13. there are few instances of successful wickedness which would more disturb our faith than that of the long and peaceful reign of Augustus Cæsar. Other usurpers have enjoyed till their death their ill-gotten power, but it has been beset by fears and anxieties; and the severity of their government has betrayed their consciousness of the real feelings with which they were regarded, and has proved that they could truly anticipate the sentence which after-ages would pass upon their memory. But Augustus reigned amidst the grateful obedience of his people; and the flattery with which his own court resounded, has been echoed by successive generations, till he has been habitually ranked amongst the best and greatest of sovereigns; and the period of his dominion has been considered synonymous with the highest state of civilization and public prosperity. Yet the man thus eulogized had shown himself capable of every wickedness, so long as his interests required it; and the merit of his later years consists only in that clearness of understanding which taught him that power, although most readily gained by crime, was most wisely exercised in promoting the happiness of mankind; and that justice and mercy, when they demanded no personal sacrifices, were only a means, as easy as effectual, of promoting at once his own security and greatness.

The conquest of Egypt became a most seasonable source of riches to Augustus, and he availed himself of it to the utmost. Augustus settles the government of Egypt. It is said that besides the immense treasures accumulated by Cleopatra,<sup>1</sup> and the heavy forfeitures imposed on all those Egyptians who had served their queen with most distinction during the late war, a tax was imposed on the whole people of Egypt to the amount of two-thirds of their property, besides a heavy contribution levied on the citizens of Alexandria,

<sup>1</sup> Dion Cassius, LI. 455, edit. Leunclavii.

as a ransom for the exemption of their city from plunder. In this manner Augustus, we are told, was enabled to pay all the arrears due to the army, and to discharge his obligations to those creditors who had lent him money for the expenses of the war; while at the same time he carried off a great number of magnificent offerings which had ornamented the temples of Egypt, and were now to be laid up in those at Rome. It is said, too, that after all the spoliations, the wealth and resources of Egypt appeared to him so formidable, that he was afraid to intrust that province to the charge of any man of rank or influence, lest he should raise up a rival to himself. He, therefore, committed the government of the country to Cornelius Gallus, a citizen of the equestrian order, and a person of very low extraction;<sup>2</sup> he would not allow the city of Alexandria to possess any municipal council; and he declared all Egyptians incapable of being admitted into the senate at Rome. At the same time he employed his soldiers in clearing out many of the old canals with which the country had been formerly intersected,<sup>3</sup> and which had been for a long period choked up by the mud and sand deposited in the successive inundations of the Nile. He then departed from Egypt, passed through Syria, and thence continued his progress to the province of Asia, wherein he resolved to remain during the winter.

The tidings of his final victory over Antonius and Cleopatra arrived at Rome in the month of September,<sup>4</sup> when, by a curious coincidence, M. Cicero, the son of the orator, was just entering on his consulship; for that office, which was now a mere empty title, was not held as formerly, for the whole year; but, in order to multiply the patronage of the sovereign, was given successively to several persons, each of whom only retained it for two or three months. Although it might have been thought that all conceivable modes of flattery to the conqueror had been already exhausted, yet the senate, on this occasion, was once more lavish of its honours to the chief of the victorious party, and of its marks of disgrace on the memory of the vanquished. All monuments in honour of Antonius were ordered to be defaced or destroyed; the day of his birth was to be held accursed, and no member of his family was ever to bear the prænomen of Marcus. On the other hand, solemn games were to be celebrated every five years in honour of Augustus; his birthday, and the anniversary of the day on which the news of his victory had reached Rome, were to be kept as days of thanksgiving; he was to be met, on his approach to the capital, by the

Honours decreed to him by the senate. U. C. 723.

<sup>2</sup> Dion Cassius, LI. 455. Suetonius, in Augusto, 66.

<sup>3</sup> Dion Cassius, LI. 456. Suetonius, in Augusto, 18.

<sup>4</sup> Dion Cassius, LI. 456. Pliny, Hist. Natural. XXII. 6. Plutarch, in Cicerone, 49.



Vestal virgins, the senate and people, in procession with their wives and children ; and his power of protection, as tribune, to any one who appealed to him, was to extend to the distance of seven stadia and a half without the walls of Rome ; and further, he was to have a privilege of pardoning any criminal, by giving what was called the vote of Minerva, when the number of the voices which condemned, exceeded only by one the number of those which acquitted. Finally, on the first of January in the ensuing year, the senators all took an oath to observe all his acts ; and the gates of the temple of Janus were shut, as if Augustus, by his conquest of Egypt, had delivered the commonwealth from every enemy, and had brought it to a state of perfect peace.

U. C. 724.

Meantime the cities of Asia, wherein Augustus was passing the winter, were vying with Rome itself in the flatteries which they offered him. They professed to regard it as a great distinction, when he allowed temples, dedicated to Rome and to the divine Julius, to be raised at Ephesus and Nicæa,<sup>5</sup> and two others, consecrated to Rome and to himself, to be built at Pergamus and Nicomedia. It is observed, however, that the care of the temples dedicated to Julius Cæsar, was committed to the Roman citizens resident in the cities wherein they were placed ; while the charge of the temples of Augustus was given to the native inhabitants, or, as they were commonly styled, the Greeks. The Romans, it is said, would not, at this time, condescend to become priests in the temple of a living man,<sup>6</sup> although they did not object to bestowing divine honours on the same individual after death. But the subjects of Rome were less scrupulous, and the example of the Greeks of Asia was soon followed, we are told, by the inhabitants of the other provinces of the empire.

Flatteries paid him by the Greek cities of Asia.

In the summer of this year, Augustus crossed over from Asia into Greece, and thence to Italy.<sup>7</sup> He lavished the treasures of Egypt so liberally on all classes of people, in donations to his soldiers, in largesses of 100 denarii, or about 3*l.* 4*s.* 6*d.* to each individual citizen, and in paying all the sums which he had borrowed for the expenses of the war, that all his crimes and oppressions were forgotten amid the splendour of his munificence ; nor did he give less general satisfaction by refusing the golden crowns which were offered to him, as they had been to his uncle, by the cities of Italy, and by remitting all arrears of taxes which were still due to the treasury. Such an overflow of money was at this time poured into the market at Rome, that the price of land rapidly rose,<sup>8</sup> and the usual rate of interest was reduced to only one-third of what it had been before ;

Augustus returns to Rome.

<sup>5</sup> Dion Cassius, LI. 458. Tacitus, *Annal.* IV. 37.

<sup>6</sup> Dion Cassius, LI. 458.

<sup>7</sup> Dion Cassius, LI. 458.

<sup>8</sup> Dion Cassius, LI. 458. Suetonius, in *Augusto*, 41.

the great mass of disposable capital making every one eager to become a purchaser of land as the readiest means of investing it to advantage, while all who wanted to borrow money were enabled to procure it on far easier terms than usual. Augustus then celebrated his "triple triumph" His three triumphs. during three successive days:<sup>9</sup> on the first of which were commemorated the victories gained either by himself or his lieutenants, over the Dalmatians, Pannonians, and various other barbarian tribes of Germany and the northern extremity of Gaul;<sup>10</sup> on the second, his naval victory at Actium; and on the third, his conquest of Egypt. No mention was made of Antonius; nor was the late contest represented in any other light than as a struggle between the senate and people of Rome and the queen of Egypt. A figure of Cleopatra lying on a couch, intended to display the manner of her death, was carried in the procession; and two of her children by Antonius, Alexander and Cleopatra, were exhibited among the prisoners. One striking change of the forms practised under the old constitution was remarked on this occasion. The consuls, and other magistrates of the commonwealth, were accustomed to walk before the chariot of the victorious general; but now they followed in his train, in company with those senators who had served with him in his late campaigns, and were now sharing in the honours of his triumph.

The consecration of a temple, dedicated to Julius Cæsar as a demigod, soon furnished Augustus with an opportunity of further gratifying the people by an exhibition of different kinds of sports and combats. It is mentioned, that the hippopotamus and rhinoceros were on this occasion first hunted and killed in a Roman amphitheatre; and that large bodies of the Suevi and the Dacians, the former one of the most powerful of the German tribes, and the latter a people who occupied both banks of the Danube, in the lower part of the course of that river, were matched against each other, and practised each their national mode of fighting in real battle, for the entertainment of the spectators.

It was a little before this time, apparently, that M. Lepidus, the son of the late Triumvir, and the nephew of M. Brutus, formed a design to destroy Augustus.<sup>11</sup>

Conspiracy of  
Lepidus.

The particulars of this attempt are not recorded: Paterculus charges him with intending to assassinate Augustus as soon as he should return to Rome; while the Epitomizer of Livy says, that he was meditating an open attack upon his power, possibly by endeavouring to draw away some of the legions from his ser-

<sup>9</sup> At Cæsar, triplici in vectus Romana Triumpho  
Mœnia, &c.—Virgil, *Æneid.* VIII. 714.

<sup>10</sup> Dion Cassius, 459; and Virgil *Æneid.* VIII. 714. Livy, *Epitome*, CXXXIII. Suetonius, in Augusto, 22.

<sup>11</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 88. Livy, *Epitome*, CXXXIII. Seneca, de Clemencia, 9. Suetonius, in Augusto, 19.

vice. But whatever his plans were, they were discovered by C. Mæcenas, to whom Augustus had intrusted the government of the capital during his absence, and Lepidus was arrested and put to death. His wife, Servilia, is said to have killed herself in consequence of his loss, by swallowing fire.

In the midst of his triumph, and when the sovereignty which he had so dearly purchased lay at length securely within his grasp, Augustus is said to have meditated an entire resignation of his power, and the restoration of the old constitution. This report, which is mentioned by Suetonius, became embellished in process of time with additional circumstances; and Dion Cassius, in the true style of a Greek rhetorician, represents Augustus as consulting his two friends, Agrippa and Mæcenas, on this important question; and ascribes to these two counsellors two speeches of immense length, in one of which Agrippa repeats all the old common-place arguments in favour of a republic, and urges Augustus to restore the authority of the senate and people; while in the other, Mæcenas, in a strain equally trite, recounts the advantages of monarchy, and presses his friend to retain the power which fortune had put into his hands. It is most improbable that Augustus should ever have entertained a serious thought of sacrificing the prize which he had led a life of such surpassing wickedness to gain; although it is perfectly consistent with his character that he should have wished to spread such a belief among the people, and should appear to be reluctantly induced to bear the weight of government, from a compassion for the disordered state of the commonwealth. We may more readily believe that Mæcenas suggested to him many of the measures which he now began to carry into execution, for establishing the new order of things.<sup>12</sup>

Augustus remodels  
the senate.

He first turned his attention to the senate, which he proposed to reduce in its numbers, and to remove all those members who seemed unfit for their station, from their deficiencies in rank, fortune, or character; particularly those individuals who had procured their admission after Cæsar's death, by purchasing from Antonius a pretended grant of that honour by the late dictator, at the time when Antonius was availing himself of the possession of Cæsar's papers to gratify his own rapacity and ambition. In this review of the senate, Augustus chose M. Agrippa as his colleague, and after a considerable number of senators had resigned their rank of their own accord, to avoid the disgrace of expulsion, each remaining senator was directed to name one other whom he considered as most worthy to remain on the rolls. All those whose names found no place on this list, and all others whom the censors judged it expedient to remove, were then marked down, and

<sup>12</sup> Dion Cassius, LII. 494. Suetonius, in Augusto, 35.



obliged, it is said, to withdraw of themselves, although they were not allowed, like those who had resigned before the examination, to retain the dress of senators, nor their seats amongst those reserved for the senate at the public spectacles. Whilst carrying on this scrutiny, Augustus is said to have worn armour under his clothes,<sup>13</sup> to have been constantly surrounded by ten of the senators, on whose personal strength and attachment he could most fully rely, and to have admitted no other senator into his presence without causing him to be previously searched, lest he should carry about him any concealed weapon. It is added also, that he deposed one Q. Statilius from the office of tribune,<sup>14</sup> that he raised two senators to the privileges of the consular rank, although they had never held that magistracy, and that, following the precedent set by his uncle, he conferred on several noble families the dignity of patricians. But his jealousy of the nobility was shown by an order which he issued, forbidding any senator to leave Italy at any time without his permission, as if fearful of their escaping from his superintendence. In this policy also he trod, as we have seen, in the steps of his uncle, Julius Cæsar.

The ensuing year, in which Augustus held the office of consul for the sixth time himself, and chose M. Agrippa as his colleague, was marked by a variety of acts, all tending to render the new government generally popular, and thus preparing the way for the scene which was soon to follow. In the first place, Augustus affected to revive the appearance of the old consulship,<sup>15</sup> by treating his colleague entirely as his own equal. He amused the people with magnificent games of various kinds; he formed and opened for public use a voluminous library of Greek and Roman literature on the Palatine Hill; he is said to have borrowed money to enable him to make a large contribution to the public treasury; he issued four times the amount of the allowance of corn usually given to the poorer citizens at the public expense; he gave sums of money to the poorer senators, to enable them to bear the burden of the ædileship, and other expensive public offices; he burnt the accounts of all debts of long standing which were due to the commonwealth; and made over to the possessors the full property of all ground in the capital to which the state maintained a doubtful claim.<sup>16</sup> It is mentioned besides, that he not only liberally repaired all the temples in Rome which needed it,<sup>17</sup> but he was careful not to efface the names of the original founders, nor to substitute his own as the restorer of their work. He also

Salutary and popular measures of Augustus.  
U. C. 725.

<sup>13</sup> Suetonius, ubi supra.

<sup>14</sup> Dion Cassius, ubi supra.

<sup>15</sup> Dion Cassius, LIII. 496.

<sup>16</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 32. "Loca

in urbe publica Juris ambigui possessoribus adjudicavit."

<sup>17</sup> Livy, IV. 20. "Augustum Cæsarem, Templorum omnium conditorem aut restitutorem." Dion Cassius, LIII. 497.

stopped the proceedings against all persons who had been long exposed to criminal prosecutions, and whose cases had never yet been decided; ordaining, that if the prosecutors were resolved to continue their suits, they should themselves be liable, if the accused were acquitted, to suffer the same punishment which he would have undergone had he been found guilty. Above all, this year is mentioned as the period in which most of the disorders and abuses introduced in the course of the civil wars<sup>18</sup> were corrected or removed. Three of the most flagrant of these are particularly noticed.<sup>19</sup> The unsettled state of the times had introduced the practice of wearing arms for self-defence even in the streets and neighbourhood of Rome; and whole bands of ruffians, pretending to be armed only for their own protection, carried on their outrages with impunity. These were suppressed by a vigorous exertion of military force. By a similar system of violence, travellers of all descriptions were continually kidnapped on the roads,<sup>20</sup> and carried off to private workhouses, where they were confined as slaves, and treated with the most excessive cruelty; but this evil was remedied by submitting all these workhouses to a vigorous search, and delivering all who were unlawfully detained in them. A third mischief was the formation of a vast number of societies or clubs,<sup>21</sup> one of the worst aggravations of the miseries of revolutions. These professed to resemble the old companies belonging to the several trades in Rome; but they were in reality mere combinations for the purposes of corruption or violence; and it was therefore a general benefit when Augustus dissolved all associations except those that were ancient and agreeable to law. When these salutary measures had won the favour of all classes of people, Augustus continued himself and Agrippa in the consulship for the following year, and then proceeded to execute the trick on which he designed to found the permanent establishment of his government.

It is said by Dion Cassius,<sup>22</sup> that several of the senators had been prepared beforehand for the scene which was to take place, and these would not fail to suggest to the other members the behaviour which they were wished to adopt. Augustus then came to the senate and read a speech composed for the occasion, in which he expressed his intention of resigning all his power, and restoring the old constitu-

<sup>18</sup> Dion Cassius, LIII. 497.

<sup>19</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 32.

<sup>20</sup> See the story of Atilius, ante, p. 416.

<sup>21</sup> Similar societies were frequent in Greece, and are described by Thucydides as the ready instruments of violence, and particularly of assassination in all political disturbances. Their object was to support their members when engaged in any civil

or criminal causes in the courts of law, and to further their election when canvassing for any public office. See Thucydides, VIII. 54. 65, and his character of such societies, III. 82, in that admirable passage on the seditions of Greece, which is a lesson to every age and nation.

<sup>22</sup> LIII. 497.

tion of the commonwealth. We may suppose that such a declaration was heard by the majority with extreme surprise; many at once perceived its insincerity; but there were others, we are told, who, dreading above all things the restoration of the republic,<sup>23</sup> were led by their fears to suspect that Augustus was in earnest; and these joined most zealously with the senators who were already in the secret, in deprecating a resignation which they said would be fatal to the empire. The senators who most regretted their ancient independence, joined perhaps the more eagerly in the general cry, lest they might betray their real feelings; and thus the proposal of Augustus was received exactly as he had hoped; and in consenting to be the despot of his country, he seemed to be only yielding to the national wish, and to accept a painful burden, which no other citizen but himself was able to bear. Yet that he might not lay aside the mask altogether, he refused to undertake the administration of all the provinces; and selected only those which were considered as requiring the most vigilant superintendence, and in which the presence of a military force was most necessary.<sup>24</sup> The portion of the empire which he thus consented immediately to govern, consisted of the whole of Spain, with the exception of Bætica, the limits of which correspond nearly with those of the modern province of Andalusia, the whole of Transalpine Gaul, Cœle-Syria, Phœnicia, Cilicia, and Egypt. The other provinces were to be governed, as formerly, by proconsuls annually appointed by lot from among the senators: and even that part of the empire which was given up to Augustus, he declared that he would only retain for ten years, within which period he hoped that every necessity for such an extraordinary power would be at an end; and he added, that he would gladly restore his provinces earlier to the senate and the people, if circumstances should render it practicable.

He divides the administration of the provinces with the senate.

The monarchy was thus established, and the senate laboured to invent yet additional honours to heap upon their new master. It was ordered that laurels should be planted at the gates of his residence on the Palatine Hill, and a wreath of oak should be for ever hung up over them;<sup>25</sup> the first denoting that he was ever victorious, and the oaken wreath, or civic crown, implying that he was the perpetual saviour of the lives of his fellow-citizens. It was debated also, what title of distinction should be conferred upon him; and it was then that L. Munatius Plancus suggested the name of Augustus,<sup>26</sup> an epithet which was ordinarily applied to places set apart for reli-

He receives additional honours, and the surname of Augustus.

<sup>23</sup> Dion Cassius, 502.

<sup>25</sup> Dion Cassius, LIII. 507. Valerius

<sup>24</sup> Dion Cassius, 502. Augusto, 47.

Suetonius, in Maximus, II. 8.

<sup>26</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 7. Festus, in voce "Augustus."



gious purposes, and containing any thing consecrated by augury, and which was now offered to the new sovereign, as signifying that a more than human sacredness and majesty existed in his person.

In this manner, at the age of six and thirty, did Augustus regularly commence his reign over the Roman empire. He retained his power during forty years, a period of general peace and prosperity, during which the wounds inflicted by the long continuance of the civil wars were gradually and effectually healed. To write the annals of such a reign, especially with our present scanty materials, would be but a meagre and unprofitable labour. We shall rather attempt to give a general picture of the whole of it, and without pretending to detail the events of every successive year, to present a view of the external and internal state of the empire; of its relations with foreign powers; of the nature of the imperial government; of the condition of Italy and the provinces; of the physical, moral, and intellectual state of the Roman world during this most memorable period. Some notice of the family of Augustus, and of the person likely to become his successor, may then properly precede our account of his death, and serve to connect the present portion of our task with the lives hereafter to be given of the emperors who followed him.

The extent of the Roman dominion in the reign of Augustus was still below the point which it afterwards attained under Claudius and Trajan. Britain was as yet unsubdued, and a large tract of country between the mountains of Hæmus and the Danube was not yet tributary to Rome. But the empire embraced within its limits the whole of the Mediterranean; its eastern frontier reached the Euphrates; the conquest of Egypt extended its southern boundary to the cataracts of the Nile; while in Europe it possessed Spain and Gaul, together with all that portion of modern Germany which is situated between the Alps and the Danube. It is of little importance, however, to ascertain the exact line which separated the Roman provinces from the possessions of the independent barbarians. Even within the limits of the empire, the more recently conquered tribes might create occasional disturbance, and afford some employment for the Roman arms. But as far as the knowledge of geography then attainable enabled them to cast their eyes around the world, the Romans could discover only two nations capable of offering an effectual resistance to their power; the Parthians in Asia, and the Germans in Europe.

The Parthians, a rude tribe of mountaineers from the eastern shores of the Caspian sea, wearing large loose caps upon their heads,<sup>27</sup> and armed with short javelins

1. With Parthia. Origin of the Parthians.

<sup>27</sup> Herodotus, Polymnia, 66. 64. 62. 61.

and bows of cane, marched in company with the neighbouring tribes of the Chorasmians and Sogdians, amidst that countless multitude of nations whom Xerxes led with him on his memorable expedition against Greece. Such is the earliest notice of the Parthian name which is to be found in history; the later fortunes of the nation, their subjection to the Greek kings of Syria, the foundation of their monarchy by Arsaces, and its subsequent progress down to the invasion and defeat of the Roman army under Crassus, have been related elsewhere.<sup>28</sup> We have also mentioned the attack made by the Parthians on Syria and Asia Minor, when T. Labienus, a Roman exile, conducted their armies; and have briefly noticed their rapid successes and equally rapid reverses; the victory gained by P. Ventidius over Pacorus, the son of their king; and, lastly, the disastrous attempt of M. Antonius to invade their country, in revenge for the assistance which they had rendered to the party of Brutus and Cassius. Their empire, which had thus contended against Rome with more than equal fortune, now embraced the whole of Asia eastward of the Euphrates,<sup>29</sup> to the most remote of those countries which were within the knowledge of the Romans. They numbered among their provinces the once mighty names of Media in Assyria;<sup>30</sup> and even Persia itself, the seat of the empire of the great king, although it still had princes of its own, was no more than a vassal kingdom dependent on the sovereign power of Parthia.<sup>31</sup> There were two capitals of the monarchy, Ecbatana and Seleucia.<sup>32</sup> The first, the ancient metropolis of Media, founded by Deioces, the earliest of the Median princes, was the summer residence of the king of Parthia. His winters were passed in the lower and milder country on the banks of the Tigris, where stood Seleucia, the former capital of the Macedonian kings of Syria. But Seleucia still retained a shadow of independence; its inhabitants, proud of their Greek extraction, language, and manners, would have associated ill with the guards and attendants of a barbarian sovereign; and in order to save the city from the burden of their presence,<sup>33</sup> the court was accustomed to reside at the neighbouring village of Ctesiphon, which was situated at the distance of about three miles from Seleucia, on the opposite bank of the Tigris. In later times, when the citizens of Seleucia were become obnoxious to the Parthian government, from having betrayed an impatience of its dominion, Ctesiphon was studiously favoured as a rival city, which might be made a national capital of the empire;<sup>34</sup> and thus it gradually increased in wealth and greatness, while Seleucia as gradually declined and went to ruin.

<sup>28</sup> Ency. Metrop.<sup>29</sup> Strabo, XI. 9, § 2, edit. Siebenkees.<sup>30</sup> Strabo, XVI. 1, § 19, edit. Sieben-

kees.

<sup>31</sup> Strabo, XV. 3, § 3. 24.<sup>32</sup> Strabo, XVI. 1, § 16.<sup>33</sup> Strabo, XVI. 1, § 16. Tacitus, Anal. VI. 42.<sup>34</sup> Pliny, Histor. Natural. VI. 26.

Our knowledge of the internal state of Parthia is confined to one or two isolated facts. Strabo expressly omits all notice of the subject in his geographical work, referring his readers to the information concerning it which he had given in some of his other writings;<sup>35</sup> and as these are now lost, his reference to them only excites our curiosity in vain. We can only discern in Parthia the existence of two orders, of the nobility and priesthood,<sup>36</sup> each of which formed a distinct member of the great national council, and from either of them indifferently the kings might be selected. There was also that striking characteristic of the Slavonic tribes, a powerful nobility, with the rest of the population consisting almost entirely of slaves. In time of war the nobles attended the king's standard, each bringing with him a large body of his dependents. These were not freemen, like the feudal vassals of Europe, but slaves;<sup>37</sup> they were, however, all carefully armed and trained as cavalry, for this constituted the whole strength of the Parthian armies; and the greatness of the chiefs was measured by the number of slaves which they brought into the field. The growth of an intermediate class of freemen between the nobles and their slaves, was checked by the law of the country, which forbade any master to give a slave his liberty; so that the highest and lowest classes of society seemed destined to exist alone, and in perpetual contact with each other. Probably, indeed, the evils of slavery were softened by the interposition of such wide distinctions between the slave and the freemen; as they must, on the other hand, appear more intolerable where the line of division is merely arbitrary, and the slave sees around him a number of freemen who appear neither in wealth, or birth, or condition, elevated above his own level. But when freedom was identified with riches, and power, and high nobility, it seemed placed completely out of his reach, and the absence of it was so natural as hardly to excite a murmur. Those revolts and mutinies, therefore, of which we have seen such bloody instances among the slaves in the Roman empire, appear to have been unknown in Parthia. None would have dared in Greece or Rome to enlist slaves into the army, much less to give them the same arms which were intrusted to free citizens; but the Parthian chiefs armed their dependents like themselves, and instead of trembling at any symptoms which they might display of courage and activity, they trained them

<sup>35</sup> Strabo, XI. 9, § 3, edit. Siebenkees.

<sup>36</sup> Strabo, XI. 9, § 3. τῶν Παρθυαίων συνεδριῶν φησι Πισιδιῶνιος εἶναι διττόν· τὸ μὲν συγγενῶν, τὸ δὲ σκλῆρων καὶ μίγων, ἐξ ὧν ἀμφοῖν τοὺς βασιλεῖς καθίστησιν. We have translated συγγενῶν by the word "nobility," supposing it to signify an extended clan or

caste. The Achæmenidæ in Persia seem to have been an instance of a smaller class on a more limited scale.

<sup>37</sup> Justin, XLI. 2. This account of the Parthians seems to be copied from some trust-worthy authority, and is consistent and sensible.



carefully in all martial exercises,<sup>38</sup> and beheld their proficiency with the same pleasure as that of their own children.

At the period with which we are now engaged, a prince, whom the Greek and Roman writers call Phraates, was seated on the Parthian throne.<sup>39</sup> Having been chosen by his father as his successor, he is said to have secured an earlier enjoyment of the crown, by murdering both him and thirty of his other sons; and committing additional cruelties after his repulse of the Roman invasion under Antonius, he was driven from the throne by the indignation of his subjects, and a successor, named Tiridates, was appointed in his room. After some time, however, Phraates, by the aid of some of the rude Scythian tribes which bordered upon Parthia, recovered his kingdom, and drove his competitor into exile in his turn. Tiridates fled into the dominions of Rome, carrying with him the youngest son of Phraates, whom he had contrived to get in his power; and offering this young prince as a hostage to Augustus, he requested his assistance to restore him to his throne, promising him to extend the influence of Rome over Parthia, if he were reinstated by Roman aid. Phraates, on the other hand, solicited Augustus to release his son, and to give up Tiridates as a rebel.<sup>40</sup> Augustus, more disposed to consolidate than to extend his empire, sent back the son of Phraates, and refused to assist the attempts of Tiridates, while at the same time he allowed him to live quietly in the Roman dominions. Phraates, thus finding that he had nothing to fear from Rome, and still suspecting danger from his own subjects, resolved to commit four of his sons to the care of Augustus, partly as hostages, and partly, we are told, to prevent them from being raised to the throne in his place,<sup>41</sup> knowing that the Parthians would set up no competitor against him, unless he were of the royal stock of the Arsacidæ. Augustus received the Parthian princes, and treated them with the greatest kindness, bringing them up in the customs of the Romans, and instructing them in the arts and superior knowledge of Europe; he availed himself also of his friendly connexion with Phraates, to procure from him the restoration of all the Roman standards and prisoners which had been taken in the expeditions of Crassus and Antonius.<sup>42</sup> This supposed reparation of the greatest disasters sustained for many years by the Roman arms, was especially grateful to Augustus; and there is no foreign transaction of his reign on which the panegyrists of those times have dwelt with greater complacency.

<sup>38</sup> Justin, XLI. 2. He says that the army which repulsed Antonius consisted of 50,000 cavalry, in which number there were only 400 freemen; the rest was made up entirely of slaves.

<sup>39</sup> Justin. XLII. 5.

<sup>40</sup> Justin, XLII. 5.

<sup>41</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* II. 1, 2. Strabo, XVI. 1, § 28.

<sup>42</sup> Strabo and Justin, *locis citatis*. Livy, *Epitome*, CXXXIX.

Nearly a century had now elapsed since the invasion of Italy by the Cimbri and Teutones; and notwithstanding the final destruction of the invaders, the Romans could not forget that several consular armies had been overthrown before Marius had been able to stem the torrent. When Cæsar first took possession of his government in Gaul, he found that the Gauls regarded the Germans with the greatest terror, as a people far more warlike than themselves; and although he destroyed the army of Ariovistus, and made a short expedition beyond the Rhine, yet the conquest of Gaul afforded him sufficient employment, and the Roman arms had as yet made no serious impression upon Germany. During the thirteen years which elapsed between the death of Cæsar and the battle of Actium, we read of a second expedition made by the Romans beyond the Rhine in the year 716, under the command of M. Agrippa;<sup>43</sup> but this had probably no other object than to chastise some of the German tribes, who had assisted the Gauls in a fruitless attempt to recover their independence. A more regular hostility seems to have been carried on against those numerous tribes who were included under the general name of Illyrians,<sup>44</sup> and who occupied the whole country between the Alps and the Danube, together with the whole of the eastern side of the Adriatic, extending southwards to the very confines of Greece. Some parts of this extensive tract had indeed been conquered by the Romans at a much earlier period: a king of the most southern extremity of it had taken part with Perseus in the last struggle made by the Macedonian monarchy, and had paid for his offence by the forfeiture of his dominions; whilst the Dalmatians, who were thus brought into contact with the Roman frontier, were attacked twelve years afterwards, merely in order to find some employment for the Roman arms.<sup>45</sup> Accordingly, several victories were gained over them, which were the occasion of a triumph to several Roman generals; and the bounds of the Roman provinces of Illyricum were gradually extended. Yet the Dalmatians were persevering enemies; even in the civil war between Pompey and Cæsar, they inflicted a signal defeat on Cæsar's officer, the notorious A. Gabinius; and after the establishment of Cæsar's power, we find P. Vatinius, the successor of Gabinius, complaining, in a letter to Cicero,<sup>46</sup> of the tedious nature of the contest against them, and of the injustice of Cæsar, who seemed to expect that he should go through the endless labour of conquering the whole people, before he would reward him with the honour of a triumph. The Triumvirs, however, were more indulgent than Cæsar, for Vatinius

<sup>43</sup> Dion Cassius, XLVIII. 387. edit. Le-nclavii.

<sup>44</sup> Cluverius, *Vindelicia et Noricum*, I, forming an appendix to his *Germania An-*

*tiqua*. To the authorities there quoted may be added Appian, *Illyrica*, 6.

<sup>45</sup> Polybius, XXXII. 19.

<sup>46</sup> *Epist. ad Familiares*, V. *epist.* X.

obtained his triumph, through their favour, in the year after the proscription,<sup>47</sup> although the Dalmatians were still unconquered; and only three years afterwards, C. Asinius Pollio obtained another triumph over the same people,<sup>48</sup> and Horace could speak of the "eternal renown" which "the laurel of his Dalmatian triumph had won for him." Again the contest was renewed by Augustus himself, who only four years after the victories of Pollio, engaged personally in the Illyrian war, and is said to have been wounded in an attack upon one of the fortresses of Dalmatia.<sup>49</sup> Under his command Pannonia was invaded and conquered; and as the Roman arms continued to advance towards the Danube, the countries bordering on the Adriatic appear to have been at last more effectually subdued; and victories became less frequent in Dalmatia and Liburnia, when they began to be won on the frontiers of Vindelicia and Noricum. After Augustus was established in the full possession of the empire, his sons-in-law, Tiberius Nero and Claudius Drusus, carried the Roman conquests into Rhætia;<sup>50</sup> and whatever occasional disturbances might still arise within that limit, the Danube became now regarded as the frontier of the empire, at least during the whole of its course through Germany.

While the Romans were thus extending their conquests from the Alps to the Danube, they attempted to pene- Expedition of Drusus and Tib. Nero beyond the Rhine. trate in another quarter into the very heart of Germany, and to advance their frontier from the Rhine to the Elbe. Claudius Drusus was first employed in this service, and afterwards his elder brother, Tiberius Nero. In the course of these wars more than fifty Roman fortresses were built on the banks of the Rhine,<sup>51</sup> many of which were the first germ of towns still existing; and amongst these are to be numbered Mentz, Bingen, Coblenz, Andernach, and Bonn. A fleet also co-operated with the army, sailing round from the ports of Gaul to the mouth of the Elbe; and the country was so far overrun, that Drusus had established military posts along the course of that river, as well as of the Weser. Had these successes been unchecked, the Romans would have permanently occupied the greatest part of Germany; the Latin language and the manners of Italy might have prevailed as entirely over the language and manners of the Germans as they did over those of the Gauls and Spaniards; whilst the Teutonic tribes, pressed by the Romans on the Elbe, and by the Slavonic nations on the Oder and the Vistula, would have

<sup>47</sup> Fasti Consulares et Triumphi, a Sigonio editi.

<sup>48</sup> Fasti Consulares et Triumphi, and Horace, Carm. II.

Cui laurus æternos honores  
Dalmatico peperit triumpho.

<sup>49</sup> Dion Cassius, XLIX. 412. Florus, IV. 12. Suetonius, in Augusto, 20

<sup>50</sup> Livy, Epitome, CXXXVI. Florus, IV. 12. Suetonius, in Tiberio, 9.

<sup>51</sup> Florus, IV. 12.



been either gradually overpowered and lost, or at any rate would never have been able to spread that regenerating influence over the best portion of Europe, to which the excellence of our modern institutions may in great measure be referred. If this be so, the victory of Arminius deserves to be reckoned among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the happiness of mankind; and we may regard the destruction of Quintilius Varus, and his three legions, on the banks of the Lippe, as second only in the benefits derived from it to the victory of Charles Martel at Tours, over the invading host of the Moham-medans.

It was in the year 744 that M. Claudius Drusus died in Germany;<sup>52</sup> and his brother, Tiberius Nero, was appointed to succeed him in his command. Tiberius is said to have conducted the war with extraordinary success; to have overrun again the whole country between the Rhine and the Elbe, and to have reduced it almost to the condition of a Roman province. But when he returned to Rome to enjoy a triumph, and to receive the consulship, the effects of his victories began to wear away, and the Germans soon renewed the contest. Ten years afterwards, when Tiberius had been adopted by Augustus as his son,<sup>53</sup> he repaired for the second time to Germany, and employed two summers in retracing the ground of his former conquests, and in again terrifying rather than subduing the Germans into submission. On this occasion, too, the Roman fleet co-operated with the army, and again sailed round to the mouth of the Elbe, and advanced some way up the river.<sup>54</sup> A succession of such campaigns must have produced a permanent effect; and the Germans would have been conquered as completely as the Gauls; for the Gauls had maintained an eight years' struggle against Cæsar, and none of their efforts had been so formidable as the last, when Vercingetorix had roused all the force of his country to contend with the Romans at Alesia. But as Tiberius was on the point of commencing his third campaign, a general revolt of all the Pannonian and Dalmatian tribes interrupted his career, and gave at this most critical moment a breathing time to Germany.<sup>55</sup> The main force of the empire was engaged between the Danube and the Alps; and the recent conquests of Tiberius between the Rhine and the Elbe, were committed to the charge of P. Quintilius Varus, with an army of three legions. Varus had already been intrusted with the government of Syria,<sup>56</sup> and in that station had made himself known by his exactions, and was said to have transferred to himself the riches of the province. In his command in Germany he seemed to consider

P. Quintilius Varus commands the Roman army in Germany.

<sup>52</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 97.

<sup>53</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 104.

<sup>54</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 106.

<sup>55</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 110.

<sup>56</sup> Tacitus, *Histor.* V. 9. Velleius Paterculus, 117. Dion Cassius, LVI. 582.

himself again in Syria; he introduced the Roman jurisdiction into the conquered territories, and irritated the rude minds of the barbarians, by subjecting them to a discipline the most alien from their habits and character. But it is said, that in order to lull him into a false security, the German chiefs pretended to receive with gratitude the institutions which he was introducing among them. They concerted quarrels amongst themselves, and solicited the arbitration of Varus to decide them, professing to admire the superior knowledge of the Romans, which taught them to settle their differences by the rules of equity instead of by the sword. Varus by constitution and habit possessed little of the activity of a soldier: the imaginary dignity of his situation, as the lawgiver and instructor of Germany, flattered at once his vanity and his indolence; and the licentious and rapacious passions which the Roman magistrates were so often accustomed to indulge in the provinces, began now also to look for gratification. Those profligacies which Varus might have committed in safety amidst the general relaxation of morals in Syria, were considered as the most intolerable outrages by the severe chastity of the Germans, who looked upon adultery with abhorrence, and regarded their wives as the chosen partners of all the dangers and labours of their lives. It is likely that the Romans, believing themselves securely established in the dominion of the country, began to offer without restraint those insults to the wives and daughters of their subjects for which the armies of southern climates have ever been infamous; and which in ancient days, from the low standard of morals every where existing, were committed with peculiar indifference.

In this state of things the plan of surprising and cutting off the whole Roman army is said to have been first conceived by a young German chief, whose name the Roman writers have corrupted into Arminius, but to whom we may more properly give his true appellation of Herman. He had served in the late campaigns amongst the auxiliaries of Rome;<sup>57</sup> and had been admitted not only to the privileges of Roman citizenship, but also to the rank of the equestrian order. He now concerted his measures with his countrymen with the utmost secrecy; while at the same time he did every thing in his power to increase the confidence of Varus, and to lead him into the snare which he was preparing. The Roman general had been persuaded to weaken his forces by sending detachments into various parts of the country, at the request of the German chiefs themselves, in order, as they said, to maintain tranquillity, and to secure the safe arrival of his convoys of provisions;<sup>58</sup> and on a stated day the insurrection broke out at a point most remote from

Conspiracy of Arminius, or Herman.

<sup>57</sup> Velleius Paterculus, 118.

<sup>58</sup> Dion Cassius, LVI. 583.

his head-quarters ; and he received intelligence that the people of the country had risen and massacred the troops which they had asked him to send among them. Upon this he instantly put his army in motion to chastise the insurgents, while Herman and the other chiefs of the conspiracy still professed the most entire attachment to Rome, and promised to join him with their own forces at a certain point on his line of march, that they might assist him in putting down the rebellion. Varus, we are told, had been previously warned of the treachery of Herman by another German chief, whom the Romans called Segestes.<sup>59</sup> Herman had married the daughter of this chief against his wishes, and this private injury, added to his own attachment to the Romans, made Segestes disposed to save them from the destruction with which they were threatened. When he found that all his warnings had been slighted, he addressed Varus immediately before he commenced his march, and while Herman and the other conspirators were yet in the Roman camp, and implored him that he would at once arrest Herman himself, and all the other German chiefs who were present, as the only means of defeating their treachery. But Varus was obstinate in his incredulity ; and Herman and his associates were allowed to depart and put themselves at the head of their forces.

The Roman army was impeded by an immense train of wag-  
Varus sets out with his army from his camp. ons laden with their baggage, and by a crowd of women and children belonging to the soldiers, who were permitted to follow the march, as the general would not allow himself to apprehend any danger. The way ran through an extensive forest, called by the Romans the Forest of Teutoburg,<sup>60</sup> which spread over a considerable tract of country between the Lippe and the Ems. In the intervals, between the woods, the ground was broken and boggy, and the Romans had to undergo the labour of forming for themselves a practicable road, by clearing away the trees, and constructing a sort of causeway through the worst parts of the morasses. When they were al-

He is surprised on his march by the Germans. ready wearied by their exertions, and perfectly unprepared for any attack, the troops of Herman and his associates, who were to join them at this place, suddenly appeared ; and rushing out from the woods on every side, assailed them with a heavy discharge of their missile weapons. The Romans, encumbered by their heavy baggage, and by the nature of the ground, were unable to form in any regular order to repel the enemy ; they thus sustained a heavy loss without being able to retaliate ; and having made little or no progress in their march, they encamped for the night on one of the most open and level

<sup>59</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* I. 55. Velleius Paterculus, 118.

<sup>60</sup> Dion Cassius, *LVI.* 583, et seq.



spots that they could find amidst the forest. Here they destroyed or abandoned a great part of their heavy baggage, and the next morning again renewed their march. But they still had to contend with the same natural difficulties of woods and bogs; and while their own numbers were decreasing every hour, the confidence of success was swelling the force of the Germans; and many, who had at first dreaded to take any part in the conspiracy, came now to share in the anticipated spoils of the Roman army. It is said too, that the weather was exceedingly tempestuous, and that violent squalls of wind and rain impeded the movements of the Romans, and so drenched their clothing and their wooden shields, that they could not stir themselves or wield their arms. The result was the total destruction of the Roman army. Varus himself and his principal officers, most of them having been already wounded, fell upon their own swords, that they might not be taken alive by the enemy;<sup>61</sup> and the wreck of his army, having attempted in vain to secure themselves at the approach of night by forming a camp, and to shelter themselves behind the ditch and rampart, were persuaded by one of their surviving commanders to lay down their arms, and to try the mercy of the conqueror. But there is little humanity to be expected from barbarians when they feel that the moment is arrived for taking vengeance for a long series of insults and injuries. The military tribunes and principal centurions among the prisoners were slaughtered by the Germans as victims to their gods, before some altars raised in the adjoining woods; the common soldiers were hanged upon the trees, or stifled in the morasses; and the heads of many of those who had perished were fastened to the trunks of the trees as a trophy of the victory. Above all, it is said, the Germans felt a peculiar delight in torturing those of their prisoners who had practised as lawyers in the courts established by Varus;<sup>62</sup> they put out their eyes, or cut off their hands; and one man, we are told, cut out the tongue of his victim, and then sewed up his mouth, exclaiming, "Now, viper, cease thy hissing!" In the defeat of the army, the standards of the legions and two of the eagles were also taken, and these trophies were exhibited by Herman to his soldiers, and treated with every mark of contempt and mockery. The third eagle was saved by the standard-bearer, who pulled it off from its staff, and kept it concealed under his girdle; he then hid himself in a bog till the enemy had left the spot, and effected his escape in safety to the Rhine. In the mean time other detachments of the Roman army were attacked in different quarters; and although some succeeded in cutting their way through the assailants and escaping into Gaul, yet the triumph of the Ger-

His army is destroyed, and he kills himself.

The Romans are driven out of Germany.

<sup>61</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* I. 61.

<sup>62</sup> Florus, IV. 12.

mans was every where complete ;<sup>63</sup> the Romans fled beyond the Rhine, and all the conquests which they had made between the river and the Elbe were totally and irrecoverably lost.<sup>64</sup>

The accounts of the consternation produced at Rome by the defeat of Varus describe it as so excessive, that unless they came from the Romans themselves, we should regard them as the mere exaggerations of national pride in the conquerors, exalting the effects of their own success. We are told that Augustus posted guards in different parts of Rome ;<sup>65</sup> that he continued all the governors of the provinces in their several commands, as if the crisis required only officers of tried ability and experience ; and that he followed a precedent which had been set during the invasion of Italy by the Cimbri, and repeated in the war with the Italian allies, of vowing solemn games to Jupiter, " if he would be pleased to bring the commonwealth into a better condition." Augustus himself is said to have felt the calamity so deeply, that for some months he let his beard and hair grow, and would strike his head from time to time against the doors of his apartments, exclaiming aloud, " Quintilius Varus ! give me back my legions." Had the Germans, indeed, united their efforts with those of the Pannonians and Dalmatians, and formed any connected plan for the invasion of the Roman frontiers, the danger of an invasion of Italy might not have been imaginary. But the revolt of Pannonia had been already quelled,<sup>66</sup> and Tiberius Nero was at leisure to march with his veteran legions towards Germany, and to maintain the usual policy of Rome, by acting at once on the offensive, and carrying the war into the enemy's country. The Germans were unable to meet him in the field, and his caution secured him against every attempt at surprise ; he accordingly overran and laid waste a district of considerable extent beyond the Rhine, and led back his army into winter quarters on the banks of that river,<sup>67</sup> pretending to have retrieved the honour of the Roman arms, and to have restored them to their accustomed superiority. But the frontier had receded to the Rhine, and Tiberius could not again advance it. Four years afterwards he succeeded to the sovereignty of the empire, on the death of Augustus ; and his jealous temper made him by no means inclined to see any of his officers obtain the glory of effectually conquering Germany. The Rhine thus became the permanent limit of the Roman dominions ; and that great river formed so natural a boundary line, that all attempts to penetrate beyond it were renounced as inexpedient ; so that the Germans remaining unconquered, had leisure to grow in power.

Consternation felt at Rome.

Expedition of Tiberius Nero into Germany.

<sup>63</sup> Velleius Paterculus, 120.

<sup>64</sup> Hâc clade factum, ut Imperium quod in litore oceani non steterat, in ripâ Rheni fluminis staret. Florus, IV. 12.

<sup>65</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 23.

<sup>66</sup> Velleius Paterculus, 114.

<sup>67</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 120.

and numbers, till they crossed the Rhine in their turn as conquerors.

We have said that Britain was not subdued by the Romans till a period later than the reign of Augustus. But although it was not yet become a province, yet the petty chiefs of the island were glad to propitiate the favour of Augustus,<sup>68</sup> by sending offerings to be presented to the temple of Jupiter in the capitol, and by paying a small tax or duty on all the articles which they imported from Gaul, or exported thither in return. However, as these duties were probably only levied in the ports of Gaul, the payment of them did not necessarily imply a state of dependence, inasmuch as it was only a voluntary compliance with the terms on which the Roman government chose to allow them to trade with its subjects. But the eagerness of the Britons for the toys and trinkets which they procured from the Roman empire, made them purchase them without complaining of the duty; and Augustus found it cheaper and easier to levy this tax upon their fondness for finery, than to incur the expense of maintaining an army in the island in order to reduce them to the condition of tributaries.

State of Britain.

Having thus dwelt somewhat longer than we are accustomed to do on the foreign relations of the empire, we shall now return within the frontiers, and proceed to describe the nature of the imperial government, and the general condition of the people under its dominion.

Whoever has traced the character of the Roman constitution through the successive periods of the commonwealth, must have observed in it a number of points which are entirely congenial to despotism.

Despotic tendency of the constitution of the Roman commonwealth.

In fact, the powers of the magistrates were to a high degree tyrannical; and were only counteracted by the mutual check which they severally found in the equally tyrannical powers of the rest. For instance, the authority of the consul seems in itself to have been absolute, although its exercise was restrained, within the walls of Rome, by the protecting power of the tribunes and by the right of appeal to the people; abroad, by the particular provisions of the Porcian law. Till that law was enacted, the consul, when without the city commanding the armies of the commonwealth, was altogether the master of the life of every citizen. Nor was this confined to points of military discipline; for we read that Q. Fabius Maximus threatened with death a citizen who had been just elected to the consulship for the ensuing year, because he had maintained the validity of his own election, which Fabius wished to overthrow,<sup>69</sup> and to recall the centuries

<sup>68</sup> Strabo, IV. 5, § 3, edit. Siebenkees.

Lictores ad eum accedere Consul jussit;

<sup>69</sup> Livy, XXIV. 9. Quum T. Otacilius ferociter vociferaretur atque obstreperet,

et, quia in urbem non inierat, admonuit, cum securibus sibi fasces præferri.



to give their votes over again. The censors might degrade any individual from his rank in the commonwealth at their sole discretion: the tribunes, or even any single number of their college, might stop the proceedings of every department of the government, and seem to have possessed an arbitrary power of committing any one to prison who opposed their measures. If from the ordinary magistrates of the commonwealth we turn to the senate itself, we shall see that body, although properly only a single member of the legislature, assuming to itself the right of dispensing with the laws, or of annulling them altogether, and claiming and exercising an unlimited despotism, whenever it thought proper to declare the country in danger, and to give the consuls charge to provide for its safety. Above all, the Romans were familiarized to arbitrary power in the authority possessed by the members of the various special commissions which were from time to time appointed. The commission of ten senators, who were usually empowered to settle the state of a newly-conquered country at the close of a war, was accustomed, indeed, to act only in the provinces; but the commissioners for planting colonies, for superintending the distribution of national lands under an agrarian law, for providing for the supply of the Roman markets, or for instituting an inquiry into any alleged misdemeanours and malversations, exercised their power towards citizens, and seem to have enjoyed an ample discretion which might be moderated only by the fear of future impeachment at the expiration of their office. In later times the practice of appointing extraordinary officers had become almost equivalent to the formation of a temporary monarchy. Twice had Pompey been invested with sovereign power over a large portion of the empire; first, when he was intrusted with the supreme direction of the war with the pirates, and again when he was sent to finish the long-contested struggle with Mithridates. On a third occasion, when he was named comptroller of the markets, allowed to appoint his lieutenants to act under him in the different provinces, and intrusted with the discretionary employment of a large sum of the public money, his power seemed far to exceed the level of a citizen of a free commonwealth. When, therefore, that atrocious Commission of Three for regulating and settling the affairs of the republic was instituted in the persons of Augustus, Antonius, and Lepidus, it was a measure not altogether unprecedented, and certainly analogous to the less absolute but yet very extensive powers which had been often given to special commissioners under circumstances of less general disorder. And the imperial power of Augustus was only an enlarged special commission of the same nature. It was limited in its duration, as it was to expire at the end of ten years; it was conferred by the senate on the most distinguished citizen in the commonwealth, for the

avowed purpose of remedying the evils which had grown up during a period of unparalleled confusion. That it was in the highest degree arbitrary, was conformable to the general spirit of similar commissions which had been conferred by the senate and people in former times ; and in this manner the government was made gradually to slide into a monarchy, merely by a dexterous application and enlargement of precedents, which had occurred repeatedly through the successive periods of the duration of the commonwealth.

The people have in every age tolerated a despotic power which has professed to derive itself from their appointment, and to be exercised in their names and for their benefit. Such was the power of the Roman emperors ; which, therefore, differed most widely in its avowed principle from the monarchies of Asia, and from those also which have been established on its ruins among the nations of modern Europe. It is true that in the eastern provinces of the empire, the people, unacquainted with the forms of the Roman government, and regarding only the absolute authority with which the emperors were invested, early began to bestow on them the title of kings, and to look upon them in the same light as they had been accustomed to view the successors of Alexander. But in Italy, the name of king, or sovereign lord, would have seemed a degradation which the Roman people could not endure ; and the gross flattery which was offered to the Cæsars, was by no means characteristic of the new state of the commonwealth, but arose out of those strongly marked distinctions by which the aristocracy were separated from the bulk of the people. It is plain from many passages in Cicero's letters, that the ordinary language of citizens of humble, or merely of inferior rank, when addressing the nobility, was in a tone of deference approaching almost to servility. Nay, even men of rank themselves, when writing to those who were still above them in power and dignity, used a style of compliment which strikes our ears as offensive ; so that it was no sudden influx of servility, but the mere operation of the ordinary feelings of the people, which produced that style of flattery so observable in the writers of the Augustan age, as well as in the decrees of the senate and the speeches of its members. In process of time, as the imperial power became more firmly established, and as the families of the old aristocracy gradually dropped off, this servile language came to be addressed more exclusively to the emperors ; and as the government continued to be wielded by a single hand, the people felt more and more that strong distinction between themselves and their ruler, which marks the relation of sovereign and subject, as opposed to that of citizens and their chief magistrate. Hence, in later times, the Roman government became a monarchy in the oriental and modern sense of the term, and its laws and titles were

transferred with perfect fitness to the kingdoms of Italy, France, and Germany.

Augustus possessed a power entirely despotic, by the mere union of the ordinary magistracies of the commonwealth in his person, with some few especial enlargements of their privileges and authority. He was invested with proconsular power in all the provinces in Italy, and even within the walls of Rome; and his authority in the provinces was to be paramount to that of the ordinary governors. In the same manner, Pompey the Great had received proconsular power in all the provinces of the empire within fifty miles of the sea, when he was intrusted with the command of the war against the Cilician pirates; and still more recently, when Cicero proposed to confer on C. Cassius the conduct of the war against P. Dolabella, the tenor of his commission allowed him to enter any province in pursuit of the enemy, and gave him superior power in that province to the magistrate by whom it was actually governed. The authority of the proconsuls in the provinces was entirely absolute under the old constitution, as they exercised supreme control over the military force, over the revenue, and over the criminal and civil jurisdiction; and by extending this power to Italy, and even to Rome itself, a virtual sovereignty was in fact bestowed. Whatever might be wanting in the proconsular power, was at all events given in the title of "imperator," which was prefixed to the name of Augustus, as it had been to that of his uncle, and seems to have been equivalent to the name of "General of the Forces of the Commonwealth." By attaching a perpetual military command to the person of the emperor, and by allowing him to hold it in Rome as well as in the provinces, all the people were in effect subjected to martial law; and it is well known that the power exercised by Roman generals over their soldiers was ever most arbitrary, insomuch, that, according to Cicero, "the Roman people in war obeyed their general as a king."<sup>70</sup> Yet further, in addition to the powers of proconsul and imperator, Augustus enjoyed also all the authority formerly possessed by the censors. He would not, indeed, take the name of censor, but he received a title and power similar to that which had been bestowed on his uncle, and which Suetonius calls, "*morum legumque regimen*," the control of the manners and laws of the commonwealth. With regard to his control of the laws, it must be understood, probably, to regard those laws which concerned the objects of the censor's jurisdiction, such as the sumptuary laws, and those which related to marriage. His control of manners rendered him absolute master of the rank of every citizen, as it enabled him to choose members into the senate, and to degrade them;

Extent of the imperial power.

<sup>70</sup> *Noster Populus \* \* in bello sic paret ut Regi.* Cicero, de Republicâ, I. 40.



to raise any plebeian to the equestrian order, or again to deprive him even of the political privileges of a simple citizen.<sup>71</sup> There was hardly any point of private life which did not fall under the censor's cognizance. Not only might a man be questioned for any intemperance in eating and drinking, or for any scandalous irregularities of conduct, but any excessive sumptuousness in his establishment, and even, it is said, any neglect of his property, such as omitting to cultivate or improve his land,<sup>72</sup> subjected him often to the loss of the most distinguished rights of citizenship. For this reason, according to tradition, the duration of the censor's power had been reduced from five years to eighteen months,<sup>73</sup> as so great an authority could not be safely intrusted to any one for more than a very limited period; and now that it was conferred on Augustus for life, it was by no means one of the least of his imperial prerogatives. To the powers of proconsul, imperator, and censor, was added, moreover, that of tribune. By this, Augustus was not only enabled to stop at once, by his negative, any measure of the senate or people which he disapproved, but his person was rendered sacred; and any violation of its sacredness, either in word or deed, exposed the offender to a complete religious and political excommunication, in which state he was devoted to some particular god,<sup>74</sup> as if peculiarly marked out for his vengeance, and might be killed by any man with impunity. Last of all must be mentioned the exemption from the authority of the laws, which Dion Cassius tells was bestowed on the emperors.<sup>75</sup> According to his account, Augustus was rendered absolutely despotic, inasmuch as he might dispense with any part of the code at his pleasure; and this prerogative he instances as one of those few which were not borrowed from the usages of the old constitution. But it has been reasonably supposed, that the Latin expression "*legibus solutus*," which was applied to persons enjoying a dispensation from some particular laws, combined with the real exemption from all the laws which was possessed by the later emperors, has misled Dion Cassius; and that the exemption was, in fact, less comprehensive than he imagined. A dispensing power had been long exercised by the senate; and we find that it was one of the measures of the patriotic tribune, C. Cornelius,<sup>76</sup> in the year of Rome 686, to remove the abuses with which it was attended, and to enact that no dispensation should pass the senate,

<sup>71</sup> The "*Ærarii*," or persons expelled by the censors from their tribes, lost their right of voting in the *comitia*, because it could only be exercised by those who belonged to some one of the thirty-five tribes. Their private rights and personal liberties were not at all affected by their degradation. See Niebuhr's *Römische Geschichte*, I. 384, &c., and II. 179.

<sup>72</sup> Aulus Gellius, IV.

<sup>73</sup> Livy, IV.

<sup>74</sup> Festus, in *vocibus* "*Sacer*," et "*Saceratæ Leges*."

<sup>75</sup> LIII. 509.

<sup>76</sup> Asconius *Argumentum in Ciceronis Orationem pro C. Cornelio primam*.

or, according to the legal phrase, "that no one should be released from the laws, *legibus solveretur*," unless two hundred senators were present. Still later, in the year 709, M. Brutus had been excused by the senate from continually residing in Rome during his prætorship, as required by law; and he is accordingly said by Cicero to have been "*legibus solutus*."<sup>77</sup> We may conclude that the same exemption, from a compliance with the injunctions of many of the old laws, was also granted to Augustus; and, indeed, if the fragments of what is called the "*lex regia*" are to be considered as genuine and authentic, it is evident that the exemption was not universal.<sup>78</sup>

It becomes here a natural question to ask, whether the right of appeal to the people was not altogether extinct; and how the provisions of the Porcian law were evaded, which made it highly criminal to scourge or put to death any Roman citizen? With regard to the first, we will endeavour to give the reader some notion of its nature, and of the cases in which it was allowed. In the earliest times it was no more than a part of the wild habits of savage life, where government being ill understood, and therefore apt to be rudely exercised, each man might appeal from the authority of the chief to that of the society at large; the power of capital punishment, as distinguished from the taking away life in a quarrel or in anger, being one of the rights which the community did not choose to intrust out of their own hands. The appeal to the people was the first simple form in which a man was tried by his country; and before the establishment of independent judges, it was the only security against the arbitrary sentence of the magistrate. But as such an appeal could not be made on every occasion, the people deputed their power to judges specially appointed by themselves<sup>79</sup> (as in the case of the *quæstores paricidii*), or chosen at the beginning of every year by the prætors out of a whole order of citizens, sometimes out of the senate alone, and sometimes from the senate, the equites, and the richer plebeians, according to the various enactments successively made on this subject. When an independent judicial power was established, the right of appeal to the people at large, could only be needless or mischievous, and therefore it gradually fell into disuse; nay, we doubt whether there was legally any appeal from the sentence of the select judges who sat with the prætor in criminal causes; for Cicero attacks Antonius for proposing a law by which criminals condemned for rioting or

<sup>77</sup> Cicero, *Philippic.* II. 13.

<sup>78</sup> *Utique quibus legibus, plebeive scitis scriptum fuit ne Divus Augustus, . . . teneretur, iis &c. Imperator Cæsar Vespasianus solutus sit. Apud Heineccium, Antiq. Roman. Syntagma, I. tit. 2, 67, edit. Haubold.*

<sup>79</sup> Pomponius, de Orig. Juris, quoted by Creuzer, *Römische Antiquitäten*, 165, and Heineccius, IV. tit. 18, c. 11, edit. Haubold. See also the expression of Cicero, de Legibus, III. 12. *Magistratibus judicia dantur, ut esset populi potestas, ad quam provocaretur.*

treason by the ordinary tribunals were allowed to appeal to the people;<sup>80</sup> and he complains that such an appeal was equivalent to the total subversion of all justice. Nor do we remember any instance in the later times of the commonwealth of a trial removed by appeal from the regular courts to the popular assembly, except in the case of C. Rabirius, v. c. 690; and Rabirius appealed not from the decision of the prætor and the select judges, but from that of two special commissioners, appointed by the prætor instead of the people, contrary to the usual practice, to try the case by themselves. The right of appeal was thus become obsolete, if were not actually done away; but at any rate it was rendered useless by the military power which the title of imperator conferred on Augustus. It was an old maxim of the Roman law, that from the sentence of a general in the actual service there was no appeal;<sup>81</sup> and in this consisted the plenitude of his power, for even if he might be questioned afterwards for an abuse of it, yet at the time there was nothing to check or limit it, and there is a wide difference between present protection and contingent future redress. As Augustus, therefore, was invested with military power both within and without the city, the right of appeal from his authority became extinct of course. Still, however, Roman citizens in the provinces, when not actually serving in the army, might appeal to Rome from the sentence of a provincial governor; but Augustus himself, if we may believe Dion Cassius,<sup>82</sup> was constituted judge of all such appeals; and we know, from a much higher authority,<sup>83</sup> that in the reign of Claudius they were regularly made to the emperor, without any allusion to the old constitutional power of the people.

A remarkable obscurity hangs over the origin of the Porcian laws; for it is not known with certainty by whom they were proposed, nor at what period they were enacted. It appears from Cicero that they were three in number, brought forward by three different members of the Porcian family;<sup>84</sup> but whether of the family of Porcius Læca, or Porcius Cato, is still undecided. However, it is sufficiently known that these laws confirmed the right of appeal to the people, and forbade, under heavy penalties, that any Roman citizen should be scourged or put to death, of whatever crime he might have been guilty, if we except, perhaps, the wilful murder of a

Of the Porcian laws, and the nature of capital punishments under Augustus.

<sup>80</sup> Philippic. I. 9. Altera promulgata lex est, ut et de Vi et de Majestate damnati ad populum provocent, si velint.

<sup>81</sup> Cicero, de Legibus, III. 3, 4. Militiæ, ab eo, qui imperabit, provocatio ne esto; quodque is, qui bellum geret, impræcasset, jus ratumque esto. Although these words are a part of the code devised by

Cicero for his Utopian Commonwealth, yet this code is confessedly borrowed almost entirely from that which actually existed at Rome,—Omnium Magistratum descriptio; sed ea pæne nostræ civitatis, 5.

<sup>82</sup> LI. 457.

<sup>83</sup> Acts of the Apostles, XXV. 10, 11.

<sup>84</sup> De Republicâ, II. 31.



parent.<sup>85</sup> Thus the greatest punishment that could be legally inflicted at Rome, was simple banishment, till Cæsar, in his dictatorship, added the forfeiture of all property in the case of those convicted of wilful murder, and the half of it for all other offences.<sup>86</sup> Nay, even the punishment denounced by the Pedian law, passed v. c. 710, against the assassins of Cæsar was no more than banishment from Italy; so completely were Roman citizens exempted by law from suffering the penalty of death. It is generally thought, however, that the provisions of the Porcian law did not extend to citizens actually serving in the army; but this must be understood with considerable limitations. The old ignominious method of punishment, by which criminals were first scourged with rods, and then beheaded with an axe (*virgis cæsi et securi percussi*), could never be inflicted upon a Roman citizen under any circumstances. This is plain from the fact mentioned by Sallust,<sup>87</sup> that Q. Metellus Numidicus, in the Jugurthine war, punished one of his officers in this manner, because, adds the historian, the offender was a Latin citizen: that is, he could not have so punished him had he been a Roman. We believe further, that a Roman soldier could not even be flogged on actual service; and we are inclined to think that this was one of the provisions of the Sempronian law, *De Militum Commodis*, carried by C. Gracchus, in his tribuneship; for we are told by Plutarch,<sup>88</sup> that M. Livius Drusus, one of his colleagues, in order to outdo him in proposing popular measures, brought forward a law to exempt the Latins from the liability to be flogged when serving as soldiers; and although the passage in Sallust already quoted, shows either that this law was soon after repealed, or that Plutarch, as we rather believe, has assigned to it a wrong date, and ascribed it to a wrong author, yet its being proposed at all clearly proves that the Roman soldiers already enjoyed a similar exemption, as no one would ever have thought of granting to the Latins immunities which were not possessed by the Romans themselves. Nor is our position refuted by the instances recorded in later times, of soldiers suffering death by running the gauntlet<sup>89</sup> (*fuste cæsi*), for this was a punishment inflicted not by the general's lictors, but by the hands of the soldiers themselves, and was expressive of the feelings of the army at large towards those who were guilty of cowardice, or of any other flagrant breach of military duty. In cases of mutiny, or any other crime which required an instant and terrifying example, a general would have ordered the offenders to be executed; there being no appeal at the time from his sentence, and if ever he was afterwards questioned for

<sup>85</sup> See Cicero, *pro Roscio Amerino*, 25.

<sup>86</sup> Suetonius, in *Cæsare*, 42.

<sup>87</sup> *De Bello Jugurthino*, 69.

<sup>88</sup> In *C. Graccho*, 9.

<sup>89</sup> *Auctor de Bello Hispaniensi apud Cæsaris Commentar.* 27. *Velleius Paterculus*, II. 78.

his conduct, he would have urged the plea of necessity or public expediency, which was ever admitted as an excuse for any departure from the ordinary laws. And thus only can we reconcile the extreme bloodiness of the proscriptions and occasional executions of the Romans, with the excessive mildness, or rather weakness, of the letter of the constitution. When, soon after Cæsar's death, a disorderly multitude used to assemble round his altar in the forum, and committed several outrages on the property of different citizens, P. Dolabella, who was then consul, attacked the rioters in a summary manner, and put numbers of them to death without any sort of trial, crucifying the slaves, and throwing the free citizens from the Tarpeian rock. This behaviour was applauded by Cicero as an act of salutary vigour;<sup>90</sup> yet had the meanest of the citizens thus executed been brought to a legal trial under the severest of the existing statutes for the punishment of riots, he could have received no heavier sentence than that of exile.

A system like this, in which the laws were so frequently superseded by acts of summary violence, was admirably calculated to serve the purposes of despotism. The Porcian laws existed unrepealed, but equally unregarded whenever it suited the interest of the sovereign to violate them. How, indeed, could they be more signally violated by the emperors than they had been in innumerable instances under the old constitution; not only in the proscriptions, but in the suppression of less alarming disorders, in the executions ordered by the senate after the deaths of the two Gracchi, in the punishment of the accomplices of Catiline, and in the severity which we have just noticed of P. Dolabella? So much respect was shown to the forms of the constitution, while its spirit was violated, that in the infliction of the punishment of death some pains were taken to deprive it of the appearance of an execution, and to give it the character of an irregular but necessary act of policy or vengeance; a sort of capital ostracism, in which the sufferer was treated more as an enemy than a criminal, and his life was taken without any accompanying circumstances of degradation. Hence a party of soldiers were so often employed as the ministers of death, instead of a regular executioner; and the sword instead of the axe was the weapon used, a distinction which continued to exist to a much later period, insomuch, that when beheading by the sword was recognized as a legal punishment, still beheading by the axe was looked upon as degrading and illegal.<sup>91</sup> Hence the sufferers were so often allowed to choose their own mode of death, and were constantly permitted to be their own executioners. For all these acts, com-

<sup>90</sup> Philippic. I. 12. epist. ad Atticum, XIV. epist. XV. XVI. XVII.

<sup>91</sup> Heineccius, *Antiquitat. Roman. Syn- tagma*, IV. tit. 18, 10. edit. Haubold.

mitted by the sovereign power on the alleged ground of public expediency, the practice of the old constitution furnished precedent and apology; and the Porcian law still availed to save Roman citizens from the rods and axe of the lictor, from those cruel and ignominious scourgings which were inflicted so often by the Roman magistrates in the provinces,<sup>92</sup> sometimes as a punishment and at other times as an instrument of torture to extort a confession from a prisoner before his trial. In process of time, as was natural, the infliction of capital punishment grew to be considered as legal and regular; it began to assume the character of an execution; and as the government became more decidedly monarchical, the cruel and degrading punishments, so congenial to tyranny, were engrafted upon the law of the empire. But, for the period with which we are now engaged, it is important to observe how an excessive mildness in the laws defeats its own object, no less than excessive severity. Because the Roman constitution provided no adequate legal punishment for enormous crimes, men became reconciled to irregular inflictions of vengeance on the plea of necessity; and thus exemplified the danger of looking with indifference upon any departure from the written law, when necessity was as easily pleaded by their tyrants for the murder of Cicero, as for those of Saturninus, Cethegus, or Lentulus.

Amongst the prerogatives possessed by Augustus, Dion Cassius mentions the right of making war or peace with whatever nation he thought proper.<sup>93</sup> This arose out of the proconsular power which had been conferred on him, and from the immediate command which he exercised in all the frontier provinces of the empire. Wherever the dominions of the commonwealth came in contact with any foreign nations, there the whole civil and military authority belonged to Augustus as proconsul; and if he possessed the power of making war or peace with the people who bordered upon his provinces, it was no more than had been commonly practised by the proconsuls of former times; nor could Augustus act with a less restrained discretion than his uncle had done in Gaul during the whole term of his command there, or than Crassus had exercised in his government of Syria, when he commenced his unprovoked attack upon the Parthian empire.

It is further stated by Dion Cassius, that Augustus was the absolute master of the revenue, and that he was enabled to levy money for the public service by his sole authority. And here, perhaps, we may fitly lay before the reader some notice of the pecuniary resources of the Roman empire; of the taxes paid by

<sup>92</sup> St. Matthew, XXVII. 26. Acts of the Apostles, XXII. 24. 29. <sup>93</sup> LIII. 508.



the people ; and of the general administration of the treasury. In doing this, we shall frequently go back to the history of an earlier period ; but the calm of the reign of Augustus allows us to turn our attention to many points connected with the internal state of Rome, which we have passed over amidst the press of wars and internal disturbances, through which our narrative has hitherto had to struggle. Once for all, however, we must remind the reader of the extreme difficulty of this part of our task, and request his indulgence for the faults or omissions which we fear he will not fail to discover. We must draw our facts from scattered and scanty sources ; and it may often happen that some passage has escaped our notice, which, had we known it, might have taught us to qualify or to amend much that we had advanced. We have said this, indeed, nearly in the same words on a former occasion ; but we deem it not superfluous to repeat it again, not only to disclaim for ourselves pretension to a more perfect knowledge than we possess, but to impress upon the reader the unsatisfactory nature of many of those disquisitions in which historians, endowed with more eloquence than industry, have permitted themselves to indulge. As the lessons of history are the most valuable part of that wisdom which concerns our earthly welfare, so it is most important that they should not be rashly offered, but that they may be at once so full and so uncorrupted, as to furnish us with a trustworthy guide. And he who feels the deficiencies of his own performance may at least render some service to his readers, if he shows them how far they may safely rely on him, and does not attempt to mislead them by assuming that tone of self-satisfied confidence which will always impose upon the mass of mankind, however much the wiser few may detect and despise it.

The revenue of the Roman people, before their dominion embraced so many dependent provinces, arose chiefly out of three sources :<sup>94</sup> 1st, a property tax (*tributum*) levied directly upon every citizen, and proportioned to the amount of the property which he possessed ;<sup>95</sup> 2dly, the rents or payments of whatever kind which were received from the national domains, using this last term in its most extensive sense, as including not only lands in cultivation, whether arable or pasture, but also forests, mines, and buildings ; 3dly, the customs, including the duties levied at the different ports on all imported goods, and the tolls paid at all public ferries. Of these three, the property tax, or *tributum*, is said to have been discontinued after the conquest of Macedon by L. Æmilius Paulus, in the year of Rome 584 ;<sup>96</sup> that is, the revenue which the state received thenceforward from its conquered

Of the Roman  
revenue.

<sup>94</sup> But see Niebuhr, I. 459.—Ed.

<sup>95</sup> Livy, I. 43.

<sup>96</sup> Cicero, de Officiis, II. 22.

provinces, enabled it to relieve its own citizens from that species of impost which is ever most galling to the popular feeling. The second source of revenue, namely, the national domains, cannot be fully understood, without touching upon a field of inquiry, at once most interesting and most laborious, and which neither our limits nor our ability enable us fully to explore.<sup>97</sup> All lands conquered in war, surrendered by the inhabitants or ceded by treaty, became the property of the conquering people, who thus were not only the sovereign, but the landlord of the territories which they acquired. Sometimes this right was so far mitigated in practice, that the old inhabitants were allowed to retain their lands, as tenants, on payment of a rent to the conquering people as their landlord; but sometimes, also, it was exercised in its widest extent,—the old proprietors were expelled altogether, and the land was disposed of according to the pleasure of its new masters. In Grecian history there is an instance of the first of these methods of proceeding in the behaviour of the Athenians, after their conquest of Mitylene in the Peloponnesian war. The territory of the Mitylenæans was divided into a certain number of lots, on each of which a certain rent was levied, and the former proprietors continued to occupy their estates as before, but in the character of tenants instead of landlords. On the other hand, when Ægina was conquered, the inhabitants were suffered to remain undisturbed for a time in their old homes; but on the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians thought proper to act upon their right of conquest more rigorously; they expelled the Æginetans accordingly, altogether, from the island, and divided the lands amongst a certain number of Athenian colonists, who became its inhabitants for several years, till they were, in their turn, driven out by the Lacedæmonians after the battle of Ægospotami. The Romans, in the same manner, made a difference in the treatment of the different nations whom they conquered; but

<sup>97</sup> For the groundwork of what follows on the subject of the national domains, the writer has great pleasure in acknowledging his obligations to the masterly work of Niebuhr, and particularly to the excellent chapter on the nature of the agrarian laws, II. 349, et seq. He is indebted to Niebuhr also for his first acquaintance with the collection of writers, *De Re Agraria*, published by Goesius at Amsterdam, in 1674, and which is so little known in England, that he has found no allusion to it in any English writer on the Roman History whose works have fallen under his notice. Niebuhr's "*Roman History*" is one of those great works of genius which throw at once a blaze of light over subjects before obscure, and which, by the clearness and

justness of the views which they communicate, make us full of surprise that the same discoveries had never been made before. Niebuhr carries some hypotheses perhaps too far, and in some of his opinions may be led away by a fondness for novelty; but these are faults which succeeding writers may easily correct, while they and the world in general derive perpetual benefit from the great excellences of his work; its surprising knowledge, and the eminent ability with which detached notices of facts are brought together and made to illustrate each other, and the penetration with which he has discovered principles of civil and religious law amidst an apparent chaos of anomalous and unconnected particulars.

in all cases they claimed a sovereignty over the soil, and in all cases, therefore, they derived from it a revenue. The peculiar mark of this sovereignty was the reservation of a right to a certain portion of the produce of the land, and this portion was generally the tenth or tithe. Even when the lands of a conquered country were restored, as it was expressed, to the old proprietors, (for by the act of conquest they were held to be instantly forfeited to the conquering people, and the right of the old inhabitants was immediately lost,) still the tithe of the produce was reserved. When they were not restored, they were either sold by the quæstors in lots of a certain size, or divided out among a certain number of the citizens; or, not being regularly disposed of by the government, were occupied by individuals without any particular title, as they severally happened to take possession; or, fourthly, were let on leases for terms of different lengths to farmers, who had the power of underletting them again either entire or in lots. In the second of these cases, and in that only, the full sovereignty of the land appears to have been granted, together with the occupation or enjoyment of it. When a colony was planted in a conquered country, and a division of lands made amongst the new settlers, according to the solemn forms transmitted through a long succession of ages from the priests of Etruria, then the state resigned all its rights, and the lots thus given to each colonist became, in the fullest sense of the word, his freehold.<sup>98</sup> But every other mode of alienation was made with a reservation of the state's sovereignty; a tenure more or less favourable was granted to the individual, but the government retained its right to the tithes of the produce, and its power of planting colonies at a future period in the domains over which it did not think proper to exercise at present its full authority. Now, as the whole territory of Rome, to speak generally, had been gained by conquest, the sovereignty of it was vested in the Roman people; and with the exception of such portions as had been divided out into colonies, it was all subject to the payment of tithes. In process of time the whole of Italy became exempted from this burden by the gradual division of every part of the public land amongst the inhabitants of its various colonies; and when the Italians successively acquired the

<sup>98</sup> In the collection of writers, *De Re Agrariâ*, to which we have before alluded, there is a very remarkable fragment, ascribed to Vegoia, and which is evidently translated from an Etruscan original of the highest antiquity. It is so curious, that the reader may not be displeased to see a part of it here transcribed:—

“Scias Mare ex Æthere remotum. Cum autem Juppiter Terram Hetruriæ sibi vindicavit, constituit jussitque metiri Campos, signarique Agros, sciens Hominum Ava-

ritiam vel terrenam Cupidinem, Terminis omnia scita esse voluit, quos quandoque ob Avaritiam prope novissimi octavi Sæculi datos sibi Homines Dolo malo violabunt, contingentque atque movebunt. Sed qui contigerit moveritque Possessionem, promovendo suam, alterius minuendo, ob hoc Scelus damnabitur a Diis,” &c. p. 258.

How exactly does this agree with the very words of the Mosaic law, that “cur- sed is he who removeth his neighbour's landmark.”



rights of Roman citizens, all the land which had been given back after conquest to its old possessors,<sup>99</sup> as well as that which had been sold by the quæstors, assumed the character of the private property of Roman citizens, and thus was placed on a level with that divided out amongst the settlers of a colony, and became altogether freehold. But in the provinces all land, except that which belonged to any Roman colony, was subject to some payment to the government. In some instances a general land tax was levied over the whole province, as a sort of fine paid by the inhabitants for the renewal of their term of possession, after their rights as freehold proprietors had been forfeited by the conquest of their country. But in other cases, where the province had been peaceably ceded or bequeathed to the Romans by its former sovereign, as in the instance of the province of Asia, the inhabitants retained their former rights, and the Roman people only acquired the sovereignty or superiority over the country (if we may borrow a nearly analogous term from the Scottish law), which was signified by the reservation of the tenth part of the produce as the invariable property of the government. This claim upon the tithes existed, we believe, quite distinctly from the general land tax or fine levied upon some particular provinces; and where that land tax was paid, the tithes were nevertheless paid also. In some instances we find that the provincial lands paid a seventh and sometimes a fifth part of their produce to the government;<sup>100</sup> and here it may be difficult to decide, whether this payment was still independent of the tithes, or whether it was made as an equivalent both for the tithes and the land tax or tribute. But in addition to all these burdens, we have a long list of others which were

<sup>99</sup> Hyginus says expressly, "*Agri qui redditu sunt non obligantur Vectigalibus, quoniam scilicet prioribus Dominis redditu sunt,*" p. 205, edit. Goesii. But Cicero says as positively, that the conquered lands in Sicily, which had been restored to their old inhabitants, were regularly let by the censors; that is, the tithes which they paid were regularly farmed. (Cicero, in *Verrem*, III. 6.) And Aggenus Urbicus lays it down as a general rule, that in the provinces, "*omnes etiam privati Agri Tributa atque Vectigalia persolvunt.*" *Commentar.* in Frontin. p. 47, edit. Goesii. We suppose, therefore, that so long as the Italians were foreigners to Rome, the lands given back to them were subject to the same burden as those which were restored to the states of Sicily. With regard to the lands sold by the quæstors, Niebuhr classes them with those divided amongst the settlers of a colony, and considers them as entirely freehold. *Römische Geschichte*,

II. 379. It is with the utmost diffidence that we differ from so great an authority; but Hyginus says, that the tenure of the "*agri quæstorii*" was the same with that of the other lands of the Roman people; and Siculus Flaccus gives it as a definition of "*lands belonging to the Roman people,*" that its revenue belongs to the treasury. Edit. Goesii, p. 2. However, as the lands sold by the quæstors were not very extensive, it is of the less consequence to ascertain minutely whether it was a sale of the sovereignty, or only of the possession of the land for ever, subject to the payment of its tithes to the government.

<sup>100</sup> Hyginus, de *Limitib. constituend.* 198, edit. Goesii. Creuzer distinguishes these payments of the fifth or seventh parts of the produce both from the tithes and from the land tax, *Römische Antiquitatem*, 265. But we know not on what authority this statement arose, and it seems to us somewhat doubtful.

imposed by the provincial governors when their own avarice or the alleged exigencies of the public service required any extraordinary resources.<sup>101</sup> First, there was a general levy of money enforced over the whole province,<sup>102</sup> corresponding perhaps to the feudal aids, and raised, we may suppose, by a per centage upon property. Then followed the most odious of all imposts, a poll tax, demanded alike of slaves and freemen; and, besides this, other taxes upon houses or house-doors,<sup>103</sup> and upon the columns which were so much used in the more expensive architecture of the ancients. Finally, there was a general impressment of soldiers, seamen, and carriages, for the military and naval service, additional requisitions of corn for the maintenance of the troops, and of arms and military engines. Under these multiplied exactions, besides a charge altogether indefinite made by the proconsul or proprætor for the maintenance of himself and all his inferior officers, it is no wonder that the provinces were overwhelmed with debt; for the necessity of paying the taxes being immediate, the people were reduced to borrow money at an exorbitant interest, and there were always wealthy Romans of the equestrian order at hand, who carried on a regular traffic in the distress of the provinces, and who were accustomed to lay out their money in loans of this kind, as they thus gained not only a very high rate of interest, but also an extensive influence over the individuals or communities who were indebted to them.

In the dealings between the government and its subjects, the intervention of a third party was generally employed. The revenues of every province were commonly farmed by wealthy individuals of the equestrian order, called by the well-known name of Publicani. As the senators were not allowed to engage in any sort of traffic, the equestrian order, consisting of all citizens not being senators, who possessed property beyond a certain amount, embraced almost the whole commercial interests of the empire; and a favourite branch of their speculations was that of farming the revenues. As soon as a province fell under the dominion of Rome, a number of these adventurers proceeded to settle themselves in it, and to acquaint themselves with the extent of its resources. They then purchased of the censors the different taxes claimed by the government,—the land tax, the tithes, the poll tax, and the other subordinate imposts, and thus took upon themselves the whole risk and trouble of collecting them. In doing this they were armed with the full

<sup>101</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Civili, III. 31, 32.

<sup>102</sup> Imperatæ Pecuniæ.

<sup>103</sup> Ostiaria, Columnaria. The poll tax and house tax seem not to have been peculiarly confined to periods of great public exigency; for both are mentioned by Cice-

ro as having been levied in Cilicia in the year 701: and by the manner in which they are spoken of, they appear to have been ordinarily levied there. Epist. ad Familiæres, III. epist. VIII.

authority of the government by the officer who commanded in the province, unless he happened to have some quarrel with their order, in which case they probably found their business sufficiently difficult, and were losers rather than gainers by their contracts.<sup>104</sup> But in ordinary cases the governor of the province and the publicani were well disposed to gratify one another; for the equestrian order, after the Sempronian law had placed the whole judicial power in their hands, was a body not lightly to be offended; and the condemnation of P. Rutilius, whose upright administration had checked the exactions of the publicani in Asia, was a lesson to future magistrates rather to share in the plunder of the farmers of the revenue than to endeavour to repress it.

Under the old constitution the revenues were under the control of the senate, to which body the quæstors, who acted as treasurers both at Rome and in the provinces, were obliged to submit their accounts. But the civil wars had created so large a military force throughout the empire, and had so dangerously taught the soldiers to know their own power, that it became most important to provide for them by regular means, lest they should again be tempted to listen to some new adventurer, and to renew the disorders which had prevailed for the last twenty years. Augustus therefore instituted a military treasury,<sup>105</sup> over which he possessed supreme authority, as imperator or commander in chief of the army; and for the support of this treasury he invented some new taxes, particularly a sort of excise duty of one per cent. on all articles exposed to sale.<sup>106</sup> He enjoyed also the entire revenues of those provinces which were immediately subjected to his jurisdiction; and even in those which were under the control of the senate, he had a treasury of his own, distinguished by the name of *fiscus* from the *ærarium* or treasury of the people, into which probably were paid those taxes which had been created for the especial support of the *ærarium militare*. In all the provinces alike, the revenues which belonged to Augustus were received in his name by officers called *procuratores*;<sup>107</sup> a class of persons who at first were hardly considered as more than the agents or stewards of a wealthy individual, and who were accordingly selected not only from the equestrian order, but also from among the freedmen; while the regular governors of the provinces, whether proconsuls or lieutenants of the emperor, were, with the sole exception of the governor of Egypt, appointed exclusively from the senate.

✓ We here propose to notice, separately, the state of Italy and of the different provinces of the empire, under the government of Augustus, as far as we have been able to col-

State of Italy and the provinces.

<sup>104</sup> Cicero, de Provinciis Consularibus, 5.

<sup>105</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 49.

<sup>106</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* I. 78.

<sup>107</sup> Dion Cassius, LIII. 506. Conf.

Creuzer, *Römische Antiquitäten*, 218, 219.



lect materials for the picture. The name of Italy was now at last applied to the whole peninsula from the Alps to the Straits of Messina ;<sup>108</sup> and the inhabitants of the whole of this district had obtained the rights of Roman citizens. Their votes, however, were no longer to be given in the comitia at Rome,<sup>109</sup> but the magistrates of the different Italian colonies were to collect the votes of their fellow-citizens in their respective towns, and send them sealed up to Rome, there to be opened on the day of election in the Campus Martius. These colonies, it must be remembered, occupied at this time nearly all the surface of Italy. It was the boast of Augustus that he had himself planted no fewer than eight and twenty ; a strange subject of exultation, when we consider that they were formed out of the soldiers of his army, and were planted in spots left desolate by the extirpation of their old inhabitants, who had suffered either under the first proscription of the Triumvirs, or under that fatal establishment of military tyranny which was created by the reduction of Perugia. The soldiers of a mercenary army are miserable elements out of which to form a civil society ; and thus, instead of a people inheriting the soil from time immemorial, and blending, in one well-organized commonwealth, nobility and wealth and honest industry, the new possessors of Italy were an ill-cemented horde of dissolute adventurers, with no natural connexion with the spots on which they were settled, and with habits the most alien from those of good husbands, good fathers, or good citizens. We are told accordingly, that the free population of many parts of Italy was reduced to a very low point,<sup>110</sup> whilst the slaves were numerous, and the capital itself was overburthened with the crowd of needy citizens whom each successive civil war threw upon that common shore of nations. The north of Italy, however, was in a more flourishing condition ; there the military colonies had been far less numerous, and the inhabitants having lately acquired the rights of Roman citizens, and possessing natural advantages of the highest order in their soil and climate, were perhaps the most fortunately circumstanced of any people throughout the empire. In Patavium or Padua there were five hundred citizens rich enough to be ranked among the equestrian order.<sup>111</sup> The town carried on a great trade with Rome, supplying the capital with clothing, with the finest carpets, and with other articles of similar kinds to an immense amount, probably from its own manufactories. The woods of this part of Italy maintained also large droves of swine,<sup>112</sup> which supplied the population of Rome with the largest proportion of their food ; and the vine was cultivated with great success, in proof of which Strabo instances the pro-

Italy.

<sup>108</sup> Strabo, V. 1.<sup>109</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 46.<sup>110</sup> Livy, VI. 12.<sup>111</sup> Strabo, V. 1, § 7.<sup>112</sup> Strabo, 1, § 12.

digious size of the wine vats, rivalling, it seems, those of our London brewers, for they are described as being larger than houses. The coarser woollen cloths, which formed the dress of the households of most of the people of Italy, were chiefly manufactured in Liguria and its neighbourhood; whilst the softest and finest wool was produced by the pastures of Mutina and Scultenna. Above all, it is said, that here was to be found a numerous free population, which provided the state with its best supply of soldiers, whilst the rest of Italy was left exhausted and desolate, and Augustus was endeavouring to force its inhabitants to marry and rear families by the penalties and encouragements of the law.

The island of Sicily had been the seat of one of the latest civil wars, that between Augustus and Sex. Pompeius, and it is said to have suffered not only during the contest, but during its previous occupation by Pompeius; the plundering and disorderly habits of his numerous seamen having proved, we may suppose, very mischievous to the inhabitants.<sup>113</sup> Since that time Augustus had sent a colony of veterans to Syracuse, and a small portion of the former site of that famous city was again occupied and fortified. But the cities of Sicily were now become few and inconsiderable; its population was small; and almost the whole of its abundant produce was regularly sent to Rome for the maintenance of the people of the capital. A great part of the surface of the island was devoted to pasture for sheep, oxen, and horses;<sup>114</sup> and the slaves, who were employed in taking care of them, had formerly, as we have seen, carried on a long and obstinate struggle against the Roman power. In the reign of Augustus they still infested the country, and particularly the neighbourhood of *Ætna*, with their robberies; and Strabo mentions a robber chief whom he himself saw torn to pieces by wild beasts in the amphitheatre at Rome, and who, before he was taken, had been at the head of a considerable force. The mountains of Corsica and Sardinia were in like manner occupied by wild tribes of barbarians, who kept up a constant system of plunder against the inhabitants of the more level country; those of Corsica are described as so inveterately brutish,<sup>115</sup> that when taken and carried to the Roman slave market, their purchasers always repented of their bargain, however trifling the price they had paid for them; while the Sardinian robbers did not confine their depredations to their own island, but frequently made excursions to the opposite coast of Italy, and were enabled, in great measure, to defy the Roman governors, in their own haunts, from the impossibility of keeping a military force exposed to the pestilential atmosphere of the wilder parts of the country. Amongst the Alpine tribes, to

<sup>113</sup> Strabo, VI. 2, § 4.

<sup>114</sup> Strabo, 2, § 6.

<sup>115</sup> Strabo, V. 2, § 7.

the north of Italy, the same plundering habits had formerly prevailed, and even the Roman armies, which were stationed in their neighbourhood, had frequently suffered from their desultory attacks;<sup>116</sup> but Augustus, judging it most important to keep up a secure communication between Italy and the Transalpine provinces, and having himself, on one occasion, lost his baggage and several of his soldiers when crossing the mountains which they inhabited, determined to put an effectual stop to their incursions. He accordingly employed such vigorous measures against them, that he extirpated the nation of the Salassi altogether, selling no fewer than forty-four thousand of them for slaves, eight thousand of whom were the warriors of the tribe. Three thousand Roman settlers were then sent to colonize the town of Augusta, or Aosta, at the very head of the valley of the Dora Baltea, from which place two roads were carried across the Alps, the one over the Little Saint Bernard, which was made practicable for carriages, and the other over the Great Saint Bernard, which could be travelled only by mules. In consequence of these exertions, the whole neighbourhood was reduced to a state of perfect tranquillity, and the communication with Gaul was carried on without molestation.<sup>117</sup>

The condition of the important province of Gaul itself will be regarded with more curiosity. Its "Cicatrice" must still "have looked raw and red after the Roman sword," when Augustus first became the sovereign of the empire; for scarcely more than twenty years had elapsed since his uncle had for the first time completed its conquest. Yet in the reign of Tiberius, Strabo describes the inhabitants as already settled into habits of peaceful submission to the Roman power;<sup>118</sup> and he attributes it to their national character, which long retained the remembrance of a defeat, and if vanquished in one general contest, was cowed for ever. But the fact is, that the Gauls, when first attacked by Cæsar, were by no means a nation of savages. They had regular governments,<sup>119</sup> were perfectly familiar with agriculture, and were accustomed to pay the greatest veneration to their Druids, who professed, with whatever success, the study of moral and natural philosophy. Such a state of society, combined with the natural features of the country, which then, as now, was by no means favourable to the maintenance of a desultory and harassing warfare, insured the permanence of the conquest of Gaul as soon as it was once effected. The people were able to appreciate the value of the arts, and the commercial advantages which they derived from their conquerors. Even before the invasion of Cæsar, traders were in the habit of visiting

Gaul.

<sup>116</sup> Strabo, IV. 6, § 7.<sup>117</sup> Strabo, IV. 6, § 7; and Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* III. 20.<sup>118</sup> IV. 1, § 2; 4, § 2.<sup>119</sup> Cæsar, *de Bello Gallico*, VI. 11, &c.



almost every part of the country, and had familiarized the people with many even of the luxuries of civilized life. But the Roman conquest must have greatly increased this traffic, by enabling merchants to transport their goods from one end of Gaul to the other with perfect security, and by bringing the whole country into direct communication with the wealth and commercial enterprise of the Roman empire. The great rivers with which France abounds were successfully employed to expedite this intercourse;<sup>120</sup> and goods from all parts of the Mediterranean were conveyed by water up the Rhone and Saone, and from thence, after a short interval of land carriage, were again embarked on the Seine, and thus transported either to Britain or to all the districts on the northern coast of Gaul, bordering on the British Channel; while the Loire and the Garonne afforded an equally convenient communication with the western parts of Gaul, and with the shores of the Bay of Biscay. In another point, also, the Gauls felt the benefit of their connexion with Rome. Great quantities of oxen, sheep, and pigs, were reared in all parts of the country;<sup>121</sup> and we are told that not only Rome itself, but most other districts of Italy, were supplied with coarse cloaks manufactured of Gaulish wool, and with Gaulish bacon of most excellent quality, particularly from the hogs fed in Burgundy, Franche Comté, and Lorraine. There were also some favoured spots in Gaul, to which the Romans had communicated their own political privileges. Narbo, Vienne, and Lugdunum were Roman colonies, and enjoyed the advantages of the "jus Italicum" in its full extent;<sup>122</sup> that is, they were governed by their own laws and magistrates, and were not subject to the authority of the proconsul of the province, and their land was considered private and freehold property in the full Roman sense of the term; it was, therefore, not liable to pay land-tax or tithes; and it might be alienated by "mancipatio," that is, it might be sold in full sovereignty, and with an indisputable title, a privilege which was peculiarly confined to the soil of Italy,<sup>123</sup> and to those places in the provinces which, by possessing the "jus Italicum," were placed on the same footing as if they were situated in Italy. The lower privilege of the "jus Latii" was conferred on the inhabitants of Nemansus, or Nismes,<sup>124</sup> and on the Convenæ and Ausci in Aquitania, by which they also enjoyed an exemption from the authority of the proconsul of the province; and those who held any magistracy among them became *ipso facto* entitled to the full

<sup>120</sup> Strabo, IV. 1, § 14.

<sup>121</sup> Strabo, 1, § 2; 4, § 3. Cæsar de Bello Gallico, IV. 2.

<sup>122</sup> See Haubold, *Epicrisis Heineccii*, I. Append. § 97, 98; and Creuzer, *Römische Antiquitäten*, 263. This account of the "jus Italicum" was first given by Savigny,

in his Dissertation "Ueber das Jus Italicum" published among the *Memoirs*, and read by him before the Academy of Berlin in 1814 and 1815.

<sup>123</sup> See *Liber Simplicii*, apud *Scriptores de Re Agraria*, 76, edit. Goesii.

<sup>124</sup> Strabo, IV. 1, § 12; and 2, § 2.

rights of Roman citizens. These, however, were in the time of Augustus rare exceptions; and the great majority of the inhabitants of Gaul shared largely in the miseries as well as in the benefits of subjection to the Roman empire. They were oppressed by all the burdens ordinarily imposed on the provinces, and suffered not only from direct taxation, but from that still heavier evil, to which we have before alluded, the frequent necessity of borrowing money at an exorbitant interest from the wealthy Roman citizens who were settled amongst them. Accordingly we find, as early as the reign of Tiberius,<sup>125</sup> that the whole of Gaul was overwhelmed with debt, and their sufferings from this cause led to the unsuccessful insurrection against the Roman power, which took place, about eight years after the death of Augustus, under Julius Florus and Julius Sacrovir.

The total extirpation of the Celtic language, which was effected throughout the whole of Gaul, during the continu-  
Change of language.  
 ance of the Roman dominion, could not have taken place till long after the reign of Augustus. But an earnest of the change was already exhibited in Gallia Narbonensis, which had been now a Roman province for more than a century; for Strabo tells us,<sup>126</sup> that the inhabitants of the left or eastern bank of the Rhone were even in his time no longer to be considered barbarians, but were become Romans, both in their customs and in their language. Several important steps had also been taken towards the civilization of the more recently conquered provinces. Human sacrifices,<sup>127</sup> and all rites of the Celtic worship which were at variance with the practices of the Roman religion, were strictly prohibited; nor was more toleration shown to the barbarous custom of carrying about the skulls of their enemies whom they had slain, and fastening them up as a trophy over their gates. Besides, the Romans found the Gauls already disposed, in some measure, to adopt their institutions, from the popularity which the arts and literature of Greece had obtained amongst them. Their knowledge of these was derived from the famous Ionian colony of Massilia, or Marseilles, a city which was at this time the Athens of the western part of the empire,<sup>128</sup> and not only served as a school of instruction to the Gauls, but was frequented by many Romans of the highest distinction, who resorted thither, instead of to Greece, to devote themselves to literature and philosophy. So strong an effect had been produced by the Massilians upon the Gauls in general, that the Greek sophists found in most parts of Gaul a liberal reception, and were often engaged, by particular cities, to open schools of public instruction for their citizens, while the Greek character began to be adopted wherever

<sup>125</sup> Tacitus, Annal. III. 40. Galliarum Civitates, ob magnitudinem Æris alieni, rebellionem cœptavere.

<sup>126</sup> IV. 1, § 12.

<sup>127</sup> IV. 4, § 5.

<sup>128</sup> IV. 1, § 5.

there was occasion for writing.<sup>129</sup> The Celtic, it appears, was not a written language; and the Druids refused to commit to writing any of the learning which they possessed and taught, giving their instructions only by word of mouth, and obliging their scholars to trust to their memories alone for retaining them. This circumstance, doubtless, contributed to the gradual adoption of the Roman language throughout Gaul. As soon as a fondness for literature was introduced, the Gauls, finding nothing to gratify it in their own language, applied themselves of necessity to that of their conquerors. This co-operating with the influence which Latin necessarily enjoyed from political causes, introduced it universally, in time, amongst the higher classes; while the existence of domestic slavery made it much more necessary for the lower orders to acquire the language of the higher, than is the case in modern Europe. Thus the negroes in the West Indies learn, universally, the language of their masters; whilst in Wales and Ireland the gentleman often accommodates himself to his poorer neighbours, and consents to address them in Welsh or in Erse, because they choose to continue ignorant of the English.

The different parts of the neighbouring country of Spain presented a striking contrast to each other. The whole

Spain.

Peninsula was at this time divided into three provinces,<sup>130</sup> known by the names of Bætica, Lusitania, and Hispania Tarraconensis; the first of which was governed by a proconsul appointed by the senate, and the two latter by the lieutenants of Augustus. Bætica comprised nearly the same

Bætica.

extent of country which is at present included within the limits of Andalusia and Grenada. It had been already conquered by the Carthaginians before the second Punic war, and in the course of that war was made a part of the Roman dominion by P. Scipio Africanus, after the expulsion of its former masters. The Romans had thus possessed it for about two hundred years, and it was now one of the most flourishing portions of their empire. Its inhabitants had almost lost their original language,<sup>131</sup> and in their speech, and dress, and manners, were become assimilated to their conquerors. The valley of the Bætis, or Guadalquivir, is described by Strabo as rivalling in richness and fertility the most favoured countries in the empire; its trade with Rome was exceedingly great, and carried on directly with Ostia and Puteoli, the ports in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital; the ships employed in this commerce were of the largest size of any that frequented the Mediterranean; and the articles exported in them were numerous and valuable, consisting of corn, wine, oil, of the finest quality, wax, honey, salt fish in

<sup>129</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Gallico, VI. 13.

<sup>131</sup> Strabo, III. 2. p. 404. 380. 389, &c.

<sup>130</sup> Dion Cassius LIII. 503. Strabo, III.

4, p. 444, edit. Siebenkees.



immense quantities, pitch, minium or cinnabar,<sup>132</sup> and coccus ilicis, an insect of the cochineal species, and used by the ancients for their best scarlet dyes, as we now use the cochineal of Mexico. The Spanish wool then enjoyed the same high reputation which it still does to this day ; great quantities of it, both in the raw and manufactured state, were exported to Rome ; and so highly was the Spanish breed of sheep esteemed, that the rams were ordinarily sold for a talent,<sup>133</sup> or 193*l.* 15*s.* of our money. Above all, we should notice the mineral riches of Spain, which exceeded, in value and in quantity, all that were known to exist in any part of the world. We read of gold obtained partly from the mines, but more brought down in small particles by the streams from the mountains, and extracted by carefully washing the sand and gravel in which it was contained ; and mention is made also of mines of silver, lead, tin, iron, and copper. Of the towns of Bætica, the most distinguished were the Roman colonies of Corduba and Hispalis (Cordova and Seville), and Gades, or Cadiz. This place had been founded at a very remote period, by a colony from Tyre ;<sup>134</sup> their Phœnician extraction however did not induce the inhabitants to bear the Carthaginian dominion with willingness ; but, on the contrary, they took an early opportunity to conclude an alliance with Rome,<sup>135</sup> even before the downfall of the Carthaginian power in Spain, and became thus, according to the usual nature of alliances between a stronger and a weaker state in the ancient world, a dependency of the Roman people. In the civil war provoked by Cæsar's rebellion, the people of Gades espoused his cause with zeal, and expelled Pompey's officer from their town ;<sup>136</sup> in return for which, if we may believe Dion Cassius,<sup>137</sup> Cæsar bestowed upon them the privileges of Roman citizenship. They found at any rate an effectual patron in their countryman L. Cornelius Balbus, the nephew of that Balbus who had been presented with the freedom of Rome by Pompey, for his services in the contest with Sertorius, and who has been mentioned before as one of the most confidential friends of Cæsar, and as one of the first instances of a man, by birth a foreigner, rising to the rank of consul at Rome. Balbus enlarged the city of Gades,<sup>138</sup> and

<sup>132</sup> The minium (sulphuret of quicksilver) belonged to the government, and, with other productions of the mines, was farmed by the publicani. The price, however, at which it was to be sold was fixed by the government at 15*s.* 8*d.* the pound avoirdupois ; but the publicani made a large profit by adulterating it. The coccus ilicis was found so plentifully on the evergreen oak, (*quercus coccifera*), that Pliny says the poorer Spaniards were enabled to pay half their tribute by the money which they got from the sale of this insect.

See Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* XVI. 8 ; and XXXIII. 7.

<sup>133</sup> Strabo, *ibid.*

<sup>134</sup> Velleius Paterculus, I. 2.

<sup>135</sup> Cicero, *pro Balbo*, 15, 16. The language of the treaty ran, "*Majestatem populi Romani comiter conservato*" (*scil. populus Gaditanus*).

<sup>136</sup> Cæsar, *de Bello Civili*, II. 20.

<sup>137</sup> XLI. 164, edit. Leunclavii.

<sup>138</sup> Strabo, III. 5, p. 451, edit. Siebenkees.

built a dock-yard on the main land immediately opposite to the island in which the town is situated. In the reign of Tiberius, Gades was one of the most flourishing cities in the empire; and it is said to have rivalled Patavium or Padua, in containing five hundred citizens, rich enough to be reckoned amongst the equestrian order. It carried on an extensive trade both in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic, and the size and number of its merchant vessels are both especially noticed.

The two remaining provinces of Spain were far from being in so advanced a state as Bætica. The Celtiberians indeed, who inhabited the central and eastern parts of the Peninsula, were partially becoming more civilized;<sup>139</sup> and some of them, like the people of Bætica, had learnt to wear the Roman dress, and to adopt the Roman manner of living. But the tribes which bordered on the Atlantic and on the Bay of Biscay still retained in great measure their original wildness. The Cantabri, whose territory corresponded with the modern provinces of Biscay and Asturias, had been only lately attacked by Augustus in person,<sup>140</sup> in the year 728; and being then partially conquered, had soon afterwards renewed the contest, and had been more effectually subdued by L. Æmilius, in the year following, and again by M. Agrippa, in the year 734. In the reign of Tiberius,<sup>141</sup> the continued presence of a large Roman army in their country (for out of three Roman legions stationed in Spain, two were quartered amongst the Asturians and Cantabrians), had produced a partial effect upon them: some of them had entered into the service of Rome, and some of the tribes were learning the first elements of civil society. But the existence of the Basque language to this very day, undestroyed by the revolutions of eighteen centuries, sufficiently proves that in these remote districts the language and manners of Rome were unable to take deep root; and therefore, at the period of which we are writing, no more had probably been done than to reduce the hostilities of the natives to mere acts of robbery in the mountains and forests, and by quartering Roman soldiers among them to set before them a view of more civilized institutions. The coast of the Mediterranean presented naturally a different picture.<sup>142</sup> Here were cultivated the vine, the fig, and the olive; and here were the famous cities of Carthago, or Carthagera, and Tarraco, or Tarragona, both Roman colonies. On this coast also there grew in great luxuriance a species of broom, which was largely used in ropemaking, and which was exported for that purpose to all parts of

<sup>139</sup> Strabo, III. 2, p. 404; and 4, p. 446.

<sup>140</sup> Dion Cassius, LIII. 513. 516. 528. Horace, Carm. III. ode 14; and Epistolar. I. epist. 12.

<sup>141</sup> Strabo, III. 3, p. 416; 4, p. 445. Tacitus, Annal. IV. 5.

<sup>142</sup> Strabo, III. 4, p. 437. 429.

the empire. In the interior may be noticed the recently-planted colonies of Augusta Emerita or Merida, Pax Augusta or Badajoz, and Cæsar-augusta or Zaragoza, which Strabo instances as a proof of the improved condition of the countries in which they were situated.<sup>143</sup>

The northern coast of Africa from the Atlantic ocean to the harbour of Saldas,<sup>144</sup> which lies a few miles to the eastward of Algiers, was known by the general name of Mauritania, and was at this time governed by an African prince, on whom Augustus had conferred the sovereignty; this was Juba, the son of that Juba who had so zealously supported the constitutional party in the civil war between Cæsar and Pompey, and the husband of one of the daughters of Antonius and Cleopatra. But notwithstanding these connexions, Juba had served Augustus in the civil wars,<sup>145</sup> and had acquired his favour; and as the greatest part of his father's dominions now formed part of the Roman province of Africa, he received the sovereignty of Mauritania as a sort of compensation. From the port of Saldas to the borders of Cyrenaica, the whole country which had been formerly possessed by the kings of Numidia and the republic of Carthage, was now united under one government, and was called the province of Africa.<sup>146</sup> It was one of the provinces assigned to the senate and people, and was governed by a proconsul, with a military establishment of two legions;<sup>147</sup> and it is known to have been one of the countries which sent the greatest quantity of corn to the Roman market.<sup>148</sup> But of the details of its condition very little is recorded. We find by the *Fasti Triumphales*, that the proconsuls of this province frequently laid claim to the insignia of a triumph, on account of victories gained over the barbarians of the interior: we hear of a Roman colony,<sup>149</sup> lately founded by Augustus, close to the site of the ancient Carthage; and we are told that private individuals possessed here immense estates,<sup>150</sup> chiefly woodland and pasture, on which many villages were built, and a numerous population was maintained around the villa of the proprietor or lord. Perhaps from this very cause the towns in Africa were few and unimportant; the old ones had been mostly destroyed, either in the Jugurthine war, or in the contest between Cæsar and the constitutional party, under Scipio and Cato: and as the land seems mostly to have been granted or sold away to individuals, there was less room for those

<sup>143</sup> III. 2, p. 404.

<sup>144</sup> Strabo, XVII. Tacitus, Annal.

IV. 5.

<sup>145</sup> Dion Cassius, LI. 454; LIII. 514.

<sup>146</sup> Strabo, XVII. 3, § 25.

<sup>147</sup> Tacitus, Annal. IV. 5.

<sup>148</sup> Tacitus, Annal. XII. 43. See also several passages in Horace; for instance,

Sat. II.; Sat. III. 87. Carm. I. ode I. 10. III. ode XVI. 30.

<sup>149</sup> Strabo, XVII. 3, § 15. Appian, Punica, 136.

<sup>150</sup> Aggenus Urbicus, de Controversiis Agrorum, apud Scriptores de Re Agraria, edit. Goesii, 71.



military colonies, which in other parts of the empire were laying the foundations of so many cities, famous in after generations. Still we know that Africa carried on a considerable trade, for Strabo,<sup>151</sup> when wishing to represent the great number of the merchant vessels employed in the commerce between Italy and the south of Spain, observes that it almost rivalled the number of the vessels engaged in the commerce of Africa.

In proceeding eastward to the small province of Cyrenaica, we enter upon a new division of the empire, and one most strongly distinguished from all the countries which we have hitherto noticed, by the general use of the Greek language. The Greek provinces, if we may so call them, were in a very different condition from those in the west, which, owing their civilization to the Romans, borrowed from them alone their language and their institutions. But in the east, society had long since assumed a settled form, which in its internal details was but little affected by the conquests of Rome. Cyrene, originally a colony from the little island of Thera, in the *Ægæan*,<sup>152</sup> after enjoying some centuries of independence and prosperity, was conquered by Ptolemy,<sup>153</sup> the son of Lagus, the first of the Macedonian kings of Egypt, about the year of Rome 430. It was afterwards, like Cyprus, conferred from time to time, as a separate principality, on some member of the royal family; and a prince, named Ptolemy Apion,<sup>154</sup> who had obtained it in this manner, bequeathed it by his will to the Roman people, in the year of Rome 657. The lands which had belonged to him as king,<sup>155</sup> thus became the demesne of the Roman people, and not being divided out amongst a certain number of citizens, as was the case when a colony was planted, they were farmed in the mass by the publicani, mostly as grazing lands, and were encroached upon from time to time, like the other national lands throughout the empire, by the proprietors of the surrounding estates. In the time of Augustus, Cyrenaica was united with Crete,<sup>156</sup> under the government of the same officer, and the two countries together formed one of the prætorian provinces which had been assigned to the jurisdiction of the senate and people. It may be remarked, as a proof that Cyrenaica was the western limit of the Greek provinces, that the Jews, who had spread themselves over all the eastern part of the empire, are known to have been very numerous at Cyrene,<sup>157</sup> but are not mentioned as having established themselves in the adjacent provinces of Afri-

<sup>151</sup> III. 2, p. 387.

<sup>152</sup> Herodotus, Melpomene, 145, et seq.

<sup>153</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVIII. 602, et seq. edit. Rhodoman.

<sup>154</sup> Livy, Epitome, LXX.

<sup>155</sup> Tacitus, Annal. XIV. 18. Pliny,

Histor. Natural. XIX. 3. Hyginus, de Limitibus constituend. 210. Script. Rei Agrar. edit. Goesii.

<sup>156</sup> Strabo, XVII. 2, § 25.

<sup>157</sup> Acts of the Apostles, II. 10; VI.

9. Dion Cassius, LXVIII. 786.

ca, or in any of the provinces westward of Italy. To Cyrene itself its connection with Egypt would naturally have led them; and they formed there a body so considerable as to have a synagogue specially appropriated to them in Jerusalem.

We have already mentioned some of the precautions taken by Augustus to prevent the great resources of Egypt from being placed at the disposal of any one who might use them for the views of his own ambition. The governor of Egypt was always selected from the equestrian order, that is, from a class of citizens who enjoyed the comforts of an affluent private station, without taking any part in civil or military offices. Next under the governor was an officer invested with the administration of justice;<sup>158</sup> and after him came the procurator of the emperor, whose business was simply to receive and collect all sums which were due to the imperial treasury. The military establishment consisted at first of three legions, besides nine cohorts, employed on permanent garrison duty at particular points of the country; but as it was soon found that nothing was to be dreaded either from any disposition to revolt in the Egyptians themselves, or from the power of the yet unconquered neighbouring nations, it was thought safer to intrust the governor of so wealthy a province with the least possible military force, and the army in Egypt was consequently reduced to two legions.<sup>159</sup> So wretched had been the condition of the country under some of its recent kings, that the Romans are said to have introduced many beneficial reforms; and the trade with India, which was carried on by way of the Red Sea, increased prodigiously under their dominion, notwithstanding the heavy duties which they took care to impose on all articles imported into, or exported from, Alexandria.<sup>160</sup> There were two modes of communication between Egypt and the Red Sea; one was by that famous canal, which had been begun in the remotest times by Pharaoh Necho, again resumed by Darius, the son of Hystaspes, and finally completed under the government of the Ptolemies; and which leaving the Nile near the southern point of the Delta, after a somewhat circuitous course, joined the Red Sea at the town of

Egypt.

<sup>158</sup> Strabo, XVII. 1, § 12. ὁ δικαιοδότης. The procurator was called *ιδίος λόγος*, or "private account," which seems almost like a cant term bestowed on him by the Egyptians. The separation of the judicial power from the supreme civil and military administration of the province, appears to be another proof of the excessive jealousy with which the power and wealth of Egypt were regarded by the emperor.

<sup>159</sup> We thus attempt to reconcile the different statements of Strabo, who states the troops in Egypt to have consisted of

three legions and nine cohorts, (XVII. 1, § 12,) and of Tacitus, who rates them only at two legions (Annal. IV. 5). Unless indeed Tacitus spoke only of the number of Roman soldiers, and Strabo meant to include the auxiliaries; a supposition which seems supported by his distinguishing the nine cohorts which were employed in garrison duty, by the epithet "Roman," as if all the troops of the three legions were not entitled to that appellation.

<sup>160</sup> Strabo, XVII. 1, § 13. 25. 45.

Arsinoe, close to the modern town of Suez. The other was by land, across the Desert, from Coptos on the Nile, situated a few miles to the north of Thebes, to the ports of Berenice and Myos Hormos; and the route was now supplied with water, partly by digging wells, and partly by reservoirs, which preserved the occasional supply from the clouds. All the goods which were introduced into Egypt from the east by either of these channels, were necessarily conveyed to Alexandria, where they were again reshipped and exported to Italy and the rest of the empire. It may be observed, that two out of the three ships in which the apostle Paul performed his voyage from Palestine to Rome,<sup>161</sup> were ships of Alexandria, which seems to indicate that vessels from that place sailing direct to Italy were more easily to be found than from any other port in the eastern provinces. Besides the various commodities of the east, Egypt exported to Rome great quantities of corn,<sup>162</sup> together with the best writing materials then known in the world, the famous papyrus, the two finest sorts of which were named the Augustan and the Livian,<sup>163</sup> in compliment to the emperor and his wife. Alexandria having been long the capital of a great monarchy, and now becoming the seat of a commerce so extensive, was probably the second city in the Roman empire. But of all its buildings and institutions, the Museum deserves most particular notice. It formed a part of that large division of the city which the successive kings of Egypt had inclosed within what may be called the precincts of their court;<sup>164</sup> a space equal to nearly a third of the whole of Alexandria; and which may be compared to the parks of London, and to that quarter of the town in which our palaces, our public offices, and our courts of justice, are concentrated together. The museum comprised within it the great library of Alexandria, an ornamented walk, and a large building, which served as a refectory or college hall to the literary men who belonged to the institution. It may perhaps surprise some of our readers to hear that there was a society at Alexandria which very closely resembled the colleges of our English universities. There was a head or master of the museum, who was also a priest, appointed by the government; and there was an endowment for the maintenance of the members of the college, who lived at the museum, and were accustomed to have their meals together, as we have seen, in their common hall. A similar assemblage of literary and scientific men had formerly existed at Heliopolis; and Strabo was shown the apartments in which, according to the tradition of the guides, Plato and Eudoxus had resided for several years, to learn wisdom from the sages of Egypt.<sup>165</sup> But this institution

<sup>161</sup> Acts, XXVII. 6; XXVIII. 11.

<sup>162</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* XII. 43. *Histor.* III. 8. 48.

<sup>163</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* XIII. 12.

<sup>164</sup> Strabo, XVII. 1, § 8.

<sup>165</sup> XVII. 1, § 29.



was gone to decay in the time of Augustus, and the buildings were occupied only by the persons engaged in the care of the sacrifices, and by those who instructed strangers in the forms which they were to observe when they came there to worship. In another point however Egypt had undergone little change since the days of Herodotus. The scandalous licentiousness of some of the festivals was still faithfully preserved; and the canals which led from Alexandria to the famous temple of Serapis, at Canopus,<sup>166</sup> were thronged day and night during the period of the festival with an innumerable concourse of people, indulging themselves without restraint in the worst excesses of debauchery.

From Egypt to the Ægæan Sea, the countries included under the general names of Asia Minor and Syria, were in the time of Augustus portioned out into a number of divisions and subdivisions, which it would be of little importance to enumerate minutely. The principal of these were the two great provinces of Syria and Asia; the former governed by the lieutenants of the emperor,<sup>167</sup> the latter by proconsuls, in the name of the senate and people. Next to these in importance were the united provinces of Pontus and Bithynia, which also belonged to the senate and people: Galatia with Pisidia and Lycaonia,<sup>168</sup> which belonged to Augustus, and Cilicia, which also was governed by a lieutenant of the emperor. Cappadocia still retained a nominal independence,<sup>169</sup> under its king Archelaus, till about four years after the death of Augustus; as did Judæa under Herod, till a somewhat later period. Lycia enjoyed its own laws<sup>170</sup> and a free municipal government; and there were a great many detached and subordinate districts, which were governed by petty kings, dynasts, tetrarchs, and rulers of various designations, but which were all subject in fact to the control of the Romans, and the condition of which was altered from time to time at the pleasure of the emperor, as it was understood that all countries of this description were under his especial authority.<sup>171</sup> Throughout the whole of this part of the empire, Greek was commonly spoken and understood by the higher orders in all the large towns; but there was a great variety of native languages and dialects which still maintained their ground,<sup>172</sup> and an almost equal variety of manners prevailing amongst the different people and tribes. Many of the mountain districts were infested by robbers, who made frequent inroads upon the lowland country in their neighbourhood; while many of the cities, such as Antioch, Tyre, and Tarsus, in Syria and Cilicia, together with most of

Syria and Asia.

<sup>166</sup> Strabo, XVII. 1, § 16, 17.

<sup>167</sup> Dion Cassius, LIII. 504. Strabo, XVII. 3, § 25.

<sup>168</sup> Dion Cassius, LIII. 514. Strabo, XII. 5, § 1.

<sup>169</sup> Tacitus, Annal. II. 42.

<sup>170</sup> Strabo, XIV. 2, § 3.

<sup>171</sup> Strabo, XVII. 3, § 25.

<sup>172</sup> See Acts II. 9, &c.

those in the province of Asia, were in a state of high civilization, cultivating the arts of peace successfully. But the Roman colonies were few, and few of the cities, in comparison with the western provinces, enjoyed the rights of Roman or of Latin citizenship. The burden of taxation was moreover great,<sup>173</sup> and much was often suffered besides from the tyranny and exactions of the provincial governors. On the other hand, the evils of war were no longer felt or dreaded; four legions only were stationed in the whole of Asia Minor and Syria,<sup>174</sup> and most of these were placed near the Euphrates, to guard the frontiers on the side of Parthia. The internal communications between different parts of the country were mostly become secure and easy; and the piracy, which had been once so great an evil on the coasts of Cilicia and Pamphylia, was now so reduced as to offer no obstacles to the trade or general intercourse which was carried on by sea.

The condition of Greece was apparently one of great desolation and distress. It was divided in its widest extent into the two provinces of Macedonia and Achaia, both belonging to the jurisdiction of the senate and people. Both had suffered severely by being the seat of the successive civil wars between Cæsar and Pompey, between the Triumvirs and Brutus and Cassius, and lastly between Augustus and Antonius. Besides, the country had never recovered the long series of miseries which had preceded and accompanied its conquest by the Romans; and between those times and the civil contest between Pompey and Cæsar, it had again been exposed to all the evils of war when Sylla was disputing the possession of it with the generals of Mithridates. In the time of Augustus therefore it presented a mournful picture of ruin. If we go through Peloponnesus, and inquire what was now the fate of cities and states once so memorable, we shall find that Messenia and Arcadia<sup>175</sup> were almost reduced to a desert, and that Laconia was greatly decreased in population, although its capital, Lacedæmon, enjoyed the title of a free state,<sup>176</sup> and the Laconians, or inhabitants of the country, and even the helots, had been long relieved from that abject dependence upon the Spartans to which they were in the old times subjected. The most flourishing towns were Corinth and Patræ,<sup>177</sup> both of them Roman colonies, recently founded; the former by Cæsar, who peopled it with a number of freedmen; and the latter, one of the military colonies of Augustus, planted after the battle of Actium. Northward of the Isthmus the scene was equally melancholy. It was from a view of the ruins of the once famous cities of the Saronic Gulf, of Ægina, and Piræus, and Megara, that Ser. Sulpicius derived that lesson of

Greece—Macedonia  
and Achaia.

<sup>173</sup> Tacitus, Annal. II. 42. 54.

<sup>174</sup> Tacitus, Annal. IV. 5.

<sup>175</sup> Strabo, VIII. 4, § 11; 8, § 1.

<sup>176</sup> Strabo, 5, § 5.

<sup>177</sup> Strabo, 6, § 23; 7, § 5.

patience under domestic calamities with which he attempted to console Cicero for the loss of his daughter Tullia.<sup>179</sup> Ætolia and Acarnania were become wastes,<sup>179</sup> and the soil was devoted to pasture for the rearing of horses. Thebes was hardly better than a village,<sup>180</sup> and all the other towns of Bœotia, except Tanagra and Thespiæ, were reduced to the same condition. Epirus was depopulated,<sup>181</sup> and occupied by Roman soldiers; Macedonia had lost the benefit of its mines, which the Roman government had appropriated to itself, and was suffering from the weight of its taxation; but it appears not to have undergone so great a desolation as the neighbouring province of Achaia. Of the burden of taxation imposed on this part of the empire, there are two remarkable proofs on record. Strabo himself happened once to touch at the little island of Gyarus,<sup>182</sup> which he describes as a place containing no town, and inhabited merely by fishermen. When the vessel was again putting to sea, one of the fishermen came on board, and took his passage to Corinth, telling Strabo and his fellow-passengers that he was going on a deputation from his countrymen to Augustus, who happened to be in Greece at that time, to request some relief from taxation; for the inhabitants of Gyarus paid, he said, an hundred and fifty drachmæ (4*l.* 16*s.* 10½*d.*) annually, one hundred of which would be more than they were able to spare. It appears also that the provinces of Macedonia and Achaia,<sup>183</sup> when they petitioned for a diminution of their burdens, in the early part of the reign of Tiberius, were considered so deserving of compassion, that they were transferred for a time from the jurisdiction of the senate to that of the emperor; a change which tended to relieve them, by subjecting them only to the exactions of the imperial procurator, instead of the joint demands of the procurator and proconsul; for the emperor's fiscus or private treasury received a portion of the revenues in the provinces belonging to the senate, but in those which were particularly under himself, there was no officer employed by the senate to collect taxes for the public treasury or ærarium. Meanwhile the change of circumstances had rendered Greece far less capable of affording a large revenue than in the days of her early greatness. Then the naval power of the Greeks, the uncommercial habits of the Persians, and the general barbarism of the west of Europe, bestowed upon Greece an extensive trade with all parts of the Mediterranean; and vessels from the coasts of Ionia found their way not only to the Adriatic,<sup>184</sup> to Sicily, and to Italy, but also to the ports of Gaul and Spain, and even through the Straits of Gibraltar to the riches of Tartessus and Gades. Be-

<sup>178</sup> Cicero, ad Familiares, IV. epist. V.<sup>182</sup> X. 5, § 3.<sup>179</sup> Strabo, VIII. 8, § 1.<sup>183</sup> Tacitus, Annal. I. 76.<sup>180</sup> Strabo, IX. 2, § 5.<sup>184</sup> Herodotus, Clio, 163. Melpomene,<sup>181</sup> Strabo, VII. 7, § 3.

152.



sides, the high military character of the Greeks procured them constant employment in the service of the Persian satraps of Asia; and there were many officers who there amassed, like Xenophon, a considerable fortune, and returned with it in the decline of life to settle in their own country. This was particularly a resource for the Arcadians;<sup>185</sup> and money was thus poured into that wild and barren district of Peloponnesus, which the poverty of its soil and its inland situation would never have allowed it to gain from agriculture or trade. But now the commerce of the Mediterranean had passed into other hands, and the power of Rome had transferred to Italy the reputation of being the best school of soldiers. In literature and philosophy Greece, it is true, still retained her pre-eminence; and in these respects her excellence was appreciated over a greater portion of the world than ever, as we have seen the cities of Gaul eager to secure the services of Greek philosophers for the education of their people. But although the honour of this general celebrity was reflected chiefly upon Greece properly so called, yet it was far otherwise with the profit of it. Massilia, Tarsus, and Alexandria, sent out over the Roman world as many public and private instructors as proceeded from the schools of Athens; and if we run over the list of Greek writers of the times of the early emperors,<sup>186</sup> we shall find very few of them to have been natives of Greece itself. In this manner Greece was left without any adequate means of repairing the devastations of war, or the exactions of the Roman government, and was thus already fallen into decay, while most other parts of the empire were as yet flourishing in unbroken vigour.

While we have thus attempted to lead our readers step by step through most of the countries which were now subject to Rome, our task has been little else than to collect together some of the scattered notices of their condition preserved by the writers of the times, and to repeat them as we have found them recorded. But we naturally aspire to something more than this; the Augustan age is so famous in the history of mankind, that we wish to form to ourselves some general impression of it; we would fain compare it with that state of society which we ourselves are witnessing, and examine to what degree of physical and moral improvement it had attained. It requires also our especial attention, because this splendid period was suc-

General state of the  
Roman Empire.

<sup>185</sup> Thucydides, VII. 57. Of the Greeks who served under the younger Cyrus, in his attempt to dethrone his brother, more than half were Arcadians and Achaïans; and of these the Arcadians formed by far the greatest portion. Xenophon, *Anabasis*, V. 10; I. 1, 2.

<sup>186</sup> Strabo was a native of Amisus, in Pontus; Dionysius was of Halicarnassus, in Caria; Appian, of Alexandria; Lucian, of Samosata, in Comagene; Diodorus, of Sicily. We hardly remember, indeed, any of the later Greek writers, except Plutarch, who was properly a native of Greece.

ceeded in the course of a few generations by a very general and remarkable decline; and many centuries elapsed before the tide of civilization began again steadily to flow, after having been so long upon the ebb. It can be only by an attentive observation of the Augustan age itself, that we can at all hope to discover the causes of the phenomena which followed it; and so, perhaps, to learn whether there is any just reason to dread their recurrence; whether the great improvements of our own days may at some future period be again cut short, and the full stream of knowledge forced back once more to its original and scanty channel.

In order to arrive at any just notions of the physical condition of a people, our attention must mainly be directed to the state of property. Where the means of creating wealth are wanting, there must be general wretchedness; where it is inadequately secured, the means of creating it are crippled; where it is very unequally divided, the splendour of individual fortunes may often make us forget the poverty of the great bulk of the people. The physical means of creating wealth were abundantly enjoyed in the Roman empire, as it possessed some of the most productive soils and favourable climates known in the world, with excellent water communication from one extremity of it to the other. The moral means of industry and skill were to be found in very different perfection in different parts of the empire; but we know that all the useful arts were successfully cultivated, and that the luxuries as well as the comforts of life were to be procured by any one who was rich enough to purchase them. In some districts, in several provinces, property was liable to very frequent assaults from the robber tribes who inhabited the neighbouring mountains; and in most of the provinces, perhaps, the weight of taxation was felt as a serious evil; but on the other hand, the miseries of war were removed: and although the government and its officers interfered greatly with the profits of property, yet the actual right of possession was secured by regular laws, and was rarely disturbed by the violence of power. But the great misfortune of the Roman empire was the excessive inequality with which wealth was divided. We know enough of the splendid villas and magnificent establishments of the nobility, and of the wealthier members of the equestrian order; but the lower classes of free citizens at Rome were in the mean time supported, in great measure, by the largesses of the emperor;<sup>187</sup> and after all, from the decay of agriculture in Italy, any continuance of stormy weather which detained the usual supplies of corn from Africa, Spain, or Egypt, threatened the capital with a scarcity of bread. The fortune necessary to qualify a man for the equestrian order, was 400 sestertia<sup>188</sup> (3229*l.*), and in the time of Augustus

No physical condition.

<sup>187</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 41, 42. Tacitus, *Annal.* II. 87; IV. 6; *Histor.* IV. 2. Horace, *Epist.* I. i. 58.

38.

there were not four thousand citizens in Rome, exclusive of the senators, whose property amounted to this sum ; and there were only two towns in the empire, Gades and Patavium, which could produce five hundred citizens who possessed it. And this is rendered credible by a speech ascribed to L. Philippus, who was consul in the year of Rome 662, and who declared that there were not, at that time, two thousand citizens in the commonwealth worth any thing.<sup>189</sup> In fact, when we read of the enormous riches possessed by some individuals in ancient history, by the kings of Babylon and Persia at an earlier period, and afterwards by the emperors and some of the great nobility of Rome, we could not reasonably credit the statements which are given, if we did not consider that this splendour was produced by the vast concentration of wealth in a few hands, and that it is in no respect an index of the general prosperity of the people at large. The great number of slaves kept in opulent families, and the practice of employing them in various trades for the supply of many of the common articles of life, was a great injury to the class of shopkeepers ; and even in the liberal arts and professions, such as architecture and medicine, the high nobility were so much in the habit of having architects and physicians among their own slaves, that the respectability as well as the profits of the free citizens of those and similar professions were necessarily lessened. The miseries of one immense portion of the whole population, the slaves themselves, need not to be particularly dwelt upon. When the slave market was so abundantly supplied as it was in Rome, the value of a slave, as an article of property, could not be considered very highly ; and nothing but this selfish motive was likely to restrain masters in general from ill usage and cruelty : for the tendency of our nature to abuse absolute power, was aggravated in Rome by the utter indifference felt with regard to the fate of a slave, and by the want of some restraining and humanizing principles of morals. Something of this same indifference extended itself also to the condition of the people of the provinces, and subjected them often to a tyranny as insulting as it was oppressive. It is mentioned indeed, to the praise of Augustus, and of the early part of the reign of Tiberius,<sup>190</sup> that the cruelties and exactions of the provincial magistrates were greatly checked by them ; that the subjects of Rome were protected from the rods of the lictors, and from confiscations of their property. And Augustus was the author of one most important reform, by assigning to the governors of provinces a certain fixed salary,<sup>191</sup> instead of allowing them, according to the old practice, to lay an arbitrary charge upon the inhabitants for the

<sup>189</sup> Cicero, de Officiis, II. 21.

<sup>190</sup> Tacitus, Annal. IV. 6.

<sup>191</sup> Dion Cassius, LIII. 506.



maintenance of themselves and their establishment. Yet the mere ordinary administration of justice towards the provincials was, at the best, harsh and summary;<sup>192</sup> and it was, perhaps, rendered more so by the strong contrast between their condition and that of a Roman citizen, whose liberty even yet was fenced round against all subordinate tyranny by the jealous laws of the old commonwealth.

If we regard the effects of the political constitution of the empire in another light, it will lead us by an easy transition from the physical to the moral condition of the people. It may be doubted, whether all the improvements of modern civilization could diffuse life and activity through so vast a body as was now united under the government of Augustus. Much less was this actually accomplished, without an established conveyance for letters, without public carriages for travellers, and without circulation of newspapers. The Romans had excellent roads, it is true, as the Persians had had before them; and like the Persians, they had relays of horses placed at certain distances, for the convenience of forwarding couriers, or other officers of the government. But these were of no benefit to the common traveller, who was obliged to find the means of conveyance for himself,<sup>193</sup> and who was forced to limit his day's journey by the distance which could be performed by the same horses. Add to this, that the difference of language between the eastern and western provinces created a barrier between them, which at all times was an obstacle to their perfect union, and at a later period rendered their separation easy and natural. Those countries which were most remote from the capital, lost all the advantages of independent government, and their inhabitants were brought up to a condition of unavoidable helplessness; while at the same time their imperfect intercourse with the heart of the empire, prevented them from deriving from it their due portion of nourishment, or from receiving any adequate return for the wealth and industry which were continually drawn from them to Rome.

Meanwhile a taste for literature was becoming fashionable in the western provinces, as it had been long in the eastern; and we have seen that the cities of Gaul were in the habit of hiring Greek sophists for the public instruction of their people. But the expensiveness and consequent rarity of books was an invincible obstacle to the general diffusion

Of the intellectual state of the empire.

<sup>192</sup> See Acts XVI. 22. 37; XX. 24.

<sup>193</sup> Nunc mihi curto

Ire licet mulo, vel, si libet, usque Tarentum,

Mantica cui lumbos onere ulceret, atque eques armos.

Horace, Sat. I. vi. 104.

No man would have talked of going to Tarentum on his dock-tailed mule, carrying saddle-bags, if he could have had the convenience of a good coach, to transport him in half the time, and with infinitely greater ease and comfort.

of knowledge. It is mentioned of one of the literary men of these times,<sup>194</sup> that he had read in the province of Syria a great number of the works of an earlier period, which continued to be known there, because they were not superseded, as at Rome, by the multitude of modern publications. And Horace speaks of his works being carried into Spain and Africa only as wrapping-paper for merchandise,<sup>195</sup> when they had lost their popularity at Rome. The consequence of this state of things was, that men of literature formed a distinct profession in the empire, which was followed for the sake of deriving from it a means of subsistence, but that the bulk of the people were left in a very general ignorance. What has been preserved to us of the writings of these times, has proceeded mostly from men who lived by their pen, or by giving instructions to their pupils, not from persons conversant with the business of actual life, from statesmen and soldiers, or men of independent fortune, such as were Cicero, Cæsar, and the elder Cato, or such as was Tacitus a few generations later. Hence the total want of intelligent books of travels, and the low state of experimental philosophy and political economy. The study of words, however dignified by the titles of Grammatica and Rhetorica, was but a poor education for any man; yet to this an excessive attention was directed, and youth were taught to admire the purity of a writer's style, or the musical arrangement of his sentences, instead of observing the value of his facts, or the wisdom of his opinions. Oratory in particular, which in the best days of Greece and Rome had been far too highly appreciated, was now become a worthless study, and a mere waste of time and ingenuity, since the practical occasions for its exercise were at an end. It is, therefore, to us no wonder at all, that when all kinds of public disasters assailed the empire, the fair show of knowledge which had just gilded the surface of the Augustan age, should have been utterly worn away. Separated as it was from the habits and concerns of the practical part of the community, it died away with the patronage and general tranquillity which had fostered it. It was but a rich man's luxury, which they who were hourly trembling for their lives had no leisure to care for. For after all, if we look at the most famous writers of the Augustan age, of what description shall we find them? The highest eminence which they attained was in poetry; yet even in this it is an excellence most suited to an artificial age, and not, perhaps, the best suited to win the ears of the people at large when literature was no longer in fashion. In history the famous work of Livy is below mediocrity;<sup>196</sup> and the reputation which it

<sup>194</sup> Marcus Valerius Probus, of Berytus. Suetonius, de Illustribus Grammaticis, 24.

<sup>195</sup> Epist. I. epist. XX. 13.

<sup>196</sup> A tolerable specimen of Livy's man-

ifold deficiencies, arranged under the several heads of "Ignorance of the old Constitution," "Ignorance of Military Topography," "Want of Judgment," "Care-

has enjoyed is the best proof of the long continued and pernicious influence of the schools of grammar and rhetoric, which taught men to admire eloquent language, and to consider it as a compensation for ignorance and shallowness of judgment. In morals, in political science, in all the various branches of experimental philosophy, what do we owe to the Augustan age? But happily for mankind, the wisdom of Providence was now preparing a knowledge the very opposite to that which we have been considering, a knowledge as unpretending and generally useful as the other was ostentatious and trifling; which was fitted for the real business of life, and was received by persons of every condition; which struck root as deeply as the literature of the Augustan age had been scattered superficially; which continued its substantial benefits through revolutions which laid every thing else in ruins, and which preserves to this day its indestructible power of beneficent activity.

But the mere intellectual advancement of a people is of little importance in comparison with their moral knowledge of right and wrong; and whether the literature of the Augustan age was generally valuable or not, the Romans might still have possessed a good state of public and private morals, and therefore might have been happily circumstanced with regard to the grand concern of human life. The great questions of the end of all our actions, and the nature of our several duties, were canvassed by the philosophers of every sect; and in the public lectures of those philosophers, such subjects formed the principal part. When a parent, well versed in these inquiries, became himself the instructor of his son, he was enabled to give him a moral education of no mean excellence; and the young man who, in addition to the conversation and example of his father, received from him such a guide as the great work of Cicero, *de Officiis*, addressed by him to his son, possessed, in many respects, a rule of conduct which required little further improvement. But neither were all parents philosophers, nor were philosophers the ordinary teachers of the great mass of the community. The common elementary schools of Rome, from which the majority of the people derived their whole education, were schools of reading and of arithmetic,<sup>197</sup> and of nothing else; for the masters were men of humble station, unacquainted with the writings of the philosophers, and quite unable to venture by themselves into all the difficulties with which the chief good of man, and the nature of his duties, were then enveloped. Under such circumstances men's characters are formed partly by the influence of the society in which they live, and partly by

lessness," &c. with numerous instances of each, is given by Wachsmuth, in his *Early History of the Roman State*, 33, et seq.

<sup>197</sup> Horat. Sat. I. iv. 72. *De Arte Poeticâ*, 325.



themselves. Some virtues are always congenial to human nature in theory, however much selfishness may obstruct the practice of them; and these were often beautifully displayed in the lives of men of amiable dispositions, who wished to live up to the best of their knowledge. But unfortunately there are many vices also, of which the practice is far more natural to man than the theory is repugnant; and into these the force of inclination and the sanction of universal custom draw almost every one. It is in such points especially that an authoritative rule of life is wanted, which being once acknowledged, may save common men the trouble of making out their duty for themselves, and may lead them at once to the true practical conclusion without the risks or the difficulties of the previous inquiry. But in the greater parts of the Roman empire no such authority was to be found. In this respect the popular religion had utterly failed; superstition, according to the necessary course of things, was closely connected with and encouraged a complete moral carelessness; and whilst the high and pure doctrines so often inculcated by the oracles and choral songs of an earlier period were neglected or scorned, the follies and sensualities of polytheism continued to flourish even with increased vigour. The oracles had lost all their authority,<sup>198</sup> a loss which Strabo ascribes to the influence of the Romans, who preferred their own natural modes of inquiry into futurity, by consulting the Sibylline books, the entrails of victims, the flight of birds, and the phenomena of the atmosphere. But the change probably was greatly for the worse; for when the oracles were in vogue, they were consulted not only as prophets but as practical directors; and however much we may be resolved to charge their predictions with collusion and imposture, there are yet specimens of their moral doctrine preserved,<sup>199</sup> which exhibit a purity and a wisdom scarcely to be surpassed. Nor did the philosophers retain and communicate these sparks of true religion when they were become extinct elsewhere. On the contrary, notwithstanding their many and great excellences as expounders of the duties of man to man, they were all agreed in one maxim, which amounts to a complete practical atheism;<sup>200</sup> the opinion, namely, that nothing was to be feared from the anger of God, because it was contrary to the divine attributes that He should be the cause of pain to any one. By this doctrine they removed the greatest check upon wickedness which has been ever devised for it; for to the mass of mankind to say that God could not or would not punish, was the same thing as to say that He did not exist. It was a virtual denial of his moral government, the only point in his nature which it greatly concerns his creatures to be acquainted

<sup>198</sup> Strabo, XVII. 1, § 43.

<sup>200</sup> Cicero, de Officiis, III. 28, 29.

<sup>199</sup> See particularly, Herodotus, Clio, 158, 159, and Erato, 86.

with. Thus while philosophy took away the best sanction of human conduct, and while those who could not be taught by philosophers were left to form their principles for themselves, or to pick them up from the opinions of the world, the morals of the people were in a state of great corruption. Of the sensualities which were universally practised, and of the excessive grossness of manners which naturally flowed from them, the writings of every author of the times, and still more strikingly, perhaps, the paintings and other embellishments of the houses which have been discovered at Herculaneum, offer proofs the most incontestable. But it is equally instructive and less disgusting to dwell rather on the entire absence of those virtues and feelings which operate with such extensive usefulness in the countries of modern Europe. Charity and general philanthropy were so little regarded as duties, that it requires a very extensive acquaintance with the literature of the times to find any allusion to them. There were no public hospitals, no institutions for the relief of the infirm and poor, no societies for the removal of abuses, or the improvement of the condition of mankind from motives of charity. Nothing was done to promote the instruction or the lower classes, nothing to mitigate the miseries of domestic slavery, and far less to stop altogether the perpetual atrocities of the kidnapper and the slave market. The selfishness of human nature was thus spared its most painful sacrifice; and he who was most largely endowed with the gifts of fortune, was taught only to abstain from doing active injury, and to enjoy the good things which he possessed in a life of social and intellectual gratification.

But there was one part of the empire in which a better knowledge had been slowly working its way, and must by this time have produced considerable effect. We have already observed that the Jews were widely scattered over the eastern provinces; and as they adopted the language which was most prevalent around them, the Greek translation of the Old Testament, commonly known by the name of the Septuagint, was the form in which they were most familiar with their Scriptures. Intercourse with the Jews, and an acquaintance thus gained with the contents of their law and of the writings of their prophets, gave birth, throughout Syria and Asia Minor, to a class of persons who are called in our translation of the Acts by the name of "the devout,"<sup>201</sup> and who, without thinking themselves bound to conform to the national peculiarities of the Jewish worship, had yet acquired those true notions of the divine nature and attributes, and of the duties which God demands of man, which are so largely contained in the Old Testa-

Of the effect produced in the east by the residence of the Jews, and the Greek translation of the Old Testament.

<sup>201</sup> XVII. 4. 17. See also X. 2; XIII. in our version, XIII. 43; XVI. 14; XVIII. 50. And the same word is used in the Greek, although it is differently translated

ment. The effect of this knowledge on those who profited by it, was to produce the very virtues in which the world was generally most deficient—devotion and charity;<sup>202</sup> and by these means a large portion of the people was in some degree prepared for the doctrines of a still more perfect law, which were a few years afterwards introduced among them by the Christian apostles.

Here then our review of the state of the Roman world must terminate. Deficient as we well know it to be from the imperfection of our own knowledge, it will yet serve, perhaps, to show what were the most striking differences between the condition of society in those times and in ours, and to point out on how much less firm a foundation civilization was then built than we may hope is the case now. When, however, we reflect on the point of time at which this sketch terminates, other thoughts, we confess, are foremost in our minds, the expression of which we do not feel called upon entirely to restrain. About fourteen years before the death of Augustus, Jesus Christ was born into the world, and in less than twenty years afterwards the first foundations of the Christian society were laid. Henceforward the Roman empire acquires, in our eyes, a nearer interest; as a country to which we were before indifferent becomes at once endeared to us, when we know it to be the abode of those whom we love. In pursuing the story of political crimes and miseries, there will be henceforth a resting place for our imaginations, a consciousness that, amidst all the evil which is most prominent on the records of history, a power of good was silently at work, with an influence continually increasing; and that virtue and happiness were daily more and more visiting a portion of mankind, which till now seemed to be in a condition of hopeless suffering. The reader who has accompanied us through all the painful details presented by the last century of the Roman commonwealth, will be inclined, perhaps, with us, to rejoice in the momentary contemplation of such a scene of moral beauty.

It now only remains that we give some account of the family of Augustus, and conclude this memoir with some particulars of his own private life. We have already mentioned his marriage with Livia, the wife of Tib. Nero, in the year 716; and that he had at that time one daughter, named Julia, the child of his former marriage with Scribonia. As he had no children by Livia, Julia remained his only heiress, and the choice of her husband became a matter of great importance. She was first married to her cousin Claudius Marcellus, the nephew of Augustus by his sister Octavia,<sup>203</sup> and the person celebrated by Virgil in those famous lines of the sixth *Æneid*, for

<sup>202</sup> See the character of the centurion Cornelius, Acts X. 2.

<sup>203</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* I. 3. Suetonius, in *Augusto*, 63, et seq.



which Octavia so largely rewarded him. But Marcellus dying young, and without children, Augustus selected for the second husband of his daughter his oldest friend and most useful adherent, M. Vipsanius Agrippa. This marriage seemed to answer all his wishes, for Julia became the mother of five children, Caius, Lucius, Julia, Agrippina, and Agrippa Postumus, so called because he was born after his father's death, which took place in the year 741. Caius and Lucius were immediately adopted by their grandfather, and assumed the name of Cæsar; before they arrived at the age of manhood they were distinguished by the title of "principes juventutis," or "chiefs of the youth;" they were marked out as consuls elect, to enter upon that office as soon as they arrived at a fit age; they were sent to the different provinces and presented to the armies, as the heirs of the emperor; their education was conducted in a great measure by Augustus himself, and they were his constant companions at table and on his journeys. But all his hopes in them were marred by their successive premature deaths. Lucius Cæsar, when on his way to take the command of the army in Spain, was taken ill and died at Massilia, about the year 754; and Caius Cæsar, who commanded the army on the frontiers of Parthia, having been wounded in Armenia, and returning slowly homewards towards Italy, died about eighteen months after his brother, at the town of Limyra, in Lycia.<sup>204</sup> Meanwhile their mother, Julia, had been married, for the third time, by her father, after the death of Agrippa, to Tiberius Claudius Nero, the son of Livia; but when Caius and Lucius Cæsar were grown up to manhood, and were in the height of their favour with their grandfather, Tiberius, for whatever reasons, thought proper to withdraw from Rome to the island of Rhodes, where he lived in the greatest retirement, and during a part of the time in a sort of disgrace, for the space of more than seven years. During his absence, his wife, Julia, was guilty of such gross infidelities to him, that Augustus himself divorced her in the name of his son-in-law, and banished her to the island of Pandataria, off the coast of Campania,<sup>205</sup> where she was closely confined for some time, and treated with the greatest rigour; nor would Augustus ever forgive her, or receive her into his presence, although he afterwards removed her from Pandataria to Rhegium, and somewhat softened the severity of her treatment. After the deaths of Caius and Lucius Cæsar, Tiberius was adopted by Augustus as his son, in the year 756,<sup>206</sup> and with him M. Agrippa Postumus, now the only surviving son of M. Agrippa. But Agrippa Postumus is represented as a youth of a brutal and intractable temper;<sup>207</sup> and Livia, to favour her

<sup>204</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 102.<sup>205</sup> Tacitus, Annal. I. 53.<sup>206</sup> Velleius Paterculus, II. 103, 104.<sup>207</sup> Tacitus, Annal. I. 3. Suetonius, 65.

son's interests, so exaggerated his faults, and so prejudiced his grandfather against him, that he, too, like his mother, was banished from Rome, and confined in the island of Planasia : Tiberius thus remained the sole heir to the greatness of his father-in-law ; but in order to point out the succession even for a more remote period, he was obliged, by Augustus, to adopt as his son his nephew, Germanicus, the only surviving child of his brother Drusus, although he had at the same time a son of his own. Accordingly, during the last ten years of the life of Augustus, Tiberius was associated with him in the tribunician power, and in the general administration of the empire, and was clearly marked out as his successor ; while Drusus and Germanicus, the two sons of Tiberius by birth and by adoption, seemed to insure the continuance of the sovereign power in his family to the third generation.

We have said that M. Vipsanius Agrippa died in the year 741. Four years afterwards Augustus lost his other chief counsellor and faithful friend, C. Cilnius Mæcenas, by whose advice he is said to have been greatly assisted in the arrangement of his government. But his power was now securely settled, and the various conspiracies which were formed against him at different times after the battle of Actium, were the mere efforts of individual revenge or ambition, and were all easily discovered and punished. In the case of L. Cinna,<sup>208</sup> who had intended to assassinate him when sacrificing at the altar, he not only forgave his intended murderer, but offered him his friendship, and afterwards raised him to the consulship, being resolved, it is said, to try the effect of clemency after having indulged so largely in cruelty, or being anxious rather to preserve that character of magnanimity which, since the overthrow of every enemy whom he dreaded, he might counterfeit with little danger. Various other stories of his moderation are recorded ; his manners were affable and courteous to all ; he forbade, and probably in sincerity, that any one should address him by the name of "dominus," or master ;<sup>209</sup> and when the people wished to force upon him the ominous title of dictator, he threw himself on his knees, and casting off his robe, and baring his breast, intreated them rather to kill him, than to oblige him to accept it. In these points the example of his uncle always served as a useful warning to him ; and he also learned from it to avoid every display of state in the appearance and manners of his family, in the size of his house, and in the regulation of his establishment. Yet it would be unjust to ascribe to a politic premeditation all the popular actions of his reign. Good is in itself so much more delightful than evil, that he was doubtless not insensible to the

Anecdotes of his character and behaviour.

<sup>208</sup> Seneca de Clementiâ, l. 9, &c

<sup>209</sup> Suetonius, 53, et seq.

pleasure of kind and beneficent actions, and, perhaps, sincerely rejoiced that they were no longer incompatible with his interest. When Valerius Messala was sent to him by the senate, to confer on him, in the name of the senate and people of Rome, the title of "father of his country,"<sup>210</sup> he was affected even to tears, and replied, "I have now gained all that I desired, conscript fathers; and what have I left to pray for from the gods, but that I may preserve to the latest day of my life this same unanimous love of my countrymen?" He did preserve it, and even with an increased affection, in proportion as the remembrance of his former cruelties became less lively, and the period of general tranquillity which had commenced under his auspices was continually lengthening. At last, in the seventy-sixth year of his age, when he was going to accompany Tiberius as far as Bene-

*His last sickness.*

ventum, on the way to Illyricum, he was seized with a dysentery, which at first attacked him but slightly, and did not prevent him from fulfilling the object of his journey, after having spent some days on the coast of Campania, in the hope of recruiting his strength. But on his return from Beneventum his complaint grew more serious; he stopped at Nola, at the house which had belonged to his father, and in which his father had died; and as he became visibly worse, his wife Livia sent hasty messengers after Tiberius, to recall him instantly to the death-bed of the emperor. Meantime every thing that passed within the walls was concealed by Livia with the utmost care; insomuch, that although it was given out that Tiberius found his adopted father still alive,<sup>211</sup> and had a long and affectionate interview with him, yet Tacitus informs us that it was never clearly ascertained whether these stories were not mere fabrications,<sup>212</sup> and whether Augustus was not in reality already dead when Tiberius arrived at Nola. The same authority which related the conversation of the dying emperor with

*His death.*  
U. C. 766, A. D. 13.

his successor, pretended also that he actually expired in the arms of his wife, and that his last words were, "Farewell, Livia, and ever be mindful of our long union." It was said that he died about three o'clock in the afternoon, on the nineteenth of August, in the year of Rome 766,<sup>213</sup> and when he had in fact a little more than completed his seventy-sixth year.

Augustus was in his stature something below the middle size, but extremely well proportioned;<sup>214</sup> his hair was a little inclined to curl, and of a yellowish brown; his eyes were bright and lively, but the general expression of his

*His character.*

<sup>210</sup> Suetonius, 58.

<sup>211</sup> Suetonius, 96, et seq.

<sup>212</sup> See Suetonius, and Velleius Paterculus.

<sup>213</sup> He was nominally born on the 23d

of September, v. c. 690, but owing to the disordered state of the calendar, it was in reality more nearly the 23d of July.

<sup>214</sup> Suetonius, in Augustus, 79.



countenance was remarkably calm and mild. His health was throughout his life delicate, yet the constant attention which he paid to it, and his strict temperance in eating and drinking, enabled him, as we have seen, to reach the full age of man. As a seducer and adulterer,<sup>215</sup> and a man of low sensuality, his character was as profligate as that of his uncle; it is mentioned, also, that he was extremely fond of gaming, a propensity which he indulged even when he was advanced in years. In his literary qualifications, without at all rivalling the attainments of Cæsar, he was on a level with most Romans of distinction of his time; and it is said, that both in speaking and writing, his style was eminent for its perfect plainness and propriety.<sup>216</sup> His speeches on any public occasion were composed beforehand, and recited from memory; nay, so careful was he not to commit himself by any inconsiderate expression, that even when discussing any important subject with his own wife, he wrote down what he had to say, and read it before her. Like his uncle, he was strongly tinged with superstition; he was very much afraid of thunder and lightning,<sup>217</sup> and always carried about with him a seal skin, as a charm against its power; notwithstanding which, in any severe storm, he was accustomed to hide himself in a chamber in the centre of his house, to be as much out of the way of it as possible; add to which, he was a great observer of dreams, and of lucky and unlucky days. He was totally destitute of military talent; but in every species of artful policy, in clearly seeing, and steadily and dispassionately following his own interest, and in turning to his own advantage all the weaknesses of others, his ability, if so it may be called, has been rarely equalled. His deliberate cruelty, his repeated treachery, and sacrifice of every duty and every feeling to the purposes of his ambition, have been sufficiently shown in the course of this narrative. But it was his good fortune, for the last forty years of his life, to be placed in circumstances in which he had no longer any temptation to the same kind of wickedness; and thus it has happened that he whose crimes fitted him to rank with Marius or Sylla, with Nero or with Domitian, has been loaded with praises as a benefactor to his species, and his name has passed into a proverb as a promoter of peace, and a general patron of literature and of civilization.

<sup>215</sup> Suetonius, in *Augusto*, 69. 71.

<sup>217</sup> Suetonius, in *Augusto*, 90.

<sup>216</sup> Suetonius, in *Augusto*, 84, et seq.

## CHAPTER XII.

M. ULPÍUS TRAJANUS CRINITUS.—FROM A. D. 98 TO 117.

BETWEEN the close of the reign of Augustus Cæsar and the accession of Trajanus, there elapsed a period of eighty-four years. During this period the Roman empire, notwithstanding the crimes of almost all its sovereigns, and the disturbances to which it had been occasionally exposed, had consolidated its widely scattered possessions, and its different provinces had learned to consider themselves as members of one great body. It was well prepared to feel the full blessing of an able and upright government, and such a blessing it was now going to experience for a term of equal length with the period of tyranny which had preceded it. The first eighty years, then, of the second century of the Christian æra may be regarded as the prime of manhood in the Roman empire, during which its excellences were most fully developed, while at the same time there were visible, even then, those evils which threw so dark a shade over its decline and fall. It is of this period that we wish to offer, not a picture, but such a sketch as our imperfect information will enable us to execute; connecting it with those particulars which we formerly gave of the state of the empire under Augustus, in order to show more clearly the changes which it had undergone since the first establishment of the imperial government.

The reign of Trajanus is in one respect peculiarly well fitted to be made the occasion of such a survey, as we are absolutely unable to offer a detailed account of its events. A few pages of an abridgment of the original history of Dion Cassius, and a few lines of Eutropius and Aurelius Victor, are all that we possess in the shape of a direct historical narrative of it. Of these scanty materials, by far the greatest part relates to the military expeditions of the emperor, and to those conquests of which he himself lived long enough to see the instability, and which his successor quietly abandoned. It were indeed a waste of our own time and that of our readers to dwell upon the events of the Dacian war, or the triumphs of Trajanus over the Parthians and Armenians. Unprofitable as is the detail of almost every war, there is none more

utterly worthless than that which relates to the contest between a civilized and a barbarian people, which repeats the story of fancied provocations, of easy victories, and of sweeping conquests. Yet if we exclude the military operations of Trajanus from our account of his life, his historians and biographers furnish us with scarcely any materials. We shall first, therefore, give only a mere outline of the events of his reign in chronological order, and then, adopting a different arrangement, we shall regard the nature of the facts related, rather than the time of their occurrence.

At the moment of Nerva's death, Trajanus was still with the army in Germany.<sup>1</sup> He had been named consul the second time for that year, together with the emperor; and as Nerva died about the 27th of January,<sup>2</sup> almost the whole term of his consulship remained unexpired when he succeeded to the sovereignty of the empire. He did not return to Rome till the beginning of the following year, having passed his consulship in Germany, where he was employed in confirming discipline among the soldiers, and in the civil administration of those important provinces. A third consulship was offered him as soon as his second was expired, as the emperors usually marked the first year of their reign by receiving that title and office; but Trajanus positively refused it. On his way home from Germany, he travelled in the quietest and most moderate manner;<sup>3</sup> his attendants were restrained from committing those excesses upon the persons and property of the people who lived near the line of his journey, which it seems were commonly practised by the train of the emperors. The expenses of his table were defrayed by the inhabitants of the provinces through which he travelled, according to the constant practice of the Roman magistrates; but this tax of purveyance, which the sovereigns of modern Europe exercised after the example of the Romans, was imposed by Trajanus with great moderation; and he could not forbear publishing a statement of the sums demanded by himself, contrasted with those which Domitianus had exacted when he returned to Rome from the same part of the empire. His entrance into his capital<sup>4</sup> was in a similar spirit. Instead of being borne on a litter, according to the practice of former emperors, it was remarked that he walked behind his lictors, surrounded not by guards, but by the flower of the senate and the equestrian order; and that he bore with patience the frequent interruptions to his progress occasioned by the eagerness of the multitude thronging to behold him. He ascended the capitol to offer his prayers in

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. 9. 56. 59. Sex. Aurel. Victor, in Trajano.

<sup>3</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. 22, et seq.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Suetonius, Domitian. 17; and Dion Cassius, LXVIII. 771.



the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter, on the same spot whereon Nerva, a short time before, had solemnly adopted him as his son and successor in the empire. Thence he retired to the palace, which he entered in the same unostentatious manner that had marked his behaviour through the day. It is added by Dion Cassius,<sup>5</sup> that his wife Plotina had displayed a like temper when she first entered the imperial residence, for she stopped on the steps, and turning round to the multitude, said aloud, "I go into this house with the same mind that I should wish to bear in leaving it."

The popularity which Trajanus had gained by his former character, and by this fair commencement of his reign, was confirmed by some of his earliest mea-<sup>First measures of his government.</sup> sures, when he took into his hands the administration of government. His justice and firmness, his liberality, and his regard for the public morals, are all made the theme of his panegyrist's admiration. Caspinus Ælianus,<sup>6</sup> the prefect of the prætorian guards, who had headed a mutiny of his soldiers in the reign of Nerva, and obliged the emperor to give up to their vengeance the assassins of Domitianus, had been sent for by Trajanus, previously to his entrance into Rome, and had been put to death. The delators, or informers, a race of men as numerous under the tyranny of the Roman emperors as ever the sycophants had been under that of the Athenian democracy, were banished to different islands, and their property confiscated; and if we may interpret literally the language of Pliny's Panegyric, they were sent off to their respective places of exile with so little delay, that the ships which carried them were obliged to put to sea before the end of the winter season, and the people enjoyed the thought that some of them were likely to perish on their voyage. On the other hand, the liberality of Trajanus was shown both by that which he gave, and by that which he resigned. The donative to the soldiers, and the congiarium, or largess to the people, as well as the shows of the circus, which he exhibited on his accession, were so much according to the common practice of other emperors, that they do not deserve any particular notice. But he obtained a peculiar and well-earned glory, by providing for the maintenance of nearly five thousand children of free parents,<sup>7</sup> in the different cities of Italy; and the example which he thus set was imitated by private individuals, as Pliny mentions<sup>8</sup> that he had settled an annual income of 300,000 sesterii on the town of Comum, for the maintenance of free-born children. The object of these liberalities was to encourage population amongst the free inhabitants of Italy; and there can be no better proof of the general corruption

<sup>5</sup> LXVIII. 771, edit. Leunclav.

<sup>6</sup> Dion Cassius, LXVIII. 771.

<sup>7</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. 26. 28.

<sup>8</sup> Epist. VII. 18.

of manners, than that any such encouragement should have been needed. With these acts of munificence was combined, at the same time, the modification of one of the most obnoxious, but most productive taxes,<sup>9</sup> the duty of five per cent. which was levied on all legacies, and even on the successions of the nearest relations, when entered upon by persons who had become citizens of Rome otherwise than by the right of birth. By the decree of Trajanus, those nearest in consanguinity, whether in the direct or collateral line, were exempted altogether from this tax; and no person whatever was liable to it, if the property to which he had succeeded was below a certain value. And while he provided for the future, he endeavoured also to remedy the oppressions of past reigns, by enacting that no arrears should be demanded in those cases in which the parties should be exempted for the future under the law as now mitigated. But besides the direct taxes, the public treasury and the imperial fiscus had been long enriched by the irregular exactions of the officers of the government, and by the frequent confiscations of the property of individuals condemned under the imperial law of treasons. The first of these sources of unjust gain Trajanus stopped, by allowing justice to take its free course, and leaving the officers of the revenue to the punishments of the laws, if they exceeded the limits of their lawful authority; the other was destroyed by the banishment of the delators, and by the discouragement shown to all prosecutions for treasons, and particularly to the informations of slaves against their masters. These deductions from the revenue were made up for partly by a severe economy, and partly by the sale of a great number of lands and villas,<sup>10</sup> which the rapacity and tyranny of former emperors had annexed to the imperial demesnes. By these means Trajanus was enabled to promote the execution of many public works in different parts of the empire, and to add to the magnificence of Rome, and to the comforts or pleasures of its inhabitants, by completing the forum<sup>11</sup> which Domitianus had begun, and by erecting or finishing several other buildings, a circus, some temples, and a colonnade or porticus. But while thus gratifying some of the prevailing tastes of the people, there were others which he strove to repress, as became him. The exhibition of the pantomimes was prohibited;<sup>12</sup> an entertainment very different from that which is now known by the same name, and an outrage upon all decency, more shameless than any thing to be found in the obscurest scenes of profligacy in the capitals of modern Europe. According to Pliny, this prohibition was highly popular; and so it was, doubtless, with the most respectable part of the community: but there was always a vast multitude at

<sup>9</sup> Panegyric. 37.

<sup>10</sup> Panegyric. 36.

<sup>11</sup> Sex. Aurel. Victor, de Cæsaribus, in Trajano. Pliny, Panegyric. 51.

<sup>12</sup> Panegyric. 46.

Rome who forgave the cruelties of the most tyrannical emperors in consideration of their toleration of licentiousness, and to whom no government was so unwelcome as that which attempted to reform their vices.

But whatever were the virtues of Trajanus, he had not learnt to appreciate the misery and wickedness of war, nor to shrink with disgust from the reputation of a conqueror. Since the reign of Augustus, the conquests of the Romans in Dalmatia and Pannonia had made them acquainted with the name of the Dacians, a people who occupied both banks of the Danube, in that part of its course where it forms at present the southern boundary of Hungary. They were reputed to be of the same stock with the tribes who lived nearer the mouth of that river, and who, under the name of Getæ, were known to the earliest of the Greek historians. But the more inland situation of the Dacians kept them longer in obscurity, nor do we find them mentioned by any writer earlier than those of the Augustan age. It is said indeed by Suetonius,<sup>13</sup> that C. Julius Cæsar had projected an expedition against them, among those vast schemes of conquest which were cut short by his assassination; but however this be, in the reign of Augustus they first became engaged in actual hostilities with Rome; and their incursions across the Danube into the Roman territory, under the conduct of their king, Cotiso, were of sufficient importance to attract the notice of the court poets of the day,<sup>14</sup> and to confer that renown which flattery is so ready to offer upon the efforts by which they were repulsed. At a later period, when the troops which defended the frontiers were drawn off to other quarters in the civil war between Vitellius and Vespasianus, the Dacians<sup>15</sup> again crossed the Danube, and committed hostilities on the Roman territory. More recently still, Domitianus<sup>16</sup> had claimed a triumph for his victories over them; but his pretended successes were an inadequate compensation for the defeats which they were intended to revenge; those of Appius, Sabinus, and of Cornelius Fuscus, the last of whom, after having materially contributed to the elevation of the Flavian family to the throne, perished in Dacia with the greater part of his army in the reign of Domitianus. Thus, when Trajanus succeeded to the empire, he judged, in the usual spirit of ambition and national pride, that the dignity of Rome required the chastisement of the Dacians. Grounds of hostility can never, in fact, be wanting between an ambitious, civilized nation, and the barbarian tribes who border on its frontiers, and whose rude habits of plunder continually lead them to offer some real provocation;

The Dacian war.

<sup>13</sup> In Julio Cæsare, 44; and in Augusto, 8.

<sup>15</sup> Tacitus, Hist. III. 46.

<sup>14</sup> Horace, Carm. II. 20; III. 6. 8. Florus, IV. 12. Suetonius, Augusto, 21.

<sup>16</sup> Suetonius, in Domitiano, 6. Dion Cassius, LXVII. 763, edit. Leunclav.



while, on the other side, self-defence is pleaded as an excuse for conquest; and injury is seldom repelled without being also retaliated. The Dacians were commanded by a chief whom the Romans called Decebalus, and who is represented as a man of ability and courage; but no personal qualities, however brilliant, could enable a barbarian leader to resist the power of the Roman empire when steadily and skilfully directed against him. Accordingly, he was soon driven to sue for peace,<sup>17</sup> which he obtained on such conditions as were likely soon to lead to another war; for his people were obliged to surrender up their arms, to give up all deserters or fugitives who had fled to them from the Romans, to pull down their fortresses, to cede a portion of territory, and to become the dependent allies of Rome. These terms were observed as long as the impression of their defeats retained its original force; but in a very short time the Romans began to complain that they were collecting arms, and rebuilding their fortresses, and harbouring fugitives from the Roman territory; and Trajanus prepared to attack them again, glad, perhaps, that he was now furnished with a pretext, according to the usual policy of Rome, for completing the conquest of their country.

At the outset of his expedition, he indicated by his conduct that he meditated more than a temporary inroad into the enemy's territory. Hitherto the Danube had been regarded as the limit of the empire; but Trajanus proposed to create a Roman province to the north of that river, and a permanent bridge over it became a necessary work to facilitate the communication with this remote portion of his dominions. Accordingly he completed one on a scale of magnificence, if we may believe Dion Cassius, superior to that of all his other works. He tells us,<sup>18</sup> that there were twenty piers of stone, at intervals of 170 feet from each other, and that each of these was in height 150 feet above the foundations, and sixty feet wide. The arches which connected them were probably made of wood, and could thus be taken down with the greater facility, which we are told was done by the emperor Hadrianus, who took away all the upper part of the bridge, and left merely the piers standing. We believe that the exact site of this famous work has not been ascertained, nor are we aware that any researches have been made to determine it, or to learn what is the extent of the actual remains; but according to D'Anville, it was built at a spot called Ram, about four leagues above Orsova, and about a hundred miles below Belgrade.

As soon as the bridge was finished, the conquest of Dacia was speedily effected. Decebalus,<sup>19</sup> seeing all his efforts useless,

<sup>17</sup> Dion Cassius, LXVIII. 773.

<sup>18</sup> Dion Cassius, LXVIII. 777.

<sup>19</sup> LXVIII. 776.

and his palace in the hands of the enemy, killed himself; and his treasures, which he is said to have concealed under the bed of the river Sargetias, were betrayed to the Romans by one of his officers, and by turning the course of the stream, were discovered and carried off. Dacia was reduced to the form of a province, and some Roman colonies were settled in it, the principal of which was called Ulpia Trajana, and was established at Zamisegethusa, the ancient capital of the country, on one of the streams which flow from the east into the Theyss.

Final conquest of Dacia.

After the conclusion of this war, Trajanus returned to Rome, and gratified the people by rejoicings celebrated on the most magnificent scale; for, according to Dion Cassius,<sup>20</sup> the different shows that were exhibited lasted for four months, in the course of which no fewer than ten thousand gladiators are said to have fought for the amusement of the multitude.

Return of Trajanus to Rome.

It was in commemoration also of the conquest of Dacia, that the famous pillar in the forum of Trajanus was erected; although it was not completed till the seventeenth year of his reign. The height of this pillar is 128 Roman feet,<sup>21</sup> and the whole shaft is covered with bas-reliefs, representing the exploits of the emperor in both his Dacian expeditions. But the most remarkable circumstance connected with it, is the excavation of the ground, which was effected preparatory to its erection; for the inscription upon its base declares, that the hill had been cut away from the height of the pillar, to form the level space on which the forum of Trajanus was built. These great changes in the appearance of the ground on which Rome is built, should always be borne in mind when we attempt to reconcile its present condition with the descriptions of ancient writers.

His forum and pillar.

Whilst Trajanus remained at Rome, he is said<sup>22</sup> to have commenced the work of making roads or causeways through the Pomptine marshes, to have issued a new coinage, and to have founded several public libraries. But his military ardour had been influenced by his late conquests, and he was ambitious of winning triumphs over the Parthians, and other Eastern nations, as he had already been victorious over the enemies of Rome in Europe. The pretext for this new war was an alleged affront offered to the dignity of the empire by Chosroes, the king of Parthia, who had conferred the crown of Armenia, by his own authority, on a prince named Exedares, instead of allowing him to receive the diadem from the sovereign of Rome. Ever since the victories of Lucullus and Cn. Pompeius, the Romans pretended to regard Armenia as one

Dispute with Parthia concerning the investiture of the kings of Armenia.

<sup>20</sup> P. 777.

<sup>22</sup> Dion Cassius, LXVIII. 777.

<sup>21</sup> Burton, *Antiquities of Rome*, 171, et seq.

of their dependent kingdoms ; and this claim had given rise to various contests between them and the Parthians, who viewed it, on the other hand, as a kind of appanage of the crown of Parthia. The neighbourhood of the Parthians, and the unwarlike character of several of the Roman emperors, had made the Parthian influence in Armenia really predominant ; but the right of the Romans had never been relinquished, and was likely to be enforced by any ambitious prince who thirsted for the glory of eastern conquests. Accordingly, it was now insisted on by Trajanus, and preparations were made on a great scale to maintain it by force of arms. The Parthian king, unwilling to involve himself in a war, deposed Exedares, and nominated Parthamasiris, his own brother, as his successor ; at the same time sending an embassy with presents to Trajanus announcing this act, and requesting him to bestow the diadem, according to the right of investiture which he claimed as emperor of Rome, on the prince whom he had just placed on the throne. For it seems, that the right of the Romans was little more than a form, and that they only installed the sovereign whom the Parthians had previously nominated ; as in the reign of Nero, when Vologeses, king of Parthia, had seated his brother Tiridates on the throne of Armenia, it was agreed that Tiridates should go to Rome to receive his investiture at the hands of the emperor. But now Trajanus, bent upon conquest, rejected the presents brought him by the ambassadors, and replied to their communication with the characteristic haughtiness of a Roman general, saying, that the king of Parthia should manifest his friendly disposition rather by deeds than by words, and that when he should have arrived in Syria, the Romans would then do that which was fitting to be done.

The narrative of Dion Cassius becomes here only a collection of disjointed fragments, preserved by his abbreviators, so that it does not appear whether the negotiation was renewed on the arrival of Trajanus in Syria. It was at all events ineffectual ; and the Roman army advanced into Armenia, where they were met by the satraps and petty princes of the neighbouring districts, who came to make their submissions and to offer presents. Meantime, Parthamasiris had laid aside the style and title of king, and had written to request that M. Junius, the governor of Cappadocia, might be sent to him, as if he wished, through his intercession with the emperor, to obtain some favourable terms. His request was refused ; but the son of Junius was sent to him, and he was probably given to understand, that he must present himself in person before Trajanus. The emperor was now at Elegia, a town of Armenia, having as yet not experienced any opposition ; and hither Parthamasiris repaired,<sup>23</sup>

Story of Parthamasiris.



in order, as he supposed, to go through the ceremony of investiture, which he the less doubted that he should obtain, as the public humiliation thus imposed upon him seemed at least a sufficient atonement for any offence which the Romans might pretend to have received. Accordingly, when Trajanus was seated on his tribunal in the midst of his camp. Parthamasiris appeared before him, and having saluted him, took off the diadem from his own head, and laid it at the emperor's feet. When he had done this, he stood silent for a few moments, expecting that Trajanus, as a matter of course, would desire him to resume it; but when he said nothing, and the soldiers with loud shouts addressed their sovereign as "imperator," considering that the act which they had just witnessed was equivalent to the absolute surrender of Armenia to the Roman dominions, Parthamasiris started, and apprehending some attempt upon his person or liberty, turned in order to leave the camp. But when the soldiers opposed his passage, he requested a private interview with Trajanus, and went with the emperor into his tent. Their conference was unsatisfactory, and Parthamasiris left the tent in great indignation; but he was again detained by the emperor's order, and was desired, with the usual indelicacy of the Romans, to state his cause publicly in the hearing of the whole army. Coarse and insolent as was this proposal, Parthamasiris did not decline it; but standing before the emperor's tribunal, he indignantly asserted, that he was betrayed, and not conquered; that he had come freely into the Roman camp, in the confidence that when he had gone through the ceremony of homage, his right to the crown of Armenia would be instantly allowed. Trajanus, who perceived himself now strong enough to avow his injustice without scruple, replied, that Armenia belonged to the Romans, and should obey none but a Roman sovereign; that the Armenian followers of Parthamasiris must, therefore, remain with the Roman army, but that he himself and his Parthians were at liberty to depart whithersoever they thought proper. The disgraceful conclusion of this scene we learn from one of the newly discovered fragments of the works of M. Cornelius Fronto, the orator.<sup>24</sup> Parthamasiris refused to submit to this treacherous outrage, and, with a courage that heeded not his unequal condition, attempted to force his way out of the camp. In this attempt he was naturally unsuccessful, and being taken prisoner, to crown the atrocity of the conduct of Trajanus, he was put to death.

Armenia having been thus surprised rather than conquered, Trajanus left garrisons in its principal fortresses, and marching

<sup>24</sup> Principia Historiæ, Fragment. IV.  
 "Trajano, cædes Parthamasiris regis haud  
 satis excusata. Tametsi ultro ille vim,  
 cæptans, tumultu orto, merito interfectus

est, meliore, tamen Romanorum famâ impunè supplex abisset, quam jure supplicium luisset."

southwards from Elegia, arrived at Edessa. Here he was hospitably received by Abgarus, prince of that district, who now thought it his best policy to propitiate the Romans to the utmost. Some others also of the petty sovereigns who lived on the outskirts of the Parthian empire, expressed their readiness to receive his commands; and he thus made himself master of the town of Singara, and some other places in Upper Mesopotamia, without any opposition. At this point, the narrative of Dion Cassius breaks off abruptly, and the next remaining fragment of his work belongs to a period nearly ten years later. But it is certain, from the evidence of inscriptions, that Trajanus did not gain further conquests at this time; and we may suppose, that after his occupation of Armenia he had no longer any pretence of hostility against the king of Parthia, and that, as that monarch was content to abandon Armenia to him, he led back his army, and returned to Rome.

The events which we have just recorded seem to have taken place about the tenth year of the reign of Trajanus; and it was probably for his triumph over Parthamasiris that he assumed the title of "imperator" for the sixth time. In the inscription on the famous bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara,<sup>25</sup> which bears date the ninth year of his reign, he is styled "imperator" for the fifth time; and Dion Cassius tells us, that he received that title again from the acclamations of his soldiers, when they beheld the unfortunate Parthamasiris surrendering to him his crown. But in the inscription on the pillar erected in the middle of his forum at Rome, and which is dated in the seventeenth year of his reign, he is described as imperator only for the sixth time;<sup>26</sup> so that a decisive proof is thus obtained, that during seven years he gained no signal victories; and as his wars were nothing but a succession of victories, we may fairly conclude, that from the tenth to the seventeenth year of his reign he remained at peace, and employed himself in the civil administration of his empire. Between the completion of his pillar and his death, the rapidity of his conquests is marked by the accumulation of his titles of imperator; for on the column, as we have seen, he is described only as imperator for the sixth time, but inscriptions of a date two years later,<sup>27</sup> in the nineteenth year of his reign, call him imperator for the eleventh time. We shall avail ourselves then of this peaceful period of nearly seven years, the events of which we are unable to relate chronologically, from the total want of all regular annals of this reign, to offer a gen-

<sup>25</sup> Gruter, Corpus. Inscription. I. 162.

<sup>26</sup> Gruter, Corpus. Inscription. I. 247.  
Burton's Antiquities of Rome, 172.

<sup>27</sup> Gruter, I. 248, and an inscription on

a bridge over the river Metaurus, on the old Flaminian road between Furlo and Fossombrone, which we copied on the spot in 1825.

eral view of the state of the empire, and of the character of the emperor's government.

Adopting the same arrangement which we formerly pursued in our life of Augustus, the foreign relations of Rome will first claim our notice. And here the picture Of the external relations of Rome. which we gave of the state of affairs under Augustus will require little alteration. Some acquisitions of territory had indeed been made previous to the recent conquest of Trajanus in Dacia. Our own island, after having been first conquered in the reign of Claudius, and subsequently held with a doubtful grasp during the last years of Nero, and the civil wars which followed his death, had been finally subdued and settled by Cn. Agricola, whose merits have been transmitted to posterity, perhaps with some exaggeration, by the affection and eloquence of his son-in-law, Tacitus. In the other extremity of the empire, Jerusalem had been destroyed, after a resistance such as the Romans had seldom experienced from an enemy so unequal. Some changes had taken place also, rather in the nominal than in the real condition of countries<sup>23</sup> already in fact subject to the authority of Rome, but retaining the form of an independent government; and some barbarous tribes had in the lapse of years been more effectually subdued, or had gradually become more familiarized to the Roman dominion. But still, as in the reign of Augustus, the Parthians and Germans were the only nations whom the Romans found capable of maintaining a contest with them almost on equal terms. The Parthian power was indeed somewhat on the decline, and it was destined to receive from Trajanus severer blows than it had ever yet sustained. But the Germans were as unbroken as ever; nor had the Romans again ventured since the defeat of Varus to extend their frontier beyond the Rhine. The title of Germanicus, fondly assumed by so many emperors, was the best proof that none had fully deserved it, and that the conqueror of Germany was as yet unborn.

Nothing then remains to divert our attention from the internal state of the empire. In our life of Augustus we Its internal state. 1. Of the government. attempted to mark the easy steps by which the old constitution had been converted into a monarchy, by showing that it contained within it all the elements of despotic power, while there was enough of servility and helplessness in the people at large to make them almost welcome as a relief their exclusion from all share in the government. Our business will now be to delineate the imperial constitution in its matured state, and to

<sup>23</sup> Cappadocia, from a dependent kingdom, had been reduced to a province as early as the reign of Tiberius. Tacitus, *Annal.* II. 42. A part of Pontus which still was governed by a king of its own, shared the same fate in the reign of Nero.

Tacitus, *Hist.* III. 47; Eutropius, in *Nerone*. Rhodes, Lycia, and some other places, were in like manner made provinces by Vespasianus. Suetonius, in *Vespasian*. 8; Eutropius, in *Vespasian*.



notice some of those points in which the forms of freedom which still subsisted in the days of Augustus had been since overthrown. The government was now become an acknowledged monarchy. In the time of Augustus it was but a sort of perpetual dictatorship, bestowed by the senate and people on the most distinguished citizen of the commonwealth, as a remedy for the disorders occasioned by so many years of civil war. But the adoption first of the sons of Agrippa, and afterwards of Tib. Claudius Nero, into the Julian family, made it evident that the new state of things was designed to be perpetual; and so natural is the notion of hereditary right, that even while the monarchy was thus recent, the succession was thought to belong to the family of the actual sovereign; and in the failure of his immediate descendants, he was allowed to adopt whomsoever he thought proper, as the presumptive heir to the imperial power. On the death of Augustus, the senate, by conferring all his extraordinary prerogatives on Tiberius, decreed in fact the final extinction of the commonwealth. The temporary reason before assigned for vesting the government in the hands of a single person, was now exchanged for one of general and lasting application; the disorders of the civil wars had been long since repaired by the peaceful administration of Augustus; but it was now discovered that the empire was too vast to be governed by the senate and people, and required the vigour and unity of a monarchy; and thus, until the provinces should be dismembered, the Roman people seemed to resign for ever its old authority. The feeble attempt made by the senate to resume the government, after the murder of Caligula, did not last longer than two days; and from that time, even when the succession to the imperial power was most disputed, yet none ever proposed the restoration of the commonwealth.

We have said, that even Augustus, when he adopted Tiberius as his son, designed to make him his successor in the empire. But the throne was never considered as actually hereditary, so that the natural or adopted son ascended it by the right of his birth, whenever the death of his father had left it vacant. By the theory of the constitution, if we may apply so noble a term to the imperial government of Rome, the emperor was still intrusted by the senate with the management of the republic, and each succeeding sovereign derived his power according to law solely from their authority. It is difficult to say whether the consent of the army was legally necessary to the validity of an election, although in reality it determined the whole transaction. The new emperor was saluted as such by the soldiers, and he promised them a donative in return; and the opposition of the senate to their choice must have been necessarily fruitless. It is possible, too, that the army may have been regarded in some measure as the representative of the people, and

It was far more monarchical than in the time of Augustus.

their voices may have been esteemed the sole remnant of the popular part of the old constitution. The comitia no longer assembled for the election of magistrates after the accession of Tiberius;<sup>29</sup> and although statutes (*leges*) and decrees of the commons (*plebiscita*) are acknowledged among the sources of the Roman law, even in the time of T. Antonius and M. Aurelius, yet the votes of the tribes in enacting laws as well as in appointing magistrates had become no more than an empty form.<sup>30</sup> In their place the constitutions of the emperor were allowed to have the force of laws,<sup>31</sup> and these gradually became more frequent, as the remembrance of free institutions became in every successive generation fainter and fainter. It may be noticed also, as a mark of the more avowed monarchical character which the government assumed within a century after the death of the first emperor, that the title of *dominus*, or master, as opposed to slave, which Augustus disclaimed with indignation,<sup>32</sup> is familiarly bestowed on Trajanus by his friend Pliny, even in his private correspondence with him.

But the instrument by which the emperors had perpetrated the worst acts of their tyranny was provided by the new imperial law of treasons. Under the commonwealth, the crime of "*majestas læsa vel imminuta*" was held to extend not only to those actions which our law regards as treasonable, such as conspiring to levy war against the state, or joining the enemy in war, but to a great variety of other offences of less magnitude, such as rioting, or gross misconduct in the management of a war, or the usurpation of the state and authority of a magistrate by any private person. Nor were even words always exempted from its operation, if the story told of Claudia be deserving of credit, who was tried, during the first Punic war, for a passionate expression uttered against the people, when her carriage was stopped in the streets by the pressure of the crowd. Whilst the commonwealth lasted, however, the severity of the laws was not amongst the prevailing evils; and although many individuals who ought to have been punished were never brought to justice, no innocent man, probably, was ever a sufferer from the law of treason as it was then established. With the imperial government new maxims and a new spirit of criminal jurisprudence were introduced: the emperor was invested with all the majesty of the commonwealth, and to attempt his life,<sup>33</sup> or to levy

<sup>29</sup> We have said, "for the election of magistrates," because the comitia even in the reign of Trajanus assembled in the Campus Martius, to go through the form of nominating those persons consuls, prætors, &c., who had been previously chosen by the senate. See Heinneccius, I. Append. § 65; and Creuzer, Romisch. Antiquitat. 121.

<sup>30</sup> See Hugo, Lehrbuch der Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, 611, 612, edit. 1824.

<sup>31</sup> Gaius, Institution, I. § 5. Nec unquam dubitatum est, quin id (sc. Constitutio Principis) legis vicem obtineat.

<sup>32</sup> Suetonius, in Augusto, 53.

<sup>33</sup> Digest. XLVIII. Tit. 4. Paulus, Sentent. Recipit. Tit. 29.

war against his authority, were naturally, as in every monarchy, regarded as acts of treason. But the jealousy of Augustus, and still more of Tiberius, extended the same appellation to every thing that could be construed into disrespect to the person or dignity of the emperor. Not only were libels punishable with death,<sup>34</sup> and expressions adjudged to be libellous, which the worst despotism of modern times would never have attempted to question; but even words spoken in private society were liable to the same penalty; and it was treasonable to consult astrologers as to the fate of the emperor,<sup>35</sup> to melt down or sell a statue of an emperor who had been deified,<sup>36</sup> to take the head off from it,<sup>37</sup> to scourge a slave, or to undress, close to it, with some other things so monstrous, that if they did not rest on good contemporary testimony we should reject them as utterly incredible. The offence was proceeded against in the same spirit of tyranny by which it was defined: for persons held to be infamous,<sup>38</sup> and whose evidence was not admissible in other cases, were in these received as accusers; freedmen might impeach their patrons, and slaves their own masters; both of which acts the Romans regarded in general with the utmost horror; and persons of the highest rank, at least in the reign of Severus, might be examined by torture.<sup>39</sup> If condemned, criminals of all ranks were punished with death, and those of humble condition, by one of those atrocious distinctions characteristic of the vilest tyranny, were either thrown to wild beasts or burned alive. The property of the victim was forfeited; and if the charge extended to the act of levying war against the emperor,<sup>40</sup> the forfeiture took place even when the accused died before his trial, unless his heirs could prove his innocence.

A law so odious bred a race of informers well fitted to pander to its cruelty. Under the worst emperors they swelled accordingly into a numerous and formidable body, composed of the vilest individuals of every rank, who abused the confidence of private society to report some word or action which the imperial law of treason rendered criminal. Such a system rendered the very name of justice unpopular; and real crimes sometimes escaped with impunity, or were undeservedly pardoned at the accession of a better emperor, from the universal hatred felt towards all prosecutions,<sup>41</sup> and the indiscriminate compassion entertained for all who

<sup>34</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* IV. 34; XIV. 48.

<sup>35</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* III. 22.

<sup>36</sup> Digest, XLVIII. Tit. 4. The atrocity of the law of treason may be estimated by the nature of those acts which the lawyers thought proper to specify as exempted from its penalties. "Non contrahit crimen Majestatis qui statuas Cæsaris vetustate corruptas reficit. Nec qui lapide jactato incerto, fortuito statuam attigerit,

crimen Majestatis commisit." Digest. XLVIII. Tit. 4.

<sup>37</sup> Suetonius, in Tiberio, 58.

<sup>38</sup> Digest. ubi supra.

<sup>39</sup> Paulus, ubi supra.

<sup>40</sup> Digest. ubi supra.

<sup>41</sup> Tacitus, *Hist.* I. 77. Placuit ignoscantibus verso nomine, quod avaritia fuerat videri Majestatem; cujus tum odio etiam bonæ leges peribant.



had incurred the penalties of the laws. Nor is it amongst the least evils of a tyrannical code, that even after it has been mitigated by a virtuous sovereign, there is perpetually danger of its being again revived in all its horrors in some succeeding reign. The precedent of a bad example is far more effectual in countenancing wickedness, than that of a good one in restraining it; and thus, although Trajanus banished the informers, and suspended the operation of the law of treason, yet the race of the one soon sprang up again, and the enactments of the other remained in existence to be again called into action by a Commodus or a Caracalla.

It were unjust, however, to estimate the general character of the Roman law from the provisions of the *lex majestatis*; or to receive our impression of the political condition of the Roman people from those tragical details with which the histories of these times are chiefly filled. The imperial system had been engrafted upon a free constitution, and upon the laws of a free people; both of which it entirely overturned, wherever they interfered with its own immediate interests: but as the principles of a corrupt system will survive many partial reforms of particular institutions, so although the principles of liberty and wisdom at Rome had been crippled in many most important points in their practical application, still their existence was not extinguished, and their influence was even yet plainly perceptible. The great lawyers of the age of the Antonines passed hastily over the odious page which contained the law of treason, and delighted to fix their attention on those wise and liberal provisions which concerned the persons and properties of citizens in their dealings with one another, wherever the government did not interfere. From the excellence of the Roman law in these points arose the eminent fame, so justly earned by its professors amidst the general decline of all other studies. It was here only that the wisdom of better times was still practically useful, and might be profitably emulated; so that talents and integrity naturally turned themselves to that field which alone was open to their exertions; and when the higher duties of a statesman were inaccessible or neglected, those of a lawyer were fulfilled in an enlightened spirit which later times have been far from imitating.

Nor should it be forgotten that the imperial tyranny, which deluged Rome with blood, affected but little the condition of the provinces; and that even at Rome itself, its victims were principally chosen from the highest classes, while the mass of the community suffered from it comparatively nothing. It was, indeed, a bitter change for the patricians and the equestrian order, to have their proud and luxurious security invaded by executioners, and to be exposed every hour, at the caprice of their tyrant, to banishment or death. But to

The excellence of the Roman law in other respects.

The imperial tyranny was most felt at Rome and by the higher orders.

the plebeians, to the inhabitants of the provinces, and to the slaves, the spirit of the monarchy was certainly not more insolent and oppressive than that of the old aristocracy ; nor did the worst excesses of the Cæsars ever produce such wide-spreading misery as the triumph of the aristocratical party under Sylla. Even Cicero had regarded the grant of the "*jus Latii*," conferred by Cæsar on the inhabitants of Sicily,<sup>42</sup> as an intolerable affront to the dignity of Rome. But now the rights of Latin citizenship were enjoyed by all the inhabitants of Spain ;<sup>43</sup> while the Gauls had received the higher privilege of becoming citizens of Rome,<sup>44</sup> and were thus admissible to the highest offices in the empire. These two great countries were fast acquiring those marks of intimate union with Italy, which all the revolutions of after ages were unable to efface. Gaul, in particular, began to take a principal part in the civil wars, and entered into them more with the zeal of an integral portion of the state, than like a province contending merely for the choice of masters. When Julius Vindex revolted against Nero, his main support was in the devotion of the people of Gaul to his cause ; and their efforts were rewarded by Galba with the gift of Roman citizenship, and the reduction of a fourth part of their taxation for ever.

But although the monarchy did not increase the evils to which the greatest part of the subjects of the empire were liable, yet we must confess that it did little to remove them. That hateful pride, which made the Romans so careless of the sufferings of those whom they considered their inferiors, was an effectual bar to any attempts to ameliorate the condition of the slaves, or to check the abuses of power when exercised only against the poor and ignoble. When in the reign of Nero,<sup>45</sup> Pedanius Secundus was murdered by one of his slaves, his whole household, consisting of four hundred slaves of both sexes and of all ages, were ordered, according to ancient practice, to be put to death. The populace of Rome, whose natural humanity had not been quite extinguished by the callousness of rank and wealth, rose in tumult to resist the execution. Upon this, the case was debated in the senate, and C. Cassius, the most celebrated lawyer of his day, strongly urged the expediency of enforcing the sentence. His opinion was approved by a large majority ; and to prevent the possibility of a rescue, Nero lined the streets with troops, whilst these four hundred human beings, most of whom were undoubtedly innocent, and amongst whose number were old men, women, and children, were led to an indiscriminate butchery. So also in the reign of Tiberius, four thou-

<sup>42</sup> Epist. ad Atticum, XIV. 12. *Multa illis (Siculis) Cæsar, neque me invito : etsi Latinitas erat non ferenda ; verumtamen.*

<sup>43</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. III. 3.

<sup>44</sup> Tacitus, Hist. I. 8 ; IV. 74.

<sup>45</sup> Tacitus, Annal. XIV. 42, et seq.

sand freedmen,<sup>46</sup> mostly Jews and Egyptians, and guilty of no other crime than that of practising the religious rites of their respective countries, were expelled from Rome, and sent into Sardinia to repress the banditti of that island, a service which, from the unhealthiness of the climate, was almost equivalent to a sentence of death; "but if they perished," says Tacitus, "their loss was of no consequence." The same pride showed itself in more trifling matters, in the behaviour of the great to the humbler classes of society. The door of a wealthy and noble Roman was crowded before day-break by visitors who came to pay their court to him,<sup>47</sup> and who, after undergoing the most insolent treatment from his porter, were seldom admitted to an interview with himself, but were answered by one of his servants; or if he did condescend to see them, they bent down to the ground before him, and kissed his hand with oriental servility. Hence, a number of subordinate oppressions were practised in the provinces, and especially in the more inconsiderable towns; so that we read of a request preferred by the people of Juliopolis in Bithynia,<sup>48</sup> in the reign of Trajanus, to have a centurion resident among them to protect them from injury. The same feeling also tended to encourage the insolence of the army towards the people, wherever they were quartered. Since Marius first changed the character of the legions by filling them with citizens of the poorest classes, and still more since the civil wars of the two first Cæsars, the soldiers had learnt to regard themselves as a distinct body in the nation, to whose superior merit and importance all other citizens should pay deference. Then all who did not belong to the army were designated by the term "pagini," which soon became used contemptuously, and thus in itself afforded a proof of the undue supremacy of those who could venture to stigmatize all other members of the community. But their offensive behaviour was not confined to words; and we learn from history, no less than from the lively picture of the satirist,<sup>49</sup> that the soldiers were in the habit of using personal violence to the provincials and to the Roman citizens of humble condition; nor did the injured party dare to seek for redress, lest he should provoke the resentment of the offender's comrades.

The worst effect, however, of the imperial dominion as of that of the commonwealth, was the helplessness of mind which a cowardly policy taught it to encourage amongst the people of the provinces. It was maintained by Aristotle,<sup>50</sup> that a state could not consist of so great a number as a hundred thousand citizens; and although we may smile at the

Helplessness of the people encouraged by government.

<sup>46</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* II. 85.

<sup>47</sup> Lucian, *de Moribus Philosophorum*, XVI. p. 20, edit. 1615.

<sup>48</sup> Pliny, *Epist.* X. 81.

<sup>49</sup> St. Luke, III. 14. Juvenal, *Sat.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ethic. Nicomach.* IX. 10.



exaggeration of this doctrine, yet it was founded on the justest notions of the duties of a political society, where all should have a common interest, and should be keenly alive to the welfare of each other, and of the whole body. The Greeks, therefore, distinguished between a state and a dominion; and it was by the latter name that they characterized that vast mass of countries yoked together at the time of which we are treating under the sovereignty of Rome. The inhabitants then of the greatest part of the empire were subjects, and not citizens; and that activity and attention to public affairs which is the great virtue of a citizen, is most unwelcome to a sovereign when he sees it in his subjects. An enlightened despot, like Trajanus, is frequently desirous of promoting the good of his people, but he dreads to see them able and zealous to promote their own; not considering that wealth and security lose half their value when they are passively received from another; and that men will dwindle into children in understanding and energy, when they are obliged to depend in childlike helplessness on the protection of their rulers. It is remarkable, with what exceeding suspicion Trajanus regarded every thing like a principle of internal organization and self-dependence in the people of his empire. A destructive fire had broken out at Nicomedia in Bithynia,<sup>51</sup> and had been greatly aggravated by the apathy of the people, who looked on without attempting to extinguish it. To prevent the recurrence of such accidents, Pliny, who was then proconsul of the province, recommended the institution of a company of engineers, to consist of a hundred and fifty persons, who were to have, we may suppose, a monopoly of the business of firemen, and would know how to act with effect whenever their services were wanted. But Trajanus objected to the proposal, on the express ground, that he did not like the principle of association, as it might lead to factions. On another occasion, the people of Amisus begged to be allowed, according to their own laws,<sup>52</sup> to give their *ἐγαστοι*, or public entertainments to the poorer classes, furnished by the subscriptions of the rich. Trajanus consented, as Amisus was a free and confederate city, and was governed by its own laws; but he expressed his hope, that the entertainments might not be abused for purposes of tumult or unlawful assemblies; and he strictly forbade them in all the cities of the province which were more immediately subject to the Roman jurisdiction. In the same spirit, Pliny, in a letter to the emperor, expresses his fears lest a practice prevalent in his province, of the richer inhabitants assembling on certain joyful occasions a great number of the common people, and giving them a largess of one or two denarii a man, should grow into a means of political influence. Nor should we omit to

<sup>51</sup> Pliny, Epist. X. 42, 43.<sup>52</sup> Pliny, Epist. X. 93, 94.

mention, the constant reference made by the people of the provinces to the government, when they wished to execute any public works of ornament or utility. Sometimes pecuniary assistance is requested, at other times permission is asked to devote a part of the revenue of a corporation to such purposes, or the emperor is applied to, to send surveyors and engineers to direct the operations. It seems as if the people had in themselves no principle of activity, but were taught on every occasion to look for aid or for permission to the government. In the reign of Trajanus certainly, the government was sufficiently ready to promote any scheme of improvement that promised to be beneficial; but when other emperors succeeded, who had neither the ability nor the disposition to forward such plans, the evil of encouraging helplessness in the people became apparent, and when the provinces were neglected by their rulers, they had lost the energy to act for themselves.

We have been led insensibly to encroach upon a topic which belongs more properly to a subsequent part of this sketch. But the transition, from considering the nature of the imperial government to an inquiry into the state of the people, is so faintly marked, that it is difficult when speaking of the one to forbear all mention of the other. We now, however, propose to proceed expressly to this second division of our subject; and to illustrate the physical and moral condition of the inhabitants of the Roman empire, by some notices on each of these following points:—1st, the amount of the national wealth, its distribution, security, and the degree and manner in which it was affected by the government; 2nd, the state of literature and general knowledge; and 3rd, that of morality, in the highest sense of the term, including our duties to God as well as to man.

1. It is probable that agriculture, at least in the western provinces, had made considerable progress since the reign of Augustus. We do not mean that it was Of the state of agriculture. better understood than formerly in those countries where it had been long since practised; but that the gradual establishment of the Roman power had diffused a knowledge of it amongst people to whom it had been hitherto very imperfectly known, and from the union of so many parts of the world under one government, the natural productions of one country were introduced into another,<sup>53</sup> and a benefit was thus conferred on mankind which survived the devastations of after ages. The wealth and fertility of Gaul are spoken of in high terms;<sup>54</sup> its corn and flax were particularly noted;<sup>55</sup> and different methods of manuring the land were practised,<sup>56</sup> which argue a state of considerable civilization. Even Britain, which had been so much more recently conquered,

<sup>53</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. XXVII. 1.

<sup>54</sup> Tacitus, Hist. IV. 73, 74.

<sup>55</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. XVIII. 8, 9; XIX. 1.

<sup>56</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. XVII. 6—8.

bore marks of the benefits which it derived from its connexion with the Roman empire. There, too, the use of marl for manure was familiarly known, and the cherry had been already introduced,<sup>57</sup> a fact deserving of notice, as it shows that not only the most necessary articles of food, but fruits and vegetables, for comfort and luxury, found their way into the provinces very soon after their conquest. The whole coast of Spain is pronounced by Pliny<sup>58</sup> to be the finest country, except Italy, with which he was acquainted; and the list of towns which he has given us in Lusitania, and the northern part of Spain, marks the advances made by those provinces since the time of Strabo. We hear much, it is true, of the decay of agriculture in Italy itself, and the greater part of that country seems to have been no more than a pleasure-ground for the wealthy Romans, while their farms for profit were in the provinces; but the north of Italy must probably be excepted from this description, as its towns were more numerous and flourishing than those of the south and centre, and its inhabitants were said to retain a simpler and purer character.<sup>59</sup> It was probably owing to the increased resources of the western provinces that Rome was enabled, on one memorable occasion in the reign of Trajanus,<sup>60</sup> to send large supplies of corn to Egypt, when, owing to an extraordinary drought, the Nile had not afforded its usual salutary inundation. This peaceful triumph of Italy is celebrated by Pliny as one of the greatest glories of the age of Trajanus; and he extols the happy effects of civilization, which had now connected the most remote countries together, and had obviated the evils of an accidental scarcity in one province, by enabling it instantly to be relieved by the superfluous plenty of another.

To what extent internal commerce was carried between the different parts of the empire, it is scarcely possible to form an accurate judgment. The more general expressions of historians are of little value, because they speak comparatively rather than absolutely; and no one can doubt that the activity of trade under the emperors must have appeared exceedingly great when compared with any former period of history. As to the foreign commerce, which was mostly carried on with India, the principal articles thus imported were silks and other luxuries, for which there was a great demand among persons of the highest fortune, but they were not used by the mass of the people.

It is sufficiently clear, that a wealthy Roman could command many comforts and luxuries; but how far comforts or even necessities were within the reach of the majority

Condition of the  
people at large.

<sup>57</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* XV. 25.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* XXXVII. 13.

<sup>59</sup> Pliny, *Epist.* I. 14.

<sup>60</sup> Pliny, *Panegyric.* 30, et seq.



of the inhabitants of the empire is a much more difficult and a more important question. The place of our labourers and operative manufacturers being almost entirely supplied by slaves, we have no opportunity of comparing the price of labour with that of provision, the surest criterion of public prosperity, if the welfare of the majority be justly regarded as the welfare of the nation. But it seems probable, that the free population of the Roman empire was small in proportion to the extent of its territory; and thus, that there was little of that severe distress which visits more thickly-peopled countries, even where their moral and political institutions are far superior to those of Rome. In Italy itself, several laws were enacted to discourage celibacy, and peculiar privileges were conferred on the father of a numerous family. That these provisions were not dictated by a mere undistinguishing desire of multiplying the number of citizens, is proved not only by the general complaints which we meet with of the decay of the free population, but by the remark of Pliny that most<sup>61</sup> persons thought even one child an inconvenience; and by the number of instances in which a successor to the imperial dignity was obtained by adoption, because the emperor had no natural heir. We may suppose that the eastern provinces were in this respect similarly circumstanced, for their morals in general were sufficiently licentious, and the unnatural indifference of parents to the fate of their children appears from one<sup>62</sup> of Pliny's letters, in which he describes the foundlings in his province of Bithynia, as forming a numerous body, and states that many of them when exposed were picked up by persons who made a profit of selling them for slaves. In the western provinces, where the physical and moral character of the people was more favourable to population, their situation was that of new countries, where the inhabitants have not yet had time to multiply in proportion to the means of subsistence. We must consider, too, when calculating the comforts of the Roman people, that the climate under which they lived enabled them to dispense with many things, the want of which in the north of Europe is a sensible privation. Well-built houses, a plentiful supply of fuel, and a large quantity of substantial food, were not to them objects of the first necessity. As amongst their descendants at this day, their principal enjoyments were not to be found at home; and if public buildings and places of public amusement were more numerous and more magnificent than with us, it was only because the fewer wants of the people obliged them to a less unremitting industry, and while the stimulus of diversion was more easily procured in the amphitheatre or the colonnade, the neglected state of their individual dwellings could be endured without any sensation of wretchedness.

<sup>61</sup> Epist. IV. 15.<sup>62</sup> Epist. X. 71, 72.

Of the security of property in the Roman empire we should judge unfavourably, if we compared it with the unrivalled protection which it actually enjoys in most countries of modern Europe. Yet our ancestors, less than a century ago, would have had little reason to exult over the Romans; when Johnson might apply with justice to London the picture drawn by Juvenal of the outrages nightly committed in the streets of Rome, when highway robbery was constantly expected and often experienced by every traveller, and a still more audacious system of rapine was yet unscrupulously practised in the highlands of Scotland. Even at that period, however, we should have been surprised to hear of such acts as those noticed in one of Pliny's letters;<sup>63</sup> where he mentions the total disappearance of a distinguished individual of the equestrian order in the neighbourhood of Ocrinum, that is in the very heart of Italy, about seventy miles from Rome. No traces of his fate were to be discovered, and the same thing had happened a short time before to a citizen of Comum, when travelling homewards with a large sum of money from Rome. To these dangers of travelling must be added, at least in the provinces, the oppressions and vexations which poor and humble men often suffered from their more powerful neighbours; and for which, under most of the provincial governors, they could find no redress. Hence Columella<sup>64</sup> advises those who were purchasing estates, to make themselves first acquainted with the characters of their neighbours; and he confirms his precept by his own experience, as one of his neighbours was continually felling his trees, robbing his plantations, and carrying off his cattle.

We have spoken at some length of the Roman revenue in our survey of the empire during the reign of Augustus. To the account of it there given we have little to add, except to observe, that its amount varied largely under different emperors; that Galba for example lightened considerably the public burdens,<sup>65</sup> while Vespasianus<sup>66</sup> again imposed the taxes which had been taken off, and carried the exactions of the treasury to the highest pitch. The most fruitful sources of revenue, as far as Roman citizens were concerned, were to be found in the Julian and Papian laws, and in the legacy duty of five per cent., which, as we have seen, Trajanus considerably moderated. By the former, unmarried men between twenty and sixty,<sup>67</sup> and even married men between twenty-five and sixty if they had never had any children, were incapable of inheriting from any but their nearest relations, and the property bequeathed to them devolved upon the treasury. The provincials were subject to a land-tax

<sup>63</sup> Epist. VI. 25.

<sup>64</sup> De Re Rusticâ, I. 3.

<sup>65</sup> Suetonius, in Galba, 15.

<sup>66</sup> Suetonius, in Vespasiano, 16.

<sup>67</sup> Hugo, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, 623, et seq.

and poll-tax, and to those other impositions which we have formerly noticed when speaking of this subject. They were besides burdened with the maintenance of the Roman magistrates by whom they were governed ; and if the ordinary expenses of the proconsul or procurator were provided for by a fixed sum raised for the purpose, yet when they travelled through the province they demanded what they thought proper for the support of themselves<sup>68</sup> and their domestic establishment, from the inhabitants of the district wherein they happened to stop. Sometimes, too, the provincial cities were expected to send a deputation to Rome<sup>69</sup> every year with a loyal address to the emperor, or to welcome their proconsul on his first arrival amongst them. To this must be added the various exactions which they often suffered from the oppression of their governors ; although in the reign of Trajanus offenders of this kind were frequently brought to trial, and sometimes to punishment.

2. We have already expressed our opinion, that the merits of Roman literature, even in its most flourishing period, have been greatly overrated ; and we believe that a State of literature. review of its condition at the end of the first century of the Christian era, might tend to lessen our wonder at the ignorance which afterwards prevailed throughout Europe. Our first impression would probably be highly favourable : we meet with the names of a great many writers, whose reputation is even now eminent ; we know that learning was not only held in honour in the eastern provinces, where it had been long since cultivated, but that Gaul, and Spain, and Africa abounded with schools and orators, and that a taste for literary studies had been introduced even into Britain. The names of the most distinguished orators at Rome were familiarly known in the remotest parts of the empire, and any splendid passages in their speeches were copied out by the provincial students, and sent down to their friends at home to excite their admiration, and serve as models for their imitation. Even the Roman laws, once so cold and so disdainful of literature and the fine arts, had in some points adopted a more conciliating language ; and the profession of a Sophist<sup>70</sup> was a legal exemption from the duties of a juryman in the conventus or circuits of the provincial judges. The age of Trajanus then had greatly the advantage over that of Augustus in the more general diffusion of knowledge, while in the comparison of individual writers the eminence which Virgil and Horace attained in poetry was at least equalled by the historical fame of Tacitus. But although knowledge was more common than it had been a century before, still its range was necessarily confined ;

<sup>68</sup> Pliny, Epist. IX. 33.

<sup>69</sup> Pliny, Epist. X. 52.

<sup>70</sup> Pliny, Epist. X. 66.



nor before the invention of printing could it possibly be otherwise. Pliny expresses<sup>71</sup> his surprise at hearing that there was a bookseller's shop to be found at Lugdunum or Lyons; yet this very city had been for a long time the scene of public recitations in Greek and Latin, in which the orators of Gaul contended for the prize of eloquence. Thus, instead of the various clubs, reading-rooms, circulating libraries, and book-societies, which make so many thousands in our day acquainted with every new publication worthy of notice, it was the practice of authors at Rome to read aloud their compositions to a large audience of their friends and acquaintance; and not only poetry and orations were thus recited, but also works of history.<sup>72</sup> To attend these readings was often naturally enough considered rather an irksome civility; they who went at first reluctantly were apt to be but languid auditors; and we all know that even to those most fond of literature, it is no agreeable task to sit hour after hour the unemployed and constrained listeners alike to the eloquence or dulness, to the sense or folly of another. The weariness then of the audience was to be relieved by the selection of brilliant and forcible passages; their feelings were to be gratified rather than their understandings; and amidst the excitement of a crowded hall and an impassioned recitation, there was no room for that silent exercise of judgment and reflection which alone leads to wisdom. From this habit then of hearing books rather than reading them, it was natural that poetry and oratory should be the most popular kinds of literature; and that history, as we have observed in our notice of the Roman historians, should be tempted to assume the charms of oratory, in order to procure for itself an audience. A detail of facts cannot be remembered by being once heard; and many of the most useful inquiries or discussions in history, however valuable to the thoughtful student, are not the best calculated to win the attention of a mixed audience, when orally delivered. The scarcity of books therefore, inducing the practice of reading them aloud to many hearers, instead of reserving them for hours of solitude and undisturbed thought, may be considered as one of the chief causes of the false luxuriance of literature at Rome in the reigns of the first emperors, and of its early and complete decay. We have already noticed the unworthy ideas which the Romans entertained of its nature, and how completely they degraded it into a mere plaything of men's prosperous hours, an elegant amusement, and an embellishment of life, not a matter of serious use to individuals and to the state. Works of physical science, and much more such as tend to illustrate the useful arts, were therefore almost

<sup>71</sup> Pliny, *Epist.* IX. 11.

<sup>72</sup> Pliny, *Epist.* VII. 17; IX. 27. Compare also I. 13; VI. 15; VIII. 12.

unknown ; so also were books of travels, details of statistics, and every thing relating to political economy. Had books of this description been numerous, it would indeed have been strange if the Roman empire had afterwards relapsed into ignorance. The nations by whom it was overrun would readily have appreciated the benefits of a knowledge which daily made life more comfortable, and nations more enlightened and more prosperous ; and the advantages of cultivating the understanding would have been as obvious to men of every condition in Rome, as they are actually at the present time in England, Germany, and America. As a proof of this, we may observe, that the only two kinds of really valuable knowledge which the Romans had to communicate to their northern conquerors were both adopted by them with eagerness ; we mean their law and their religion. The Roman code found its way, or rather retained much of its authority in the kingdoms founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, and its wisdom imperceptibly influenced the law of those countries which affected most to regard it with jealousy and aversion. And the Christian religion, in like manner, survived the confusion of the fourth and fifth centuries, and continually exercised its beneficent power in insuring individual happiness, and lessening the amount of public misery. If, together with these, Rome could have offered to her conquerors an enlarged knowledge of nature and of the useful arts, and clear views of the principles of political economy, and the higher science of legislation in general, we need not doubt that they would have accepted these gifts also, and that thus the corruption to which her law and religion were exposed, would have been in a great measure obviated. For it is a most important truth, and one which requires at this day to be most earnestly enforced, that it is by the study of facts, whether relating to nature or to man, and not by any pretended cultivation of the mind by poetry, oratory, and moral or critical dissertations, that the understandings of mankind in general will be most improved, and their views of things rendered most accurate. And the reason of this is, that every man has a fondness for knowledge of some kind ; and by acquainting himself with those facts or truths which are most suited to his taste, he finds himself gaining something, the value of which he can appreciate, and in the pursuit of which, therefore, all his natural faculties will be best developed. From the mass of varied knowledge thus possessed by the several members of the community, arises the great characteristic of a really enlightened age, a sound and sensible judgment ; a quality which can only be formed by the habit of regarding things in different lights, as they appear to intelligent men of different pursuits and in different classes of society, and by thus correcting the limited notions to which the greatest minds are liable, when left to in-

dulge without a corrective in their own peculiar train of opinions. Want of judgment, therefore, is the prevailing defect in all periods of imperfect civilization, and in those wherein the showy branches of literature have been forced by patronage, while the more beneficial parts of knowledge have been neglected. Nor is it to the purpose to say, that the study of facts is of no benefit, unless we form from them some general conclusions. The disease of the human mind is impatiently to anticipate conclusions, so little danger is there that it will be slow in deducing them when it is once in possession of premises from which they may justly be derived. But, on the other hand, wherever words and striking images are mainly studied, as was the case in ancient Rome, man's natural indolence is encouraged, and he proceeds at once to reason without taking the trouble of providing himself with the necessary materials. Eloquence, indeed, and great natural ability may, in the most favourable instances, disguise to the vulgar the shallowness which lurks beneath them; but with the mass of mankind this system is altogether fatal. Learning, in the only shape in which it presents itself to their eyes, is to them utterly useless; they have no desire to pursue it, and if they had such, their pursuit would be fruitless. They remain therefore in their natural ignorance; not partaking in the pretended cultivation of their age, and feeling no deprivation when the ill-rooted literature which was the mere amusement of the great and wealthy, is swept away by the first considerable revolution in the state of society.

The decay of learning, then, which we are called to account for, is of all things the most readily explained. Unsubstantial as it was, it would have worn out of itself, as it did at Constantino-ple, even if no external violence had overwhelmed it. Facts, indeed, whether physical or moral, are a food which will not only preserve the mind in vigour, but increasing in number with every successive century, furnish it with the means of an almost infinite progress. But the changes on words and sentiments are soon capable of being exhausted; the earliest writers seize the best and happiest combinations, and nothing is left for their successors but imitation or necessary inferiority. Poetry had fallen sufficiently low in the hands of Silius Italicus, and history in those of Appian and Dion Cassius; the Romans themselves in the reign of Trajanus acknowledged their inferiority to their ancestors in oratory, and in a few centuries more the vessel was drained out to the dregs. The great excellence of Tacitus is a mere individual instance, and we might as well ask, why Rome had produced no historian of equal merit before him, as why she produced none such after him. One other great man had died only a few years before the accession of Trajanus, whose example, had it been imitated, might have produced a great revolution in the intellec-



tual state of the Roman empire. We speak of the elder Pliny, the natural historian. The particulars of his life and death, recorded by his nephew, no less than the contents of his own work, display a thirst after real knowledge, and an active spirit in searching for it by a personal study of the great book of nature, which rose far above the false views and the literary indolence of his contemporaries. But he was a splendid exception to the spirit of his age, and there arose none to tread in his steps. Posterity were contented to read his writings, rather than improve upon them by imitating his example; and his authority continued to be quoted with reverence on all points of natural history, even down to a period when errors, which in him were unavoidable, could no longer be repeated without disgrace.

It may be asked, however, why the example of Pliny was not followed, and why the most valuable parts of human knowledge were so unhappily neglected. In addition to the cause which we have already mentioned, namely, the scarcity of books, the practice of recitations, and the consequent discouragement of any compositions that were not lively and eloquent, there are several other circumstances which tended to produce the same effect. The natural indolence of mankind and their attachment to the old beaten track were powerful obstacles to the improvements that were most required; and if so many centuries elapsed in later times before the birth of Bacon, we need not wonder that no man of equal powers with Pliny arose at Rome between the age of Trajanus and the fall of the western empire. We must consider also the general helplessness of mind produced by such a government as that of Rome; which, while it deprived men of the noblest field for their exertions, a participation direct or indirect in the management of the affairs of the nation, did not, like some modern despotisms, encourage activity of another kind, by its patronage of manufactures and commerce. If we ask, further, why commerce did not thrive of itself without the aid of the government, and why the internal trade kept up between the different parts of an empire so admirably supplied with the means of mutual intercourse was not on a scale of the greatest magnitude, the answer is to be found partly in the habits of the nations of the south of Europe, which, with some exceptions, have never been addicted to much commercial enterprise, and much more to the want of capital amongst private individuals, and the absence of a demand for distant commodities amongst the people at large, owing to their general poverty. The enormous sums lavished by the emperors and possessed by some of the nobility, or by fortunate individuals of the inferior classes, have provoked the skepticism of many modern readers, as implying a mass of wealth in the Roman empire utterly incredible. They rather show how unequally property was distributed; an evil of very long standing

at Rome, and aggravated probably by the merciless exactions of many of the emperors, who seemed literally unsatisfied so long as their subjects possessed any thing. The Indian trade, which furnished articles of luxury for the consumption of the great, was therefore in a flourishing condition; but not so that internal commerce in articles of ordinary comfort, which in most countries of modern Europe is carried on with such incessant activity. Where trade is at a low ebb, the means of communication between different countries are always defective; and hence there exists undisturbed a large amount of inactivity and ignorance, and a necessarily low state of physical science and the study of nature. So that from all these causes together, there would result that effect on the intellectual condition of the Roman empire, which we have described as so unfavourable.

From this unsatisfactory picture we turn with delight to the contemplation of a promise and of a partial beginning of moral improvement, such as Rome had never seen before. We need not dwell upon the need that there was for such a reform, except to observe, that there can be no better proof of a degraded state of morals, than the want of natural affection in parents towards their offspring; and that the practice of infanticide,<sup>73</sup> or that of exposing children soon after their birth, together with the fact that Trajanus found it necessary to provide for five thousand children at the public expense, and that Pliny imitated his example on a smaller scale in his own town of Comum, sufficiently show how greatly parents neglected their most natural duty. It is remarkable, also, that the younger Pliny, a man by no means destitute of virtue, could not only write and circulate indecent verses, but deliberately justify himself for having done so.<sup>74</sup> Yet, with all this, the writings of Epictetus and M. Aurelius Antonius, if we may include the latter in a review of the reign of Trajanus, present a far purer and truer morality than the Romans had yet been acquainted with from any heathen pen. The providence of God, the gratitude which we owe Him for all his gifts, and the duty of submission to his will, are prominently brought forward; while the duties of man to man, the claims which our neighbours have upon our constant exertions to do them service, and the excellence of abstaining from revenge or uncharitable feelings, are enforced with far greater earnestness than in the writings of the older philosophers. We cannot, indeed, refuse to admire the noble effort of the stoic philosophy to release

Of the moral state  
of the empire.

Of the stoic  
philosophy.

Its excellencies.

<sup>73</sup> Is not the prevalence of infanticide among the Romans indicated by the observation which Tacitus makes concerning the Jews? Hist. V. 5,—“Augendæ multitudini consulitur. Nam necare quam ex agnatis, nefas.” And, again, he

says the same thing of the Germans. German. 19,—“Numerum liberorum finire, aut quemquam ex agnatis necare, flagitium habetur.

<sup>74</sup> Epist. IV. 14; V. 3.

mankind from the pressure of physical evil, and to direct their minds with undivided affection to the pursuit of moral good. When the prospect beyond the grave was all darkness, the apparently confused scene of human life could not but perplex the best and wisest; sickness, loss of friends, poverty, slavery, or an untimely death, might visit him who had laboured most steadily in the practice of virtue; and even Aristotle himself<sup>75</sup> is forced with his own hands to destroy the theory of happiness which he had so elaborately formed, by the confession that the purest virtue might be so assailed with external evils that it could only preserve its possessor from absolute misery. The stoics assumed a bolder language, and strove with admirable firmness to convince reluctant nature of its truth. Happiness, as they taught, was neither unattainable by man, nor dependent on external circumstances; the providence of God had not,<sup>76</sup> according to the vulgar complaint, scattered good and evil indiscriminately upon the virtuous and the wicked; the gifts and deprivations of fortune were neither good nor evil; and all that was really good was virtue, all that was really bad was vice, which were respectively chosen by men at their own will, and so chosen that the distribution of happiness and misery to each was in exact proportion to his own deservings. But as it was not possible to attain to this estimate of external things without the most severe discipline, the stoics taught their disciples to desire nothing at all,<sup>77</sup> till they had so changed their nature as to desire nothing but what was really good. In the same way they inculcated an absence of all feelings, in order to avoid subjecting ourselves to any other power than that of reason. When our friends were in distress,<sup>78</sup> we might appear outwardly to sympathize with their sorrow, but we were by no means to grieve with them in heart; a parent should not be roused to punish his son,<sup>79</sup> for it was better that the son should turn out ill, than that the father should be diverted from the care of his own mind by his interest for another. Death was to be regarded as the common lot of all,<sup>80</sup> and the frailty of our nature should accustom us to view it without surprise and alarm. In itself it must be an extinction of being,<sup>81</sup> or a translation to another state, still equally under the government of a wise and good Providence; it could not then be justly an object of fear, and our only care should be to wait for its coming without anxiety, and to improve the time allotted to us before its arrival, whether it were but a day or half a century.

Such were the doctrines of the stoic philosophers of the age of

<sup>75</sup> Ethic. Nicomach. I. 10, \* Ἀθλῖος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' οὐδ' εὐδαίμων, οὐδ' μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πριαμικαὶς τύχαις περιπέσῃ.

<sup>76</sup> Epictetus, Enchiridion, 38.

<sup>77</sup> Epictetus, Enchiridion, 7.

<sup>78</sup> Epictetus, Enchiridion, 22.

<sup>79</sup> Epictetus, Enchiridion, 16.

<sup>80</sup> M. Antoninus, III. IV.

<sup>81</sup> M. Antoninus, VII.



its imperfections.

Trajanus ; and assuredly it must be a strange blindness or uncharitableness that can refuse to admire them. He can entertain but unworthy notions of the wisdom of God, who is afraid lest the wisdom of man should rival it. The stoic philosophy was unfitted for the weakness of human nature ; its contempt of physical evil was revolting to the common sense of mankind, and was absolutely unattainable by persons of delicate bodily constitutions ; and thus, generally speaking, by one half of the human race, and particularly by that sex which under a wiser discipline has been found capable of attaining to such high excellence. Above all, it could not represent God to man under those peculiar characters, in which every affection and faculty of our nature finds its proper object and guide. There are many passages in the works of Epictetus and M. Antonius, in which his general providence and our duties towards Him are forcibly declared ; still He seems to be at the most no more than a part of their system, and that neither the most striking, nor the most fully developed. But in order to make us like Him, it was necessary that in all our views of life, in our motives, in our hopes, and in our affections, God should be all in all ; that He should be represented to us, not as He is in Himself, but as He stands related to us,—as our Father, and our Saviour, and the Author of all our goodness ; in those characters, in short, under which the otherwise incomprehensible Deity had so revealed himself as to be known and loved, not only by the strongest and wisest of his creatures, but also by the weak and the ignorant.

One great defect in the ancient systems of philosophy was their want of authority. It was opinion opposed to opinion, and thus the disputes of the several sects seemed incapable of ever arriving at a decision. Plain men, therefore, were bewildered by the conflicting pretensions of their teachers, when they turned to seek some relief from the utter folly and worthlessness of the popular religion. So that a large portion of mankind were likely to adopt the advice of Lucian,<sup>82</sup> to regard with contempt all the high discussions of the philosophers relating to the end and principle of our being, and to think only of the present, bestowing serious thoughts upon nothing, and endeavouring to pass through life laughingly. Something, too, must be ascribed not only to the discordant opinions of the philosophers, but to their reputed dishonesty, and the suspicion which attached to them of turning morality into a trade. Their temptations were strong, and such as we have seen even the teachers of Christianity unable often to resist. In an age of ignorance, just made conscious of its own deficiencies, any moral and intellectual superiority is regarded with veneration ; and when the sophists professed to teach men the

<sup>82</sup> *Necyomanteia*, 166.

true business of life, they found many who were eager to listen to them. Then followed an aggravation of the evils of popular preaching under another name:

The sophists.

the sophists aspired to be orators as well as moralists; and their success would depend as much on their eloquence and impressive delivery, as on the soundness of their doctrines. In the eastern part of the empire their ascendancy was great; and if the story of Philostratus be true,<sup>83</sup> the philosophers in Egypt formed as considerable a body, and, during the stay of Vespasianus at Alexandria, claimed the right of advising princes as boldly as the Romish clergy of a later period have done. With these means of influence, and the consequent temptation to abuse it, the sophists were without that organization and discipline, which in the Christian church preserved the purity, or checked the excesses of individual teachers; and not being responsible to any one for their conduct, they were less scrupulous in avoiding censure. The same want of organization prevented them from acting in concert in the several parts of the empire, and from directing their attention on a regular system to all classes of the community from the highest to the lowest. The sophists were no missionaries, and poor or remote districts, which could tempt neither their cupidity nor their ambition, derived little advantage from their knowledge.

Under these circumstances, the Christian religion had grown with surprising rapidity, and must have produced effects on the character and happiness of individuals, far greater than the common details of history will allow us to estimate. If our sole information were derived from Pliny's famous "Letter," we must yet be struck with the first instance in Roman history of a society for the encouragement of the highest virtues, those of piety, integrity, and purity, and embracing persons of both sexes and of all conditions. Such a project was, indeed, a complete remedy for the prevailing faults of the times; it promised not only to *teach* goodness, but actively to disseminate it; and to do away those degrading distinctions between slaves and freemen, and even between men and women, which had so limited the views of the philosophers in their plans for the improvement of mankind. Of all subjects for history none would be so profitable as the fortunes of the Christian society; to trace the various causes which impeded or corrupted its operations, and to bring at the same time fully into view, that vast amount of good which its inherent excellence enabled it still to effect, amidst all external obstacles and internal corruptions. We think that its friends have not rightly understood the several elements which have led to its partial failure, while we are certain that its enemies can

<sup>83</sup> In vitâ Apollonii Tyanei, V. 27, et seq.

never appreciate its benefits. But we must not enter upon this most inviting field at present; and from the long, but very imperfect survey which we have attempted to give of the state of the empire, we must at last return to the history of Trajanus, and hasten to conclude this memoir, after we have briefly noticed the character of his individual government, and his expedition into the East.

The highest spirit of a sovereign is to labour to bring his government, in every point of view, as nearly as possible to a state of absolute perfection; his next highest praise is to administer the system which he finds established, with the greatest purity and liberality. This glory was certainly deserved by Trajanus; and although he never thought of amending some of the greatest evils of the times, yet, as far as his people had suffered from the direct tyranny and wastefulness of former governments, his reign was a complete relief; and we can easily account for the warm affection with which his memory was so long regarded in after-ages. He pleased the Romans by observing many of the forms of a free constitution; nor ought we to suspect that in so doing he was actuated by policy only, for he was quite capable of feeling the superior dignity of the magistrate of a free people to that of a tyrant; and he most probably spoke from his heart, when on presenting the sword to the præfect of the prætorian guards, he desired him to use that weapon in his service so long as he governed well, but to turn it against him if ever he should abuse his power.<sup>84</sup> There is the same spirit observable in his conduct during his third consulship: as soon as he had been elected, he walked up to the chair of the consul who presided at the comitia, and whilst he stood before it, the consul, without rising from his seat,<sup>85</sup> administered to him the usual consular oath, that he would discharge his office faithfully. And when his consulship had expired, he again took an oath,<sup>86</sup> that he had done nothing, during the time that he had held it, which was contrary to law. These professions of regard to the welfare of his people were well verified by his actions. His suppression of the informers; his discouraging prosecutions under the "leges majestatis;" his relaxation of the tax on inheritances; and the impartiality with which he suffered the law to take its course against his own procurators, when they were guilty of any abuse of power, were all real proofs of his sincerity; and they were not belied by any subsequent measures at a later period of his reign. The causes which were brought before himself immediately, he tried with fairness and attention;<sup>87</sup> and it was on an occasion of this kind, when Eurythmus, one of his

<sup>84</sup> Dion Cassius, LXVIII. 778. Sex. Aur. Victor. in Trajano.

<sup>86</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. 65.

<sup>87</sup> Pliny, Epist. VI. 31.

<sup>85</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. 64.



freedmen and procurators, was implicated in a charge of tampering with a will, and the prosecutors seemed reluctant to press their accusation against a person so connected with the emperor, that he observed to them, "Eurythmus is not a Polycletus," (one of the most powerful of Nero's freedmen and favourites,) "nor am I a Nero." In his care of the provinces, and in his answers to the questions to him by the younger Pliny, when proconsul of Bithynia, he manifested a love of justice, an attention to the comforts of the people, and a minute knowledge of the details of the administration, which are most highly creditable to him. It is mentioned, too, that he was very careful in noticing the good conduct of the officers employed in the provinces;<sup>88</sup> and considered the testimonials of regard given by a province to its governor, as affording him a just title to higher distinctions at Rome. The materials for the history of this reign are, indeed, so scanty, that we know scarcely any thing of the lives and characters of the men who were most distinguished under it, nor can we enliven our narrative with many of those biographical sketches, which, by bringing out individuals in a clear and strong light, illustrate most happily the general picture of the age. But C. Plinius Secundus, whom Trajanus made proconsul of Bithynia, affords one memorable exception; and we gladly seize this opportunity to bestow some particular notice on one of the most distinguished persons who lived in these times.

C. Plinius Cæcilius Secundus was born at or near Comum, about the sixth year of the reign of Nero, or A. D.

*Pliny the younger.*

61. His mother was a sister of C. Plinius, the natural historian; and as he lost his father at an early period, he removed with her to the house of his uncle, with whom he resided for some years, and was adopted by him, and, consequently, assumed his name in addition to his parental one, Cæcilius. He appears to have been of a delicate constitution, and even in his youth to have possessed little personal activity and enterprise; for at the time of the famous eruption of Vesuvius, when he was between seventeen and eighteen, he continued his studies at home, and allowed his uncle to set out to the mountain without him. In literature, however, he made considerable progress, according to the estimate of those times; he composed a Greek tragedy when he was only fourteen,<sup>89</sup> and wrote Latin verses on several occasions throughout his life; he attended the lectures of Quintilianus,<sup>90</sup> and some other eminent rhetoricians, and assiduously cultivated his style as an elegant writer and an orator. In this latter capacity he acquired great credit, and to this cause he was probably indebted for his political advancement. He went through the whole succession of public offices from that of quæstor to the

<sup>88</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. 70.

<sup>89</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. VII. 4.

<sup>90</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. II. 14.

high dignities of consul and augur, and was so esteemed by Trajanus as to be selected by him for the government of Bithynia, because there were many abuses in that province, which required a man of ability and integrity to remove them.<sup>91</sup> The trust so honourably committed to him he seems to have discharged with great fidelity; and the attention to every branch of his duties, which his letters to Trajanus display, is peculiarly praiseworthy in a man of sedentary habits, and accustomed to the enjoyments of his villas, and the stimulants of literary glory at Rome. His character as a husband, a master, and a friend, was affectionate, kind, and generous; he displayed also a noble liberality towards his native town, Comum, by forming a public library there, and devoting a yearly sum of 300,000 sesterces for ever to the maintenance of children born of free parents who were citizens of Comum. A man like Plinius, of considerable talents and learning, possessed of great wealth, and of an amiable and generous disposition, was sure to meet with many friends, and with still more who would gratify his vanity by their praises and apparent admiration of his abilities. But as a writer he has done nothing to entitle him to a very high place in the judgment of posterity. His panegyric of Trajanus belongs to a class of compositions the whole object of which was to produce a striking effect, and it must not aspire to any greater reward. It is ingenious and eloquent, but by its very nature it gives no room for the exercise of the highest faculties of the mind, nor will its readers derive from it any more substantial benefit than the pleasure which a mere elegant composition can afford. His letters are valuable to us, as all original letters of other times must be, because they necessarily throw much light on the period at which they were written. But many of them are ridiculously studied, and leave the impression so fatal to our interest in the perusal of such compositions, that they were written for the express purpose of publication. In short, the works of Plinius, compared with the reputation he enjoyed among his contemporaries, seem to us greatly to confirm the view which we have taken of the inferiority of the literature of this period, and of the unworthy notions which were entertained of its proper excellence.

It was in the seventeenth year of the reign of Trajanus, after a peaceful period of seven or eight years, that war again broke out in the East, and the Roman and the Parthian empires became involved in direct hostilities with each other. We are neither acquainted with the causes of the quarrel, nor with the precise period of its commencement; but we are merely told, that the chief operations of the first campaign consisted in the capture of Nisibis and Batnæ,<sup>92</sup> towns of Meso-

The eastern expedition of Trajanus.

<sup>91</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. X. 41.

<sup>92</sup> Dion Cassius, LXVIII. 781.

potamia, and that for these successes, the senate bestowed on the emperor the title of Parthicus. Nisibis is a name which often occurs in the history of the subsequent wars between Rome and Persia; and Batnæ was a Macedonian colony,<sup>93</sup> and the seat of a celebrated fair, held annually in the month of September, to which there was a general resort of merchants for the purchase of commodities of India, China, and other parts of the East. On the approach of winter, Trajanus returned to Antioch, and during his stay in that city it was visited by a most fatal earthquake, which lasted for several days, and destroyed a vast multitude of persons of every condition; Trajanus himself, it is said, escaping with difficulty from the ruin of the house in which he was residing.<sup>94</sup> The next campaign presents us with a series of rapid and short-lived conquests, such as the East has often witnessed. It appears that the moment was happily chosen, for the Parthian monarchy was torn by intestine contests, and was unable to offer any resistance, so that the advance of the Roman troops was a triumphant progress, and they crossed the Tigris, overran Adiabene, were gratified by visiting Babylon as conquerors, and finally took Ctesiphon, the capital of the Parthian empire. Trajanus, elated with the successes, and emulating the glory of Alexander while he traversed the countries which had been the scene of his exploits, descended the Tigris to its mouth, to behold the Persian Gulf; and it is said, that seeing there a vessel ready to sail for India, he exclaimed that if he were a younger man he would carry his arms against the Indians. But on his return from the sea coast of Babylon, he learned how sudden are the vicissitudes of Asiatic warfare. While he had been dreaming of the invasion of India, his conquests of the preceding year were vanishing from his grasp. As soon as the immediate terror of his army was withdrawn, the countries which he had overrun shook off the yoke, and Nisibis, amongst other places, either drove out or reduced the Roman garrison, and recovered its independence. Nor were the efforts of Trajanus as successful as they had been in the preceding summer. Nisibis, indeed, was retaken, and the emperor enjoyed the empty glory of giving away the crown of Parthia to a prince whom Dion Cassius calls Parthamaspates, and whose reign was likely to last no longer than whilst the Romans were at hand to protect him. But Maximus, a man of consular rank, on whom Trajanus had bestowed the command of a separate army, was defeated and slain in Mesopotamia; and Trajanus himself closed the campaign with disgrace, after having lost a great number of men in a fruitless siege of Hatra,<sup>95</sup> a small town of Mesopotamia, standing in the midst of a desert, and protected

<sup>93</sup> Ammian. Marcel. XIV. 7, edit. Vales.

<sup>95</sup> See Ammian. Marcel. XXV. 301.

<sup>94</sup> Dion Cassius, ubi supra.



by the utter barrenness of the country around it, and the scarcity of fresh water. At the end of the season, the Romans fell back into Syria, with the hope of renewing their invasion of Mesopotamia in the following spring ; but Trajanus was seized with a lingering illness, which obliged him to resign all thoughts of taking the command in person ; and he wished, therefore, to return himself to Rome, leaving the army to the care of Ælius Hadrianus, a native of the Spanish town of Italica, in which he had himself been born, and who had married his niece. As he had no children, the state of his health excited great anxiety as to the person whom he would adopt as his successor, and his wife Plotina is said to have used all her influence in favour of Hadrianus ; but it was generally believed that she could never persuade her husband to adopt him, and that the instrument which she produced, and sent to Hadrianus at Antioch immediately before the death of Trajanus, was in reality a forgery of her own. It was known, at least, that she was present with the emperor when he died, and that she took care that no particulars of his illness should transpire, but such as she chose herself to circulate. Trajanus died at Selinus in Cilicia,<sup>96</sup> in the month of August, A.D. 117, after a reign of nineteen years, and a little more than six months.


In addition to what we have said of his public character, we may add, that he was an affectionate husband and brother ; and that the cordiality which subsisted between his wife Plotina and his sister Mariana<sup>97</sup> was thought to reflect honour not only on themselves but on him. It is said by Sex. Victor, that he was addicted to intemperance in drinking ; and the circumstance of his being dropsical in his last illness agrees with this imputation. But as a sovereign, his popularity during his lifetime was equalled by the regard entertained for his memory by posterity ; and his claim to the title of Optimus, which the senate solemnly bestowed on him, was confirmed by the voice of succeeding times ; inasmuch as for two hundred years after his death the senate,<sup>98</sup> in pouring forth their prayers for the happiness of a new emperor, were accustomed to wish that he might surpass the prosperity of Augustus and the goodness of Trajanus.

<sup>96</sup> Dion Cassius, LXVIII. 786.

<sup>67</sup> Eutropius, in Trajano, VIII.

<sup>97</sup> Pliny, Panegyric. 83, 84.











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